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"Knowledge	is	like	a	candle.	Even	as	it	lights	a	new	candle,	the	strength	of	the	original	
flame	is	not	diminished."	-	Thomas	Jefferson			
CHAPTER	1.		 INTRODUCTION.	FRAMING	A	NEW	
METHOLODOGICAL	APPROACH	TO	INTELLECTUAL	
PROPERTY.			Since	the	first	synthesized	drug	chloral	hydrate	in	1869,	our	world	has	experienced	a	fast	growing	of	drugs	to	prevent,	cure	and	treat	diseases.	We	live	today	in	a	world	of	drugs.	Drugs	for	pain,	drugs	for	disease,	drugs	for	allergies,	drugs	for	pleasure,	drugs	for	mental	health	and	even	drugs	for	sex,		sadness	and	unhappiness.	In	order	to	treat	symptoms	and	diseases,	conventional	medicine	is	mostly	based	on	radiation,	surgery	and	 sophisticated	 drugs	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 designed	 or	 synthesized	 in	 the	laboratory	or	purified	from	nature.			Conventional	medicine	is	also	named	allopathic	medicine.	This	term	was	first	coined	by	 Dr.	 Samuel	 Hahnemann	 in	 the	 late	 18th	 century.	 It	 derives	 from	 the	Greek	“allo”	meaning	 “other”	 and	 is	 based	 on	 the	 theory	 that	 symptoms	 should	 be	treated	by	substances	that	suppress	symptoms.	Other	than	drugs	to	combat,	prevent	or	cure	symptoms,	pharmaceutical	industry	is	also	focused	on	developing	diagnostic	tools	which	can	reveal	the	presence	of	a	disease	even	before	the	patient	experiences	symptoms.	These	diagnostics	tools	can	be	lifesaving	and	thus	have	an	extraordinary	value.			Leaving	 apart	 the	 controversies	 between	 conventional	 medicine	 and	 the	 so-called	
homeopathic	medicine,	pharmaceutical	drugs	play	an	important	role	 in	the	progress	of	human	beings	by	increasing	their	life	expectancy	and	health	as	long	as	improving	their	lives.	Thanks	to	the	development	of	new	drugs,	people	are	now	free	from	many	distresses	and	diseases	affecting	our	ancestors	in	the	recent	past.	In	this	sense,	if	we	adopt	 the	 definition	 of	 health	 contained	 in	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	World	 Health	 Organization	 (WHO),	 where	 health	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 "a	 state	 of	
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complete	 physical,	 mental	 and	 social	 well-being	 and	 not	 merely	 the	 absence	 of	disease	or	infirmity”,	we	may	conclude	that	the	access	to	drugs	becomes	fundamental	to	 enjoy	 healthy	 lives	 and	 it	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 right	 to	 the	 highest	 attainable	standard	of	health	("the	right	to	health").			The	right	 to	health	 first	emerged	as	a	 social	 right	 in	 the	World	Health	Organization	(WHO)	Constitution	(1946)	and	in	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(1948).	The	 binding	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	 Social,	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	(ICESCR)	 of	 1966	 details	 the	 progressive	 realization	 of	 the	 right	 to	 health	 through	four	 concrete	 steps,	 being	 the	 access	 to	 medicines	 (health	 facilities,	 goods	 and	services)	 between	 them.	 Accessibility	 implies	 also	 economic	 accessibility	(affordability)	 based	on	 the	principle	 of	 equity:	 health	 facilities,	 goods	 and	 services	must	 be	 affordable	 for	 all	 (Authoritative	 General	 Comment	 14	 Committee	 of	Economic,	 Social,	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	 2000).	 Access	 to	 medicines	 is,	 therefore,	indispensable	for	ensuring	freedom	of	human	beings	in	the	sense	of	freedom	as	living	a	life	in	dignity.		The	development	of	new	and	innovative	drugs	and	the	legal	framework,	under	which	this	innovative	process	is	carried	out,	has	become	a	complex	and	expensive	one.	From	the	 first	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 which	 were	 spin-offs	 from	 the	 textiles	 and	synthetic	dye	 industry	and	which	owe	much	to	the	rich	source	of	organic	chemicals	derived	 from	 the	distillation	of	 coal,	we	have	passed	 to	 the	 current	pharmaceutical	companies.	Current	pharmaceutical	companies	have	become	important	transnational	companies	 interacting	 in	a	business	market	which	 is	worth	–US$	1	 trillion	a	year,	a	figure	expected	to	rise	to	US$	1,3	trillion	by	2018.	These	companies	stand	for	strong	international	 monopoly	 rights	 (patents	 and	 other	 exclusive	 rights)	 in	 order	 to	eventually	 recoup	 the	 costly	 investments	 on	 Research	 and	 Development	 (R&D)	 of	new	pharmaceuticals.	Temporary	monopoly	rights	are	said	to	constitute	a	necessary	incentive	 and	 a	 fair	 reward	 to	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	development	of	new	drugs	and	processes	which	benefit	society	in	what	it	is	known	as	a	 social	 contract	 between	 society	 and	 innovators	 i.e.,	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	(IPRs)	are	instrumental	rights	aimed	at	pursuing	certain	social	functions.		
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Notwithstanding	 this,	 pharmaceutical	 business	 dynamics	 and	 the	 current	international	market	driven	regime	protecting	their	monopoly	rights	may	hinder	the	access	(affordability)	to	new	drugs	for	millions	of	people,	thus	threatening	their	right	to	 health.	 In	 accordance	 with	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 right	 of	
everyone	 to	 the	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 highest	 attainable	 standard	 of	 physical	 and	mental	
health	 (2011),	 one	 third	 of	 the	 world’s	 population	 lacks	 such	 access;	 100	 million	people	fall	into	poverty	actually	because	of	high	health-care	costs	and;	only	5,2	of	the	15	million	persons	living	with	HIV	receive	antiretroviral	treatment.	According	to	the	recently	published	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	High-Level	Panel	on	Access	to	Medicines	of	September	2016,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	we	are	living	in	an	era	which	has	 brought	 about	 impressive	 scientific	 and	 medical	 progress,	 many	 people	 and	communities	 in	 need	 do	 not	 enjoy	 them;	 thus,	 availability,	 affordability	 and	adaptation	to	specific	settings	and	patient	categories	remain	problematic.			The	 failures	 of	 this	 global	 regime	has	mainly	 three	 dimensions;	 first,	medicines	 for	diseases	concentrated	among	the	poor	are	neglected	by	pharmaceutical	research	and	I&D	efforts	-this	phenomenon	has	come	to	be	known	as	the	10/90	gap,	alluding	to	the	claim	 that	 ‘only	 10	 per	 cent	 of	 global	 health	 research	 is	 devoted	 to	 conditions	 that	account	for	90	per	cent	of	the	global	disease	burden;	second,	existing	medicines	are	during	 their	 initial	 years	 on	 the	 market,	 priced	 vastly	 higher	 than	 their	 cost	 of	production	and;	 third,	 lack	of	 adequate	 local	health	 infrastructure	as	well	 as	health	professionals.						The	 global	 regime	 of	 IPRs	 and,	 in	 particular,	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 is	anchored	to	a	large	extent	in	the	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS)	under	the	WTO	which	entailed	a	new	and	unprecedented	era	of	 global	 intellectual	 property	 norms.	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 provides	 developed	countries’	standards	for	the	protection	of	IPRs	and	it	encompasses	an	innovative	and	effective	mechanism	for	the	fulfilment	and	enforceability	of	its	norms.	This	has	had	an	important	 impact	 in	many	 countries;	 especially	 if	we	 take	 into	 account	 that	 before	TRIPS	more	 than	50	countries	did	not	provide	patent	protection	on	pharmaceutical	products.	 In	this	sense,	TRIPS	together	with	the	growing	income	inequalities	during	the	 last	 decades	 –between	 countries	 and	 between	 individuals	 within	 the	 same	
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country-,	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 national	 governments’	 room	 to	 implement	 public	health	policies1	partly	explain	the	lack	of	access	to	medicines	by	a	significant	volume	of	the	world	population.	As	it	is	observed	in	the	above	mentioned	Special	Rapporteur	(2011);	 TRIPS	 and	 the	 so-called	 TRIPS-plus	 constitute	 an	 impediment	 to	 greater	access	 to	medicines	 the	high	standards	of	protection	of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights	(IPRs)	implemented	worldwide.			Furthermore,	the	creation	of	WTO	and	the	enactment	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	is	not	an	independent	and	autonomous	reality	which	functions	following	its	own	founding	principles	and	logic	but	it	is	part	of	a	wider	process	aimed	at	restructuring	the	global	economy	 under	 neoliberal	 parameters	 and	 where	 the	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 –by	means	 between	 others	 of	 global	 and	 stronger	 protection	 of	 property	 and	 the	weakening	of	distributive	policies	of	nation	states-	takes	precedence	over	any	other	concern.	The	 recipe	of	privatization,	 commodification	and	 liberalization	has	deepen	social	exclusion,	increased	inequality	and	unequal	power	relations,	and	it	has	eroded	the	 state-sponsored	 commons2	 by	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 enclosures	 as	those	related	to	knowledge	and	intangibles.			Interestingly,	the	implementation	of	this	neoliberal	agenda	has	run	in	parallel	to	the	“evolution”	 of	 the	 individual’s	 psyche	 observed	 by	 the	 professor	 Byung-Chul	 Han3	towards	a	society	composed	of	narcissistic	and	self-motivated	individuals	who	under	the	 promise	 of	 self-realization,	 seek	 the	 success	 within	 a	 society	 of	 (productive)	
performance.	This	psychological	perception	which	 is	based	on	a	 fake	belief	of	being	free	-not	subject	to	anything-	and	being	capable	of	succeeding,	conceals	the	fact	that	the	 narcissistic	 individual,	 this	 homo	oeconomicus	 exploits	 himself	 in	 a	much	more	effective	way	than	any	other	external	authority	could.	Hence,	each	of	us	and	our	self-perception	and	the	perception	of	others	would	permit	the	triumphant	emergence	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	which	makes	the	rules	of	play	without	constraints.																																																									
1 This gradual shrinking of maneuverability is mainly due to:  the decline of their public revenues derived from 
reduced tariffs; its international commitments; and the international financial markets which dramatically 
constrain domestic policy space and make national governments unable to solve and compensate those 
“market failures” by putting in place public policies 
2 de Sousa Santos, B. (2005). Beyond neoliberal governance: The World Social Forum as subaltern 
cosmopolitan politics and legality. Law and globalization from below: Towards a cosmopolitan legality, 29, 29-
63. 3	Han, B. C. (2014). La agonía del Eros. Herder Editorial.	
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The	above	analysis	about	the	linkage	of	TRIPS	-the	creation	of	a	global	IPRs	regime-	with	an	economic	restructuring	of	capitalism	at	global	scale	and	thus,	 the	economic	and	 political	 reality	 affecting	 the	 configuration	 of	 international	 law	 -and	 even	 the	psyche	 of	 individuals-	 is	 at	 odds	 with	my	 legal	 education	 and	 -I	 suspect-	 with	 the	education	provided	by	most	schools	of	law	in	Spain.	Both	the	general	courses	leading	to	graduation	and	the	specific	post-graduate	courses	on	Intellectual	Property	I	have	been	 lucky	 enough	 to	 be	 taught	 in	 order	 to	 have	 the	 opportunity	 of	 getting	 to	 the	Promised	Land	in	terms	of	becoming	a	prosperous	and	socially	respected	corporate	lawyer,	 start	 from	 two	 conceptions	 of	 law	 and	 practice	 of	 law;	 first,	 an	 approach	based	mainly	on	a	rather	Kelsenian	theory	of	law	according	to	which,	law	is	a	set	of	hierarchical	 and	 complete	 set	 of	 autonomous	 norms	 whose	 application	 and	evaluation	are	the	subject	of	a	new	scientific	discipline	and;	secondly	and	related	to	the	 first,	 that	 judges	 do	 not	 create	 law	 but	 they	 are	 neutral	 law	 adjudicators	 who	apply	 law	 following	 simple	 syllogisms	 and	 interpretative	 codified	 techniques;	 law	interpretation	and	application	would	be	a	 logical	quasi-automatic	deductive	 system	where	 legal	 rules	 are	 deducible	 from	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 by	 a	 neutral	 and	 aseptic	judge	or	law	adjudicator.	This	approach	to	law	purports	to	encapsulate	law	from	any	political	or	other	discipline´s	interference	–legal	science	is	to	be	separated	from	legal	politics,	economics	or	morals-.		From	the	above	standpoint	it	follows	that	law	must	be	pure,	law	should	get	rid	of	all	forms	 of	 moral,	 ethical,	 political,	 or	 religious	 impurities	 or	 bias.	 In	 this	 sense	 and	despite	the	 fact	 that	Kelsenian	approach	remarkably	contributed	to	protect	 law	and	legal	 practice	 from	 some	 undue	 interferences	 and	 unwanted	 interests	 at	 the	 time	when	this	theory	was	proposed,	it	has	also	given	rise	to	a	formal	legal	interpretation	where	 the	 decontextualization	 of	 law	 may	 have	 gone	 too	 far;	 in	 part	 due	 to	 this	theoretical	 approach,	 law	 adjudication	 has	 often	 become	 a	 function	 of	 technically-minded	legal	experts	unconnected	from	the	social	and	political	reality	they	intend	to	regulate;	the	denial	of	the	factual	nature	of	 law	has	disconnected	it	 from	reality	and	has	motivated	 important	dysfunctions	by	undermining	 the	 substance,	nature,	 scope	and	social	functions	of	some	legal	institutions.	As	some	critical	theorists	have	argued,	this	“depolitization”	is	in	fact	a	highly	political	option.	Moreover,	this	“depolitization”	of	 law	 -especially	 when	 interpreting	 law-	 silences	 and	 leaves	 out	 concepts	 and	
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principles	 which	 are	 counter-hegemonic	 to	 the	 hegemonic	 agenda	 of	 neoliberal	globalization.					In	this	context,	my	experience	with	the	study	of	Intellectual	Property	was	reduced	to	the	analysis	of	a	special	category	of	property	(just	 like	real	property)	but	applied	to	intangibles.	In	a	certainly	natural,	technical	and	unobjectionable	manner,	Intellectual	Property	 rights	 (IPRs)	were	 presented	 as	 the	 indispensable	 instrument	 in	 order	 to	promote	 scientific	progress	 (patents)	and	 to	protect	defenseless	and	disadvantaged	authors	 and	 poets	 who	 wandered	 worldwide	 (droit	 d’auteur)	 without	 any	 right.	Hence,	 the	 expansion	 of	 IPRs	 to	 a	 global	 scale	 through	 TRIPS	 -among	 other	instruments-,	is	seen	as	a	natural	step	and	a	helpful	instrument	for	the	development	of	 those	 countries	which	apparently	were	not	 capable	of	 implementing	and	putting	the	basis	for	the	flourishment	and	modernization	of	their	societies.										While	my	 political	 conscience	 and	my	 conception	 of	 justice	 and	 practice	 of	 law	 fit	uneasily	with	what	I	perceived	it	was	the	“race	of	(narcissistic)	rats”	of	corporate	law	firms,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 virtuous	world	 of	 norms	 hierarchically	 assembled	 and	 isolated	from	 all	 the	 impurities	 of	 the	 external	 world	 was	 gradually	 fading.	 In	 this	 sense,	application	 of	 law	 to	 specific	 facts	 reveals	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 law	 and	 its	indeterminacy;	 law	is	 inconclusive	as	 it	does	not	contemplate	a	specific	solution	 for	each	 and	 every	 given	 case,	 nor	 does	 it	 have	 a	 unique,	 clear	 and	 fixed	meaning	 for	indeterminate	legal	concepts	and	institutional	categories	such	as	democracy	or	public	interest	or	market.	Legal	 concepts	 in	 IPRs	global	 regime	such	as	property	or	public	interest	 or	 even	 novelty	 are	 highly	 under-determinate	 (even	 containing	 internal	antinomies),	and	therefore,	their	implementation/interpretation	requires	subsequent	political-ethical	choices	to	select	which	interpretation	the	law	should	enforce4.			Also,	lawyers	and	other	practitioners	of	law	take	for	granted	certain	relations	of	cause	and	effect	described	by	 law	or	 implicitly	embodied	 in	 it	without	 revising	 the	casual	
																																																								
4 Fisher, W. W., & Syed, T. (2006). Global justice in healthcare: developing drugs for the developing world. UC 
Davis L. Rev., 40, 581. 
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assumptions	 encompassed	by	 legal	 institutions5;	 i.e.	we	 all	 assume	 that	 IPRs	 are	 in	the	public	interest	since	they	promote	and	incentivize	innovation	and	we	often	ignore	that	 the	 conferred	 legal	monopoly	 is	 grounded	 and	 enforceable	 on	 the	 assumption	that	IPRs	actually	foster	innovation	and	provide	social	benefits.	However,	what	about	if	 those	 IPRs	 are	 not	 incentivizing	 innovation	 in	 a	 specific	 jurisdiction	 but	 on	 the	contrary,	 it	 is	 deterring	 follow-on	 innovation?	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 underlying	philosophical	 foundations	 of	 IPRs	 and	 patents	 are	 being	 challenged	 today	 and	paradoxically,	public	interest	is	invoked	not	in	favor	of	exclusive	rights	but	in	favor	of	affordable	access	by	the	public.	
As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 above,	 if	 we	 accept	 the	 indeterminacy	 of	 law	 and	 the	existence	 of	 indeterminate	 legal	 concepts	 and	 legal	 institutions,	 judges	 and	adjudicators	 of	 law	 are	 no	 longer	 aseptic	 interpreters	 of	 law	 who	 apply	 the	 law	following	quasi-automatic	deductive	 techniques	and	syllogisms	between	norms	and	facts	but	they	have	room	to	interpret	law.	While	the	process	of	law	interpretation	and	application	 of	 law	 is	 anchored	 in	 the	 ideal	 premise	 or	 rather	 the	 illusion	 that	decisions	 are	 the	 result	 of	 a	 scientific,	 dispassionate,	 neutral	 legal	 method,	 this	configuration	conceals	 first	 the	 inherent	conflict	and	power	struggles	present	 in	the	judicial	 decision-making	 process	 and	 second,	 the	 ideological,	 political	 or	 other	motivational	 constraints	 existing	 in	 the	 judge’s	 interpretative	 process.	 In	 fact,	 legal	practice	and	jurisprudence	shows	that	legal	institutions	and	interpretations	of	law	fail	to	 present	 a	 single	 and	 unequivocal	 version	 over	 time	 and	 space.	 On	 the	 contrary,	legal	institutions	have	proved	to	be	shifting	and	contingent.			
These	 considerations	 and	 concerns	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 law	 and	 law	 adjudication	were	 intuitive	 and	 fragmented	 in	 my	 mind	 until	 the	 reading	 of	 some	 of	 the	 most	prominent	commentators	within	the	so-called	Critical	Legal	Studies	(CLS)6.	CLS	shed	light	 on	 different	 conceptual	 approaches	 to	 law	 and	 law	 adjudication	 and	
5 As it is noted by Miaille, Michel. (1976) Une introduction critique au droit. Paris: Maspero: […] une science 
qui, par autosatisfaction ou par crainte, se refuse directement ou indirectement à réfléchir sur sa propre 
démarche et a remettre en cause la nature de ses concepts n’est déjà plus une science : peut-être une 
nouvelle forme de métaphysique. […] 
6 Despite the fact that CLS has its origins in the US and in common law jurisdictions, legal traditions anchored 
in continental law like Spain or other Latin-American jurisdictions are incorporating CLS analysis as a result of 
the emergence of Constitutional Courts. See in this respect, Kennedy, D., Rodríguez, C., & López, D. E. 
(1999). Libertad y restricción en la decisión judicial. Bogota: Siglo del Hombre Editores.    
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interpretation	 and	 it	 help	 me	 to	 overcome	 certain	 conceptual	 paradigms.	 In	particular,	 in	Critical	Legal	Studies	Movement7,	Roberto	Mangabeira	Unger	highlights	the	 related	 critique	 of	 objectivism	 and	 the	 critique	 of	 formalism.	 Following	 Unger,	objectivism	 would	 be	 the	 belief	 that	 the	 authoritative	 legal	 materials	 and	 sources	applicable	by	judges	and	law	adjudicators	embody	and	integrate	an	intelligible	moral	order	 which	 go	 beyond	 the	 contingent	 power	 struggles	 and	 ideological	 disputes	which	 characterize	 the	 lawmaking	 process;	 i.e.,	 theoretically,	 law	 application	 is	presented	as	a	 “noble”	and	 “pure”	exercise	of	application	of	a	given	moral	or	 social	order	 resulting	 from	 the	 system	 of	 statutes,	 cases	 and	 accepted	 legal	 ideas.	 CLS	criticizes	 that	 this	 approach	 ignores	 the	 cause-effect	 premises	 and	 the	 different	interests	behind	law	and	behind	a	given	social	order.	On	the	other	hand	and	directly	linked	to	objectivism,	the	critique	of	formalism	would	be	referred	to	the	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	neutral	and	deductive	method	of	legal	justification	and	legal	reasoning	which	is	encapsulated	from	ideological,	political	or	philosophical	disputes.								This	dissertation	takes	a	CLS	approach	in	the	sense	that	our	conception	of	law	for	the	purposes	of	this	study	is	based	on	some	CLS	premises:	although	our	analysis	does	not	hold	 the	 premise	 that	 all	 law	 is	 politics,	 we	 reject	 the	 idea	 that	 law,	 ideology	 and	politics	can	be	entirely	separated	from	one	another	when	it	comes	to	law	application.	On	the	contrary,	in	our	view,	all	those	disciplines	and	realms	are	intertwined	and	they	interact	 and	 influence	 each	 other.	 Neither	 do	 we	 hold	 that	 law	 serves	 per	 se	 the	hegemonic	 neoliberal	 views	 or	 the	 oppression	 of	 the	weeks	 and	 subalterns.	 In	 this	sense,	there	is	nothing	intrinsic	to	the	idea	of	law	as	a	vehicle	of	social	injustice	and	there	is	potential	for	thinking	of	law	as	a	transformative	tool.	Finally,	we	consider	that	equality	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 application	 of	 law	 does	 not	 mean	 formal	 equality;	judicial	 reasoning	 cannot	 ignore	 political,	 social	 or	 economic	 constraints	 that	determine	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 fate	 of	 societies,	 communities	 and	 individuals;	application	of	law	has	to	take	into	account	the	socioeconomic	and	cultural	context	of	the	society	and	individuals	which	are	the	object	of	regulation	and	it	has	to	be	applied	accordingly	in	order	to	adequately	fulfil	its	social	function.									
																																																								
7 Unger, R. M. (1983). The critical legal studies movement. Harvard Law Review, 561-675. 
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Based	on	the	foregoing,	the	purpose	of	this	dissertation	is	to	revise	critically	some	of	today’s	 presumptions	 made	 about	 IPRs	 and	 IPRs	 application	 in	 the	 context	 of	pharmaceutical	 patents	 and	 pharmaceutical	 exclusive	 rights	 and	 propose	 an	alternative	 interpretation	 and	 implementation	of	 IPRs.	To	 this	 end	 and	 in	 line	with	our	critical	 legal	approach	to	 law	interpretation,	 it	 is	 imperative	that	the	analysis	of	IPRs	as	a	legal	institution	grounded	in	a	set	of	presumptions,	be	accompanied	by	an	adequate	 review	 of	 the	 economic,	 political,	 institutional	 and	 historic	 aspects	 and	dimensions	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	 structure	 and	 the	world	 scenario	where	 the	 new	 IPRs	global	 regime	 is	 framed	 today.	 Only	 in	 this	 way,	 we	 will	 be	 capable	 and	 properly	equipped	 to	 identify	 the	 root	 cause-effect	 relationships	 and	 the	 validity	 of	 the	presumptions	 which	 justify	 the	 enforceability	 of	 IPRs	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents.	Also,	from	the	review	of	the	economic,	political	and	institutional	context	–where	IPRs	are	 inserted-	 and	 of	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 current	 interpretation	 and	implementation	of	IPRs,	it	is	possible	to	formulate	propositions	addressed	to	change	the	current	global	regime.			In	this	sense,	and	for	the	proper	understanding	of	today’s	hegemonic	version	on	the	application	 of	 IPRs	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents,	 and	 to	 highlight	 the	 gaps	 and	contradictions	 between	 the	 justification	 and	 founding	 principles	 of	 IPRs	 and	 their	current	 formal	and	naturalist	 –as	a	natural	 right-	application	worldwide	 it	becomes	necessary	 to	 analyze	 two	dimensions	before	presenting	 some	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	real	motives	leading	to	today’s	regime	and	state	of	facts	and	before	formulating	some	propositive	considerations;	The	first	dimension	is	focused	on	the	changes	observed	in	the	treatment	of	health	and	international	architecture	around	health.	In	this	sense,	it	is	 important	 to	 note	 and	 describe	 the	 transformation	 of	 public	 health	 and	international	health	run	by	states	towards	a	model	which	is	rather	a	global	market	of	health	with	the	participation	of	a	multiplicity	of	actors	and	where	the	performance	of	the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 entrepreneurial	 conduct	 is	 basically	explained	by	its	constant	seeking	of	maximum	profit.	In	this	first	dimension,	it	is	also	required	to	identify	the	legal	framework	under	which	these	transformations	operate	and	the	official,	hegemonic	dialectic	of	the	new	global	IPRs	regime.			
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In	the	second	dimension,	it	is	analyzed	the	general	perception	of	legitimacy	deficit	of	today’s	international	authorities	responsible	for	the	global	architecture,	in	particular	in	the	field	of	health.	Also,	it	is	noteworthy	to	explain	the	political	and	legal	solutions	proposed	 by	 hegemonic	 forces	 in	 order	 to	 countermeasure	 the	 failures	 and	imbalances	 provoked	 by	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 legitimize	 and	reconcile	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 regime	 with	 slight	 concessions	 to	 other	 political	claims	and	democratic	concerns.	Finally,	these	two	dimensions	permit	us	to	introduce	our	considerations	and	 interpretation	about	 the	actual	reasons	and	motives	 leading	to	 the	 IPRs	 regime	 linked	 to	 the	 global	 capitalism.	 This	 analysis	 also	 enables	 us	 to	challenge	the	hegemonic	legal	approach	by	proposing	an	alternative	interpretation	of	law	 which	 ultimately	 becomes	 more	 congruent	 with	 the	 nature	 and	 founding	principles	 of	 IPRs	 and	 which	 may	 contribute	 to	 generate	 a	 more	 legitimate	 and	democratic	 political	 and	 legal	 order	 in	 this	 field.	 Therefore,	 we	 could	 say	 that	 the	thesis	encompasses	three	main	blocks	which	are	divided	into	six	chapters.			The	first	two	chapters	-second	and	the	third	chapters-	deal	with	the	emergence	of	a	new	 global	 regime	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health	 and	 the	 international	 legal	 framework	 in	which	the	new	regime	operates.	The	new	scenario	reduces	the	states’	maneuver	and	it	has	given	rise	to	a	constellation	of	new	actors	with	an	important	impact	on	health	and	on	medicines.	The	legal	framework	in	the	field	of	health	and	in	particular,	in	the	realm	of	medicines	is	substantially	integrated	by	the	agreements	of	WTO	and	TRIPS,	i.e.,	 health	 and	 access	 to	medicines	 are	mainly	 affected	 by	 an	 international	 regime	whose	 concerns	 and	purposes	 (free	 trade)	 are	 far	 from	 the	dialectic	 of	 the	 right	 to	health	 and	 the	 right	 to	 affordable	 medicines.	 In	 this	 sense,	 our	 analysis	 evaluates	whether	the	global	IPRs	regime	and	the	market	oriented	policies	on	health	implied	in	it,	 guarantee	 an	 adequate	 access	 to	 medicines	 by	 world	 population.	 From	 this	perspective,	 this	 dissertation	 analyses	 next	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	business,	 the	 contradictory	 interests	 at	 stake	 around	 health	 and	 development	 of	medicines	 and	profit	 seeking	 oriented	 activity	 and	 some	 ethical	 dilemmas	 faced	 by	the	pharmaceutical	industry.			The	 fourth	and	 the	 fifth	 chapters	present	a	political	 and	 legal	 approximation	 to	 the	deficit	of	legitimacy	observed	in	WTO	functioning	and	in	the	global	IPRs	regime.	This	
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crisis	 of	 legitimacy	not	 only	 affects	WTO	but	 it	 is	 having	 a	multiplying	 effect	 in	 the	sense	 of	 challenging	 some	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 settings	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda	 for	globalization.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 fourth	chapter	explores	 the	nature	and	scope	of	 the	legitimacy	 crisis	 and	 it	 reviews	 some	 legal	 and	 conceptual	 constructions,	measures	and	 propositions	 of	 political	 and	 governance	 type	 developed	 by	 the	 system	 as	 a	reaction	 to	 the	 disruptions	 and	 threats	 facing	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 new	 regime.	These	 measures	 have	 been	 proposed	 to	 counteract	 or	 alleviate	 the	 failures,	unbalances	and	pervasive	effects	of	this	global	regime.	In	particular,	it	is	important	to	analyze	 the	 utility	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 proposed	 theories	 of	 the	 Global	 Public	Goods	to	the	international	relations	field	as	a	means	to	cope	with	market	failures	and	externalities	 by	 promoting	 a	 concerted	 collective	 action.	 Also,	 it	 deserves	 attention	the	 eventual	 existence	 of	 a	 sort	 of	 Global	 Public	 Interest	 and	 its	 contours	 as	 an	international	 legal	 concept	 to	 justify	 the	 implementation	 of	 public	 action	internationally	recognized	in	favor	of	the	general	interest.			Both	approaches	are	anchored	in	the	attempt	to	introduce	“politics”	and	a	political	or	humanistic	 view	 to	 compensate	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 global	 capitalism	 which	 is	however	 not	 questioned	 as	 it	 is	 considered	 inevitable	 and	 irreversible.	 Also,	 we	cannot	 ignore	 the	 Human	 Rights	 regime	 as	 an	 eventual	 emancipatory	 dialectic	 to	temper	the	severity	of	unrestricted	capitalism.	Notwithstanding	this,	it	is	necessary	to	wonder	to	which	extent	the	lack	of	concreteness	of	Human	Rights	paradigm	when	it	comes	to	descend	to	specific	demands	and	problems	and	the	different	binding	nature	of	other	legal	“self-contained”	regimes	–namely	the	one	affecting	free	trade-	make	this	paradigm	 an	 effective	 instrument	 for	 change.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 and	 despite	 the	seemingly	 poor	 practical	 outcomes	 of	 confronting	 human	 rights	 versus	 other	normative	regimes,	it	is	helpful	to	examine	how	human	rights	may	play	an	important	role	to	inspire,	 justify	and	inform	the	parameters	to	interpret	and	implement	law	in	an	alternative	non	hegemonic	manner.		The	 sixth	 chapter	 reveals	 the	nature	of	 IPRs	as	a	 social	 construction	 resulting	 from	different	 historical	 and	 political	 processes.	 We	 pay	 attention	 to	 nowadays’	“naturalization”	process	of	patent	rights,	which	are	conceived	as	a	natural	proprietary	right	of	 its	owner	who	is	entitled	to	prevent	no	matter	whom,	and	no	matter	under	
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which	circumstances,	from	using	her	intangible	asset	irrespective	of	how	much	of	her	investment	has	been	recoup	or	which	social	effects	have	the	excludability	from	its	use	in	a	particular	society.			In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	 explored	whether	 the	proprietary	 approach	 in	 the	 application	 of	IPRs	today	has	been	always	the	same,	i.e.,	whether	IPRs	conception	has	varied	or	not	in	the	different	historic	phases	of	nations.	We	will	evaluate	whether	IPRs	are	actually	no	longer	“instrumental”	or	intended	for	the	benefit	and	welfare	of	society	or	at	the	service	of	national	strategies	to	achieve	social	goals	and	the	common	good.	As	far	as	health	is	concerned,	previous	to	TRIPS,	patent	law	was	adjusted	to	national	needs	in	the	field	of	public	health.	In	this	respect,	it	is	important	to	review	to	which	extent	all	this	has	changed	with	the	global	regime	of	IPRs,	and	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	the	one	
size	 fit	all	principle	behind	 the	TRIPS	regime	and	 the	 implementation	worldwide	of	western	standards	of	IPRs	protection.	Therefore,	we	would	see	to	which	extent	TRIPS	has	 constrained	 states’	 room	 to	 regulate	 IPRs	 according	 to	 their	 necessities	 and	 to	their	stage	of	development.	Finally,	the	chapter	attempts	to	answer	which	is	the	logic	followed	by	 the	 adoption	 of	 TRIPS	by	 states	which	 apparently	were	 contrary	 to	 its	implementation;	 if	 many	 states	 (especially	 developing)	 held	 TRIPS	 as	 being	detrimental	to	their	interests,	why	they	were	unanimously	adopted?				Finally,	chapter	seven	elaborates	upon	the	singular	proprietary	character	of	IPRs.	The	non-rivalrous	and	non-excludable	characteristics	of	 intangibles	make	that	 the	social	function	 of	 property	 is	 remarkably	more	 pronounced	when	 it	 comes	 to	 intellectual	property	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 pharmaceutical	 patents.	 In	 this	 sense,	 chapter	 seven	asks	 to	which	extent	 the	 instrumental	 character	of	 IPRs	makes	 this	 legal	 institution	and	its	enforceability	explicitly	dependent	on	the	fulfilment	of	their	social	function.	In	this	sense,	this	dissertation	proposes	an	alternative	reading	of	IPRs	by	highlighting	its	instrumental	nature	and	its	inherent	social	function.	Finally,	the	last	chapter	explores	the	 potential	 of	 deliberative	 democracy	 to	 promote	 the	 reprogramming	 and	redefinition	 of	 the	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	 and	 giving	 the	 whole	 system	 a	 more	legitimate	and	democratic	character.								
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To	 conclude	 these	 introductory	 notes,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 that	 this	dissertation	does	not	provide	an	explanation	of	previous	ideas	and	conclusions	living	in	my	mind.	Far	from	being	an	automatic	embodiment	of	previously	developed	ideas,	this	 thesis	 is	 rather	 the	 reflection	 of	 a	 learning	 process	which	was	 initiated	 from	a	suspicion	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 was	 not	 working	 out	 in	 the	manner	it	was	expected.	Neither	did	this	regime	seem	to	bring	about	the	announced	benefits.	 In	 this	 sense	 and	 resorting	 to	 the	 CLS	 approach	 I	 felt	 the	 necessity	 to	overcome	 the	 positivist	 view	 of	 law	 which	 isolated	 law	 as	 a	 parallel	 world	 and	decontextualized	 law	 from	social	 reality.	Therefore,	 a	political	 economic	 analysis	 of	the	 reality	where	 the	global	 IPRs	 regime	and	pharmaceutical	patents	were	 inserted	became	 a	 must.	 Hence,	 Chapter	 2	 and	 Chapter	 3	 focus	 on	 the	 study	 of	 the	 new	international	paradigm	developed	from	a	new	phase	of	capitalism	(global	capitalism	or	supercapitalism)	and	on	the	study	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry,	its	performance	and	its	evolution	along	time.			From	Chapter	2	 and	Chapter	3	we	got	 a	 factual	 basis	 to	highlight	 the	 shadows	and	failures	 showed	 by	 certain	 market	 driven	 policy	 on	 health	 and	 on	 pharmaceutical	innovation.	Based	on	 those	 finding	of	 facts,	Chapter	4	addresses	 the	contestation	of	the	current	regime	and	its	perceived	lack	of	political	legitimacy.	Chapter	4	reveals	the	democratic	 deficit	 of	 the	 general	 regime	 whose	 flagrant	 example	 is	 precisely	represented	 by	 the	 problems	 and	 challenges	 which	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 are	generating	around	health	by	jeopardizing	the	access	to	medicines	of	a	large	number	of	world	populations.	Hence,	it	is	not	only	that	the	global	regime	is	not	performing	as	it	was	announced	or	expected	but	it	lacks	legitimacy	and	political	acceptance	creating	a	 very	 fragile	 regime	 which	 is	 constantly	 subject	 to	 contestation	 and	 questioning.	Chapter	 5	 reviews	 some	 general	 legal	 and	 institutional	 tools	 presented	 as	 possible	solutions	 to	 overcome	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 global	 regime.	 Global	 public	 goods,	public	 interest,	 public	 policy	 or	 ordre	 public	 have	 been	 considered	 as	 elements	addressed	to	correct	the	defects	and	imbalances	motivated	by	the	global	regime.	An	analysis	 of	 those	 legal	 and	 institutional	 approaches	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	pharmaceutical	 patents	 does	 not	 seem	 very	 encouraging	 about	 their	 emancipatory	capacity	and	effectiveness.		
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Despite	 the	 findings	 about	 the	 poor	 results	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 and	 the	questionable	use	of	pharmaceutical	patents	as	instruments	at	the	service	of	purposes	other	 than	 innovation	 in	 health,	 this	 thesis	 does	 not	 embrace	 certain	 radical	 (even	naively	revolutionary)	approach	which	intends	to	demolish	or	“demonize”	the	patent	system.	In	this	sense,	the	thesis	uphold	an	approach	which	purports	to	overcome	the	too	much	simplistic	debate	about	patents	yes	or	patents	but	 it	 tries	 to	highlight	 the	complexity	of	the	issue.		Paradoxically,	 the	 thesis	 examines	 how	 much	 of	 the	 “blame”	 explaining	 the	malfunctioning	of	the	IPRs	regime	and	the	patents	system	has	to	do	precisely	with	the	process	of	 “denaturalization”	 IPRs	 institution	has	been	subjected	to.	This	process	of	denaturalization	has	been	 forced	with	 the	dynamics	and	 the	needs	of	 the	voracious	evolution	 of	 capitalism	 which	 may	 lead	 it	 to	 its	 own	 suicide.	 In	 particular,	 this	“mutant”	version	of	IPRs	and	pharmaceutical	patents	has	forgot	the	basic	foundation	which	justifies	its	existence	and	the	ultimate	meaning	of	the	legally	artificial	scarcity	over	 an	 unlimited	 and	 non-rivalrous	 good	 on	 which	 are	 based	 IPRs,	 i.e,	 its	 social	function.	 The	 automatic	 application	 of	 IPRs	 deprived	 from	 their	 inherent	 and	structurally	defining	element,	i.e.	of	their	social	function	is	on	the	basis	of	the	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	this	legal	institution.		Hence,	the	thesis	upholds	a	genealogic	approach	of	this	particular	rights	in	order	to	recover	their	sense	and	meaning	as	well	as	ensuring	the	 necessary	 balance	 among	 all	 the	 public	 and	 private	 interests.	 Finally,	 it	 is	proposed	a	deliberative	model	of	decision	and	law	enforcing	which	may	provide	the	concept	 of	 social	 function	 with	 the	 necessary	 legitimacy	 and	 flexibility	 to	 the	enforcement	of	IPRs	which	by	nature	must	be	adjusted	to	the	socioeconomic	context	where	they	operate.						 	
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CHAPTER	2.	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	 GLOBAL	 REGIME	 AND	
ITS	SHORTCOMINGS	IN	THE	FIELD	OF	HEALTH.			
2.1.	 Globalization	and	the	imperatives	of	Global	Health	Governance.			
The	loss	of	innocence	of	the	term	Globalization.			Economist	Theodore	Levitt	is	widely	credited	with	popularizing	the	term	in	the	latter	half	 of	 the	 1980s	 since	 the	 publication	 of	 his	 article	 entitled	 "Globalization	 of	Markets".	Globalization	is	a	misleading	concept	in	its	attempt	to	explain	the	new	era	we	 are	 living	 in	 today.	 Rather	 than	 describing	 objectively	 the	 reality,	 this	 concept	responds	 to	 a	 dominant	discourse	which	 tries	 to	mask	 the	 reasons	 and	decisions	 –mostly	of	political	character-	leading	to	today’s	world.	Also,	it	conceals	the	competing	interests	and	inherent	conflicts	therein	as	well	as	the	alternatives	to	create	a	different	international	order	by	resorting	to	an	allegedly	aseptic	concept	such	as	globalization.	Globalization	 is	 presented	 as	 an	 exogenous	 phenomenon	 characterized	 by	 its	presumed	 inevitability,	 a	 relentless	event	 in	 the	natural	process	of	 evolution	of	our	societies.	 In	this	sense,	the	economist	 Joseph	E.	Stiglitz1	describes	Globalization	as	a	phenomenon	which	generates	the	closer	 integration	of	 the	countries	and	peoples	of	the	 world	 which	 has	 been	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 enormous	 reduction	 of	 costs	 of	transport	 and	 communication,	 and	 the	 breaking	 down	 of	 artificial	 barriers	 to	 the	flows	 of	 goods,	 services,	 capital,	 knowledge	 and	 (to	 a	 lesser	 extent)	 people	 across	borders2.	The	assumed	 inevitability	of	globalization	plays	a	 firewall	 role	against	 the	legitimate	questioning	of	decisions	of	political	reach	as	well	as	the	current	status	quo	of	international	order.	The	 changes	 leading	 to	 today’s	 world	 have	 sped	 up	 since	mid	 of	 the	 1970.	 In	 this	period,	 from	mid-1970	 to	present,	 international	 relations	as	 long	as	social	 relations																																																									
1 Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. Norton: New York. 
2 Notwithstanding this, the concept of globalization as a closer integration of the countries and peoples cannot 
explain the causes leading to the deep world-wide transformations we are living in. It does not capture the 
reasons why our world has changed in this specific manner; it would be rather a post factual description of the 
features and characteristics of a new era. Thus, globalization neither does constitute a phenomenon in the 
sense of a singular happening causing a break with the immediate past, nor explains the reasons leading to 
today’s transformations of our society.      
Actually, most of the processes invoked by the allegedly novel paradigm of globalization have been happening 
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between	the	political	and	the	economic	and	between	the	nation	state	and	society	have	experienced	 profound	 transformations	 which	 cannot	 merely	 explained	 by	 the	eventual	 strengthening	 of	 the	 world	 interdependence	 and	 an	 intensified	interconnection	 but	 by	 a	 new	 era	 of	 capitalism,	 a	 new	 phase	 of	 development	 of	capitalism	eased	by	political	decisions	inspired	by	a	particular	hegemonic	ideology	–neolibelarism-	and	made	possible	by	 the	new	 technological	 advances.	 In	 this	 sense,	we	could	say	that	we	have	passed	from	democratic	capitalism	to	supercapitalism,	also	known	as	neoliberal	capitalism	or	financialization	–finance-led	capitalism-3.		Focusing	 on	 the	 developed	 world	 which	 has	 dominated	 the	 changes,	 the	 previous	balance	 between	 capitalism	 and	 economic	 growth	with	 increasing	 income	 equality	and	 a	 perceived	 democratic	 political	 system	 characterized	 the	western	world	 since	the	Second	World	War	and	it	made	people	have	certain	confidence	in	democracy	and	trust	in	government.	Keynesian	states	intervened	into	the	economy	to	induce	growth	and	 the	 liberal	 state	 changed	 into	 the	welfare	 state	 recognizing	 a	 number	 of	 social	rights	which	became	universal.	The	result	–les	30	années	glorieux-	was	an	expression	of	what	was	then	understood	as	the	common	good.		All	 that	 changed	 since	 the	mid	 1970	 –despite	 the	 causes	 leading	 to	 these	 changes	were	previous	and	latent-,	as	it	has	been	profusely	explained	by	some	scholars4,	the	30	glorious	years	of	capitalism,	a	democratic	capitalism	or	Fordist	regime	gave	way	to	a	 finance-led	 capitalism	or	 neoliberal	 capitalism.	 The	main	difference	 in	 relation	 to	the	precedent	economic	scenario	was	not	a	sudden	globalization	or	massive	exchange	of	trade	or	productive	capital	(capital	stocks	or	productive	investments	abroad)	but	a	financial	 globalization5	 -deregulation	 and	 liberalization	 of	 financial	 markets	 and	 a	major	increase	in	financial	flows	around	the	world-	and	the	expansion	of	capitalism.	Under	the	Post-Fordism	or	neoliberal	capitalism,	there	is	first	an	enormous	increase	in	the	number	and	value	of	the	financial	assets	circulating	around	the	world	as	long	as	a	multiplication	of	financial	instruments;	a	decoupling	of	real	wealth	and	fictitious	or																																																									
3 Reich, R. (2008). Supercapitalism. The transformation of business, democracy and everyday life. New York: 
Vintage books.  
4 Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2010). The global financial crisis, neoclassical economics, and the neoliberal years of 
capitalism. Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, (7). 
5 Navarro, V. (1998). Neoliberalismo y Estado del bienestar. Barcelona: Ariel. 
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speculative	wealth	–in	 the	distinction	highlighted	by	Adam	Smith-;	augmentation	of	the	profit	 rate	of	 financial	 institutions	and	 financial	rents	 to	 the	benefit	of	capitalist	rentiers.			This	new	scenario	has	provoked	the	creation	of	multiple	trans-national	corporations	(TNCs)	 and	 the	 unprecedented	 concentration	 of	wealth	 in	 few	hands.	 For	 instance,	between	1970	and	2000	the	number	of	trans-national	corporations	(TNCs)	grew	from	some	7000	to	55000	with	the	revenues	of	 the	 largest	200	TNCs	amounting	to	more	than	that	of	182	of	the	world’s	nations,	or	80	percent	of	the	world’s	population6.	As	we	 will	 see,	 although	 economic	 power	 has	 always	 played	 a	 role	 in	 defining	international,	 the	 role	 of	 economic	 or	 market	 driven	 logic	 is	 also	 prevalent	 in	 the	current	global	health	system7.				The	 emergence	 of	 this	 new	 capitalism	 has	 been	 backed	 by	 a	 concrete	 economic	ideology;	 Neoclassical	 macroeconomics	 or	 neoliberalism.	 As	 Professor	 Navarro	briefly	describes8,	neoliberal	ideology	posits	the	following	three	main	characteristics:		the	state	must	reduce	its	shape	and	interventionism	in	economic	and	social	activities	–selective	reduction	of	traditional	state	interventions	but	not	quantitative	reduction-;	labor	and	financial	markets	need	to	be	deregulated	to	liberate	the	creative	energy	of	the	markets	 and;	 commerce	 and	 investments	 need	 to	 be	 stimulated	 by	 eliminating	borders	 and	 barriers.	 This	 economic	mantra	 has	 inspired	 the	 political	 economy	 of	state	governments,	 international	 institutions	–mainly	World	Bank	and	 International	Monetary	 Fund	 and	 an	 important	 number	 of	 economists,	 intellectuals	 and	 media	which	have	so	replaced	the	precedent	hegemonic	political	economy	orthodoxy	based	on	Keynesian	macroeconomics.	As	many	observers	note	international	economic	and	financial	 organizations	 (WTO,	 IMF,	 WB)	 are	 pushing	 a	 neoliberal	 agenda	 favoring	capital	and	overriding	the	will	of	national	democratic	institutions9,	this	coming	at	the	expense	of	equality.																																																										
6 Singh, K. (2001). Global corporate power: emerging trends and issues. Public Interest Research Centre. 
7 Smith, R. (2010). The role of economic power in influencing the development of global health governance. 
Global Health Governance, 3(2). 
8 Navarro, V. (2007). Neoliberalism as a class ideology; or, the political causes of the growth of inequalities. 
International Journal of Health Services, 37(1), 47-62. 
9 Kohlmorgen, L. (2003). Globalisation, global health governance and national health politics in developing 
countries: an exploration into the dynamics of interfaces (No. 60). W. Hein (Ed.). GIGA-Hamburg. 
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	The	 effects	 of	 these	 policies	 have	 brought	 about	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	 financial	instability	 -an	 increasing	 number	 of	 financial	 crisis-,	 a	 rampant	 inequality	 and	disparities	 between	 and	within	 countries10,	 a	 dramatic	 increase	 of	 the	 competition	between	 companies,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 old	 system	 of	 large-scale	 production	 and	 the	weakening	of	big	labor	unions	and	the	permanent	languishment	of	the	middle	class.			
The	decline	of	Democracy	and	political	processes.		Also,	 this	 new	 architecture	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 important	 issues	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 the	international	regime,	which	are	not	perceived	to	be	backed	by	democratic	processes	of	 decisions	 neither	 is	 subject	 to	 democratic	 control	 and	 supervision.	 In	 parallel	 to	this	 crisis	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 institutions,	 citizens	 have	 lost	 their	confidence	in	national	governments	which	are	suspicious	of	being	agents	of	interests	other	 than	 those	 representing	 the	 general	 interest	 of	 citizens.	 Democracies	 seem	unable	to	act	upon	the	common	good	and	its	being	installing	a	formal	understanding	of	 democratic	 systems	 which	 are	 threaten	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 ex-post	 legitimizing	processes	 of	 previously	 decisions	 taken	 somewhere	 else.	National	 political	 systems	start	to	be	questioned	as	to	their	capacity	to	be	a	valid	instrument	of	the	political	will	of	 people.	 The	 social	 compromises	 under	 the	 Fordism	 years	 –the	 instruments	 to	spread	the	wealth,	stabilize	jobs	and	communities	and	establish	equitable	rules	of	the	game-	have	gradually	vanished.					As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Ulrich	 Brand11,	 Post-Fordist	 politics	 are	 characterized	 by	 the	profound	 transformations	 occurred	 between	 the	 political	 and	 the	 economic	 and	between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 A	 permanent	 critique	 of	 the	 state	 together	 with	 a	strong	 legitimization	 of	 the	 markets	 has	 enabled	 private	 interests	 to	 handle	 areas	which	were	previously	under	public	control.	Furthermore,	 the	significance	of	public	and	the	role	of	the	state	as	the	safeguard	of	the	general	interest	or	common	good	are	being	 gradually	 blurred	 into	 what	 the	 author	 calls	 a	 “national	 competition	 state”;																																																									
10 Progress, S. H. (2014). Human Development Report 2014. Worldwide: IARC CancerBase No. 
11 Brand, U. (2005). Order and regulation: Global Governance as a hegemonic discourse of international 
politics?. Review of International Political Economy, 12(1), 155-176. 
19		
national	 states	 have	 to	 be	 primarily	 concerned	 on	 ensuring	 international	competitiveness,	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 the	 free	 development	 of	 market	 forces.	Competition,	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 are	 sacralized	 as	 objective,	 infallible	 and	scientific	 standards	which	must	be	advanced	by	 states	and	must	prevail	 over	other	virtually	 wishful,	 naïve,	 “political”	 and	 non-objective	 considerations	 as	 equality	 or	justice.				Furthermore,	 political	 margin	 or	 room	 for	 maneuver	 of	 national	 states	 have	 been	drastically	 reduced	and	 limited.	These	 limitations	 in	 state	power	 take	place	both	 in	developing	and	developed	countries	and	are	mainly	due	to	the	“exit	options”	offered	to	 the	 financial	 capital	 by	 the	 different	 national	 competition	 states	 and	 its	 higher	mobility	 towards	 states	 which	 offer	 better	 suited	 regulative	 conditions	 to	 their	interests	and	to	some	international	commitments,	-especially	in	the	trade	field-	which	sometimes	reduce	the	sphere	for	democratic	choice12.	Some	countries	are	obliged	to	adjust	 their	 domestic	 public	 policies	 and	 public	 spending	 to	 the	 standards	 of	what	international	private	creditors	consider	appropriate	and	competitive	without	regard	to	 what	 public	 spending	 cuts	 may	 affect	 to	 their	 national	 populations	 and	 thus,	eroding	the	sovereignty	of	democratic	elected	governments	as	long	as	the	confidence	of	people	on	politics	and	democracy.	Apart	 from	the	exit-option	of	 financial	capitals	which	make	 developing	 countries	 hostage	 of	 their	 conditions	 to	 remain,	 conditions	attached	to	loans	from	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	have	become	key	elements	of	the	economics	 of	 most	 developing	 countries	 over	 the	 past	 30	 years.	 As	 described	extensively	by	some	scholars13,	the	structural	adjustment	programs	attached	to	credit	granting	 ignored	 the	 social	 impact	 of	 the	 imposed	 macroeconomic	 policies	 which	were	 exclusively	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 inflation,	 improving	 macroeconomic	fundamentals	and	protecting	the	ability	to	repay	external	creditors.	The	same	could	be	 said	 to	 the	 today’s	 recipes	 imposed	 to	 Greece	 and	 other	 European	 countries	 in	order	 for	 this	 European	 and	 “sovereign”	 country	 to	 have	 access	 to	 credit.	 These	recipes	 based	 on	 public	 austerity,	 reduction	 of	 public	 services	 (mainly	 health	 and	education)	and	pensions	and	a	more	flexible	labor	market	are	clearly	inspired	by	the																																																									
12 Sreenivasan, G. (2005). Does the GATS undermine democratic control over health?. Current debates in 
global justice, 269-281. 
13 Woods, N. (2006). The globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Ithaca:Cornell University 
Press. 
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neoliberal	 agenda	 -which	 already	 showed	 important	 shortcomings	 in	 the	 90´s	 in	South	America-	and	have	been	accurately	qualified	as	“politics	of	austericide”.					
International	architecture	under	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	Globalization.		In	the	international	arena	and	despite	considerations	about	the	existence	of	different	regimes	(security,	economic,	environmental	and	human	rights	regimes14)	eventually	fragmented,	unconnected	and	without	a	regime	of	regimes	or	superior	system	which	makes	sense	to	the	whole	picture,	the	truth	is	that,	as	we	will	see,	it	is	emerging	what	some	 scholars	 call	 a	 “global	 constitutionalism”.	 This	 new	 legal	 order	 ruling	 the	international	 (global)	 society	 reserves	 a	 binding	 nature	 and	 a	 prior	 attention	 to	property	 rights.	 Property	 rights	 are	 increasingly	 conceived	 as	 having	 the	unobjectionable	 status	 of	 natural	 rights.	 International	 regime’s	 main	 focus	 is	therefore,	to	secure	private	property	at	the	international	level	through	international	norm-settings	which	compel	states	to	implement	market	and	private	interest	friendly	oriented	 policies	 overriding	 no	 matter	 which	 other	 consideration.	 This	 is	 possible	thanks	 to	 some	 international	 organizations,	 namely	 IMF,	WB	 and	WTO	which	 push	the	neoliberal	agenda	by	means	of	financial	power	which	constrain	states	maneuver	–access	 to	 financial	 resources	 conditioned	 to	 the	 national	 implementation	 of	 tough	macroeconomic	measures-	or	by	certain	legal	mechanisms	which	ensure	compliance	with	international	rules.					On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 internationalization	 of	many	 social	 problems	 and	processes	which	are	the	consequences	of	decisions	adopted	at	a	global	scale	and	that	eventually	cannot	be	longer	handled	by	national	states	has	given	rise	to	the	hegemonic	concept	of	Global	Governance15.	Despite	the	confusion	that	this	concept	generates	around	its	meaning,	 it	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 somehow	 political	 multilayered	 response	 by	 a	diverse	range	of	state,	international	institutions	and	non-state	actors	to	the	problems	raised	by	the	globalization	process.																																																											
14 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Integrating theories of international regimes. Review of 
International Studies, 26(01), 3-33. 
15 Dingwerth, K., & Pattberg, P. (2006). Global governance as a perspective on world politics. Global 
governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, 12(2), 185-203. 
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James	 Rosenau16has	 also	 used	 "governance"	 to	 denote	 the	 regulation	 of	interdependent	relations	in	the	absence	of	an	overarching	political	authority,	such	as	in	the	international	system.	Adil	Najam	has	defined	global	governance	simply	as	"the	management	of	global	processes	 in	 the	absence	of	global	government17."	Thomas	G.	Weiss,	refers	to	concrete	cooperative	problem-solving	arrangements,	many	of	which	increasingly	involve	not	only	the	United	Nations	of	states	but	also	'other	UNs,'	namely	international	secretariats	and	other	non-state	actors."			These	"cooperative	problem-solving	arrangements"	may	be	formal,	taking	the	shape	of	 laws	 or	 formally	 constituted	 institutions	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 actors	 (such	 as	 state	authorities,	intergovernmentalorganizations	(IGOs),	non-governmental	 organizations	(NGOs),	private	 sector	entities,	 other	civil	 society	actors,	 and	 individuals)	 to	manage	collective	 affairs.18	They	 may	 also	 be	 informal	 (as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 practices	 or	guidelines)	or	ad	hoc	entities	(as	in	the	case	of	coalitions)19.	Also,	as	it	is	noted	by	an	important	 literature	 on	 the	matter,	 the	 framework	 of	 governance	 for	 international	economic	 transactions	 increasingly	 is	 created	 and	maintained	by	 the	private	 sector	and	 not	 by	 the	 state	 or	 interstate	 organization20	 in	 what	 has	 been	 called	 the	“emergence	of	Private	Authority	in	Global	Governance”.		This	 whole	 picture	 has	 been	 presented	 as	 the	 new	 economic	 reality	 of	 our	 world	under	the	concepts	of	Globalization	and	Global	Governance.	Those	two	concepts	take	for	granted	the	current	situation	without	any	critical	or	causal	review	of	the	current	state	of	facts.	These	analyses	tend	to	conceive	the	Post-Fordist	economic	processes	as	unavoidable	and	are	somehow	based	on	an	economic	determinism	in	the	sense	that	economic	 processes	 which	 are	 taking	 place	 are	 a	 natural	 evolution	 in	 the	development	of	humanity	and	their	economic	relations.			
																																																								
16 Rosenau, J. N. (1999). Toward an ontology for global governance. Approaches to global governance theory, 
287-301. 
17 Riazati, S. (2006). A Closer look: Professor seeks stronger UN. The Daily Bruin, 21. 
18 Zaleski, P. (2006). Global Non-governmental Administrative System: Geosociology of the Third Sector, Civil 
Society in the Making. Warszawa: IFiS Publishers. 
19 Momani, B., Karns, M. P., Mingst, K. A., Kirton, J. J., & Stefanova, R. N. (2006). International Organizations: 
The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
20 Cutler, A. C., Haufler, V., & Porter, T. (Eds.). (1999). Private authority and international affairs. Suny Press. 
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In	this	respect,	as	it	is	remarked	by	some	above	mentioned	scholars21,	by	configuring	them	as	unavoidable,	the	terms	globalization	and	global	governance	themselves	will	be	 part	 of	 an	 hegemonic	 discourse	 to	 disguise	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 discretionary	decisions	 informed	by	 the	neoliberal	 economic	 agenda.	All	 the	 terminology	used	 to	describe	and	refer	 to	our	reality	would	be	aimed	at	disguising	a	specific	 ideological	thinking	which	 can	be	 revealed	by	using	deconstructive	 techniques22.	 In	 this	 sense,	Global	 Governance	 is	 a	 hegemonic	 discourse	 because	 it	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	dominant	transformations	of	neoliberalism	and	it	serves	a	legitimizing	function	as	it	does	 not	 question	 the	 current	 Post	 Fordist	 capitalism	 nor	 does	 formulate	 an	alternative.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 takes	 for	 granted	 this	 economic	 reality	 and	 it	 just	proposes	 political	 cooperative	 answers	 to	 ensuing	 problems.	 Finally,	 behind	 the	invocation	 of	 the	 technical	 character	 and	 complexity	 of	 some	 issues,	 it	 seems	 clear	that	 decision	 making	 processes	 are	 less	 open	 to	 the	 scrutiny	 of	 civil	 society	 and	citizenry,	less	transparent,	less	representative	and	finally	less	democratic.		
Global	Health	and	Global	Health	Governance.		Global	Health	 and	Global	Health	Governance	 (GHG)	would	be	 the	 translation	of	 the	concept	 of	 globalization	 to	 the	 kingdom	of	 health.	 This	 concept	 intends	 to	 describe	the	 changes	 in	 health	 and	 in	 health	 politics	 derived	 from	 both	 the	 new	 challenges	posed	by	the	globalization	as	long	as	the	new	international	architecture	in	the	field	of	health	 and	 the	 incapacity	 of	 national	 governments	 to	 effectively	 address	 health	 of	their	 population.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	must	 be	 remarked	 that	 –as	 it	 happens	with	 the	term	globalization-	both	concepts	have	been	conceived	and	are	commonly	used	in	the	context	 of	 a	 hegemonic	 discourse	 which	 assumes	 without	 any	 questioning,	 certain	assumptions	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	grounded	-as	it	has	been	previously	mentioned-,	on	a	market	driven	globalization	process.		Likewise,	 Global	 health	 Governance	 has	 been	 also	 defined	 in	 a	 variety	 of	manners;	there	are	those	authors	who	define	Global	Health	Governance	as	a	means	to	a	more	
																																																								
21 Dingwerth, K., & Pattberg, P. Global governance... op. cit footnote 21. 
22 Balkin, J. M. (1987). Deconstructive practice and legal theory. The Yale Law Journal, 96(4), 743-786. 
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just	world23	or	as	a	term	encompassing	the	collective	transnational	actions	to	address	public	health	concerns	across	borders24.	The	existence	of	the	term	itself,	constitutes	an	 “optimistic	 view”	 –since	 it	 presupposes	 coordination	 and	 coherent	 operation-	 of	the	dynamics	and	interaction	of	the	different	agents	and	processes	having	an	impact	on	global	health	issues.	On	its	part,	there	are	some	critics	about	the	use	of	this	term	as	this	 is	 considered	 to	 support	 a	 neoliberal	 view	 of	 health	 and	 health	 public	 policy.	From	a	more	neutral	perspective,	GHG	would	encompass	the	institutions,	processes,	mechanisms,	 relationships	 and	 transnational	 actions	 to	 address	 global	 health	concerns.			In	 this	sense,	Global	Health	and	GHG	could	not	be	 limited	 to	address	 the	policies	 to	cope	 with	 the	 treatment	 of	 transnational	 diseases	 and	 plagues.	 On	 the	 contrary,	health	 and	 health	 governance	 are	 deeply	 encapsulated	 within	 the	 problems	 and	above	mentioned	discussions	rose	by	the	globalization,	and	cannot	be	separated	from	this.	In	fact,	one	of	the	most	urgent	tasks	to	do	with	this	field	of	study	is	to	reestablish	the	linkage	between	disease-oriented	health	care	intervention	and	the	broader	socio-economic	environment;	inequality	of	access	to	health	mirrors	broader	socioeconomic	inequality25.	 	 	Because	of	that	and	in	 line	with	some	scholars26,	 it	 is	not	adequate	to	treat	 global	 health	 as	 a	 singular	 and	 separated	 field	 of	 analysis	 and	 study	without	resorting	 to	 the	general	socioeconomic	context	and	circumstances	around	 it.	 In	 this	sense,	global	health	is	intrinsically	linked	to	the	wider	landscape	of	globalization	and	global	governance,	of	which	health	is	a	mere	part,	not	even	the	most	important.	In	this	sense,	many	of	the	challenges	and	problems	on	nowadays	health	are	thus,	related	to	Post	Fordist	capitalism.		In	 effect,	 the	 increasing	 economic	 interdependence	 and	 the	 vast	 international	movements	of	people	and	products	which	 characterize	our	global	 era	may	provoke	that	 infectious	 diseases	 originated	 in	 one	 remote	 country	 have	 important																																																									
23 Meier, B. M. (2014). An Agenda for Normative Policy Analysis in the Study of Global Health 
Governance. Law and Global Health, Current Legal Issues, 16. 
24 Leon, J. K. (2015). The Rise of Global Health: The Evolution of Effective Collective Action. SUNY Press. 
25 Thomas, C., & Weber, M. (2004). The politics of global health governance: whatever happened to “health 
for all by the year 2000”?. Global Governance, 10(2), 187-205. 
26 Williams, O., & Rushton, S. (2009, February). Global Health Governance as a contested space: competing 
discourses, interests and actors. 50th International Studies Association Annual Convention in New York. (Feb. 
15-18, 2009), available at http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p311363_index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
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repercussions	 everywhere	 (see	 the	 recent	 Ebola	 crisis).	 Needless	 to	 say	 that	globalizing	forces,	including	increasing	interconnectivity	in	trade,	finance,	technology,	communications,	 and	 population	mobility	 have	 created	 impacts	 and	 challenges	 for	public	 health	 that	 transcend	 national	 boundaries	 and	 which	 require	 transnational	cooperation.	 	Although	this	state	of	 facts	 is	 invoked	by	some	authors27	to	 justify	the	necessity	of	addressing	health	on	a	global	scale	under	the	terms	of	Global	Health	and	Global	 Health	 Governance,	 health	 outcomes	 of	 globalization	 go	 beyond	 the	 direct	repercussions	 that	 transnational	diseases	 can	have	 in	a	more	 interrelated	world.	 In	this	sense,	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	effects	derived	from	the	new	socioeconomic	conditions	brought	by	globalization	and	specially	the	increase	in	inequality	(causes	of	the	 causes).	 In	 fact,	 and	 despite	 neoliberal	 assumptions	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 creating	global	 markets	 will	 eventually	 “trickle	 down”	 and	 lead	 to	 better	 health28,	 it	 seems	clear	that	globalization	is	giving	rise	to	new	patterns	of	health	and	disease	linked	to	the	 global	 restructuring	 of	 human	 societies	 and	 growing	 inequality.	 Poverty	would	thus	be	the	most	important	cause	of	preventable	death,	disease,	and	disability29.			According	to	the	Final	Report	to	the	Commission	on	Social	Determinants	of	Health30	-one	of	 the	most	 serious	and	profusely	cited	studies	on	 the	 field-,	 globalization	does	eventually	affect	health	through	different	changes	in	social	stratification,	differential	exposure	 or	 vulnerability,	 health	 system	 characteristics	 and	 differential	consequences.	 Although	 recognizing	 that	 globalization	 holds	 considerable	 potential	for	 improving	 human	 health	 (ease	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 medical	 and	 public	 health	knowledge	 and	 technology	 from	 one	 part	 of	 the	 globe	 to	 another),	 the	 study	concludes	that	the	past	25	years	of	intensified	global	market	have	seen	a	reversal	on	health	improvements	and	growing	health	inequalities,	between	which;	 labor	market	“flexibility”	 and	 its	 inherent	 economic	 insecurity	 especially	 for	 most	 of	 unskilled	workers	and	women;	 changes	 in	diet	habits	 towards	 industrial	produced	 foods	and	
																																																								
27 Ng, N. Y., & Ruger, J. P. (2011). Global health governance at a crossroads. Global health governance: the 
scholarly journal for the new health security paradigm, 3(2), 1. 
28 Huynen, M. M., Martens, P., & Hilderink, H. B. (2005). The health impacts of globalisation: a conceptual 
framework. Globalization and health, 1(1), 14. 
29 Beaglehole, R., & Bonita, R. (1998). Public health at the crossroads: which way forward?. The Lancet, 
351(9102), 590-592. 
30 Network, G. K. (2007). Towards health-equitable globalisation: rights, regulation and redistribution. Final 
Report of the Globalisation Knowledge Network of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health. Geneva: 
World Health Organization. 
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obesogenic	 food	 environments	 which	 increase	 the	 prevalence	 of	 chronic	 disease;	increase	 of	 foreign	 debt	 and	 associated	 health	 policy	 reforms	 in	 low	 and	 middle	income	 countries;	 migration	 of	 health	 professionals,	 this	 migration	 being	asymmetrical	 –from	 poor	 countries	 to	 rich	 ones-	 and	 internal	 migration	 of	 health	personnel	from	public	to	private	health	care	systems;	inequities	in	access	to	potable	water;	trade	reforms	in	agriculture	and	food	security	and	finally,	the	lack	of	access	to	medicines.			In	 spite	 of	 the	 clear	 linkage	 between	health	 and	 socioeconomic	 equity,	 the	modern	GHG	approach	has	departed	from	the	spirit	of	“Health	for	All”	strategy	captured	in	the	1978	declaration	of	Alma	Ata	and	it	is	being	limited	to	specific	interventions,	diseases	and	goals	such	as	Malaria,	Global	Alliance	 for	Vaccines	and	Immunization	(GAVI)	or	UNAIDS	 while	 abandoning	 any	 comprehensive	 view	 of	 the	 socioeconomic	environment	 and	 social	 transformation.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	must	 be	 distinguished	 two	different	 historic	 approaches	 of	 GHG;	 the	 one	 whose	 milestone	 was	 the	 Alma	 Ata	Declaration	in	1978.	In	this	period	of	time	in	the	70’s,	the	UN	was	the	forum	for	the	articulation	of	the	global	governance,	a	sort	of	forum	of	political	will	formation	which	encompassed	 the	 call	 for	 a	 New	 International	 Economic	 Order	which	 purported	 to	integrate	 economic	 and	 social	 concerns	 and	 transformation.	 The	 second	 period	 of	time	 from	 the	 80’s	 onward	 the	 globalization	 process	 has	 been	 governed	 by	 global	economic	institutions	such	as	the	IMF,	WB	and	WTO	and	neoliberal	principles.		Whereas	poverty	was	the	cause	of	ill	health	in	the	previous	period,	the	emphasis	has	shifted	 nowadays	 as	 ill	 health	 is	 one	 cause	 of	 poverty	 by	 causing	 low	productivity.	The	business	rhetoric	of	nowadays	considers	health	as	a	business	opportunity	and	a	field	of	innovation	of	the	potential	of	medicine	to	combat	health	problems	instead	of	dealing	 with	 socioeconomic	 issues	 as	 the	 route	 to	 health.	 Also,	 production	 and	distribution	 of	 health	 products	 and	 services	 are	 set	 apart	 from	 its	 social	 impact	 as	mere	 goods	 and	 services	 within	 the	 market	 and	 economic	 logic	 and	 presented	 as	functional	 and	 non-political.	 The	 global	 response	 at	 this	 new	 era	 is	 based	 on	piecemeal	investments	from	loans	or	donations	while	health	policy	is	framed	in	terms	of	the	rights	of	corporations	and	consumers	rather	than	the	human	rights	to	health.						
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This	 approach	has	 its	 reflection	 in	 the	discursive	 framing	 of	 health.	 In	 this	 respect,	between	 the	 contemporary	 discourses	 of	 global	 health,	 security	 and	 economism	related	discourses	prevail	over	other	conceptual	 framing.	Security	based	discourses	emphasize	the	necessity	to	cope	with	health	crises,	 infectious	disease	and	pandemic	outbreaks	which	eventually	may	become	risks	 to	national	 security31,	 the	role	of	 the	WHO	 is	 being	 reduced	 to	 ensure	 security	 of	 states	 by	 preventing	 the	 international	expansion	 of	 diseases.	 This	 discourse	 narrows	 the	 global	 health	 agenda	 and	 public	intervention	 and	 it	 is	 connected	with	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 reduce	state	role	to	deliver	security	to	attain	a	free	and	secure	market	for	private	initiative.						Economism	 related	 discourses	 are	 a	 natural	 counterpart	 to	 those	 of	 security	 and	frames	 health	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 market.	 This	 view	 prioritizes	 the	 achievement	 of	efficiency	 or	 the	 maximum	 benefit	 for	 a	 given	 expenditure.	 Also	 it	 attempts	 to	quantify	 health	 ratios	 and	 the	 burden	 of	 disease	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 controversial	Disability-Adjusted	 Life	 Years	 (DALYs).	 Finally,	 it	 embraces	 a	 customer	 market	oriented	 approach	 to	 health,	 boosting	 liberalization,	 privatization	 and	commodification	of	health	systems,	goods	and	services.	Both	economism	and	security	related	 discourses	 tend	 to	 sidestep	 the	 social	 dimension	 of	 health,	 its	 social	determinants	and	contribute	to	deal	with	health	issues	from	a	superficial	formal	and	abstract	 perspective	 which	 is	 keen	 on	 using	 “prefabricated”	 recipes	 or	 “neoliberal	templates”	while	ignoring	the	structural	causes	and	grounds	of	people’s	health.						This	new	approach	 to	 the	globalization	and	 its	 impact	on	health	has	 created	a	new	scenario	which	 can	be	described	by	 the	 following	 features;	 the	 incapacity	of	nation	states	to	cope	with	the	totality	of	health	problems	of	their	populations;	the	fact	that	decision	making	centers	with	an	important	impact	in	Health	do	not	have	health	as	one	of	 their	 main	 concerns;	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 international	 actors	 in	 the	 health	outlook;	the	lack	of	a	global	and	integral	strategy	to	address	health	in	a	systematic	pro	general	interest	manner.																																																										
31 Williams, O., & Rushton, S. (2009, February). Global Health Governance as a contested space: competing 
discourses, interests and actors. 50th International Studies Association Annual Convention in New York. 
available at http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p311363_index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
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As	to	the	lesser	capacity	of	nation	states	to	handle	health	issues,	we	can	observe	that	national	 governments	 maneuver	 has	 been	 significantly	 reduced.	 National	governments	(especially	 those	of	developing	countries)	 find	difficulties	 to	deal	with	health	problems	of	their	population.	On	the	one	hand,	financial	liberalization	and	the	ease	with	which	money	can	shift	around	the	world	make	national	governments	adapt	their	public	policies	and	public	spending	to	what	international	creditors	and	financial	markets	deem	more	appropriate	for	their	investments	to	be	profitable.	In	this	sense,	even	governments	with	strong	commitments	to	egalitarian	domestic	policies	have	to	temper	 them	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 certain	 credibility	 with	 international	 financial	markets32.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 an	 important	 decline	 in	 public	 revenues	 from	 tariffs	reduction	 in	many	 low-income	 countries	which	 are	 not	 able	 to	 develop	 alternative	methods	of	revenue	collection;	out	of	96	countries,	import	tariffs	and	other	taxes	on	trade	accounted	for	more	than	five	percent	of	total	revenues	in	58	countries;	in	16	of	these,	 trade	 taxes	 contributed	 more	 than	 25	 percent	 of	 total	 revenues33.	 This	reduction	has	its	effect	on	public	spending	and	public	services	like	health.			Furthermore,	as	we	will	see,	trade	agreements	 limit	the	range	of	policy	instruments	available	 to	governments;	 the	expansion	and	harmonization	of	 Intellectual	Property	Rights	 (IPRs),	 especially	 TRIPS	 and	 “TRIPS-plus”	 endanger	 equitable	 access	 to	patented	 medicines.	 Also,	 while	 IPRs	 are	 believed	 to	 foster	 Research	 and	Development	(R&D)	by	Pharmaceutical	companies	 to	develop	new	medicines,	 these	efforts	go	primarily	 to	combat	mainly	health	problems	and	 illnesses	of	high-income	countries	 without	 low-income	 consumers	 substantially	 benefiting	 of	 the	 prices	 of	patented	medicines.	Although	the	developing	world	suffers	90	percent	of	 the	global	disease	burden,	only	10	percent	of	research	expenditures	target	that	burden.	This	is	due	to	the	poor	economic	incentives	to	make	investments	on	innovative	research	to	
																																																								
32 It is very illustrative of what we are saying, some financial media comments and opinions about Syriza and 
their purposes of ending up with austerity measures (http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2015/01/syriza-and-voodoo-
economics/) 
33 Center, W. (2006). Summary of Proceeding of a Conference on the “Impact of Trade Liberalization on 
Poverty”, organized on 15 April 2006. USAID and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
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cope	with	developing	world	diseases	and	because	developing	countries	have	not	the	necessary	means	and	infrastructures	to	conduct	that	kind	of	research34.				Finally,	 the	 fact	 that	 health	 services	 were	 included	 in	 the	 WTO	 treaty	 (after	 an	insistent	and	powerful	US	corporate	lobbying35)	and	in	spite	of	the	exemption	regime	established	in	the	Annex	1	B	(General	Agreement	on	trade	services),	these	trade	rules	favor	markets	 and	 privatization	 into	 areas	 traditionally	 seen	 as	 essential	 to	 public	welfare	 (health	 care)	 and	 have	 the	 undoubted	 potential	 to	 further	 constrain	 the	ability	of	governments	to	regulate	committed	services	in	the	public	interest.			
Global	Health	and	economic	determinism.		The	 second	 remarkable	 characteristic	 of	 the	 new	 order	 is	 that	 global	 health	“governance”	 is	 more	 and	 more	 determined	 by	 economic	 organizations	 whose	principle	 concern	 is	 not	 health	 but	 other	 objectives	 such	 as	 that	 of	 market	liberalization36.	This	 trend	begun	 in	 the	1980s	where	 the	neo-liberal	 approaches	 to	social	policy,	and	widespread	promotion	of	structural	adjustment	policies	carried	out	by	the	World	Bank	replaced	the	goal	of	providing	universal	comprehensive	primary	care	(enunciated	in	the	Alma-Ata	declaration)	with	the	health	care	systems	reform	as	part	 of	 a	 privatization	 agenda.	 The	 World	 Bank	 became	 the	 arbiter	 of	 health	development	norms37.	Health	is	one	of	the	elements	of	the	agenda	and	program	of	the	World	Bank.	The	Bank	 is	 often	 the	world’s	 largest	 external	 funder	of	 health	having	committed	in	2005	more	than	1	billion	USD	annually	in	new	projects	and	lending38.			The	adverse	effects	of	these	market	oriented	health	policies	have	come	under	severe	criticism	 by	 health	 activists.	 Criticism	 to	 both	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF	 are	
																																																								
34 Pakenham-Walsh, N., & Priestley, C. (2002). Towards equity in global health knowledge. Qjm, 95(7), 469-
473. 
35 Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009). The political economy of the world trading system: the WTO and 
beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
36 Smith, R. The role of economic power in influencing the development of global health governance. See 
supranote 13. 
37 Kickbusch, I. (2000). The development of international health policies—accountability intact?. Social 
Science & Medicine, 51(6), 979-989. 
38 Ruger, J. P. (2005). The changing role of the World Bank in global health. American journal of public health, 
95(1), 60-70. 
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generally	 focused	 on	 the	 approaches	 adopted	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF	 in	formulating	their	policies,	and	the	way	they	are	governed.	This	includes	the	social	and	economic	 impact	 these	 policies	 have	 on	 the	 population	 of	 countries	 who	 avail	themselves	 of	 financial	 assistance	 from	 these	 two	 institutions,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	accountability	for	these	impacts.		Critics	 to	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF	 are	 centered	 on	 the	 ‘conditionalities’	 and	structural	adjustments	imposed	on	borrower	countries.	The	World	Bank	and	the	IMF	often	 attach	 loan	 conditionalities	 based	 on	 what	 is	 termed	 the	 ‘Washington	Consensus’,	 by	 emphasizing	 economic	 management,	 macroeconomic	 stability,	privatization	 of	 nationalized	 industries,	 liberalization	 and	 deregulation	 of	 trade,	investment	 and	 financial	 sector,	 and	 public	 sector	 contraction.	 Often	 the	conditionalities	 are	 attached	 without	 due	 regard	 for	 the	 borrower	 countries’	individual	circumstances	and	 the	prescriptive	recommendations	by	 the	World	Bank	and	 IMF	 fail	 to	 resolve	 the	 economic	 problems	 within	 the	 countries.	 These	conditionalities	 and	 structural	 adjustments	 have	 been	 linked	 with	 negative	 social	outcomes	 such	 as	 reduced	 investment	 in	 public	 health.	 Critics	 argue	 that	 such	programs	reduce	health	care	spending	and	have	deleterious	health	effects39.	UNICEF	already	in	the	eighties	estimated	that	structural	adjustment	programs	may	have	been	associated	with	500.000	deaths	of	young	children	in	a	12-month	period40.			Also,	a	number	of	critics	were	made	on	the	World	Bank’s	health	sector	policies	with	regard	 to	 user	 fees	 (disproportionately	 affecting	 poor	 and	 sick	 people),	 use	 of	DALYs41	 (a	 health	 indicator	 criticized	 for	 ignoring	 equity),	 and	 privatization	 (some	research	shows	that	a	strong	government	is	necessary	to	address	market	failures	that	occur	 in	 financing,	 consuming,	 and	 providing	 both	 personal	 and	 public	 health	services)42.		
																																																								
39 Rao, M. (Ed.). (1999). Disinvesting in health: the World Bank's prescriptions for health. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications India. 
40  UNICEF (1989). The State of the World’s Children. Oxford University Press 16–7 
41 Anand, S., & Hanson, K. (1997). Disability-adjusted life years: a critical review. Journal of health economics, 
16(6), 685-702. 
42  Turshen, M. (1999). Privatizing health services in Africa. Rutgers University Press. 
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On	the	other	hand,	as	expressly	recognized	by	the	WTO	itself	in	the	joint	study	by	the	World	 Trade	 Organization	 and	 the	World	 Health	 Organization	 on	 trade	 and	 public	health	in	august	2012,	the	rules	of	multilateral	free	trade	have	important	implications	for	health43.	The	WTO	role	has	expanded	as	 its	rules	address	 fundamental	 issues	 to	health	such	as	access	to	drugs	and	health	services.	Because	of	 this	and	according	to	some	scholars,	WTO	has	become	the	most	 important	 international	 institution	 in	the	architecture	of	global	health	governance44.	WTO	and	TRIPS	agreements	main	concern	is	not	related	 to	health	but	 to	 trade	 liberalization.	Needless	 to	say	 that	health	holds	the	weaker	position	in	the	health-trade	nexus.		Part	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 this	 international	 institution	 lies	 in	 its	 power	 to	 enforce	compliance	 of	 the	 countries	 with	 WTO	 rules	 and	 thus	 limiting	 national	 choices	 in	public	 health	 policies.	 This	 is	 possible	 through	 the	 celebrated	 Dispute	 Settlement	Understanding	 (DSU)	 which	 envisages	 ultimately	 a	 right	 of	 retaliation	 through	 the	suspension	 of	 trade	 concessions	 or	 obligations	 as	 well	 as	 countermeasures.	 Many	criticisms	 have	 been	 raised	 regarding	 the	 asymmetries	 created	 by	 this	 system	between	 developing	 and	 developed	 countries45.	 In	 effect,	 while	 such	 "retaliatory	measures"	are	a	strong	mechanism	when	applied	by	economically	powerful	countries	like	 the	United	 States	or	 the	European	 Union,	 when	 applied	 by	 economically	 weak	countries	 against	 stronger	 ones,	 they	 can	 often	 be	 ignored.	 The	 critique	 of	 these	retaliation	rules,	from	a	developing-country	perspective,	is	that	developing	countries	with	small	domestic	markets	are	not	able	 to	 impose	sufficient	economic	or	political	losses	within	the	 larger	WTO	Members	to	generate	the	requisite	pressure	to	 induce	compliance.	In	fact,	the	suspension	of	trade	concessions	may	be	more	detrimental	to	the	 developing	 country	 than	 the	 non-complying	 Member.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	common	perception	 that	 shortcomings	 in	 the	WTO	 retaliation	 rules	 undermine	 the	utility	of	WTO	dispute	settlement	for	developing	countries.			
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In	 any	 case,	 the	 DSU	 mechanism	 is	 one	 of	 the	 unique	 features	 of	 the	WTO	 which	permits	this	international	regulation	to	be	profusely	complied	–especially	in	favor	of	the	 commercial	 interests	 of	 the	 developed	 countries-.	 The	 former	 WTO	 Director-General	Mr.	Supachai	Panitchpakdi	characterized	the	WTO	dispute	settlement	system	as	"the	most	active	international	adjudicative	mechanism	in	the	world	today”.		In	contrast,	WHO	is	no	longer	the	“coordinating	authority	for	health”	which	should	be	according	 with	 its	 constitutional	 mandate,	 its	 budget	 is	 insignificant	 within	 the	general	investments	in	global	health	and	it	does	not	enjoy	with	the	binding	powers	of	other	 international	 institutions	 as	 the	 before	 mentioned	 WTO46.	 Thus,	 trade’s	formalized	governance	with	its	important	impact	on	health	has	not	its	counterpart	on	the	 health	 governance	 instruments.	WHO	 lacks	 enforcement	 power	 and	 it	 bases	 its	authority	mainly	on	technical	expertise47.		As	we	will	see,	 the	WHO’s	role	has	raised	a	number	of	critics	about	 its	weakness	as	the	“global	health	conscience”	and	supreme	coordinator	which	is	supposed	to	be	and	which	constitutes	its	foundational	mandate.	It	is	vulnerable	to	bilateral	influence	and	political	pressure,	it	has	no	enforcement	powers	and	it	does	not	hold	the	capacity	to	apply	 the	 international	 law48.	 Also,	 critics	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 too	 focused	 on	 technical	matters	and	vertical	programs,	too	bureaucratic	and	insufficiently	engaged	with	civil	society49.	 Its	 conflicting	 roles	 as	 advocate,	 advisor	 and	 evaluator	 further	 limit	 its	effectiveness	and	its	partnership	with	the	private	sector	might	undermine	its	ability	and	legitimacy	to	set	norms	and	standards.	All	this	may	explain	the	reasons	why	the	record	 of	 member	 state	 compliance	 with	 WHO	 binding	 rules	 and	 non-binding	recommendations	is	poor50.						The	 role	 and	 the	 increasing	 importance	of	 institutions	 such	as	 the	World	Bank,	 the	IMF	and	the	WTO	in	the	field	of	health	are	not	irrelevant	for	health-related	outcomes.																																																									
46 Hashemian, F., & Yach, D. Global Health Functions In The 21st Century. mimeo. 
47 Ng, N. Y., & Ruger, J. P. Global health governance at a crossroads. See supranote 33. 
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In	 effect,	 these	 market-liberalization	 oriented	 institutions	 are	 proving	 to	 be	detrimental	to	advance	and	achieve	the	international	standards	and	aims	to	improve	global	 health	 as	 economic	 liberalization	 does	 not	 necessarily	 support	 poverty-oriented	health	care,	nor	does	public	health	necessarily	improve	under	the	devolution	of	health	responsibilities	to	the	individual	level	when	health’s	determinants	are	also	national	and	global51.		
New	actors	in	the	international	scene	and	Global	Health.	Public-Private	Partnerships.		The	third	feature	of	the	new	regime	of	global	health	is	the	emergence	of	new	actors	in	the	health	field.	The	new	scenario	in	the	field	of	health	politics	began	at	the	end	of	last	century.	Until	then,	nation	states	and	multilateral	organizations	with	state	members	governed	 international	 health52.	 National	 governments	 had	 the	 capacity	 and	sovereignty	to	organize	and	regulate	their	health	systems	according	to	their	national	priorities	 (public/private	 health	 systems;	 universal/partial	 coverage;	 drug	 pricing	and	 patent	 protection…).	 International	 health	 governance	 –also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	multilateral	 health	 regime-	 was	 simple	 with	 a	 few	 actors	 and	 clearer	 lines	 of	responsibility.	 Health	 funding	 was	 mainly	 bilateral	 and	 the	 World	 Health	Organization	(WHO)	coordinated	worldwide	efforts	addressed	to	specific	targets	and	provided	 International	 Health	 Regulations	 (IHRs)	 for	 international	 reporting	 and	handling	 of	 disease	 outbreaks	 and	 developing	 a	 knowledge	 base	 for	 country	information	and	technical	expertise	on	global	health	issues.	The	underlying	premise	for	national	and	international	health	governance	is	that	states	possess	responsibility	for	health53.		Nowadays,	however	 things	have	ostensibly	changed	as	 to	 the	 relevant	actors	 in	 the	domain	 of	 health.	 There	 is	 a	 new	 plethora	 of	 players	 and	 agencies	 financing	 and	affecting	global	health	 issues	and	activities	giving	rise	 to	 “pluralism	 in	 international	
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health”54.	 In	 this	 sense,	 to	 nation	 states	 and	 WHO	 we	 should	 add	 first	 other	multilateral	 organizations,	 namely	 UNICEF,	 UNFPA,	 UNDP	 and	 UNAIDS	 (within	 the	UN	 organizations),	 the	 above	 mentioned	 WTO,	 World	 Bank	 and	 IMF;	 regional	development	banks,	G8/G20,	European	Commission	and	 the	Global	Fund;	 secondly,	Non-Governmental	Organizations	(NGOs)	and	Civil	Society	Organizations	(CSOs)	such	as	Medecins	Sans	Frontiers,	Partners	in	Health,	Red	Cross	or	Rotaly	International	and	last	but	not	least	the	important	private	sector	composed	of	philanthropic	foundations	(Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation,	the	Rockefeller	Foundation),	the	pharmaceutical	transnational	 companies	 whose	 10	 top	 companies	 account	 for	 50	 percent	 of	 the	world	market	and	Public-Private	Partnerships	(PPPs).			As	other	actors	will	deserve	special	attention	in	other	chapters	of	this	dissertation,	it	is	necessary	to	stop	at	this	point	at	the	figure	of	Public-Private	Partnerships	(PPPs).	Some	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 rationale	 for	 global	 PPPs	 in	 health	 is	 that	 they	 are	 a	response	 to	 both	 market	 failure55	 and	 institutional	 failure	 or	 lethargy	 to	 provide	health	care	goods	and	services,	particularly	in	developing	countries.	Others	argue	that	the	 emergence	 and	 growth	 of	 PPPs	 are	 due	 to	 the	 neo-liberalism	 agenda	 and	 neo-liberal	 international	 regime	 addressed	 to	 the	 retrenchment	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 in	social	policy	and	the	increase	of	opportunities	and	invigoration	of	the	private	sector56.	Finally,	 and	 from	 the	 “globalization	 discourse”	 perspective,	 PPPs	 would	 be	 an	“unavoidable	 necessity”	 in	 harnessing	 the	 necessary	 resources	 to	 address	increasingly	complex,	inter-related,	global	health	issues57.			From	this	third	perspective,	PPPs	promise	private	sector	managerial	skills,	expansive	financial	 and	 in-kind	 resources,	 innovation	 and	 the	 always	 mentioned	 efficiency.	Global	 public-private	 partnerships	 (GPPPs)	 in	 health	 would	 have	 been	 created,	purportedly,	as	a	response	to	both	market	and	government	failure	to	provide	health																																																									
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care	goods	and	services,	particularly	 in	developing	countries.	They	are	said	 to	have	been	 created	 to	 address	 issues	 of	 product	 development	 (vaccines	 or	pharmaceuticals),	 improve	 access	 to	 healthcare	 products,	 assist	 with	 global	coordination	mechanisms,	 strengthen	health	 care	 services,	 provide	public	 advocacy	and	education,	and	for	regulatory	and	quality	assurance	purposes58.	Some	celebrate	this	 figure	 as	 an	 extraordinary	 instrument	 to	 overcome	 public	 institutional	 and	market	shortcomings	and	deficiencies59	particularly	in	developing	countries.			From	a	formal	legal	view	a	PPP	is	a	collaborative	relationship	formed	between	at	least	three	 parties:	 1)	 a	 corporation	 or	 industry	 association,	 2)	 intergovernmental	organizations,	 and	 3)	 national	 authorities60.	 It	 covers	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 ventures	involving	 a	 diversity	 of	 arrangements,	 varying	 with	 regard	 to	 participants,	 legal	status,	 governance,	 management,	 policy-setting	 prerogatives,	 contributions	 and	operational	roles.	They	range	from	small,	single-product	collaborations	with	industry	to	 large	 entities	 hosted	 in	 United	 Nations	 agencies	 or	 private	 not-for-profit	organizations61		Despite	the	enthusiasm	and	tolerance	of	PPPs	in	health	by	the	UN	and	international	community,	there	are	no	global	norms	or	guidelines	on	the	matter.	They	operate	in	a	highly	 unregulated	 environment	 and	 fashion	 and	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 serious	evaluation	on	PPPs	impact	and	outcomes	for	health.		PPPs	 operate	 under	 the	 premise	 of	 ‘mutual	 benefit’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 PPPs	 afford	 a	number	of	benefits	to	private	partners	including	direct	financial	returns,	payment	for	services	or	products	or	tax	deductions,	entering	new	markets	and	promotion	of	their	image	and	brand,	corporate	legitimacy	and	authority	with	UN	and	other	institutions62	etc.	Meanwhile,	recipient	countries	get	resources	to	cope	with	national	needs	 in	the	form	of	drugs,	supplies,	services,	or	funds.	Partnerships	also	provide	skills,	expertise,																																																									
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and	management	 to	 health	 interventions.	 For	 example,	 the	 African	 Comprehensive	HIV/AIDS	 partnership	 (ACHAP),	 a	 partnership	 between	 the	 Bill	 and	Melinda	 Gates	Foundation	 and	Merck	Foundation,	 has	 provided	 training	 to	 over	 500	Government,	NGO	 and	 other	 actors	 in	 project	 development,	 monitoring,	 evaluation,	 proposal	development,	media	 training,	and	computer	skills,	as	well	as	 training	 for	over	1200	health	care	workers.			Notwithstanding	 this,	 PPPs	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 increasing	 criticism	 focusing	 on	 the	structure	 and	 governance	 arrangements	 under	 which	 these	 PPPs	 perform	 and	 on	their	 impact	 on	 health	 and	 healthcare	 delivery	 in	 developing	 countries.	 From	 the	critical	school,	it	is	contended	that	PPPs	would	be	part	of	a	broader	hegemonic	shift,	primarily	 discursive,	 which	 acts	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 dominance	 of	development	 theory	 and	 practice.	 The	 depoliticized	 language	 in	much	 of	 the	 policy	research	 and	 official	 documentation	 on	 partnerships,	 these	 critics	 attest,	 falsely	suggests	that	power	relations	within	partnerships	are	equitable	and	benign	–	a	kind	of	‘win–win–win’	scenario	in	which	all	agents	are	party	to	an	absolute	gain63.	As	Buse	and	 Harmer	 state,	 the	 concept	 of	 partnership	 is	 constructed	 through	 a	 dominant	discourse	 as	 ‘natural’,	 inevitable,	 and	 as	 ‘win	 to	 win.’	 Partnerships	 are,	 therefore,	considered	desirable	solutions	to	global	health	crises.	Similarly,	any	negative	impacts	or	 consequences	 are	 regarded	 as	 regrettable	 but	 unavoidable:	 for	 example,	 the	challenges	 of	 coordinating	 a	 proliferation	 of	 initiatives,	 or	 the	 burden	 placed	 on	recipient	 administrations	 in	 terms	 of	 applications,	 monitoring	 and	 reporting.	 The	discursive	 construction	 of	 ‘partnership’	 has	 been	 so	 effective	 that	 criticism	 of	partnership	per	se	is	almost	unthinkable64.		However,	things	are	not	always	what	they	look.		Firstly,	and	regarding	the	arrangements	through	which	they	are	governed;	there	are	concerns	 with	 PPPs	 in	 terms	 of	 real	 and	 potential	 conflict	 of	 interest	 situations,	interfaces	between	institutions	and	structures	of	national	health	governance	and	the	partnerships	 accountability,	 transparency,	 decision-making	 structures	 and																																																									
63 MacLean, S., Brown, S., & Fourie, P. (Eds.). (2009). Health for some: the political economy of global health 
governance. Berlin: Springer. 
64 Buse, K., & Harmer, A. (2004). Power to the Partners?: The politics of public-private health partnerships. 
Development, 47(2), 49-56. 
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participation,	 sustainability,	 and	 outcome	 orientations.	 The	 governing	 boards	 of	various	 PPPs	 are	 mostly	 integrated	 by	 representatives	 of	 major	 pharmaceutical	companies,	 having	 WHO	 a	 marginal	 role.	 Also,	 it	 is	 remarkable	 the	 lack	 of	representation	of	affected	communities	and	NGOs	on	partnership	governing	boards65.	An	 eloquent	 example	 of	 this	 is	 represented	 by	 the	Global	 Alliance	 on	Vaccines	 and	Immunization	(GAVI)	whose	Board	of	Directors	is	made	up	of	two	representatives	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry	versus	one	member	representing	the	WHO.			Some	scholars66	note	that	there	is	not	an	adequate	scrutiny	of	corporate	partners	by	international	public	bodies	for	potential	conflicts	of	interest.	Buse’s	study	notes	that	only	 four	 (4)	 out	 of	 the	 nineteen	 (19)	 partnerships	 in	 his	 study	 undertook	 formal	assessments	 of	 the	 background	 of	 their	 commercial	 partners67.	 Furthermore,	 this	study	also	notes	that	there	is	a	“gross	under	representation	of	southern	stakeholders”	in	 the	governing	arrangements	of	PPPs.	 In	 this	 sense,	most	of	PPPs	secretariats	are	located	 in	 western	 countries	 (particularly,	 USA	 and	 Switzerland).	 Thus,	 it	 seems	difficult	 to	 see	 a	 meaningful	 involvement	 in	 decision-making	 process	 in	 favor	 of	developing	countries	when	the	loci	of	those	processes	are	mainly	located	in	western	countries.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 decision-making	 processes	 are	 increasingly	inaccessible	 to	 the	 public,	 this	 exacerbating	 the	 problems	 of	 transparency68.	 For	instance,	 the	access	 to	 the	Global	PPPs	eventually	accessible	 in	 the	web	page	of	 the	Initiative	for	Public-Private	Partnership	in	Health	(IPPPH)	is	not	available	at	the	time	of	 writing	 this	 dissertation.	Many	 of	 the	materials	 on	 PPPs	 rather	 resemble	 public	relations	 or	 promotional	 materials	 than	 rigorous	 information	 with	 valuable	 and	verifiable	 data.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 PPPs	 information	 on	 their	 annual	 budgets	 or	program	evaluation/impact	documentation.	In	the	above	mentioned	study	carried	by	
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68 Kickbusch, I. (1997). New players for a new era: responding to the global public health challenges. Journal 
of Public health, 19(2), 171-178. 
37		
Buse	 (2004),	 he	 found	 that	 none	 of	 the	 partnerships	with	 independent	 legal	 status	make	available	the	minutes	of	their	deliberations.			Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 PPPs	 often	 report	 on	 quantitative	 data	 (number	 of	 drug	 units	distributed,	the	number	of	personnel	trained,	the	total	funds	distributed,	and	so	on).	There	is	little	information	on	whether	the	PPPs	actually	contribute	to	improvements	in	the	quality	and	efficiency	of	their	pharmaceutical	donations,	product	development	and	in	general,	about	their	performance	in	specific	countries.	Neither	is	there	reliable	information	on	the	potential	problems	or	unintended	side-effects	of	PPPs.	Also,	 it	 is	stated	 that	 there	 is	 poor	 baseline	 data	 upon	 which	 to	 conduct	 research	 on	 the	effectiveness	 of	 partnerships	 in	 their	 specific	 contributions	 to	 health	 or	 health	outcomes69.			Furthermore,	 there	 is	 considerable	debate	on	 the	 issue	of	 accountability	of	PPPs	 in	the	 literature.	 Scholars	 have	 found	 various	 shadows	 to	 the	 accountability	 of	 PPPs	which	 impairs	 their	 legitimacy	 as	 global	 actors	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 health.70	Questions	 are	 raised	 as	 to	 whom	 the	 partners	 are	 actually	 accountable	 to	(stakeholders,	 general	 public,	 national	 states	 or	 international	 agencies);	 the	availability	 and	 employment	 of	 reporting	 mechanisms;	 eventual	 sanctions;	instruments	 of	 evaluation	 of	 their	 performance;	 criteria	 upon	 which	 partners	 are	judged	 on	 measures	 of	 accountability	 and	 many	 other	 questions	 with	 uncertain	answer	which	make	numerous	scholars	conclude	that	many	PPPs	do	not	ensure	that	all	 players	 are	held	 accountable	 for	 the	delivery	of	 efficient,	 effective	 and	equitable	healthcare	services71.		As	to	the	second	type	of	criticism	received	by	PPPs,	there	are	serious	concerns	on	the	impact	 of	 PPPs	 on	 the	 social	 determinants	 of	 health72since	 PPPs	 are	 not	 just	influencing	how	health	priorities	are	financed	but	also	what	is	financed.	In	this	sense,	
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it	is	noted	that	efforts	are	specific	communicable	disease	oriented	rather	than	focused	on	social	determinants	of	health,	national	health	systems	or	preventive	services73.			Also,	 some	observers	questions	whether	drug	donations	are	 sustainable	models	 for	the	provision	of	essential	medicines74.	In	effect,	these	partnerships	operates	based	on	charity	 standards	 of	 health	 rather	 than	 being	 a	model	 of	 health	 based	 on	 rights	 of	citizens	and	the	result	of	a	political	collective	action	for	health.	Populations	depend	on	the	 donor,	 who	 may	 or	 may	 not	 continue	 their	 programs	 upon	 expiration.	 In	 this	respect,	some	of	the	partnerships	do	not	even	have	stated	timelines.	Also,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	accountability	or	binding	undertakings	of	PPPs	 to	be	claimed	by	 their	beneficiaries.	All	this	make	these	entities	unstable	instruments	in	order	to	guarantee	the	provision	of	health	services	to	the	people.		Moreover,	 it	 is	 not	 fully	 considered	 the	 obstacles	 and	 unintended	 side-effects	 of	implementation,	 integration,	 and	management	 of	 partnerships	 with	 existing	 health	governance	structures	and	institutions.	Partnerships	are	said	to	have	the	potential	to	overwhelm	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 national	 health	 system75.	 There	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 skewing	national	priorities	by	PPPs.	For	example,	although	HIV/AIDS	only	accounts	for	5%	of	global	 burden	of	 disease	 (and	overall	 20%	burden	 in	Africa),	 approximately	half	 of	the	total	aid	 flows	for	health	are	spent	on	HIV/AIDS.	 In	this	respect,	malaria	(and	it	disproportionate	 effect	on	 the	poor)	 gets	only	one-twenty	 fifth	of	 that	provided	 for	HIV/AIDS,	being	obviously	underfunded	confronted	with	HIV/AIDS76.			Thus,	partnerships,	particularly	those	 in	developing	countries,	are	 likely	to	confront	inadequate	 health	 infrastructure,	 and	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 overwhelm	 already	overextended	 health	 personnel	 and	 infrastructure.	 Furthermore,	 because	 very	 few	partnerships	actually	address	more	than	one	aspect	of	health	(product	development,	access	 to	 products,	 health	 systems	 and	 services,	 research,	 public	 information	 and																																																									
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advocacy,	 and	 coordination),	 PPPs	 are,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 vertical	 programs	 that	require	 integration	 into	 existing	 health	 infrastructures	 and	 strategies,	 and	 could	possibly	contribute	to	the	fragmentation	of	health	systems77.	In	this	sense,	it	is	argued	that	PPPs	have	the	potential	 to	alter	public	priorities,	redirect	national	policies,	and	shift	public	responsibility	for	health	to	the	private	sector.	Also,	PPPs	may	contribute	to	 the	 further	 commercialization	 and	 privatization	 of	 health	 governance	 by	weakening	 the	 role	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 in	 providing	 essential	 health	 services	 and	treatments	and	by	transferring	this	responsibility	to	private	sectors	partners.			In	 this	 sense,	 questions	 are	 raised	 on	 whether	 PPPs	 are	 not	 eroding	 the	 national	state’s	capacity	and	autonomy	to	deliver	health	services.	PPPs	may	be	just	a	new	form	of	developing	country	dependency	on	developed	countries.		Given	that	very	few	of	the	partnerships	 involve	 real	 transfers	 in	knowledge,	or	building	of	new	 infrastructure,	and	 that	 the	 intellectual	 property	 generated	 by	 these	 partnerships	 (i.e.	 in	 vaccine	development)	 will	 be	 largely	 retained	 by	 researchers	 in	 the	 north,	 some	 authors	wonder	 how	 these	 partnerships,	 beyond	 the	 value-added	 component,	 contribute	 to	the	building	of	equitable,	sustainable	health	systems	in	developing	countries.78			Other	 “collateral”	 disadvantage	 of	 these	 PPP	 funds	 are	 their	 capacity	 to	 whet	 the	industry’s	appetite	for	otherwise	“unpatented”	countries.	In	this	sense,	funds	such	as	the	Global	Fund	have	 created	new	markets	 for	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry.	Where	previously	there	might	have	been	no	incentives	to	apply	for	AIDS	patents	in	countries	with	 poor	 purchasing	 power,	 fresh	 funding	 of	 those	 affluent	 donors	 has	 awaken	companies’	interest	in	seeking	patents	in	those	countries.			Last	but	not	 least,	 there	are	reasonable	concerns	over	excessive	corporate	influence	in	 setting	 the	 global	 health.	 It	 is	 noted	 that	 partnerships	 have	 increased	 corporate	influence	 in	policy	making	at	 global	 and	national	 levels79.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	 argued	that	PPPs	pose	a	 risk	 to	 the	 “integrity,	 independence,	and	reputation”	of	 the	United	
																																																								
77 Nishtar, S. Public–private 'partnerships' in health–a global call to action. See supranote 64.   
78 Brown, S. (2008). Global public-private partnerships for pharmaceuticals: operational and normative 
features, challenges, and prospects. Canadian Public Administration Journal. 
79 Richter, J. . Public–private Partnerships for Health: A trend with no alternatives?. See supranote 72. 
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Nations.	Also,	some	authors80question	the	appropriateness	of	using	public	money	(in	the	partnership	arrangements)	 to	 support	 corporate	 legitimacy.	These	partnerships	open	 up	 considerable	 space	 for	 private	 sector	 influence	 in	 global	 health	 decision-making,	and	could	potentially	undermine	traditional	support	for	the	UN.	Finally,	some	authors81	claim	that	 there	 is	a	need	 for	 “consensus	about	 the	underlying	moral	and	ethical	principles	that	guide	global	health	cooperation”.			Therefore,	we	should	conclude	that	there	are	yet	many	questions	on	the	advantages	and	virtues	of	 the	PPPs	 in	order	 to	 consider	 them	as	 a	 valid	 instrument	 to	provide	people	with	more,	better	and	affordable	health.			Together	with	the	emergence	of	new	actors,	the	last	feature	of	the	new	institutional	architecture	of	global	health	would	be	the	lack	of	coordination	between	the	different	actors	this	leading	to	an	increasingly	fragmented,	uncoordinated	and	disparate	global	health	agenda	creating	a	 leadership	gap.	The	 large	plethora	of	 actors	 in	 the	 field	of	health	 are	 operating	 within	 multiple	 more	 uncoordinated	 frameworks	 affecting	health	at	both	national	and	global	levels	without	sharing	a	common	aim,	discourse	or	inner	 coherence	 for	 resource	mobilization	 and	 priority	 setting	 purposes.	 A	 lack	 of	clear	structure	and	the	blurring	of	responsibility	are	therefore	characteristics	of	the	new	 scenario.	 There	 is	 no	 a	 clear	 architecture	 of	 global	 health82,	 there	 is	 no	 an	integrated	 and	 systematic	 approach	 to	 global	 health.	 Neither	 is	 there	 formalized	governance	 regulating	 it.	 As	we	 have	mentioned	 before,	 the	WHO	 is	 no	 longer	 the	major	source	of	knowledge	neither	is	the	supreme	coordinating	body	of	health.	This	state	 of	 facts	which	has	 been	 called	by	 some	 authors	 as	 “pluralism	 in	 international	health”83could	 rather	 reveal	 a	 state	 of	 anarchy	 or	 at	 least	 of	 a	 sort	 of	 unstructured	plurality.			As	 the	 Dean	 of	 the	 Harvard	 School	 of	 Public	 Health	 argued	when	 speaking	 on	 the	influx	 of	 new	 actors	 and	 approaches	 into	 global	 health,	 “there’s	 one	missing	 piece.																																																									
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There’s	no	architecture	of	global	health”84.	Some	authors	claim	that	it	is	wrong	to	use	the	term	architecture	to	describe	a	situation	which	does	not	have	to	do	with	the	“old	school	anarchy”	used	by	international	relations	academia	to	refer	the	difficulties	for	the	states	to	create	and	maintain	collective	action85.	According	to	these	authors,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	use	the	term	of	“open	source	anarchy”	which	better	describe	the	different	 anarchy	 problem	 governance	 in	 international	 relations	 nowadays.	 Open-source	anarchy	describes	anarchy,	as	a	governance	space,	as	accessible	to,	and	shaped	by	states	but	also	by	non-state	actors.			The	objective	of	this	new	paradigm	“open	source”	anarchy	is	said	to	go	beyond	highly	structured	architecture	 towards	 a	purposeful	plurality.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 thinking	of	global	health	governance	 in	 terms	of	applying	a	source	code	as	opposed	to	building	architecture	better	reflects	the	opportunities	and	constraints	created	for	global	health	by	open-source	anarchy.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 see	 the	utility	of	 this	conceptual	framework	except	in	the	case	we	want	to	legitimize	the	established	order	which	 -as	 the	 author	 recognizes-,	 prioritizes	 approaches	 grounded	 in	 security	 and	economic	policy	rather	than	rights-based	or	humanitarian	thinking,	this	all	resulting	in	an	uncoordinated,	suboptimal	and	even	regressive	governance.			Some	authors	claim	that	the	new	global	health	regime,	its	decentralization,	and	non-hierarchical	 character	 is	 actually	 promoting	 efficiency	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	specialization	of	 the	different	actors,	 this	 reducing	 the	overlapping	 tasks	associated	with	regime	complexity86.	However,	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	in	the	field	of	health.	According	to	a	study	carried	out	by	the	University	of	Oxford87,	the	pluralism	of	
global	 health	 institutions	 and	 the	 informal	 alliances	 on	which	 power	 in	 global	 health	
rests	make	a	unified	and	fully	coordinated	health	system	highly	unlikely.	Contributions	made	 by	 the	 four	 largest	 donors	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health,	 i.e.,	 the	World	 Bank,	 Bill	 &	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	(BMGF),	the	US	Government,	and	the	Global	Fund	to	Fight	HIV/AIDS,	 Tuberculosis	 and	 Malaria,	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 far	 from	 achieving	 an																																																									
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optimal	 allocation	 of	 resources.	 Also,	 the	 study	 interestingly	 notes	 that	 this	inefficiency	 is	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 transparency	 as	 to	 what	 and	 how	 is	 financed	 and,	specially	that	these	donations	or	loans	do	not	comply	with	the	concept	of	ownership	as	defined	in	the	Paris	Declaration	of	2005,	i.e.,	they	do	not	explicitly	incorporate	the	demands	of	the	governments	or	citizens	of	the	developing	country	where	the	aids	are	assigned.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 these	 money	 flows	 could	 even	 unduly	 distort	 national	plans.		As	the	mentioned	research	notes,	the	inclination	of	donors	to	repeatedly	create	new	initiatives,	like	the	parallel	priorities	and	delivery	of	care	by	donors,	weakens	national	strategies.	 This	 difficulty	 was	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 transparency	 among	donors,	 and	 restricted	 awareness	 by	 health	 ministries	 about	 what	 donors	 were	directing	funds	to.	As	one	minister	said	about	donors,	“they	like	to	monitor	activities,	but	 they	 do	 not	 like	 to	 be	 monitored	 and	 evaluated”.	 Similar	 conclusions	 were	reached	by	another	research	analyzing	international	health	financing	in	India,	Brazil	and	Russia.88		The	 UN	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals	 (SDGs)	 which	 supersedes	 the	 Millennium	Development	 Goals	 (MDGs)	 is	 not	 either	 very	 encouraging	 in	 this	 respect.	 SDGs	embrace	somehow	the	principles	and	values	of	the	market	oriented,	pro	corporation	globalization	 process.	 SDGs	 lack	 consistency	 in	 distinguishing	 between	 health	delivery	 and	 policies	 in	 other	 sectors	 to	 realize	 health	 outcomes,	 specially	 poverty	and	 equality	 -between	 countries	 and	 within	 countries-.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 keeps	 the	framing	 of	 health	 policies	 as	 a	 sum	 or	 fragmented,	 piecemeal	 patches	 and	interventions	 addressed	 to	 deal	with	 specific	 technical	 issues	 and	 diseases	without	having	the	general	picture	of	health	and	its	diverse	manifestations	in	other	fields.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 it	 does	 not	 ensure	 accountability	 for	 the	 new	 actors	 while	 also	promoting	 country	 ownership.	 Finally,	 there	 is	 no	 articulation	 of	 a	 rights-based	approach	in	the	health	goal89.																																																										
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In	summary,	Global	Health	is	deepening	inequalities	between	states	and	within	states;	the	loss	of	sovereignty	and	maneuver	of	states	is	deteriorating	public	health	as	long	as	other	public	policies	aimed	at	reaching	equality	goals;	the	approach	of	health	made	by	 the	 market-oriented	 forces	 running	 the	 globalization	 process	 is	 focused	 on	considering	health	as	a	commodity	and	a	business	opportunity	to	 innovate	and	find	new	market	niches.	Health	products	and	services	have	been	deprived	of	their	social	dimension	for	public	health.	There	is	a	current	tendency	of	ignoring	the	clear	linkage	between	 health	 and	 socioeconomic	 equity.	 Ill	 health	 is	 now	 viewed	 as	 a	 cause	 of	poverty	due	to	the	low	productivity	that	generates.	Trying	to	improve	health	without	taking	 into	 account	 socioeconomic	 factors	 of	 population	 constitutes	 an	 obvious	absurdity	 for	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 advance	 in	 health	 without	 ensuring	 some	minimal	 living	conditions	of	people.	On	the	other	hand,	state-centered	 international	health	has	given	way	to	GHG	where	new	actors	have	emerged	and	have	become	active	in	 the	 field	 of	 health.	 It	 seems	difficult	 to	 say	 that	 current	GHG	 is	 advancing	public	health,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 addressing	 health	 of	 people,	 this	 including	 the	 conditions	 to	maintain	 a	 mental	 and	 physical	 well-being,	 from	 an	 integral	 and	 all	 the	 factors	approach.	This	 approach	 is	 crucial	 to	ensure	 the	 full	 realization	of	human	potential	and	 dignity.	 Maybe	 one	 of	 the	 failures	 of	 GHG	 is	 thinking	 that	 it	 responds	 to	 a	previous	plan	and	 strategy	when	contrarily,	 it	 is	merely	descriptive	and	 sometimes	ideologically	 oriented	 of	 a	 set	 of	 given	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 which	 reveals	 -in	terms	of	public	health-	an	anarchy	full	of	inefficiencies	and	shortcomings.				 	
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2.2.	 TRIPS	regime	and	access	to	medicines.	An	introduction.		
Globalization	and	access	to	medicines.		Access	to	medicines	is	considered	as	a	cornerstone	of	the	enjoyment	of	the	rights	to	health	and	life.	Also,	it	constitutes	one	fundamental	component	of	the	human	right	to	health	-as	the	right	of	everyone	to	the	enjoyment	of	the	highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	health-.	The	process	described	above	as	globalization	has	had	an	undoubted	impact	on	the	access	to	medicines	around	the	world.			The	 normative	 basis	 of	 this	 right	 is	 well	 acknowledged	 in	 the	 Preamble	 of	 WHO	constitution,	art.	25	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	of	1948,	in	article	 12	 of	 the	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Economic,	 Social	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	(ICESCR)	 and	 the	 general	 comment	 No.	 14	 (2000)	 made	 by	 the	 Committee	 on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	in	its	interpretation	of	the	normative	content	of	article	12,	the	1978	Alma	Ata	Declaration	as	long	as	many	other	national	constitutions	which	 indirectly	 (135	 constitutions	 include	 the	 right	 to	 health)	 or	 directly	 (Syria,	Philippines,	Peru	and	Mexico)	recognize	the	access	to	medicines	as	a	citizenry’s	right.	This	 right	 implies	 that	 medicines	 should	 be	 made	 available,	 accessible,	 affordable,	acceptable	and	of	good	quality	to	everyone.		Notwithstanding	 that,	 there	 is	 a	 huge	 discrepancy	 between	 this	 praiseworthy	 legal	desideratum	and	the	reality.	According	to	the	Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	right	of	everyone	to	the	enjoyment	of	the	highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	 health90,	 massive	 inequalities	 remain	 in	 access	 to	 health	 services	 and	medicines	around	the	world.	In	particular	and	regarding	access	to	medicines,	nearly	2	billion	people	lack	access	to	essential	medicines,	i.e.	a	third	of	the	world’s	population,	living	 mainly	 in	 developing	 countries,	 still	 do	 not	 have	 regular	 access	 to	 essential	medicines.	 A	 report	 from	 WHO	 and	 Health	 Action	 International	 on	 the	 results	 of	surveys	undertaken	in	36	countries	reported	that	in	the	public	sector	only	one	third																																																									
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highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover. Human Rights Council, Fourteenth 
session, Agenda item, 3. 
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of	essential	medicines	needed	were	available	and	in	the	private	sector	only	two	thirds	of	such	medicines	were	available91.	In	the	context	of	HIV,	as	of	2007,	only	31	per	cent	of	 people	 living	with	HIV	who	 needed	 treatment	 received	 it92.	 Improving	 access	 to	medicines	could	save	10	million	lives	a	year,	4	million	in	Africa	and	South	East	Asia.		Furthermore,	 in	 developing	 countries,	 patients	 themselves	 pay	 for	 50-90%	 of	 the	price	of	essential	medicines;	 this	 is	one	of	 the	reasons	why	over	100	million	people	fall	 into	 poverty	 annually	 because	 they	 have	 to	 pay	 for	 health	 care93Public	 health	spending	in	both	high	and	low	income	countries	benefits	the	rich	more	than	the	poor.	People	with	the	most	means	and	often	with	less	need	consume	the	most	care,	while	those	with	the	least	means	and	most	need	consume	the	least	care94.	As	it	was	noted	in	 the	2015	Social	 Forum	organized	by	 the	UN	Office	of	 the	High	Commissioner	 for	Human	 Rights	 (OHCHR),	 the	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 medicines	 is	 now	 also	 affecting	developed	 country	 populations,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 in	 the	 United	States.		Also	 and	 following	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 UN	 International	 Narcotics	 Control	 Board	 for	2014,	 three	 quarters	 of	 the	 world	 population	 has	 no	 access	 to	 proper	 pain	 relief	treatment,	 i.e.	around	5.5	billion	people	still	have	 limited	or	no	access	 to	medicines	containing	narcotic	drugs	such	as	codeine	or	morphine,	which	went	on	to	point	out	that	around	92	per	cent	of	all	morphine	used	worldwide	is	consumed	by	only	17	per	cent	of	 the	world	population,	primarily	 living	 in	 the	United	States,	Canada,	Western	Europe,	Australia	and	New	Zealand.		The	inability	of	populations	to	access	medicines	has	different	dimensions;	first,	as	we	will	see,	drugs	for	poor	population	are	neglected	by	current	pharmaceutical	research	–only	a	small	percentage	of	total	health	R&D	is	for	neglected	disease;	second,	control	measures	 of	 drugs	 and	 the	 absence,	 scarcity	 or	 poor	 conditions	 of	 health																																																									
91 Cameron, A., Ewen, M., Ross-Degnan, D., Ball, D., & Laing, R. (2009). Medicine prices, availability, and 
affordability in 36 developing and middle-income countries: a secondary analysis. The lancet, 373(9659), 240-
249. 
92 World Health Organization, & Unicef. (2009). Towards universal access: scaling up priority HI. 
93 World Health Organization. (2014). The World Health Report 2008: Primary health care (now more than 
ever). 
94 Ibid. 
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infrastructures	 in	 developing	 countries	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 local	 production	 of	pharmaceuticals	and;	third,	high	costs	of	medicines	due	to	pricing	policies	(external	reference	pricing	(ERP),	therapeutic	reference	pricing	(TRP),	as	well	as	the	regulation	of	 manufacturers’	 selling	 price	 and	 distributor’s	 mark-ups)	 and	 the	 monopolistic	prices	 of	 some	 medicines	 under	 patent	 rights	 and	 other	 proprietary	 rights	 –affordable	 access	 for	 the	 poor	 would	 reduce	 profitability	 for	 patent	 owners	 and	allegedly	 the	 incentives	 for	 investing	 in	 pharmaceutical	 research-.	 Within	 the	different	 and	 somehow	 complex	 variables	 which	 determine	 and	 condition	 the	accessibility	 to	medicines	we	will	 focus	 on	 their	 protection	 by	 IPRs	 as	 they	 have	 a	significant	bearing	on	their	production,	price,	distribution	and	access	to	medicines.			As	 the	 above	 cited	 Report	 of	 the	 special	 Rapporteur	 (2013)	 indicates,	 market-oriented	 approaches	 to	medicines	 in	 a	 highly	 competitive	 global	marketplace	 often	project	issues	related	to	access	to	medicines	as	a	matter	of	profit	rather	than	a	public	health	 concern.	 While	 it	 is	 understandable	 that	 private	 pharmaceutical	 companies	should	 follow	 such	 an	 approach,	 there	 is	 a	 growing	need	 for	 States	 to	 balance	 that	market-driven	perspective	by	positioning	access	 to	medicines	 in	 the	 right-to-health	framework.	 According	 with	 the	 report,	 this	 could	 be	 only	 faced	 by	 shifting	 the	dominant	 market-oriented	 paradigm	 on	 access	 to	 medicines	 towards	 a	 right-to-health	paradigm.		
Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS)	and	access	to	medicines.			During	 the	 recent	 2015	 UN	 Social	 Forum	 organized	 by	 the	 UN	 Office	 of	 the	 High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	Professor	Lisa	Forman	focused	on	how	IPRs	has	had	an	 impact	 on	 drugs	 pricing,	 illustrated	 by	 the	 increase	 of	 the	 price	 of	medicines	 in	Malaysia	 of	 28	 per	 cent	 per	 year	 between	 1996	 and	 2005	 following	 the	implementation	of	TRIPS.				Pharmaceuticals	 pricing	 remain	 a	 key	 impediment	 to	 the	 access	 of	 population	 to	essential	 medicines.	 In	 this	 regard,	 needless	 to	 say	 that	 IPRs	 have	 an	 important	impact	 on	 the	 drug	 pricing	 and	 affordability	 of	 medicines.	 Patents	 and	 other	
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proprietary	and	exclusive	rights	confer	 to	 their	owners	a	 legal	monopoly	 to	market	their	medicines,	thus,	creating	artificial	scarcity	of	 intangible	assets	which	in	fact	do	not	deplete	when	shared.	The	monopolist	 is	a	price	maker	–in	contrast	with	a	price	taker	 in	 a	 competitive	 market-	 and	 seeks	 the	 maximum	 profit	 by	 producing	 and	selling	 a	 lesser	 quantity	 of	 goods	 at	 a	 higher	 price	 than	 companies	 would	 do	 in	 a	competitive	 market.	 The	 economic	 reasoning	 of	 the	 market	 logic	 tells	 us	 that	 the	monopolist	or	the	pharmaceutical	patent	owner’s	target	is	not	reaching	or	meeting	as	big	demand	or	number	of	consumers	as	possible	or	selling	as	many	units	of	products	as	 possible	 but	 maximizing	 profit	 with	 an	 optimal	 output	 and	 this	 is	 normally	obtained	 by	 selling	 to	 a	 “few	 and	 affluent	 people”	 at	 a	 high	 price	 that	 to	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 individuals	 at	 a	 lower	 price.	 Therefore,	 for	 the	 patent	 owner	 the	remaining	80	per	cent	of	humankind	is	simply	not	worthwhile	because	the	patentee	would	 lose	more	 from	 the	necessary	price	 reduction	 than	 it	would	gain	 through	an	increased	sales	volume.95									The	absence	of	patent	protection	for	medicines	in	some	countries	has	enabled	many	developing	 countries	 to	 have	 access	 to	 medicines	 at	 an	 affordable	 price	 either	because	of	their	own	local	production	or	by	importing	generic	versions	of	medicines	from	 third	 countries.	 India	 had	 become	 an	 international	 pharmacy,	 being	 home	 of	important	 pharmaceutical	 manufacturing	 firms,	 which	 used	 to	 supply	 developing	countries	 with	 cheap	 generic	 versions	 of	 medicines	 that	 were	 patented	 in	 the	developed	 world.	 Also,	 the	 non-patentability	 of	 pharmaceutical	 products	 gave	 the	opportunity	 to	many	 countries	 such	 as	 Italy	 and	 Spain	 to	 acquire	 basic	 technology	and	 imitate	 products	 patented	 in	 industrialized	 countries	 through	 reverse	engineering,	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 their	 populations	with	 pharmaceuticals	 at	 a	 lower	cost	and	to	develop	their	own	technology	and	then	incipient	pharmaceutical	industry.	Spanish	Industrial	Property	policy	was	designed	to	encourage	industrial	development	through	 emphasizing	 technology	 acquisition	 from	 abroad,	 domestic	 information	diffusion,	 and	 incremental	 innovation.	Nothing	 of	 this	would	 be	 possible	 nowadays	following	the	restrictive	pro-patent	protection	adopted	by	most	of	the	world	nations	following	TRIPS.																																																										
95 Pogge, T., Rimmer, M., & Rubenstein, K. (Eds.). (2010). Incentives for global public health: patent law and 
access to essential medicines. Cambridge University Press. 
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	The	Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	(TRIPS)	 is	the	Annex	1C	of	the	Marrakesh	Agreement	Establishing	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO),	 signed	 in	 Marrakesh,	 Morocco	 on	 15	April	1994.	 It	 is	 therefore	 an	 integral	part	 of	 the	 WTO.	 TRIPS	 provisions	 which	 apply	 to	 all	 members,	 are	 composed	 of	seven	major	parts	and	73	articles	and	they	cover	copyrights	and	related	rights	(rights	of	performers,	broadcasters	and	phonogram	producers),	layout-designs	of	integrated	circuits,	 geographical	 origin	 indications,	 trademarks,	 industrial	 designs	 and	 most	importantly	 for	our	purposes,	 protected	undisclosed	 information	 (business	 secrets)	and	patents.	TRIPS	sets	down	minimum	substantive	standards	of	protection	 for	 the	before	mentioned	rights;	it	establishes	procedures	and	remedies	which	have	to	be	put	in	 place	 by	 member	 states	 to	 effectively	 enforce	 IPRs	 and;	 it	 extends	 basic	 GATT	principles	such	as	transparency	and	nondiscrimination	to	IPRs.		Despite	the	fact	that	there	was	a	long	tradition	of	international	norms	governing	IPRs	issues	 (specially	 the	 Paris	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Industrial	 Property	 of	1883	 or	 the	 Berne	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Literary	 and	 Artistic	Works	 of	1886),	 they	 were	 focused	 largely	 on	 non-discrimination,	 national	 treatment	 and	procedural	issues.	In	this	respect,	as	there	were	countries	adopting	full	IP	protection	in	 the	 field	 of	 pharmaceutical	 research	 –granting	 patents	 to	 process	 and	 products-	there	 were	 some	 other	 countries	 which	 kept	 the	 pharmaceutical	 field	 free	 from	patents	 or	 which	 permitted	 generic	 or	 national	 producers	 to	 imitate	 foreign	pharmaceuticals	(in	Spain	for	example	before	1986	new	Patent	Act,	there	existed	the	so-called	“national	novelty”	as	one	of	the	patentability	requirements,	which	permitted	to	national	producers	to	get	national	patents	based	on	foreign	patents).	 	At	the	time	that	negotiations	for	TRIPS	began,	over	40	countries	in	the	world	did	not	grant	patent	protection	for	pharmaceutical	products.		All	this	was	changed	in	1994.	This	somehow	surprising	insertion	of	this	body	of	law	into	the	WTO	was	eventually	to	overcome	the	difficulties	of	reaching	consensus	and	compliance	within	a	single-focus	organization	such	as	the	World	Intellectual	Property	Organization	 (WIPO),	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 reciprocity	 and	 conflicting	 interests	 between	countries	 which	 are	 mainly	 importers	 and	 those	 which	 are	 mainly	 exporters	 of	
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information-based	 products	 and	 services96.	 Unlike	 other	 trade	 negotiations,	 the	TRIPS	 negotiations	 were	 not	 about	 freeing	 trade	 but	 about	 changing	 domestic	regulatory	and	legal	regimes.97Under	the	WTO	framework,	adherence	to	TRIPS	is	not	only	required	of	every	WTO	member	or	future	one	but	also	enforceable	through	the	WTO’s	 Understanding	 on	 Dispute	 Settlement	 (DSU)	 and	 adjudicative	 mechanism,	administered	 by	 the	 Dispute	 Settlement	 Board	 (DSB)	 and	 an	 Appellate	 Body	 to	entertain	 appeals	 from	 Panel	 decisions	 and	 trade	 sanctions	 for	 non-compliance	 –which	become	much	more	effective	and	deterrent	for	developing	countries,	many	of	which	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 exportations	 of	 their	 raw	 materials	 to	 western	markets-.	Except	for	the	exceptions	and	flexibilities	we	will	see	later,	the	fact	that	art.	27	of	TRIPS	requires	that	protection	be	accorded	in	all	fields	of	technology,	prevents	WTO	members	from	excluding	pharmaceuticals	from	the	purview	of	protection.			There	 has	 been	 an	 important	 controversy	 between	 observers	 who	 are	 concerned	about	the	validity	and	fairness	of	“one	size	fit	all”	aspect	of	the	TRIPS	without	regard	to	the	diverse	and	different	socio-economic	conditions	and	development	stage	of	each	member	 state98.	 Even	 some	 economists	 who	 are	 in	 favor	 of	 TRIPS	 highlight	 the	complex	relationship	between	IPR	protection	and	economic	development,	suggesting	that	 strengthening	 IPRs	may	expand	growth	prospects	under	certain	 circumstances	but	 may	 offer	 no	 improvement,	 or	 even	 retard	 conditions	 for	 development,	 under	other	circumstances99.		Even	 though	 in	 theory	 TRIPS	 encompasses	 a	 minimum	 standards	 regime	 which	formally	 gives	 its	 members	 the	 freedom	 to	 “customize”	 and	 tailor	 their	 domestic	norms	to	their	specific	needs	(art.	1.1	TRIPS)	the	truth	is	that	as	it	is	been	observed	by	some	analysts,	a	 formalistic	application	of	TRIPS,	 the	subtle	surveillance	and	the	
sotto	 voce	 threat	 by	 powerful	 countries	 to	 developing	 countries	 are	 tightly	constraining	 the	 autonomy	 of	 states	 to	 regulate	 and	 elaborate	 their	 domestic	
																																																								
96 Ryan, M. P. (1998). Knowledge diplomacy: global competition and the politics of intellectual property. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
97 Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. See supranote 41. 
98 Dreyfuss, R. C. (2009). TRIPS and essential medicines: must one size fit all? Making the WTO responsive 
to the global health crisis. 
99 Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual property rights in the global economy. Washington DC: Peterson Institute. 
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legislation	 in	 coherence	 with	 their	 interests	 and	 evolution	 and	 necessities	 of	 their	population	and	industrial	sector100.			Taking	into	account	that	developing	countries	are	generally	net	importers	of	IPRs	and	intangible	assets,	TRIPS	scheme	seem	clear	 in	 favor	of	developed	nations	which	are	IPRs	 exporters	 and	 have	 legislation	 that	 meet	 whichever	 minimum	 standard	 is	adopted.	Therefore	and	except	 for	the	presumed	effect	of	enhancing	 innovation	and	incentive	medical	 research	 and	 technology	 transfer,	 TRIPS	 has	 adverse	 distributive	effects	since	it	shifts	wealth	from	developing	nations	to	the	developed	economies.			The	inclusion	of	TRIPS	-and	this	prima	facie	unfair	Agreement	for	developing	nations-	into	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 WTO	 was	 the	 result	 of	 intense	 lobbying	by	 the	United	States	 and	 its	 pharmaceutical	 and	 media	 firms,	 supported	 by	 the	European	Union,	Japan	and	 other	developed	 nations	 at	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	 negotiations101.	 In	effect,	 the	 ideological	 impulse	 of	 TRIPS	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 1982	 when	 Barry	MacTaggart,	 then	 chairman	 and	 President	 of	 Pfizer	 International	 published	 an	opinion	 piece	 in	 the	 New	 York	 Times	 claiming	 for	 a	 global	 strategy.	 As	 profusely	explained	by	some	scholars102,	this	document	reflects	the	shift	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry	toward	a	strategy	for	a	global	protection	of	IPRs	and	encompasses	much	of	the	 industry	 thinking	 in	 blaming	 foreign	 states	 for	 allegedly	 stealing	 American	inventions.	As	we	will	see,	one	of	the	most	effective	action	of	pro-IPRs	lobbyists	was	to	make	a	link	between	IPRs	protection	and	legitimate	trade.		The	 global	 scope	 of	 the	 IPRs	 through	 the	 TRIPS	was	 part	 of	 an	 expanding	 strategy	mainly	of	the	American	industry	aimed	at	strengthening	their	exclusive	rights.	It	was	preceded	domestically	by	the	creation	of	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Federal	Circuit.	This	 law	 court	 has	 developed	 and	 extremely	 pro-patent	 jurisprudence	 rarely	mentioning	 the	 word	 monopoly,	 upholding	 the	 interests	 of	 alleged	 innovators	 by	granting	 them	 large	 scale	 compensatory	damages	 and	permanent	 injunctions.	Once																																																									
100 Dinwoodie, G. B., & Dreyfuss, R. C. (2004). TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. 
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51		
consolidated	a	pro-patent	domestic	practice	and	law,	the	global	strategy	was	the	logic	step	forward	in	a	gradual	agenda	pushed	by	the	American	pharmaceutical	industry	to	maximize	business	profits.	According	to	many,	the	TRIPS	Agreement	was	the	result	of	the	will	of	 large	US	corporations	 in	order	to	obtain	rent	 for	developed	nations	from	two	 emerging	 sectors	 and	 technologies,	 digital	 technology	 (through	 copyright,	patents	 and	protection	 for	 layout	 designs)	 and	biotechnology	 (through	patents	 and	trade	secrets)103.	In	addition	to	this,	the	expanding	somehow,	“insatiable”	strategy	of	pharmaceutical	 corporations	 is	 far	 from	 coming	 to	 an	 end.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 US	Department	 of	 Commerce	was	 required	 to	 review	 and	 analyze	 whether	 the	 use	 of	price	controls,	reference	pricing	and	other	measures	could	constitute	a	burden	to	free	trade	 as	 a	 nontariff	 barrier,	 suggesting	 that	 those	 barriers	 are	 detrimental	 for	 US	consumers	in	terms	of	higher	prices	for	their	medicines104.			As	 we	 will	 analyze	 more	 deeply,	 one	 may	 wonder	 how	 developing	 countries	consented	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 this	 unbalanced	 international	 Agreement.	 In	 fact,	 TRIPS	were	only	reluctantly	accepted	by	developing	countries	in	exchange	of	the	prospect	of	better	market	 access	 for	 their	 textile,	 clothing	 and	 agricultural	 products.	 India	 and	Brazil	 which	 were	 home	 of	 large	 generic	 pharmaceutical	 industries,	 were	 against	TRIPS,	on	the	basis	of	considering	that	this	Agreement	would	burden	the	provision	of	affordable,	 essential	 medicines	 which	 would	 hurt	 their	 domestic	 industries	 in	 the	field.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 US,	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 Japan	 defended	altogether	the	signature	of	TRIPS.	They	put	its	signature	as	the	first	condition	to	the	main	WTO	Agreement	and	annexes.						In	 exchange	 of	 adherence	 to	 TRIPS,	 developing	 nations	 were	 promised	 to	 have	greater	 access	 to	 agricultural	 markets	 of	 developed	 countries	 markets.	 Ironically,																																																									
103 Drahos, P., & Braithwaite, J. (2002). Information feudalism: Who owns the knowledge economy?. London: 
Earthscan. 
104 The study which can be found at (http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf) was published 
under the title “Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD Countries Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, 
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TRIPS	have	also	increased	proprietary	rights	of	developed	countries	companies	over	plants	 and	 seeds	 and	 phytosanitary	 restrictions	 are	 used	 as	 indirect	 barriers	 to	developing	 countries	 agricultural	 products.	 Also,	 developing	 countries	 were	persuaded	 that	 TRIPS	 and	 IPRS	 new	 standards	 of	 protection	 shall	 foster	 their	innovation	 process,	 local	 production,	 foreign	 investment	 and	 technology	 transfer	north-south.	As	we	will	see,	after	20	years	of	TRIPS,	there	are	important	shadows	in	relation	with	the	announced	outcomes	and	virtues	of	this	Agreement.				Paradoxically	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 impact	 of	 TRIPS	 on	 health,	WHO	did	 not	participate	into	the	negotiations	leading	to	the	signature	of	TRIPS.	Consequently,	not	traditionally	health-related	institutions	such	as	the	WTO	have	gained	an	undisguised	role	in	world	health	through	its	determinant	role	regarding	health	services	and	access	to	 medicines.	 In	 this	 respect,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 previously,105	 from	 the	international	legal	perspective,	the	center	of	power	for	global	health	governance	has	shifted	 from	WHO	 to	WTO.	 Neither	 is	 provided	 in	 TRIPS	 any	 previous	 analysis	 or	balance	on	the	impact	and	cost	that	protection	of	certain	pharmaceuticals	may	have	on	public	health	of	the	countries	where	it	is	to	be	implemented.					 	
																																																								
105 Fidler, D., & World Health Organization. (2002). Global health governance: overview of the role of 
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2.3.	 Internal	exceptions	and	limitations	to	the	implementation	of	IPRs	under	
TRIPS.			
TRIPS	explicit	limitations	and	exceptions.		Within	 the	 legal	 tradition	of	both	national	and	 international	 law	of	 IPRs,	exceptions	and	 limitations	 have	 been	 adopted	 within	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 exclusive	rights/monopolies	 conferred	 by	 IPRs.	 These	 exceptions	 and	 limitations	 are	 mostly	justified	 by	 questions	 related	 to	 public	 interest	 which	 should	 prevail	 over	 other	private	interests.	TRIPS	could	not	constitute	an(other)	exception	to	this.			During	the	negotiations	of	TRIPS,	many	developing	countries	 led	by	 India,	strove	to	achieve	 explicit	 legal	 margins	 to	 permit	 national	 governments	 to	 use	 compulsory	pharmaceutical	 licensing	 as	 long	 as	 some	 concessions	 in	 the	 field	 of	 parallel	importation	of	pharmaceuticals.	 In	 this	sense,	many	poor	countries	which	 lack	drug	manufacturing	capability	had	serious	concerns	on	the	accession	of	India	to	the	TRIPS	as	this	country	was	their	main	supplier	of	drugs.	In	fact	India	is	still	considered	to	be	the	“pharmacy	of	the	developing	world”.	Neither	goal	was	fully	achieved	but	in	turn,	TRIPS	contemplates	some	windows	to	a	more	flexible	application	of	patent	exclusive	rights.			
Exceptions.		Unlike	 the	 GATTS	 and	 its	 article	 XX,	 TRIPS	 does	 not	 include	 general	 exceptions106.	Instead	 of	 this	 general	 chapeau	 clause,	 TRIPS	 integrates	 those	 exceptions	 into	 the	structure	and	 language	of	 the	agreement	 itself.	 It	 is	not	clear	whether	art.	XX	 list	of	exceptions	 in	 GATTS	 could	 be	 invoked	 in	 a	 TRIPS	 case.	 Even	 if	 the	 fact	 that	the	 	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	 Investment	Measures	 (TRIMs	Agreement)	explicit																																																									
106 Article XX consists of two parts: an introductory clause (the chapeau) and a list of types of measures that 
fall within its scope and which include among others, those measures: a) necessary to protect public morals; 
b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with GATT rules themselves; j) essential to the acquisition or 
distribution of products in short supply. All these exceptions could be fit into the interpretation and 
implementation of TRIPS. In fact,  
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mention	to	the	exceptions	under	the	GATT	in	article	3107	makes	some	authors	think	that	 this	 inclusion	 is	 not	 the	 legislator’s	 intent	 for	 TRIPS	 –following	 the	 expressio	
unius	 est	 exclusio	 alterius	 principle-,	 there	 is	 no	 conclusive	 legal	 reason	 to	 exclude	them	 from	applicability	 in	 the	TRIPS	 context,	 especially	 if	we	 take	 into	 account	 the	necessary	coherence	of	the	whole	treaty	which	calls	for	a	holistic	interpretation	of	all	of	its	parts108.			TRIPS	 provides	 instead	 a	 standard	 three-part	 test	 allowing	 members	 to	 make	“Exceptions	 to	 the	 Rights	 Conferred”.	 According	 to	 article	 30	 of	 TRIPS,	 these	exceptions	can	be	implemented	as	long	as	they	are	1)	limited;	2)	do	not	unreasonably	conflict	with	normal	exploitation	of	the	patent;	3)	do	not	“unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	patent	holder,	taking	account	of	the	legitimate	interests	of	third	 parties.	 The	 panelists	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 interpret	 thoroughly	 this	 three-part	 test	 exceptions	 in	 the	 dispute	 DS114	 Canada	 —	 Patent	 Protection	 of	Pharmaceutical	Products.109		On	the	other	hand,	and	according	to	article	27	of	TRIPS,	Governments	can	refuse	to	grant	patents	for	three	reasons	that	may	relate	to	public	health:	1)	inventions	whose	commercial	exploitation	needs	to	be	prevented	to	protect	human,	animal	or	plant	life	or	health	(Article	27.2);	2)	diagnostic,	 therapeutic	and	surgical	methods	 for	 treating																																																									
107 all exceptions under the GATT 1994 shall apply, as appropriate, to the provisions of this agreement 
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Appellate Body says that “In light of the interpretive principle of effectiveness, it is the duty of any treaty 
interpreter to "read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, 
harmoniously."108  An important corollary of this principle is that a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, 
and, in particular, its sections and parts should be read as a whole.108  Article II:2 of the  WTO Agreement 
expressly manifests the intention of the Uruguay Round negotiators that the provisions of the  WTO 
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements included in its Annexes 1, 2 and 3 must be read as a 
whole” 
109 The Panel found the so-called regulatory review exception provided for in Canada’s Patent Act as not 
inconsistent with Article 27.1 of the TRIPS, being covered by the exception in Article 30. Under the regulatory 
review exception, potential competitors of a patent owner are permitted to use the patented invention, without 
the authorization of the patent owner during the term of the patent, for the purposes of obtaining government 
marketing approval, so that they will have regulatory permission to sell in competition with the patent owner by 
the date on which the patent expires. However the Panel found that the so-called stockpiling exception the 
second aspect of the Canadian Patent Act challenged by the EC, was inconsistent with Article 28.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement and was not covered by the exception in Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. Under the 
stockpiling exception, competitors are allowed to manufacture and stockpile patented goods during a certain 
period before the patent expires, but the goods cannot be sold until after the patent expires. The panel 
considered that, unlike the regulatory review exception, the stockpiling exception constituted a substantial 
curtailment of the exclusionary rights required to be granted to patent owners under Article 28.1 to such an 
extent that it could not be considered to be a limited exception within the meaning of Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
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humans	 or	 animals	 (Article	27.3a)	 and;	 3)	 certain	 plant	 and	 animal	 inventions	(Article	27.3b.)	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 the	most	 important	 jurisprudence	 by	 Panel	 on	 this	article	involves	India	(Dispute	DS	50	and	DS79	both	cases	India-Patent	Protection	for	Pharmaceutical	and	Agricultural	Chemical	Products	brought	to	Panel	respectively	by	the	 US	 and	 EC110)	 and	 were	 brought	 to	 the	 Panel	 at	 the	 early	 beginning	 of	 the	existence	of	the	Panel.				Furthermore,	 article	 73	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 governs	 the	 use	 of	 the	 "Security	Exceptions"	(right	to	take	measures	to	protect	essential	national	security	interests	or	in	pursuance	of	its	obligations	under	the	United	Nations	Charter	for	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security),	which	may	restrict	trade	in	goods.	The	wording	of	Article	73	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	is	identical	to	the	provision	governing	trade	in	goods	(Article	XXI	of	the	GATT	1994)	and	the	application	of	the	concept	is	the	same	as	for	 trade	 in	 goods	 and	 trade	 in	 services.	 There	 is	 no	 explicit	 obligation	 to	 notify	measures	taken	pursuant	to	Article	73	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.	However,	a	Decision	adopted	 by	 the	 GATT	 CONTRACTING	 PARTIES	 in	 1982	 (1982	Decision)	 states	 that	"subject	to	the	exception	in	Article	XXI(a),	WTO	Members	should	be	informed	to	the	fullest	extent	possible	of	trade	measures	taken	under	Article	XXI".			Interpretations	made	by	the	Panel	have	raised	important	critics	as	to	their	formalistic	approach.	First,	 in	 the	context	of	article	30,	 it	 is	been	regarded	as	questionable	that	the	parts	of	the	test	are	construed	as	cumulative	and	the	mechanistic	interpretation	of	 legal	concepts	following	the	 legal	constructions	made	by	the	 jurisprudence	of	the	developed	 countries111.	 	 Also,	 some	 scholars	 are	 questioning	 whether	 the	jurisprudence	 developed	 with	 respect	 to	 GATT	 provisions	 should	 apply	 equally	 to	TRIPS	and	whether	 the	 formalistic	approach	 taken	 in	 relation	with	 trade	 should	be	implemented	when	 evaluating	 accomplishment	 of	 TRIPS.	 GATT’s	 jurisprudence	 has																																																									
110  Both cases were requested (2 July, 1996 and 28 April 1997) in respect of the alleged absence in India of 
patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, and the absence of formal systems 
that permit the filing of patent applications of and provide exclusive marketing rights for such products. The 
Panel found that India has not complied with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) or Article 63(1) and (2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement by failing to establish a mechanism that adequately preserves novelty and priority in 
respect of applications for product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions, and was 
also not in compliance with Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement by failing to establish a system for the grant 
of exclusive marketing rights. 
111 Dreyfuss, R. C. TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit All? (See footnote 104). 
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been	 characterized	 for	 having	 rejected	 automatically	 the	 argument	 of	 substantive	equality	 (or	 offsetting	 equality)	 in	 adjudicating	 claims	 for	 violations	 of	 national	treatment	as	there	is	an	insistence	on	formal	equality	(a	member	state	does	not	have	room	 to	 successfully	 argue	 that,	 although	 it	 applies	 different	 rules	 to	 nationals	 of	different	countries,	equality	of	treatment	in	fact	is	achieved	by	viewing	the	applicable	rules	as	a	whole–that	is,	when	the	ways	in	which	particular	rules	offset	one	another	are	taken	into	account-).			For	 many,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 make	 sense	 that	 the	 jurisprudence	 that	 has	 been	developed	with	 regard	 to	 the	 GATT’s	 trade	 provisions	 should	 be	 drawn	 to	 TRIPS	 -with	 quite	 remarkable	 different	 structure	 and	 purpose	 -.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 are	serious	doubts	about	whether	the	structural	implications	attached	to	the	guarantee	of	national	treatment	are	appropriate	to	other	TRIPs	obligations	as	long	as	whether	the	formalistic	 approach	 taken	 to	 trade	 should	 be	 utilized	 when	 assessing	 compliance	with	 obligations	 unique	 to	 intellectual	 property,	 such	 as	 minimum	 protection	standards	 and	 the	open	 and	 indeterminate	 concepts.	The	decision	 to	 subject	TRIPS	decisions	to	adjudication	within	the	trade	system	is	said	to	lead	to	overly	restrictive	interpretations	that	ignores	TRIPS	principles	and	objectives	and	the	intentions	of	the	parties	which	are	reflected	 in	article	7	and	8	of	 the	Agreement.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	argued	 that	 TRIPS	 panels	 are	 requested	 to	 consider	 the	 overall	 balance	 between	benefits	and	detriments	and	subsequent	tradeoffs	of	TRIPS	implementation	instead	of	a	strict	formalistic	approach	of	its	provisions112.			Finally,	 some	 scholars	 demand	 an	 IP-specific	 standard	 of	 review	 tailored	 to	 the	demands	of	intellectual	property	balancing	which	should	have	a	greater	deference	to	national	decision	making	(giving	greater	weight	to	state	actions	designed	to	achieve	human	rights	objectives)	in	evaluating	exceptions	and	limitations	to	IPRs.	Using	trade	approaches	 to	 interpret	 TRIPS	 –they	 argue-	 is	 nullifying	 implementation	 of	 those	TRIPS	 provisions	 supporting	 the	 creation	 of	 balanced	 intellectual	 property	protection.	 A	 greater	 deference	 to	 national	 decision	 making	 (eventually	 the	 frame	where	IPRs	operate)	instead,	would	permit	panels	to	consider	the	reasons	states	offer																																																									
112 Dinwoodie, G. B., & Dreyfuss, R. C. (2004). TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property […] (see 
previous footnote 106). 
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for	 the	 domestic	 intellectual	 property	 policies	 in	 view	 of	 balancing	 different	interests113.					
	
Limitations.		As	to	the	limitations	of	the	rights	conferred	to	the	Patent	owner,	it	is	very	important	for	 our	 purposes	 to	 mention	 article	 31	 of	 TRIPS	 which	 has	 been	 the	 object	 of	 an	interesting	 debate	 and	 legal	 controversy	 over	 its	 specific	 interpretation.	 Article	 31	permits	national	governments	to	authorize	others	the	use	of	the	subject	matter	of	the	patent	without	the	patent	owner’s	consent,	including	use	by	the	government	itself	or	third	 parties	 authorized	by	 government.	 In	 brief,	 article	 31	 regulates	 the	 regime	of	compulsory	 licensing	of	patents.	Even	 though	compulsory	 licenses	are	applicable	 to	no	matter	which	subject	matter	of	the	patent,	the	truth	is	that	this	is	usually	relevant	in	 the	 field	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents.	 In	 developing	 countries,	 high	 prices	 of	pharmaceuticals	reduce	affordability	of	medicines,	and	compulsory	licensing	may	be	seen	as	an	adequate	legal	tool	to	balance	IPRs	protection	and	public	health.	Instead,	in	developed	 nations,	 the	 higher	 per	 capita	 income	 and	 public	 budgets	 eventually	prevent	 governments	 from	 using	 compulsory	 licensing	 except	 when	 there	 is	 an	economic	slowdown	or	any	national	emergency.		Thus,	national	governments	can	grant	a	compulsory	license	within	its	jurisdiction	to	manufacture,	 import	or	 sell	 a	patented	product	 as	 long	as	 the	 conditions	 set	 out	 in	paragraphs	a)	to	l)	of	article	31	are	met.	Among	them:		making	first	efforts	to	obtain	authorization	from	the	right	holder	on	reasonable	commercial	terms	and	conditions	and	 that	such	efforts	have	not	been	successful	within	a	reasonable	period	of	 time	–except	in	the	case	of	a	national	emergency	or	other	circumstances	of	extreme	urgency	or	public	non-commercial	use-;	paying	an	adequate	remuneration	taking	into	account	the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case	 and	 the	 economic	 value	 of	 the	 authorization;	 the	compulsory	 license	 has	 to	 be	 used	 “predominantly”	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 the	 domestic	market	of	the	member	granting	such	compulsory	use;	and	that	the	scope	and	duration	of	such	use	shall	be	limited	to	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	authorized.																																																										
113 Land, M. (2012). Rebalancing Trips. Michigan Journal of International Law, 33. 
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The	 problem	with	 article	 31	 for	many	 developing	 countries	 is	 that	 although	 those	countries	 could	 grant	 a	 compulsory	 license	 to	 manufacture,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	capacity	to	manufacture	the	required	drugs	except	they	could	import	them	at	below-the-market	 prices	 –most	 likely	 because	 they	 were	 also	 manufactured	 under	compulsory	 license	 by	 the	 exporting	 country-.	 The	 word	 predominantly	 used	 in	article	 31f)	 –any	 such	 use	 shall	 be	 authorized	 predominantly	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 the	
domestic	market	of	the	member	authorizing	such	use-	is	not	defined	leaving	open	this	wording	 to	 different	 interpretations	 and	 controversies.	 It	 could	 mean	 that	 a	compulsory	license	cannot	be	used	to	supply	a	foreign	country	in	need	or	that	more	than	50%	of	the	production	must	be	sold	on	the	domestic	market.			Developed	nations,	particularly	the	United	States,	disputed	all	efforts	to	a	flexible	use	of	the	compulsorily	license	system	of	article	31,	even	under	a	public	health	exigency,	and	threatened	to	levy	punitive	trade	sanctions114	and	challenged	all	attempts	by	the	developing	 nations	 to	 use	 the	 right	 to	 compulsorily	 license	 patents.	 The	 developed	nations’	 pressure	 on	 developing	 nations	 to	 comply	 with	 some	 international	commitments	–	even	compromising	national	public	needs	and	goals-	has	resulted	in	what	has	been	called	by	some	a	“poverty	penalty.”	The	term	“poverty	penalty”	would	refer	 to	 the	 cost	 poorer	 nations	 suffer	 from	 fulfilling	 international	 obligations	 that	require	prioritizing	trade	interests	to	the	detriment	of	welfare115.			As	 we	 will	 see,	 the	 South	 African	 case	 constitutes	 one	 of	 the	 most	 illustrative	examples	of	the	social	mobilization	against	the	effects	of	the	TRIPS	agreement	and	the	belligerency	of	 the	pharmaceutical	 lobby	regarding	a	 flexible	use	of	 the	compulsory	licenses	provided	 in	 article	 31	of	TRIPS.	After	 an	 intense	 contestation	of	 the	TRIPS	agreement	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 public	 health,	 WTO	 members	 accorded	 the	 DOHA	Declaration	which	led	to	the	proposition	of	a	new	article	31bis	on	6	December	2005	(aimed	at	removing	the	difficulties	found	for	the	application	of	article	31	and	creating	an	 additional	 form	 of	 compulsory	 license	 related	 to	 the	 export	 of	 medicines	 to	countries	in	need	and	waiving	application	of	article	31	f)	in	order	to	make	permanent																																																									
114 Ford, S. M. (1999). Compulsory licensing provisions under the TRIPS agreement: balancing pills and 
patents. Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., 15, 941. 
115 Ragavan, S. (2003). The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in PhRMA v. 
Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement. U. Rich. L. Rev., 38, 777. 
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a	decision	on	patents	and	public	health	originally	adopted	in	2003.	This	was	formally	built	into	the	TRIPS	Agreement	after	acceptance	of	the	Protocol	amending	the	TRIPS	Agreement	by	two	thirds	of	 the	WTO’s	members.	The	amendment	took	effect	on	23	January	 2017	 and	 replaced	 the	 2003	 waiver	 for	 members	 who	 have	 accepted	 the	amendment116.		
Flexibilities.		A	 first	block	of	 flexibilities	provided	for	by	TRIPS	results	 from	textual	silence	of	 the	Agreement,	 i.e.	 questions	 not	 expressly	 regulated	 by	 it,	 which	 permit	 countries	 to	adopt	national	legislation	adapted	to	their	national	interests.	In	this	sense	and	despite	the	 fact	 that	 it	 imposes	certain	minimum	levels	of	protection	on	states	and	to	do	so	without	discrimination,	the	treaty	largely	does	not	specify	the	manner	in	which	states	should	go	about	achieving	 these	goals.	 In	 theory,	 these	 lacunae	give	 state	members	ample	room	to	enact	legislation	suited	to	their	necessities.	India’s	legislation	is	a	good	example	 of	 this	 approach.	 India’s	 Patent	 Law	 of	 1970	 excludes	 for	 example	 from	patentability	 the	 new	 use	 for	 a	 known	 substance	 as	 long	 as	 new	 form	 of	 a	 known	
substance	which	does	not	result	in	the	enhancement	of	the	known	efficacy	(art.	3d).			This	 article	 prevents	 evergreening	 (new	 patent	 applications	 for	 a	 novel	 product	which	 is	 in	 fact	 only	 very	 slightly	 different	 from	 the	 one	which	 is	 about	 to	 lose	 its	patent	protection,	thus	artificially	extending	patent	protection)	as	 long	as	 it	permits	that	 new	 uses	 (to	 treat	 a	 different	 disease)	 of	 a	 known	 pharmaceutical	 substance	remain	in	the	public	domain.	Indian	Supreme	Court	has	endorsed	a	pro	public	health	approach	 regarding	 the	 requirements	 for	 patentability	 and	 it	 has	 held	 the	constitutionality	of	this	important	article117.	Despite	the	apparent	freedom	of	Indian	legislators	and	judiciary	to	craft	patent	law	in	accordance	with	Indian	needs,	there	is	
																																																								
116 Members who are yet to accept the amendment currently have until 31 December 2017 to do so. For them 
the waiver will continue to apply until a member accepts the amendment and it takes effect for it. 
117 In the most recent case, Novartis AG v Union of India & others in 2013, the Supreme Court of India in a 
very important ruling stated that the required “efficacy” is not arbitrary but it depends upon the function, utility 
or purpose of the product under consideration, therefore in the case of pharmaceuticals which claim to cure a 
disease, the test of efficacy can only be therapeutic efficacy.    
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an	 important	 pressure	 by	 the	 US	 and	 other	 western	 countries	 to	 reduce	 this	margin118.			Other	flexibility	established	by	TRIPS	is	established	in	Article	41(1),	which	provides	that	 members	 shall	 ensure	 that	 enforcement	 procedures	 "permit	 effective	 action"	against	 acts	 of	 infringement	 and	 provides	 that	 they	 make	 available	 "expeditious	remedies	 to	 prevent	 infringements	 and	 remedies	 which	 constitute	 a	 deterrent	 to	further	 infringements.	 Article	 41(1)	 does	 not,	 however,	 define	 "effective"	 or	"expeditious,"	leaving	these	terms	to	be	interpreted	consistently	with	local	context.			Other	 important	 flexibility	 regarding	developing	countries	and	LDCs	has	 to	do	with	exhaustion	 of	 rights,	 i.e.,	 the	 concept	 that	 once	 a	 company	 has	 sold	 a	 batch	 of	 its	product,	its	patent	rights	are	exhausted	on	that	batch	and	it	no	longer	has	any	rights	over	 what	 happens	 to	 that	 batch,	 which	 can	 be	 exported	 and	 imported	 by	 other	country.	 In	 this	 respect,	 TRIPS	 establishes	 that	 none	 of	 its	 provisions,	 except	 those	dealing	 with	 non-discrimination	 (“national	 treatment”	 and	 “most-favored-nation	treatment”),	 can	be	used	 to	address	 the	 issue	of	 exhaustion	of	 intellectual	property	rights	in	a	WTO	dispute.	Therefore,	even	if	a	country	allows	parallel	imports	in	a	way	that	another	country	might	think	violates	TRIPS,	this	cannot	be	raised	as	a	dispute	in	the	WTO	unless	fundamental	principles	of	non-discrimination	are	involved.	The	Doha	Declaration	 clarifies	 that	 this	 means	 that	 members	 can	 choose	 how	 to	 deal	 with	exhaustion	in	a	way	that	best	fits	their	domestic	policy	objectives	-Article	6	TRIPS	and	Doha	declaration	5(d)-.		Finally,	it	is	worth	mentioning	the	flexibility	concerning	the	use	exception	of	IPRs,	in	particular,	 of	 patents	 which	 permit	 the	 free	 and	 unauthorized	 use	 of	 patents	 for	research	 and	 experimental	 purposes.	 This	 use	 is	 an	 effective	 instrument	 to	 speed	introduction	of	generic	medicines	 just	upon	expiration	of	patents.	The	research	and	
																																																								
118 In Obama’s visit to India in 2015, the ONG MSF denounced that one of the purposes of the visit was to put 
pressure on the Indian Government towards an amendment of Indian Patent Law. The visit was followed by 
some declarations of Indian Prime Minister saying that India was willing to accept the suggestions of a joint 
Indo-US working group on intellectual property rights.  
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early	 working	 exception	 (“Bolar”	 exception)	 is	 permitted	 under	 TRIPS.	 However	some	countries	like	the	US119	are	narrowing	the	scope	of	this	exception.			Some	states	have	taken	advantage	of	the	flexibilities	allowed	under	the	TRIPS.	More	than	 thirty	 developing	 countries	 have	 adopted	 a	 rule	 of	 international	 exhaustion,	many	 others	 have	 excluded	 diagnostic,	 therapeutic,	 and	 surgical	 methods	 from	patentability	 and	 allowed	 third	 parties	 to	 use	 inventions	 under	 patent	 for	experimental,	 scientific,	 or	 research	 purposes.	 Most	 also	 allowed	 compulsory	licensing	 of	 patented	 inventions,	 although	 the	 grounds	 for	 issuing	 such	 licenses	varied.		Notwithstanding	this,	it	can	be	observed	that	most	of	developing	countries	and	Least	Developed	 Countries	 (LDCs)	 have	 been	 reluctant	 to	 fully	 implement	 into	 their	domestic	 legislation	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 TRIPS	 flexibilities.	 In	 fact,	 and	according	 to	 some	 commentators	 the	 low	 number	 of	 conflicts	 around	 the	accomplishment	of	TRIPS	may	have	to	do	with	a	somehow,	culture	of	overcompliance.	In	effect,	the	threat	of	defending	an	onerous	proceeding	and	above	all,	the	possibility	of	 sanctions,	 has	 contributed	 to	 a	 culture	 of	 overcompliance	 which	 has	 prevented	member	states	from	implementing	and	experimenting	with	flexibilities.			According	to	an	important	survey	on	the	implementation	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement120,	a	number	of	states	-including	many	LDCs-	have	explicitly	forgone	the	flexibilities	they	would	otherwise	be	entitled	to	use	and	have	adopted	restrictive	national	laws	beyond	what	 is	 required	 by	TRIPS121.	 Paradoxically,	 some	of	 the	 poorest	 countries	 had	 the	highest	 levels	 of	 protection,	 while	 some	 developing	 countries	 with	 the	 greatest	technological	 capacity	 (see	 the	 case	 of	 India)	 had	 mixed	 approaches	 to	implementation	 of	 TRIPS	 to	 ensure	 and	 adjustment	 of	 their	 patent	 law	 to	 their	national	needs.	Analyzing	the	legal	and	political	reasons	behind	this	paradox,	we	can																																																									
119 An illustrative example of this is the Madey case. In Madey v. Duke University (307 F. 3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002)) the court held that any experimentation at a university which is not limited to actions performed "for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”, potentially breaches a patent. 
120 Deere, C. (2008). The implementation game: the TRIPS Agreement and the global politics of intellectual 
property reform in developing countries. OUP Oxford. 
121 Ibidem. For example, of 106 developing countries surveyed, less than ten expressly included a Bolar 
provision into their laws  
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conclude	that	apart	from	the	eventually	poor	domestic	resources	and	legal	expertise	in	 the	 area	 of	 IPRs,	 the	 threat	 of	 trade	 retaliation	 is	 especially	 deterrent	 for	many	developing	 countries	 and	 LDCs	 as	 many	 of	 these	 countries	 are	 strongly	 trade-dependent.	Furthermore,	the	reduction	of	unilateral	pressure	by	developed	countries	(namely	the	US)	as	a	logical	consequence	of	the	institutionalization	of	trade	conflicts	hoped	 by	 developing	 countries	 has	 not	 materialized	 and	 the	 Dispute	 Settlement	Understanding	(DSU)	has	not	constituted	any	obstacle	to	unilateral	actions.122		Finally,	in	order	to	conclude	with	TRIPS	flexibilities,	it	is	important	to	mention	some	procedural	flexibilities.	In	this	sense,	developing	and	LDCs	were	given	additional	time	to	 comply	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement.	 Developing	 countries	 had	 until	January	1,	2000,	to	implement	the	Agreement	and	could	optionally	delay	application	of	 the	product	patent	provisions	until	 January	1,	 2005,	 in	 certain	 fields.	 LDCs	were	given	ten	years	to	implement	the	treaty,	or	until	 January	1,	2005	(This	deadline	has	been	extended	several	times123.)		While	there	have	been	some	successful	cases	of	implementation	of	these	flexibilities,	there	 is	 still	 a	 long	 way	 to	 go	 in	 order	 to	 make	 full	 use	 of	 the	 potential	 of	 these	instruments.	Many	of	the	poorest	countries	have	enacted	IP	laws	which	far	exceed	the	required	 floor	 of	 TRIPS.	 As	 many	 developing	 countries	 do	 not	 have	 resources	 to	conduct	substantive	examination	of	patent	applications,	patents	are	often	registered	on	demonstration	 that	 it	has	been	granted	by	 the	European	or	 the	US	patent	office.	This	 made	 developing	 countries	 forego	 the	 opportunity	 to	 implement	 TRIPS	flexibilities	 while	 adopting	 developed	 countries	 IPRs	 standards	 of	 protection.	 Also,	the	number	of	countries	that	have	used	compulsory	licenses	is	small	and	the	possible	limits	on	scope	of	patentability	have	not	been	optimally	used.	The	main	barriers	 to																																																									
122 Land, M. Rebalancing Trips. Supranote 119. 
123  The last extension is due to the Decision on Least Developed Country Members – Obligations under 
Article 70.8 and Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products adopted by the 
General Council on 30 November 2015 following a recommendation by the Council for TRIPS. This Decision 
complements the aforementioned decision to extend the transition period for least developed country 
Members by waiving certain obligations that would have otherwise been applicable during the transition 
period. This includes an extension of the waiver to give exclusive marketing rights to pharmaceutical products 
that was initially put in place in 2002, and also adds a new waiver of the obligation to provide for the possibility 
of filing mailbox applications. Both waivers apply until 1 January 2033. The Decision was said to be taken with 
a view to ensuring attainment of the objectives of paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. 
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the	 effective	 and	 full	 implementation	 of	 these	 flexibilities	 are	 four124:	 1)	 lack	 of	supportive	legal	frameworks;	and	2)	resource	constrains	and	limited	coordination;	3)	the	 continued	 unilateral	 pressure	 from	 developed	 countries	 with	 important	 IPRs	industries	and	4)	new	international	agreements	and	legal	constraints	which	reduces	the	scope	of	TRIPS	flexibilities.			As	 to	 this	 last	 barrier,	 the	new	 legal	 constraints	 post	TRIPS	 are	 those	 coming	 from	bilateral	 or	 regional	Free	Trade	Agreements	 (FTAs)	between	 the	US	or	Europe	and	developing	 countries	 which	 will	 be	 analyzed	 in	 other	 chapter	 –TRIPS	 Plus-	 and	 a	more	 subtle	 “IPRs	 enforcement	 agenda”	 as	 represented	 by	 seizure	 of	 legitimate	generic	 medicines	 that	 conflate	 IPRs	 enforcement	 and	 drug	 quality	 control	 and	thereby	 threaten	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 generic	 supply	 chain.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 are	obvious	 attempts	 to	 make	 a	 link	 between	 patented	 medicines	 and	 drug	 quality	assurance.	The	so-called	“anti-counterfeiting”	bills	have	been	mostly	adopted	in	East	Africa.	By	purportedly	addressing	drug	counterfeiting	these	laws	expand	dramatically	the	 IPRs	 enforcement.	 The	 Kenyan	 Anti-Counterfeit	 Act	 of	 2008	 included	 the	obligation	 for	 local	 enforcement	 authorities	 to	 take	 measures	 against	 generic	medicines	that	were	fully	lawful	in	Kenya	on	the	grounds	that	they	infringed	patents	in	other	countries.	While	some	counterfeit	medicines	may	be	of	substandard	quality,	the	presumption	 that	 all	not-branded	medicines	are	unsafe	 is	biased	 since	branded	medicines	may	also	not	comply	with	quality	standards.	In	this	respect,	it	is	important	to	 separate	medicine-quality	 issues	 from	 the	 IPRs	 enforcement	 agenda.	 Other	 legal	formula	 resulting	 from	 the	 intense	 lobbying	 of	 IP	 industries	 is	 represented	 by	 the	controversial	 European	 regulation125-subject	 to	 different	 claims	 before	 the	 DSU-	permitting	 seizure	 of	 goods	 that	 were	 in	 transit	 through	 European	 ports	 or	 other	transport	hubs	even	if	those	goods	are	legitimate	generic	medicines	both	in	the	origin	and	in	the	destination	countries.							 																																																									
124 El Said, M., & Kapczynski, A. (2012). Access to Medicines: the role of intellectual property law and policy. 
Global Commission on HIV and the Law Working Paper. 
125 Council Customs Regulation No 1383/2003 which was replaced by the new EU Customs Regulation 
608/2013 (July 19, 2013) or the new EU trademark Directive 2015/2436 have raised important critics by some 
developed countries (mainly India and Brazil) and some NGOs. These regulations are said to allow wrongful 
seizures of generic medicines in transit.  
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2.4.	 Evaluation	and	impact	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.		After	20	years	of	the	TRIPS	implementation	–effective	on	January	1,	1995-	there	is	not	a	consistent,	unbiased,	serious	and	empirical	research	on	the	socioeconomic	 impact	of	TRIPS	and	the	achievement	of	its	objectives.	However,	it	is	important	to	bring	here	some	relevant	 information	and	data	as	to	the	actual	 impact	of	TRIPS	with	regard	to	the	 access	 to	 pharmaceuticals	 in	 the	 first	 place	 and	 closely	 linked	 to	 it,	 the	accomplishment	of	the	ends	and	benefits	announced	by	its	supporters.			As	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 TRIPS	 on	 the	 access	 to	medicines,	 and	 in	 accordance	with	 the	before	mentioned	Report	of	the	UN	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	right	of	everyone	to	the	enjoyment	of	the	highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	health	(16	March	2011),	massive	 inequalities	remain	 in	access	 to	medicines	around	the	world.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 recalls	 in	 the	 Report	 that	 some	 issues	 relating	 to	intellectual	property	laws	threatened	access	to	medicines.	The	Special	Rapporteur	is	clear	when	stating	and	concluding	that	the	TRIPS,	or	at	least	its	application	by	certain	States,	remained	an	impediment	to	greater	access	to	medicines.	Intellectual	property	rights	and	competition	are	seen	as	the	most	 important	elements	 in	the	reduction	of	prices	and	affordability	for	all.	He	also	warns	against	reinforced	standards	in	the	area	of	 patent	 law	 in	 free-trade	 agreements	 such	 as	 TRIPS-plus,	 which	 threatened	 to	compound	this	problem	even	further.				The	 2015	 Social	 Forum	 organized	 by	 the	 UN	 Office	 of	 the	 High	 Commissioner	 for	Human	 Rights	 (OHCHR)	 which	 took	 place	 from	 18-20	 February	 and	 focused	 on	“access	 to	medicines	 in	 the	context	of	 the	right	of	everyone	to	 the	enjoyment	of	 the	highest	attainable	standard	of	physical	and	mental	health,	including	best	practices	in	this	 regard”	 also	 mentioned	 TRIPS	 and	 TRIPS	 plus	 as	 one	 important	 burden	 to	 a	greater	access	to	medicines.						Also,	the	Report	of	the	United	Nations	Secretary-General’s	High	Level	Panel	on	Access	to	Medicines126released	 in	 September	 14,	 2016	 states	 that	despite	 the	 technological																																																									
126 Retrieved from http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ 
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progress	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health,	 millions	 of	 people	 continue	 to	 suffer	 and	 die	 from	
treatable	 conditions	 because	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 health	 technologies	 and	 that	
investment	 in	 research	 and	 development	 of	 health	 technologies	 does	 not	 adequately	
address	 a	 number	 of	 important	 health	 needs	 […].	 Also,	 the	 Report	 says	 that	 the	
proliferation	 of	 free	 trade	 agreements	 containing	 expensive	 patent	 and	 test	 data	
protections	 on	 health	 technologies,	 which	 exceed	 the	 minimum	 standards	 for	 IP	
protection	 required	 by	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 (so-called	 “TRIPS-plus”	 provisions)	 may	
impede	access	to	health	technologies	[…]		Introduction	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 in	markets	where	 those	 IPRs	 did	 not	 exist,	leads	to	an	 increase	of	prices.	This	premise	has	been	evidenced	by	different	studies	which	conclude	that	the	absence	of	product	patents	and	the	relative	ease	of	entry	into	imitative	 production	 mean	 that,	 in	 countries	 without	 product	 patents	 there	 are	significant	 numbers	 of	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 firms	 producing	 copies	 of	 drugs	patented	 elsewhere,	 this	 making	 drug	 prices	 fall	 markedly	 in	 the	 presence	 of	competing	products.		This	(pre-patent)	structure	characterizes	(or	has	characterized)	a	wide	range	of	countries	that	were	studied,	including	Argentina,	Brazil,	Chile,	India,	Italy,	Turkey,	Korea,	Egypt,	and	Lebanon127.			Pharmaceutical	 industry	suggested	 first	 that	 there	was	no	relationship	between	 the	drug	prices	 and	access;	 rather,	 and	 in	 relation	with	 the	main	 challenge	 to	health	 in	both	 developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 (HIV/AIDS)	 they	 argued,	 that	 social,	political,	 and	 infrastructural	 barriers	 impeded	 the	 broad	 rollout	 of	 complicated	HIV/AIDS	 medications.	 Pharmaceutical	 companies	 finally	 admitted	 that	 prices	charged	 for	 their	 drugs	 in	 developing	 countries	 made	 them	 largely	 prohibitive.	However,	 they	 also	 argued	 that	 patent	 protection	was	 necessary	 to	 stimulate	 drug	research	 and	 development.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 HIV/AIDS	 some	 ONGs	 and	 civil	society	 organizations	 such	 as	 Treatment	 Action	 Campaign	 (TAC)	 in	 South	 Africa,	Oxfam,	 and	Médecins	 Sans	 Frontieres	 had	 conceptualized	 the	 issue	 differently	 and	drew	attention	to	the	issue	of	patent	protection,	patent	abuses,	and	the	lack	of	generic	
																																																								
127 Maskus, K. E. Intellectual property rights in the global economy […] supranote 105. 
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competition	 in	 constraining	 access	 to	HIV/AIDS-related	 pharmaceuticals128.	 Finally,	as	 we	 will	 further	 see	 in	 next	 chapters,	 some	 doubts	 have	 been	 raised	 as	 to	 how	effective,	necessary	and	balanced	is	the	current	system	of	IPRs	for	innovation	in	the	field	of	health.			Therefore,	 IPRs	 imply	an	 increase	on	medicines	which	can	make	these	unaffordable	for	 many	 people,	 especially	 but	 not	 only	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Notwithstanding	that,	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 predicated	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 in	 order	 to	 convince	 developing	countries	to	be	bound	by	it	was	that	the	establishment	of	higher	intellectual	property	standards	 or	 their	 legal	 implementation	would	 eventually	 benefit	 them	 in	 terms	 of	stimulating	 innovation	 and	 the	 capabilities	 for	 local	 production	 of	 medicines	addressed	to	their	specific	health	needs.	Also,	TRIPS	was	said	to	be	an	instrument	to	promote	 an	 effective	 and	 necessary	 technological	 transfer	 from	 developed	 to	developing	 countries,	 this	 contributing	 to	 the	 development	 of	 their	 economies	 and	societies.	 These	 benefits	 are	 explicitly	 recognized	 in	 article	 7	 of	 TRIPS	 which	establishes	that	IPRs	should	contribute	to	the	promotion	of	technological	innovation	and	 to	 the	 transfer	and	dissemination	of	 technology,	 to	 the	mutual	advantage	of	 its	users	and	producers	in	a	manner	conducive	to	social	and	economic	welfare	and	to	a	balance	 of	 rights	 and	 obligations.	 It	 is	 thus,	 important	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 these	virtues	 predicted	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 have	 been	 accomplished	 as	 a	 “compensation”	 for	developing	countries	adhesion	to	TRIPS.				In	2011	 the	WHO	published	and	 important	 study	 focused	on	evaluate	 the	 trends	 in	the	local	production	of	medicines	in	developing	countries	from	Africa,	Asia	and	Latin	America	 and	 related	 technology	 transfer129.	 This	 research	 is	 very	 helpful	 to	 extract	some	 conclusions	 as	 to	 how	 TRIPS	 is	 contributing	 or	 not	 to	 foster	 the	 promised	technology	 transfer	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 local	 facilities	 for	 the	 production	 of	medicines.	The	study	pays	special	attention	to	the	cases	of	China	and	especially	India	since	drug	companies	in	these	countries	are	important	suppliers	of	low-priced	active	pharmaceutical	 ingredients	 and	 finished	 products	 domestically	 and	 for	 developing																																																									
128 Brown, S. (2008). Global public-private partnerships for pharmaceuticals: operational and normative 
features, challenges, and prospects. Canadian Public Administration Journal. 
129 http://www.who.int/phi/publications/trends-in_local-production-of-medicines.pdf.  
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countries,	and	many	fear	that	the	introduction	of	product	patents	will	destroy	these	industries	and	lead	to	increased	drug	prices.		As	to	the	argument	that	TRIPS-compliant	patent	protection	would	prompt	developing	country	companies	to	conduct	greater	R&D	for	the	development	of	new	drugs	more	suited	to	 local	needs,	 the	study	finds	that	among	a	sample	of	166	Indian	companies	only	37	were	major	R&D	spenders	(increasing	steadily	from	3.89	percent	in	2001	to	8.35	percent	in	2005/06)	while	the	rest	maintained	their	R&D	expenditure	around	1	percent.	In	relation	with	access	to	medicines,	the	report	informs	that	the	introduction	of	generic	medicines	in	Jordan	has	been	delayed	as	a	consequence	of	amended	patent	and	 regulatory	 data	 rules	 (following	 TRIPS	 and	 TRIPS	 plus),	 with	 a	 significant	monetary	 cost	 to	 consumers.	 China	 is	 already	 experiencing	 access	 problems	within	the	category	of	newer	drugs.	Some	important	antiretroviral	are	simply	not	physically	present	 on	 the	 Chinese	 market,	 while	 others	 are	 present,	 but	 at	 prices	 aimed	 at	skimming	only	the	wealthy	market	segment.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Study	 finds	 that	 in	 the	 pre-TRIPS	 situation,	 because	 of	competition	 in	patented	drugs	 in	 India,	both	consumers	and	 Indian	producers	were	able	to	benefit	from	the	policy	environment.	After	TRIPS,	the	new	policy	environment	has	 led	 to	 collaborations	 between	 Indian	 companies	 and	 TNCs	 that	 are	 restricting	competition	and	both	of	them	are	gaining	at	the	cost	of	consumers.		As	to	the	technology	transfer,	TRIPS	is	considered	to	be	weak	on	imposing	technology	transfer	obligations	 in	developed	 countries	 towards	developing	 countries	 as	 a	 legal	requirement,	 although	 it	 suggest	 that	 the	 statements	 referring	 to	 this	 technology	transfer	may	be	used	as	an	interpretative	device,	either	to	 inform	the	application	of	other	 parts	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 or	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 political	 objection	 to	 the	manner	 in	which	TRIPS	 is	being	 interpreted	and	applied	by	developed	countries.	 In	this	sense,	the	Study	states	that	although	as	long	as	the	institutional	and	governance	structures	are	aligned	with	increasing	protection	of	IPR,	we	could	expect	to	see	more	willingness	 of	 firms	 to	 license	 and	 contract	 out	 increasingly	 important/proprietary	technologies	 to	 developing	 country	 firms,	 it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 strong	 intellectual	
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property	 protection	 is	 liable	 to	 stifle	 technology	 transfer	 as	 technology	 owners	exploit	their	market	power.		Finally,	 this	 interesting	 research	warns	 that	worldwide	 access	 to	medicines,	where	India	and	China	provide	products	or	sources	of	price	competition,	is	affected	not	only	by	the	parameters	which	determine	domestic	access	 in	India	and	China,	but	also	by	the	 IP	 situation	 in	 the	 importing	 country	 since	 once	 implemented	 the	 new	 patent	legislation,	many	African	countries	cannot	authorize	generic	copies	unless	the	patent	holder	has	waived	its	rights	or	licensed	the	patents	to	generic	firms.	Account	taken	of	all	 the	 cases	 and	 specially	 the	 Indian	 and	 Chinese	 experience,	 the	 WHO	 study	concludes	that	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	support	and	drive	reforms	for	a	proper	review	and	renegotiation	of	TRIPS.		On	the	other	hand,	even	though	there	was	reasonable	fears	that	DSU	would	imply	an	explosion	of	litigation	against	developing	countries	on	TRIPS	issues,	specially	for	non-accomplishment	 of	 some	 provisions	 of	 the	 Agreement,	 the	 truth	 is	 that	 TRIPS	 has	produced	 less	 litigation	 than	 anticipated	 and	 still	 less	 between	 developed	 and	developing	 countries.	 In	 fact,	 there	 have	 been	 more	 cases	 facing	 developed	 state	members.	 Notwithstanding	 that,	 this	 apparent	 peace,	 conformity	 and	 compliance	with	 TRIPS	may	 be	misleading.	 As	 some	 scholars	 think,	 although	 the	 TRIPS	 is	 not	being	 subject	 to	many	 litigated	 cases	 overall,	 the	 reason	 behind	 can	 be	 the	 fear	 of	many	developing	countries	to	face	the	threat	of	defending	a	costly	complaint	and	the	possibility	of	substantial	trade	sanctions	which	can	significantly	hurt	their	economies,	this	 explaining	 a	 culture	 of	 overcompliance	 that	 has	 discouraged	 countries	 from	experimenting	with	flexibilities	protected	under	the	Agreement130.		
TRIPS	and	the	promise	land	of	innovation.		The	discrepancy	between	what	was	promised	by	the	global	IPRs	regime	and	what	has	been	really	achieved	is	then	clearly	reflected	in	the	context	of	the	implementation	of	TRIPS.	 Theoretically,	 TRIPS	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 developed	 countries-IPRs																																																									
130 Land, M. Rebalancing Trips. Supranote 119. 
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standards	 generate	 incentives	 for	 innovation	 and	 technology	 transfer	 (FDI)	 to	developing	 countries.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 the	 case.	 In	 this	sense,	 even	 if	 TRIPS	 statement	 of	 Principles	 and	 Objectives	 acknowledges	 the	importance	 of	 balancing	 interests,	 promoting	 social	 welfare	 and	 protecting	 public	health,	the	truth	is	that	adjudicators	and	legal	practitioners	lack	judicially	manageable	standards	 to	 implement	 those	 principles	 and	 objectives	 to	 satisfy	 public	 interest	concerns	when	it	comes	to	specific	legislative	safeguards	or	adjudication	of	cases	and	controversies131.						There	 has	 been	 very	 little	 or	 no	 empirical	 or	 theoretical	 research	 concerning	 the	effects	of	 increasing	 IPRs	 in	a	developing	country	with	previous	 lower	standards	of	protection.	 In	the	mid	to	 late	1980s,	when	there	was	an	 increasing	 lobby	activity	to	adopt	 an	 agreement	 like	TRIPS,	 very	 little	 empirical	 or	 theoretical	 research	 existed	concerning	the	effects	of	increasing	IPRs	standards	all	around	the	world.	The	limited	research	 that	 did	 support	 the	 trade-IP	 linkage	with	 pharmaceutical	 innovation	was	generally	 written	 by	 pharmaceutical	 company	 funded	 institutes	 and	 academics	supporting	the	pharmaceutical	lobby’s	views132.		An	important	number	of	scholars	and	practitioners	argue	the	disadvantages	of	TRIPS	for	developing	countries.	These	scholars	have	serious	doubts	about	the	assertion	that	strong	 IPR	 systems	 foster	 across-the-board	 innovation	 and	 economic	 growth.	 They	argue	that,	even	if	theoretical	incentives	for	innovation	and	technology	transfer	exist	as	 a	 result	 of	 intellectual	 property	 protection,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 engender	sustainable	development.	In	effect,	even	if	high	IPRs	standards	may	foster	innovation	and	FDI,	the	limited	local	absorptive	capability	may	limit	the	potential	to	use	it.	On	the	contrary,	 various	 studies	 indicate	 that	 the	 IPR	 induced	 influx	 of	 FDI	 and	 foreign	technology	reduces	domestic	innovation	incentive	and	capacity,	which	impedes	long-term	economic	growth	in	developing	countries.133		
																																																								
131 Dreyfuss, R. C. (2010). TRIPS and Essential Medicines […] (see footnote 104). 
132 Bennett, B., & Tomossy, G. F. (2006). Globalization and Health (Vol. 27). Springer. 
133 Daley, W. (2014). In search of Optimality: Innovation, Economic Development, and Intellectual Property 
Rights. GSDR Prototype Briefs. 
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Letting	aside	considerations	as	to	how	TRIPS	restrain	national	governments	to	cope	with	 certain	 public	 interest	 concerns,	 and	 focusing	 strictly	 on	 the	 relationship	between	IPRs	and	innovation,	there	are	studies	which	indicate	that	the	optimal	level	of	IPR	protection	varies	across	countries	(and	even	by	industry)	depending	on	their	stage	of	development.	In	this	sense,	harmonization	of	global	IPR	protection	may	not	be	 beneficiary	 to	 developing	 countries	 given	 that	 the	 industrial	 technological	capability	 differs	 significantly	 across	 some	 countries.	 There	 is	 an	 obvious	 tension	between	 considerations	 of	 IPRs	 as	 an	 instrument	which	 can	 encourage	 innovation,	technology	diffusion	and	enhance	growth	and	those	considerations	which	warn	that	stronger	 IPR	 protection	 leads	 to	 monopoly	 power	 for	 patent	 holders,	 reduces	 the	incentive	to	 innovate	and	 limits	the	diffusion	of	knowledge.	Before	TRIPS,	countries	had	the	capacity	to	adapt	their	IPR	regimes	to	facilitate	technological	transfer	and	to	promote	 their	 own	 industrial	 policy	 objectives.	 Today	 technologically	 developed	countries	 had	 lax	 IPRs	 systems	 in	 their	 past	 designed	 to	 encourage	 technology	diffusion	through	imitation.	Spain	and	Italy	are	two	good	examples	of	countries	with	an	 emergent	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 which	 grew	 one	 day	 by	 imitating	 foreign	technology.	 As	 far	 as	 domestic	 capabilities	 were	 becoming	more	 sophisticated	 and	they	were	able	 to	 innovate,	national	 legislation	 increased	 the	 level	of	protection.	 In	the	 same	manner,	 Japan	 is	 commonly	 conceived	 as	 a	 country	 which	 developed	 its	technological	“catch-up”	and	sophistication	by	first	acquiring	foreign	technologies	in	advantageous	 terms	 and	 conditions,	 a	 process	 that	 was	 permitted	 by	 a	 IPRs	 legal	regime	favoring	dissemination	of	knowledge.	Furthermore,	Korea	was	able	to	absorb	and	 develop	 considerable	 amounts	 of	 adaptive	 technological	 information	 in	 the	absence	of	meaningful	IPRs	through	the	1970s	and	early	1980s134.				In	 an	 econometric	 analysis	 commissioned	 by	 the	 non-suspicious	 US	 International	Trade	Commission,	 it	 is	 concluded	 that	 IPRs	 in	 developing	 countries	 do	not	 have	 a	significant	positive	effect	on	R&D	in	developed	countries135.	Also,	the	positive	effects	of	TRIPS	on	FDI	seem	to	be	ambiguous.	While	stronger	IPR	protection	in	the	poorest	countries	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 substantial	 benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 innovation	 or																																																									
134  Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual property rights in the global economy […] supranote 105. 
135 Maxwell, A., & Riker, D. (2014). Web Version: November 2014. Journal of International Commerce & 
Economics, 75. 
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technology	diffusion,	 the	administrative	 cost	of	developing	a	patent	 system	and	 the	enforcement	 of	 TRIPS,	 along	 with	 the	 potential	 abuses	 of	 market	 power	 in	 small	closed	 markets	 suggests	 that	 such	 countries	 could	 lose	 out	 from	 TRIPS.	 As	 some	studies	suggest,	stronger	IPR	protection	in	the	poorest	countries	may	also	inhibit	or	lengthen	 the	 imitative	 stage	of	development	 that	 seems	 to	be	necessary	 in	order	 to	develop	innovative	capacity	in	many	industries	and	its	impact	on	technology	diffusion	is	unclear136.			Professor	emeritus	Scherer	reaches	similar	conclusions	on	this	respect.	He	notes	that	incentives	 from	 IPRs	 and	 innovation	 are	 far	 from	being	 automatic,	 especially	when	these	 incentives	 are	 implemented	 in	 countries	where	 technological	 capabilities	 are	scarce.	Also,	he	observes	that	TRIPS	has	not	made	pharmaceutical	companies	reorient	their	 R&D	 efforts	 to	 place	 more	 emphasis	 on	 third	 world	 diseases.	 Finally,	 it	 is	interesting	to	mention	his	proposal	standing	for	a	sort	of	 international	commitment	conditioning	strong	patent	rights	to	the	compromise	that	pharmaceutical	companies	will	 commit	 20%	 of	 their	 R&D	 budgets	 to	 combat	 diseases	 of	 the	 less	 developed	nations137.		Finally,	 TRIPS	may	 reorient	 developing	 countries	 producers’	 activity	 towards	more	profitable	business	in	the	developed	world.	There	are	studies	revealing	that	enhanced	IP	 protection	 in	 China	 and	 the	 approaching	 introduction	 of	 product	 patent	 law	 in	India	 are	 already	 having	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 product	 and	 market	 strategies	 of	 Indian	firms138.	 In	effect,	 the	 introduction	of	product	patents	means	that	 Indian	 firms	have	reduced	 revenue	 options	 for	 the	 sale	 of	 drugs	 domestically	 and	 to	 low	 income	countries,	since	generic	copies	of	newer	drugs	will	become	illegal.	To	compensate	this	revenue	 loss,	 Indian	 firms	have	 increased	 their	 emphasis	 on	 exporting	 to	 the	more	profitable	 regulated	 markets,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 large	 concentration	 of	 FDA	approved	manufacturing.																																																										
136  Anja, B., & Neil, F. (2012). Intellectual property rights, innovation and technology transfer: a survey. 
137 Scherer, F. M. (2003). ‘Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patent Policy. Princeton University, Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, NJ. 
138 Grace, C. (2004). The effect of changing intellectual property on pharmaceutical industry prospects in India 
and China. DFID Health Systems Resource Centre, 1-68. 
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In	 short,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 promises	 and	 expectations	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 in	terms	 of	 technology	 transfer,	 foreign	 investment	 and	 general	 development	 and	growth	for	developing	countries	are	far	from	being	reached.	On	the	contrary,	it	seems	that	 other	 than	 its	 negative	 impact	 on	 public	 health,	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 may	 have	impaired	the	economic	and	technological	development	of	many	developing	countries	without	any	known	and	tangible	benefit.		
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CHAPTER	3.	 PHARMACEUTICAL	BUSINESS	AND	THE	ROLE	OF	
IPRs	IN	THE	PROMOTION	OF	GENUINE	
INNOVATION.		
3.1.		 Big	Pharma	and	beyond:	global	political	economy	of	health.		Pharmaceutical	industry	is	one	of	those	global	realities	impacting	the	life	of	virtually	everyone	 in	 the	 planet.	 This	 impact	 on	 people’s	 life	 and	 quality-of-life	 makes	 this	businesses	one	of	 the	most	particular	 industries	 in	 the	world.	There	 is	no	business	which	 encompasses	 as	many	 dimensions	 as	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry;	 in	 fact,	 it	engages	 at	 the	 same	 time	 science,	 medicine,	 economics,	 health,	 human	 rights,	government,	 and	 social	 welfare.	 Also,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 industries	 which	 has	 first	acquired	a	global	dimension,	 impact,	 scope	and	operation.	Because	of	 its	 impact	on	every	person’s	life,	health	and	safety,	it	is	a	highly	regulated	industry;	this	regulation	is	oriented	to	succeed	in	getting	patient’s	wellbeing	and	safety	at	reasonable	cost.	The	fact	 of	 being	 a	 regulated	 business	 does	 not	 impede	 pharmaceutical	 business	 from	being	a	tremendously	profitable	industry.		In	effect,	pharmaceutical	industry	is	not	only	one	of	the	main	industrial	sectors	of	the	world	but	also	one	of	the	most	profitable.	As	in	2001	worldwide	revenue	was	around	390	billion	US	dollars,	in	2014	the	revenues	have	tripled	reaching	a	total	sum	of	1.057	billion	US	dollars1.	This	business	had	a	profit	margin	of	nearly	20%	during	that	year.	Also,	according	to	some	economic	reports2,	prescription	drugs	sales	are	expected	to	grow	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 5%	 yearly	 until	 2020.	 US	 and	 Canada	 have	 the	 world’s	 largest	market	with	 a	 41%	 share	 of	 the	 total,	 Europe	 27,4%,	 Japan	 9,7%,	 Africa,	 Asia	 and	Australia	the	16,1%	and	Latin	America	the	5,8%3.	As	to	production,	the	United	States	accounts	 for	39%	of	 global	 pharmaceutical	 production,	 slightly	more	 than	 the	36%	European	share.	Maybe	the	 two	main	elements	driving	 the	activity	and	success	of	a	pharmaceutical	company	are	innovation	and	marketing.																																																										
1  http://www.statista.com/statistics/263102/pharmaceutical-market-worldwide-revenue-since-2001/ 
2 http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/wp15.pdf. EvaluatePharma® World Preview 2015, 
Outlook to 2020 8th Edition – June 2015. 
3 http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_2014_Final.pdf. The Pharmaceutical Industry in figures. EFPIA Key 
Data 2014.  
74		
The	 pharmaceutical	market	 is	 generally	 divided	 up	 into	 the	 producers	 of	 branded-pharmaceuticals,	 -many	 of	 which	 under	 patent	 or	 any	 IPR-	 and	 generic	 producers.	Although	 producers	 of	 generic	 have	 an	 increasing	 importance	 in	 the	 market	 of	medicines,	 the	 biggest	 slice	 of	 the	 pie	 is	 still	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 big	 pharmaceutical	companies	 (Big	 Pharma)	 in	 the	 race	 to	 obtain	 “blockbusters”	 –original	 medicines	generating	more	than	1	billion	USD	in	annual	sales-.			Since	 marginal	 production	 costs	 are	 relatively	 low,	 producers	 of	 original	pharmaceuticals	 endeavor	 to	 maximize	 profits	 during	 the	 life	 of	 a	 product	 by	extending	the	period	of	market	exclusivity	and	by	engaging	in	promotional	activities	that	 aim	 both	 to	 capture	 as	 large	 a	 market	 share	 as	 possible	 and	 to	 increase	 the	potential	 market.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 further,	 pharmaceutical	 marketing	 expenditures	exceeds	that	of	R&D	expenditures.	Anyway,	the	operation	and	the	costs	of	business	in	different	countries	are	different	depending	on	factors	such	as	regulatory	compliance,	types	 of	 marketing	 and/or	 advertising	 activities	 permitted	 and	 the	 exposure	 to	liability	for	safety	or	quality	problems.		Despite	the	important	contributions	to	human	progress,	there	is	growing	controversy	and	even	hostility	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	and	 the	public.	As	we	will	 see,	many	ethical	 issues	are	raised	globally	as	 to	 the	relationship	between	 an	 activity	which	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 human	 life	 and	 the	 pursuit	 of	 profit	 of	these	 transnational	 companies.	 According	 to	 some,	 the	 implicit	 social	 contract	allowing	the	pharmaceutical	company	to	emerge	and	flourish	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	in	exchange	of	life-saving	and	life-enhancing	drugs	for	humanity,	is	being	 vanished.	 Today,	many	 consider	 that	 this	 bargain	 is	 unbalanced	 and	 that	 the	tremendous	profits	are	not	proportionally	matched	by	contributions	to	the	common	good.	This	 is	compelling	some	to	speak	about	the	necessity	of	a	new	social	contract	between	society	and	the	pharmaceutical	sector4.	Before	entering	the	discussion	about	the	current	performance	of	this	particular	industry,	it	is	important	however	to	have	a	historical	background	about	the	evolution	of	this	industry.	
Pharmaceutical	industry:	past	and	new	business	trends.																																																									
4 Santoro, M. A., & Gorrie, T. M. (2005). Ethics and the pharmaceutical industry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Pharmaceutical	 industry	is	a	mature	industry	which	is	however	constantly	evolving.	The	history	of	this	industry	is	generally	divided	into	three	periods;	the	creation	of	the	industry	 (period	 from	 1880	 to	 the	 Second	 World	 War),	 the	 implementation	 of	formalized	 in-house	R&D	programs	 and	 fast	 rates	 of	 new	drug	 introduction	 (1945-1990)	and	the	implementation	of	genetic	engineering	in	the	production	and	discovery	of	new	drugs	(1990-today)5.			The	 birth	 of	 the	 modern	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 mid-19th	century.	 Until	 this	 moment,	 there	 were	 no	 standardized	 medicines	 for	 treating	specific	illnesses.	A	patient	had	customized	prescription	which	would	be	formulated	at	 the	 local	 pharmacy	 ad	 hoc.	 The	 creation	 of	 the	 chemical	 and	 pharmaceutical	industries	 began	 almost	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 Europe	 and	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 In	Europe	 it	 emerged	 from	 the	 chemical	 industry	with	 expertise	 in	organic	 chemistry.	This	 was	 possible	 due	 to	 the	 important	 market	 created	 from	 the	 unification	 of	Germany	and	the	growth	of	its	economy	based	on	heavy	industry	in	the	Rhine	Valley.	However,	 in	 the	 United	 States	 the	 industry	 evolved	 in	 response	 to	 the	 advent	 of	modern	 transportation	 and	 communication—the	 railroads	 and	 the	 telegraph—	and	the	 big	market	 created	 around.	 This	market	made	 possible	 the	mass	 production	 of	over-the-counter	(OTC)	non-prescription	drugs	based	mainly	on	natural	resources.	It	is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 many	 of	 the	 companies	 which	 started	 to	 produce	pharmaceuticals	 both	 in	 Europe	 and	 America	 are	 still	 important	 pharmaceutical	players.	Among	others,	we	can	mention	Swiss	and	German	chemical	companies	such	as	 Ciba,	 Sandoz,	 Bayer,	 and	 Hoechst	 and	 American	 and	 British	 companies	 such	 as	Wyeth,	Eli	Lilly,	Pfizer,	or	Warner.		The	 second	 epoch	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 began	 with	 the	 so-called	“therapeutic	 revolution”	 in	 the	 1940s	which	was	 accelerated	 by	World	War	 II	 and	wartime	 needs	 for	 antibiotics.	 This	 provoked	 the	 industry's	 transition	 to	 an	 R&D	intensive	business.	Penicillin	and	its	antibiotic	properties	which	were	discovered	by	Alexander	Fleming	in	1928,	were	produced	throughout	the	1930s,	only	in	laboratory-scale	quantities	and	was	used	almost	exclusively	for	experimental	purposes.	With	the																																																									
5 Chandler, A. D. (2009). Shaping the industrial century: The remarkable story of the evolution of the modern 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Vol. 46). Harvard University Press. 
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outbreak	of	World	War	 II,	 it	was	developed	a	system	to	produce	 large	quantities	of	penicillin	and	major	gains	in	productivity.	Also,	it	laid	out	a	framework	where	future	improvements	 could	 take	 place	 and	 be	 implemented.	 The	 commercialization	 of	penicillin	marked	 a	watershed	 in	 the	 industry's	 development.	 Due	 to	 the	 technical	and	 organizational	 experience	 accumulated	 through	 the	wartime,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	recognition	 that	 the	 pharmaceutical	 business	 could	 be	 highly	 profitable,	pharmaceutical	companies	embarked	on	a	period	of	massive	investment	in	R&D	and	built	 large-scale	 internal	 R&D	 capabilities.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 there	 was	 a	 very	significant	 shift	 in	 the	 institutional	 implication	around	 the	 industry.	Public	 support,	public	effort	and	public	resources	put	the	bases	for	a	period	of	great	prosperity	of	the	industry6.	Under	these	premises,	the	period	from	1950	to	1990	inaugurated	a	golden	age	for	the	pharmaceutical	industry	grew	rapidly	and	profitably.	Also,	R&D	spending	boomed	to	unknown	levels	and	this	effort	was	followed	by	an	important	flow	of	new	pharmaceuticals.	 Companies	 like	Pfizer,	Merck	or	Bristol	 rushed	 towards	profitable	patents	 over	 antibiotics.	 For	 instance,	 penicillin	which	 had	 not	 been	 patented,	 had	gone	from	costing	$	3.955	per	pound	in	1945	to	$	282	per	pound	in	1950.7		Through	 these	 golden	 years,	 there	was	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 technology	 of	 pharmaceutical	research	from	random	screening	to	one	of	"guided"	discovery	or	"drug	discovery	by	design".	 This	 steady	 innovation	 process	 was	 critically	 dependent	 on	 the	 publicly	generated	 knowledge.	 The	 industry	 directly	 benefited	 from	 the	 explosion	 in	 public	funding	 for	health	 related	 research	 that	 followed	 the	war.	This	public	 funded	effort	was	especially	important	as	a	source	of	knowledge	about	the	cause	of	disease.	Smaller	firms,	 and	 those	 farther	 from	 the	 centers	 of	 public	 research,	were	much	 slower	 to	adopt	the	new	techniques	than	their	rivals.		Pharmaceuticals	 companies	 have	 enjoyed	 important	 “isolating	 mechanisms”	 and	barriers	to	entry	of	imitators	and	new	entrants.	Several	of	these	barriers	have	to	do	with	the	scale	economies	in	pharmaceutical	research,	the	strength	of	IPRs,	the	nature	of	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 for	 pharmaceutical	 products,	 the	 process	 of	 gaining																																																									
6 Mowery, D. C. (1999). Sources of industrial leadership: studies of seven industries. Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
7 Drahos, P., & Braithwaite, J. (2001). Intellectual property, corporate strategy, globalisation: TRIPS in context. 
Wis. Int'l LJ, 20, 451. 
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regulatory	 approval,	 and	 marketing	 and	 distribution	 and	 the	 organizational	capabilities	 developed	 by	 the	 larger	 pharmaceutical	 firms.	 The	 postwar	pharmaceutical	 industry	 has	 been	 dominated	 by	 American	 and	 western	 European	companies.	 Although	 Japan	 was	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 pharmaceutical	 market	 in	 the	world,	Japanese	firms	have	to	date	been	consciously	absent	from	the	global	industry.	Only	the	Japanese	Takeda,	for	instance,	ranks	among	the	top	20	pharmaceutical	firms	in	the	world.			The	third	epoch	of	the	industry	has	its	roots	in	the	use	and	expansion	of	the	tools	of	genetic	 engineering	 in	 the	production	 and	discovery	of	 new	pharmaceuticals	 based	on	 the	 molecular	 biology	 that	 emerged	 with	 the	 discovery	 of	 recombinant	 DNA	(rDNA)	 and	 the	 techniques	 of	 genetic	 engineering.	 These	 new	 techniques	 have	 had	substantial	implications	both	for	the	discovery	of	new	drugs,	on	the	one	hand,	and	for	the	ways	 in	which	 they	were	manufactured,	 on	 the	 other.	 Genetic	 engineering	 has	been	 used	 first	 as	 a	 process	 technology	 to	 manufacture	 proteins	 whose	 existing	therapeutic	qualities	were	already	quite	well	understood	 in	 large	enough	quantities	to	 permit	 their	 development	 as	 therapeutic	 agents	 –this	 activity	 permitting	 a	proliferation	of	new	firms	manufacturing	large	quantity	of	proteins-	and	as	a	tool	for	small	 molecule	 discovery	 –this	 field	 being	 dominated	 by	 the	 large	 global	pharmaceuticals-.	 These	 new	 firms	 were	 start-ups,	 many	 of	 them	 as	 result	 of	 the	Bayh-Dole	act	of	1980,	which	enabled	universities	or	non-profits,	 to	own	and	profit	from	 the	 patents	 created	 through	 public	 funding.	 Biotech	 based	 pharmaceuticals	represents	18%	of	total	worldwide	medicine	sales	in	20128.		These	new	biotechnology	firms	were	perceived	as	creators	of	a	Schumpeterian	new	improved	paradigm	which	would	preclude	the	former	one.	However,	the	emergence	of	 these	 new	 companies	 has	 not	 resulted	 in	 Schumpeterian	 creative	 destruction.	Different	barriers	to	entry,	the	dominance	of	the	industry	in	the	downstream	market	and	 some	organizational	 competencies	of	 the	 traditional	pharmaceutical	 companies	have	permitted	these	to	keep	their	dominance	over	the	pharmaceutical	market.																																																									
8 Ey & EuropaBio Biotechnology in Europe (2014). The tax, finance and regulatory framework and global 
policy comparison. Retrieved from http://www.europabio.org/sites/default/files/report/ey-
europabio_report_final_1.pdf. 
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Since	 the	 alliance	 between	 Eli	 Lilly	 and	 Biotech	 Genentech	 in	 the	 80’s,	most	 of	 the	major	pharmaceutical	companies	have	invested	in	biotechnology	R&D	and	integrated	new	 firms	 through	 collaborative	 arrangements	 (equity	 purchases,	 acquisitions,	mergers,	 joint	 ventures	 and	 R&D	 contracts)	 with	 the	 new	 biotechnology	 start-ups.		Even	 if	 new	 firms	 were	 eventually	 more	 successful	 than	 the	 traditional	pharmaceutical	 companies,	 these	 start	ups	have	needed	 to	 seek	out	partners	 in	 the	big	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 with	 the	 experience	 and	 competencies	 required	 for	clinical	development,	 regulatory	approval,	and	marketing.	Therefore,	 far	 from	being	swept	away	by	new	entrants,	incumbent	companies	have	been	reinforced	as	leaders	of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 market	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 complex	 cooperative	interactions	with	new	entrants.			Another	 feature	 of	 this	 third	 historic	 phase	 is	 the	 important	 disparity	 between	regions	 in	 the	 development	 of	 this	 new	 scientific	 paradigm.	 Despite	 the	 global	dimension	of	the	scientific	development	and	shared	knowledge,	there	are	remarkable	differences	 in	 industry	 structure	 across	 different	 regions	 of	 the	 world.	 As	 in	 the	United	 States,	 the	 sector	 has	 experienced	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 actors	 -	 the	 new	startups	 –	 and	 the	 gradual	 implementation	 of	 biotechnology	 programs	 within	established	 firms,	 Europe	 has	 not	 witnessed	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 specialized	biotechnology	 sector.	 Also,	 Swiss	 and	 British	 incumbent	 firms	 have	 been	 more	vigorous	and	aggressive	than	the	French,	German,	Italian	or	Spanish	firms.	In	Japan,	the	large	pharmaceutical	companies	have	been	particularly	slow	to	embrace	the	new	technology.	 Institutional	 flexibility,	 technology	 transfer	 between	 publicly	 funded	universities/entities	and	private	companies,	easy	recognition	and	patents	awards	on	biotech	inventions	and	a	more	entrepreneurial	friendly	financial	system	may	explain	today’s	hegemony	of	US	in	the	biotech	industry.			
Concentration	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry.		The	pharmaceutical	 industry	is	characterized	by	a	high	level	of	concentration	of	the	business	in	few	hands.	Fifteen	multinational	companies	enjoy	a	remarkable	dominant	position	of	 the	market.	Around	65%	of	 the	global	pharmaceutical	market	 is	divided	between	 the	 top	 20	 pharmaceutical	 firms	 (Big	 pharma)	 whose	 headquarters	 are	
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mainly	located	in	the	United	States,	Europe,	Japan,	or	Israel.	The	vast	majority	of	new	inventions	are	then	generated	by	pharmaceutical	companies	in	developed	nations.		Top	 global	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 by	 global	 sales	 2015	 in	 billion	 dollars	 and	market	share	(by	Pharmaceutical	Executive).		 Novartis	(46,1	–	5,1%)	 Switzerland	Pfizer	(44,5	–	4,5%)	 USA	Roche	(40,1	-	3,6%)	 Switzerland	Sanofi	(38,2	–	3,9%)	 France	Merck	(36,6	–	3,7%)	 USA	Johnson	&	Johnson	(30,7	–	3,1%)	 USA	GSK	 Glaxo	 SmithKline	 (37,96	 -3,3%)	 UK	AscatraZeneca	(25,7	–	3,1%)	 UK	Gilead	Sciences		 USA	Abbvie	 USA	Amgen	 USA	Teva	 Israel	(generic	company)	Bayer	 Germany	Lilly		 USA	Novo	Nordisk	 Denmark			The	 top	 10	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 have	 the	 44,	 1%	 of	 the	 global	 prescription	drug’s	 market.	 Most	 of	 the	 top	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 have	 been	 the	 result	 of	mergers	 and	 acquisitions;	 Pfizer	 (Pzifer,	 Warner-Lambert,	 Monsanto);	GlaxoSmithKline	 (Glaxo,	Wellcome,	Beecham);	Novartis	 (Ciba-Geigy,	 Sandoz);	Roche	(Roche,	Syntex,	Genentech)…		
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Furthermore,	concentration	process	among	few	companies	is	an	increasing	tendency;	in	 1985	 the	 10	 largest	 firms	 accounted	 for	 about	 20	 percent	 of	 worldwide	 sales,	whereas	 in	 2002	 the	 10	 largest	 firms	 accounted	 for	 48%	 of	 sales.	 This	 is,	 among	others,	the	result	of	a	number	of	company	merger	and	acquisition	operations	which	is	still	underway.	 Indeed,	most	of	 the	pharmaceutical	companies	which	have	stayed	in	the	top	20	between	1995	and	2005	have	been	involved	in	mega	mergers	(larger	than	$	 10	 billion).	 A	 commonly	 cited	 rationale	 for	 this	 consolidation	 by	 proponents	 of	these	mergers	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 economies	 of	 scale	 in	 research	 and	 development	(R&D)	 and	 in	 sales	 and	 marketing.	 However,	 despite	 rising	 R&D	 spending	 the	productivity	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 number	 of	compounds	approved	by	 the	Food	and	Drug	Administration	 (FDA)	has	deteriorated	since	1996.			As	we	will	see,	there	are	important	questions	and	doubts	as	to	the	beneficial	impact	of	this	 concentration	 process	 on	 innovation	 and	 R&D	 productivity.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	number	of	new	drugs	entering	clinical	trials	has	declined	since	1998,	which	calls	into	question	 the	 effectiveness	 of	mergers	 and	 the	 economies	 of	 scale	 hypothesis	more	generally.	Moreover,	several	of	the	largest	pharmaceutical	firms	have	been	trading	at	significantly	 lower	 price-to-earnings	 ratios	 than	 many	 of	 their	 smaller	 rivals,	indicating	 investors	 believe	 the	 larger	 firms	will	 experience	 lower	 growth	 rates9.	 It	seems	that	this	concentration	process	is	not	specially	grounded	in	the	achievement	of	bigger	efficiency	in	the	creation	of	new	substances	and	drugs.		Again,	there	are	important	disparities	among	different	world	regions.	From	the	year	2004,	there	have	been	more	mergers	and	acquisitions	in	the	pharmaceutical	sector	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	compared	to	North	America	and	Europe.	In	this	period	the	rate	of	 growth	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region	 has	 been	 37%.	 In	Western	 Europe	 the	 rate	 of	growth	 has	 been	 11%	 and	 in	North	 America	 it	 has	 been	 20%.	 The	 pharmaceutical	market	in	Eastern	Europe	has	not	experienced	any	increase	in	the	rate	of	mergers	and	acquisitions.																																																										
9 Danzon, P. M., Epstein, A., & Nicholson, S. (2007). Mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries. Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(4-5), 307-328. 
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It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 acquisition	 process	 has	 also	 encompassed	 the	acquisition	by	major	pharmaceutical	companies	of	producers	or	companies	of	generic	medicines.	 One	 example	 of	 this	 was	 the	 acquisition	 in	 2005	 of	 Hexal,	 Germany's	second-largest	generics	company,	and	67%	of	 its	US	affiliate	Eon	Lab	by	Novartis	in	an	attempt	to	get	a	dominant	position	(and	control)	in	the	global	business	of	generics	selling	"copy	cat"	versions	of	pharmaceuticals	whose	patent	protection	has	expired.	It	is	 easy	 to	 infer	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 operations	 jeopardize	 competition	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	market.	As	we	will	further	see,	this	is	not	the	only	behavior	which	can	be	viewed	as	collusive	to	competition.		As	 we	 have	 noted	 before,	 the	 concentration	 process	 experimented	 by	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 foster	 an	 increasing	 and	 faster	 rate	 of	innovation	 and	 creation	 of	 new	 substances.	 Different	 studies10	 suggest	 rather	 the	opposite.	In	particular,	 it	 is	said	that	fewer	centers	of	initiative	and	decision-making	reduces	and	restricts	the	incentives	and	opportunities	to	carry	the	creative	efforts	of	small	 biotech	 companies	 into	 the	 expensive	 clinical	 development	 and	 marketing	stages	and	that	recent	mergers	have	contributed	to	the	observed	decline	in	the	rate	of	pharmaceutical	innovation.		
Big	 Pharma	 companies	 as	 Transnational	 Companies	 (TNCs)	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 world	
health. 	One	of	the	main	features	of	dominant	pharmaceutical	corporations	is	their	nature	as	transnational	companies	(TNCs).	There	are	different	names	to	refer	companies	with	production	 activities	 and	 ownership	 of	 assets	 abroad;	 multinational	 companies,	international	companies	or	enterprises.	Pharmaceutical	multinational	companies	are	Transnational	 Companies	 (TNCs)	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 UNCTAD	 because	 it	 best	represents	 one	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 these	 powerful	 corporations:	 the	 ability	 to	operate,	manage,	control	and	develop	strategies	across	and	above	national	 frontiers	with	activities	in	two	or	more	countries	with	the	capacity	to	influence	others	and	not	just	 in	 many	 of	 them	 independently	 and	 autonomously.	 This	 ability	 permits																																																									
10 Comanor, W. S., & Scherer, F. M. (2013). Mergers and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Journal of 
health economics, 32(1), 106-113. 
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pharmaceutical	 TNCs	 to	 plan	 their	 operations	 across	 countries	 in	 a	manner	 which	maximizes	 their	 goals	 (mainly	 profits)	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 manage,	 control	 and	develop	strategies	across	and	above	national	borders11.			TNCs	operate	normally	in	industries	characterized	by	oligopolistic	structures	such	as	the	 pharmaceutical	 industry.	 In	 the	 global	 scenario,	 TNCs	 have	 increasingly	 turned	their	 look	to	the	developing	world,	with	some	important	operational	advantages	for	them;	 lower	wages	 and	 operating	 costs,	weak	 labor	 unions,	 lax	 environmental	 and	health	controls,	filters	and	regulations,	transfer	pricing	and	favorable	tax	regime12.	In	the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 there	has	 indeed	been	an	 important	shift	 in	 the	supply	chain	 from	 ICH	 (International	 Conference	 on	 Harmonisation	 of	 Technical	Requirements	 for	 the	Registration	 of	 Pharmaceuticals	 for	Human	Use)	 countries	 to	emerging	 countries.	 India	 and	 China,	 are	 currently	 the	 biggest	 producers	 of	 active	pharmaceutical	ingredients	(API).	This	trend	will	continue	as	the	Indian	and	Chinese	API	 industries	 are	 growing	 at	 nearly	 19.3%	 and	 17.6%	 annually.	 While	 Italy	 still	remains	the	world	market	leader	in	APIs	destined	to	sectors	such	as	cardiovascular	or	the	 central	 nervous	 system,	 China	 leads	 in	 anti-infective	 APIs	 with	 approximately	43%	of	world	market	share.	Lower	production	costs	in	India	and	China	drive	much	of	this	 growth.	 For	 example,	 to	 develop,	 test,	 manufacture	 and	 market	 a	 generic	medicine	in	India	costs	20-40%	of	what	it	costs	in	the	West13.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 today’s	 post-Westphalian	 global	 system	 of	 politics	 and	 the	global	 governance	 context	 described	 in	 chapter	 2	 where	 there	 has	 been	 a	 shift	 of	political	authority	away	from	nation	states,	TNCs	such	as	Big	Pharma	are	emerging	as	powerful	actors	in	deciding	“the	who-gets-what”	in	the	health	arena	(pharmaceuticals	constitute	one	of	the	main	pillars	of	the	health	area).	These	pharmaceutical	TNCs	not	only	 have	 acquired	 and	 exercise	 an	 important	 authority	 beyond	 and	 outside	 of	 the	nation	 states	 in	 carrying	 out	 structural	 changes	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 world	 production,																																																									
11 Ietto-Gillies, G. (2012). Transnational corporations and international production: concepts, theories and 
effects. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
12 De Jonge, A. (2011). Transnational corporations and international law: accountability in the global business 
environment, London:  Edward Elgar Publishing. 
13 Bumpas, J., & Betsch, E. (2009). Exploratory study on active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturing for 
essential medicines. Health, nutrition and population discussion paper. Washington, DC, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and World Bank. 
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technology	 or	mobility	 of	 capital	 but	 they	 also	 constrain	 the	 options	 of	 states	 and	individuals	 to	make	changes	 in	 their	public	policies14.	Sovereignty	of	 states	 is	being	gradually	 eroded	 as	 TNCs	 may	 initiate	 international	 arbitration	 directly	 against	 a	state	 for	 alleged	 breaches	 of	 their	 rights	 (investment	 treaties).	 Also,	 these	 TNCs	consciously	 sought	 to	 influence	policies,	mainly	 state	behavior	 in	 the	 foreign	policy	arena15.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 pharmaceutical	 TNCs	 played	 a	prominent	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 TRIPS,	 they	 used	 their	 vast	 influence	 on	policymakers	 and	 officials	 to	 shape	 international	 trade	 law	 and	 expand	 IPRs	 into	previously	unreached	markets,	-without	regard	of	the	social	and	economic	impact	of	this	implementation-16.			One	of	the	consequences	of	the	power	of	these	TNCs	in	the	pharmaceutical	field	is	the	unequal	 bargaining	 power	 of	 some	 states	 versus	 Big	 Pharma	 companies.	 These	negotiations	 are	 far	 from	 being	 one	 between	 equals.	 	 Comparing	 the	 GPD	 between	developing	 countries	 participating	 in	 the	 public-private	 partnership	 Accelerated	Access	 Initiative	and	the	revenues	and	 incomes	of	 the	pharmaceutical	companies	of	the	initiative,	it	can	be	seen	that	only	6	of	the	17	countries’	GPD	from	2004	is	equal	to	or	greater	than	the	pharmaceutical	company	with	lowest	total	revenues	in	2004.	Also,	the	 combined	worth	of	 the	world’s	 top	 five	drug	 companies	 ‘is	 twice	 the	 combined	GNP	 of	 all	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 This	 situation	 substantially	 compromises	 some	countries	negotiating	position.17		Other	 characteristic	 derived	 from	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 these	 pharmaceutical	TNCs	is	that	they	tend	to	make	decisions	 in	their	head	office	country	and	not	 in	the	countries	 where	 they	 operate.	 In	 this	 sense,	 decisions	 affecting	 the	 people	 of	developing	countries	are	made	in	TNCs	offices	in	cities	such	as	Washington,	London	or	Tokyo,	 far	 away	 from	 the	 specific	necessities	of	developing	 countries	population	and	without	any	 link	or	political	 engagement	with	 local	 communities.	Furthermore,	TNCs	size	and	power,	the	jobs	they	offer	to	create	and	the	taxes	they	pay	put	TNCs	in																																																									
14 Strange, S. (1996). The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge 
university press. 
15 Ietto-Gillies, G. Transnational corporations and international production […] see supranote 11.  
16 Drahos, P. (1995). Global property rights in information: the story of TRIPS at the GATT. Prometheus, 
13(1), 6-19. 
17 Thomas, C. (2002). Trade policy and the politics of access to drugs. Third World Quarterly, 23(2), 251-264. 
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a	powerful	position	 to	 influence	government	policy.	This	raises	questions	about	 the	democratic	 process	 itself.	 Their	 increasing	 political	 role	 and	 authority	 is	 mainly	driven	 by	 private	 interests	 rather	 than	 public	 interests.	 This	 raises	 important	questions	 as	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 some	 decisions	 and	 practices.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	market	domination	of	the	pharmaceutical	TNCs	enables	them	to	largely	dictate	what	is	produced	at	what	price	without	any	democratic	control	or	intervention.			One	may	question	whether	the	emergence	of	pharmaceutical	TNCs	as	key	players	in	the	health	arena	and	the	market	driven	logic	of	their	decisions	have	been	beneficial	or	detrimental	to	people,	their	rights	and	their	necessities.	In	this	sense,	and	regarding	the	access	to	medicines	we	have	seen	that	the	system	is	not	working	in	favor	of	the	many	 or	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 general	 interest.	 First,	 pharmaceutical	 research	 neglects	diseases	among	 the	poor18;	only	10	per	cent	of	global	health	research	 is	devoted	 to	conditions	that	account	for	90	per	cent	of	the	global	disease	burden19;	and	second,	for	most	of	people,	prices	of	medicines	are	not	affordable;	according	to	WHO	estimates,	around	85	per	 cent	 of	 the	world’s	 population	 is	 being	priced	out	 of	 the	market	 for	medicines.	High	prices	are	therefore	one	of	the	major	barriers	to	reliable	access.	The	poor	need	access	to	the	available	life-saving	medication	at	prices	they	can	afford.20	In	this	 sense,	 medicines	 account	 for	 20–60%	 of	 health	 spending	 in	 developing	 and	transitional	 countries,	 compared	 with	 18%	 in	 countries	 of	 the	 Organization	 for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development21		
Market	of	Generics.			According	 to	 WHO	 website	 a	 generic	 drug	 is	 a	 pharmaceutical	 product,	 usually	intended	 to	 be	 interchangeable	 with	 an	 innovator	 product,	 which	 is	 manufactured	without	a	license	from	the	innovator	company	and	marketed	after	the	expiry	date	of																																																									
18 Trouiller, P., Olliaro, P., Torreele, E., Orbinski, J., Laing, R., & Ford, N. (2002). Drug development for 
neglected diseases: a deficient market and a public-health policy failure. The Lancet, 359(9324), 2188-2194. 
19 Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group. (2001). Fatal imbalance: the crisis in research and 
development for drugs for neglected diseases. Paris: Médecins sans Frontières. 
20 Madeley, J. (1999). Big business, poor peoples: the impact of transnational corporations on the world's 
poor. Baingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
21 Cameron, A., Ewen, M., Ross-Degnan, D., Ball, D., & Laing, R. (2009). Medicine prices, availability, and 
affordability in 36 developing and middle-income countries: a secondary analysis. The lancet, 373(9659), 240-
249. 
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the	 patent	 or	 other	 exclusive	 rights.	 Generic	 drugs	 are	 marketed	 under	 a	 non-proprietary	 or	 approved	name	 rather	 than	 a	 proprietary	 or	 brand	name.	A	 generic	drug	must	contain	the	same	active	ingredients	as	the	original	formulation.	According	to	the	U.S.	Food	and	Drug	Administration	(FDA),	generic	drugs	are	identical	or	within	an	 acceptable	bioequivalent	range	 to	 the	brand-name	 counterpart.	 By	 extension,	therefore,	generics	are	considered	(by	 the	FDA)	 identical	 in	dose,	 strength,	 route	of	administration,	 safety,	 efficacy,	 and	 intended	 use.	The	 FDA's	 use	 of	 the	 word	"identical"	is	very	much	a	legal	interpretation,	and	is	not	literal.			Before	 the	 TRIPS	 has	 been	 fully	 implemented	 worldwide,	 producers	 of	 patented	medicines	 competed	 with	 generic	 producers.	 Historically	 Italy	 was	 the	 main	manufacturer	 of	 generics.	More	 recently,	 India	 played	 that	 role.	Many	 industry	 and	academic	representatives	have	referred	to	India	as	the	“pharmacy	of	the	developing	world”	 to	 highlight	 its	 key	 role	 in	 supplying	 large	 volumes	 of	 generic	 medicines	around	the	world.	Today,	generic	production	worldwide	is	associated	to	the	expiry	of	patents.	In	effect,	expiry	of	a	drug	patent	allows	different	pharmaceutical	companies	to	 produce	 the	 same	 pharmaceutical	 and	 compete	 in	 the	 market	 with	 the	corresponding	decrease	of	prices	of	these	pharmaceuticals.	Also,	branded	producers	often	 introduce	 their	 own	 generics.	 The	 branded	 producer	 does	 not	 usually	 need	approval	 to	 enter	 the	market	with	a	 so-called	branded	generic—also	 referred	 to	 as	authorized	 generic,	 pseudo-generic,	 or	 fighter	 brand-.	 Pharmaceutical	 companies	often	control	subsidiaries	that	produce	and	market	generics	or	they	license	the	drug	to	a	generic	 firm	to	compete	against	other	generics.	 In	this	way,	branded	producers	tend	to	either	deter	generic	entry	or	to	capture	a	share	of	the	generic	profits.			It	is	estimated	that	an	optimal	reduction	of	prices	is	obtained	when	the	sixth	or	even	seventh	firm	enters	the	market22.	This	reduction	in	prices	is	also	due	to	the	fact	that	producers	of	generics	do	not	incur	the	cost	of	drug	discovery.	Also,	generic	producers	do	not	bear	the	burden	of	proving	safety	and	efficacy	of	the	drug	by	clinical	trials	as	these	 have	 been	 previously	 proved	 by	 their	 brand-name	 counterparts.	 India	 is	 still	playing	an	important	role	in	providing	access	to	the	low-priced	medicines,	not	only	to																																																									
22 Reiffen, D., & Ward, M. R. (2005). Generic drug industry dynamics. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
87(1), 37-49. 
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developing	 countries	but	 also	 to	patients	 in	 the	developing	world.	However,	 Indian	pharmaceutical	production	 is	being	subject	 to	a	strict	control	by	developed	nation’s	regulators.	21	drug	manufacturing	plants	of	India	firms	have	been	banned	for	export	of	 medicines	 to	 US	 in	 2013	 due	 to	 quality	 concerns.	 Also,	 US	 Food	 and	 Drug	Administration	(USFDA)	 is	conducting	surprise	 inspections	at	 Indian	manufacturing	sites,	which	are	likely	to	increase	in	future23.			Notwithstanding	 this,	 and	 due	 to	 its	 affordability,	 the	 increased	 use	 of	 generic	medicines	 is	 becoming	 essential	 to	 maintain	 healthcare	 systems	 given	 the	 ever	increasing	 pressure	 on	 resources.	 Many	 national	 governments	 have	 initiated	 to	encourage	 prescribing	 and	 dispensing	 of	 generic	 drugs.	 Increasing	 use	 of	 generic	drugs	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 compromise	 care.	 In	 spite	 of	 certain	 interest	 oriented	campaigns	 addressed	 to	 question	 generic	 efficacy,	 safety	 and	 quality	 as	 compared	with	 their	 brand-name	 counterparts,	 many	 studies	 have	 reported	 little	 or	 no	difference	in	outcomes	between	the	two	across	a	range	of	products	and	classes.24		Because	 of	 all	 the	 above	mentioned	 reasons,	 generic	 producers	 hold	 an	 increasing	share	of	the	pharmaceutical	market.	In	this	respect,	it	is	said	that	the	pharmaceutical	industry	 in	 some	 ways	 resembles	 an	 iceberg25.	 These	 generic	 companies	 actually	produce	the	vast	majority	of	all	pharmaceuticals	sold.	For	example,	 in	2013	84%	of	the	 4000 million	 prescriptions	 issued	 in	 the	 USA	were	 filled	 by	 generics.	 Together	with	 the	 	well-known	 companies,	which	 are	 collectively	 known	as	Big	Pharma,	 and	which	represent	40%	of	the	market	in	terms	of	finance;	there	are	generic	companies	such	 as	 Teva	 (12th	 largest	 pharmaceutical	 company)	 or	 Actavis	 (19th	 largest	company)	which	 are	 not	 known	 by	 the	 general	 public	 and	with	 a	 high	 probability.	Almost	 50%	of	 generic	medicines	 are	 produced	 by	 the	 top	 generic	 companies	 (the	Israeli	 TEVA,	 the	 Swiss	 Sandoz	 –a	 Novartis	 unit-,	 the	 American	 Mylan,	 the	 Irish	Actavis	and	the	Indian	Sun	Pharma).																																																											
23 Goyal, A. (2015). ‘Pharmacy of the World’is ill?. Developing world bioethics, 15(1), ii-ii. 
24 Godman, B., Wilcock, M., Martin, A., Bryson, S., Baumgärtel, C., Bochenek, T., ... & Fusté, A. C. (2015). 
Generic pregabalin: current situation and implications for health authorities, generics and biosimilars 
manufacturers in the future. Generics and Biosimilars Initiative journal, 4(3), 125-135. 
25 Taylor, D. (2015). The pharmaceutical industry and the future of drug development. 
87		
Today,	the	market	is	experiencing	a	rise	of	generic	drug	prices.	Some	commentators	suggest	 that	 this	may	be	produced	by	 the	merger	 and	 concentration	process	of	 the	generic	 industry26	 this	having	 the	effect	of	driving	up	generic	prices	as	 competition	declines.	In	2015	global	pharmaceutical	merger	and	acquisition	deals	were	valued	at	462	 billion	 dollars.	 The	 Israeli	 Teva	 For	 example,	 has	 acquired	 Allergan	 for	 40.5	billion	dollars	creating	a	concentration	of	generic	market	share	that	hugely	increased	the	company’s	power	to	control	prices	in	a	previously	fragmented	market.	Teva	now	controls	around	20	per	cent	of	the	global	generics	industry.			 	
																																																								
26 Munro, R. (2015). Generic drug pricing–is it becoming a runaway train?. Prescriber, 26(22), 5-5. 
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3.2.	 The	regulatory	challenge:	proliferation	of	patents	and	regime	demand.		The	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 more	 regulated	 than	 any	 other	 industry.	 Because	pharmaceutical	 drugs	 substantially	 impact	 people’s	 quality-of-life,	 both	 regulation	and	the	unique	channel	of	healthcare	provider	(e.g.,	doctor	or	pharmacist)	and	payer	(i.e.,	 government	 or	 insurer)	 are	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 patient’s	 wellbeing	 at	reasonable	cost27.	In	this	chapter,	we	are	focusing	on	three	sets	of	rules/regulations	which	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector,	 namely	 marketing	authorization	rules,	pharmaceutical	pricing/reimbursement	and	IPRs	rules.			
Regulations	for	drug	approval	and	marketing	authorization.								The	European	 Directive	 2004/27/EC	 defines	 a	 “medicinal	 product”	 as	 "(a)	 Any	substance	or	combination	of	substances	presented	as	having	properties	 for	 treating	or	 preventing	 disease	 in	 human	 beings;	 or	 (b)	 Any	 substance	 or	 combination	 of	substances	which	may	be	used	in	or	administered	to	human	beings	either	with	a	view	to	 restoring,	 correcting	 or	 modifying	 physiological	 functions	 by	 exerting	 a	pharmacological,	 immunological	 or	 metabolic	 action,	 or	 to	 making	 a	 medical	diagnosis.			Medicinal	products	have	certain	traits	that	set	them	apart	from	most	other	consumer	products.	 First,	 the	 value	 of	 pharmaceutical	 lies	 in	 the	 knowledge/IP/intangible	assets	 rather	 than	 in	 the	 chemical	 constituents;	 secondly,	 consumer	 is	 usually	directed	 by	 a	 third	 party	 (doctor	 or	 health	 professional)	who	 does	 not	 pay	 for	 the	product	 (pharmaceutical)	 and;	 third,	without	 the	 expert	 advice	 of	 an	 intermediary,	few	consumers	have	sufficient	information	to	make	rational	and	informed	choices,	all	this	being	likely	to	affect	the	price.			There	 are	 substantial	 differences	 in	 regulation	 of	 pharmaceuticals.	 However	 the	purpose	of	all	these	different	regulations	is	aimed	at	ensuring	the	safety,	quality,	and																																																									
27 Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., & Stremersch, S. (2014). The pharmaceutical industry: specificity, challenges, and 
what you can learn from this book. In Innovation and Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry (pp. 1-18). 
Springer New York. 
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efficacy	of	the	pharmaceuticals	which	are	covered	under	the	scope	of	the	regulation.	In	most	 jurisdictions,	pharmaceuticals	must	be	registered	and	approved	before	they	are	 allowed	 to	 be	 marketed.	 There	 is	 usually	 some	 degree	 of	 restriction	 of	 the	availability	of	certain	pharmaceuticals	depending	on	their	risk	to	consumers.	 In	this	sense,	 pharmaceuticals	 are	mainly	 classified	 by	 level	 of	control,	 which	distinguishes	prescription	 drugs	(those	 that	 a	 pharmacist	dispenses	 only	 on	the	order	of	 a	physician,	physician	 assistant,	 or	 qualified	or	 authorized	 nurse)	from	over-the-counter	 pharmaceuticals	 –OTC-	(those	 that	 consumers	 can	 obtain	 by	themselves).		Some	 controversial	 and	 unfortunate	 pharmaceutical	 cases	 like	 the	 case	 of	 the	Thalidomide	–an	OTC	pharmaceutical	which	was	marketed	first	in	West	Germany	in	1957	 and	 which	 caused	 10.000	 cases	 throughout	 the	 world,	 of	 infants	 with	phocomelia	 due	 to	 thalidomide-	 led	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 more	 structured	 and	stringent	 pharmaceutical	 regulations	 over	 pharmaceutical	 use	 and	 development.	Since	 the	 early	 1960s	 most	 countries	 increased	 the	 guarantees	 and	 complexity	 of	their	approval	processes	requiring	pharmaceutical	companies	to	provide	substantial	evidence	of	a	new	pharmaceutical's	efficacy	and	safety	based	on	adequate	and	well	controlled	trials	and	establishing	more	controls	over	the	clinical	testing	of	new	drug	candidates.	 These	 new	 regulations	 led	 to	 important	 increases	 in	 the	 cost	 and	resources	necessary	to	obtain	approval	of	a	new	pharmaceutical,	and	they	probably	caused	sharp	 increases	 in	both	R&D	costs	and	the	gestation	times	for	new	chemical	entities	(NCEs).	This	process	of	development	and	approval	also	increased	barriers	to	imitation,	 even	 after	 patents	 expired.	 It	 was	 not	 until	 the	 enactment	 of	 Waxman-Hatch	Act	style	laws	when	generic	versions	of	drugs	were	exempted	from	undergoing	extensive	human	clinical	trials	before	they	could	be	sold	in	the	market.28		Letting	 aside	 the	 regulatory	 differences	 between	 the	 different	 jurisdictions,	 in	 the	development	 of	 a	 new	 drug,	 most	 of	 them	 have	 a	 similar	 path.	 It	 begins	 with	 the	screening	of	thousands	of	compounds	in	order	to	identify	potential	medicines.	Those	compounds	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 promising	 activity	 against	 a	 particular	 biological																																																									
28 Mowery, D. C. (1999). US Industry in 2000: Studies in Competitive Performance, report of the Board on 
Science, Technology, and Economic Policy of the National Research Council. 
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target	 thought	 to	 be	 important	 in	 disease.	 After	 this	 first	 stage,	 it	 begins	 the	preclinical	testing	where	potential	medicines	from	the	first	stage	receive	1	to	3	years	of	testing	in	order	to	assess	safety	and	biological	activity	against	a	disease.	Moreover	different	 tests	 monitor	 chemical	 purity	 and	 stability	 of	 a	 compound,	 determining	what	is	required	for	large-scale	production	of	the	new	medicine.	After	this,	and	prior	to	the	clinical	testing	in	patients,	the	new	drug	producer	must	apply	for	the	review	of	a	new	drug	 to	be	 conducted	by	government	authorities.	Authorities	usually	 require	precise	 and	 accurate	 information	 about	 the	 plans	 for	 clinical	 testing	 in	 patients	 as	well	 as	 manufacturing	 procedures,	 and	 toxicology	 studies	 in	 animals	 previous	 to	allowing	a	producer	 to	 initiate	clinical	 testing	 in	patients.	On	average,	 from	the	250	drug	 candidates	 entering	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 preclinical	 testing,	 just	 ten	 drug	candidates	make	it	through	to	the	next	stage	of	clinical	trials.			The	 clinical	 trials	 involve	 three	 or	 four	 steps	 and	 they	 are	 aimed	 at	 testing	 drug	candidates	in	patients	in	order	to	verify	that	those	drugs	are	effective	and	safe.	This	stage	 encompasses	 can	 take	 up	 to	 10	 years.	 In	 the	 first	 phase,	 researchers	 test	 the	new	drug	in	a	small	group	of	up	to	100	healthy	volunteers	to	determine	mainly	safety	and	dosing.	The	second	phase	contains	trials	with	up	to	500	volunteers	suffering	from	a	 certain	disease	 in	order	 to	 look	 for	 efficacy,	 side	 effects,	 and	optimal	dose.	 In	 the	third	step,	researchers	test	the	new	medicine	in	large	trials	with	up	to	5000	patients	in	hospitals	and	clinics	to	determine	safety	and	efficacy	in	sufficiently	large	numbers	of	 patients.	 Parallel	 to	 these	 phases,	 researchers	 keep	 on	 conducting	 toxicity	 tests,	planning	 for	 full-scale	production	and	preparing	 the	application	 for	approval	 in	 the	next	 stage.	 Upon	 conclusion	 of	 the	 mentioned	 phases,	 it	 begins	 the	 approval	procedure	 which	 can	 take	 10	 months.	 Throughout	 this	 procedure,	 advisory	committees	of	technical	experts	review	the	pharmaceutical	producer’s	application,	all	the	clinical	 trial	 results	and	all	 the	relevant	 information	 in	order	 to	decide	whether	the	new	drug	 can	be	approved	 for	human	use.	Once	 the	new	medicine	 is	 launched,	pharmaceutical	 companies	 are	 required	 to	 continue	 to	 monitor	 the	 approved	medicine	 for	 safety	 and	 generate	 more	 data	 about	 how	 the	 new	 drug	 affects	
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particular	groups	of	patients.	These	trials	are	post-approval	trials	that	are	sometimes	a	condition	attached	by	the	approval,	also	called	post-market	surveillance	studies29.			Clinical	research	is	becoming	increasingly	global,	and	clinical	trials	may	be	conducted	across	different	 countries.	 For	 example,	 the	number	of	 applications	before	 the	FDA	for	marketing	 approval	 supported	 by	 foreign	 clinical	 trials	 has	 increased	 in	 recent	years	and	will	likely	continue	to	increase	in	the	future30.	This	increasing	globalization	of	 clinical	 trials	 poses	 important	 challenges	 to	 national	 regulators.	 Some	 of	 these	challenges	are	of	ethical	nature	and	they	will	be	analyzed	in	following	chapters.			
Pharmaceutical	pricing.		Due	 to	 the	 specific	 features	 of	 these	 products	 (medicines)	 and	 the	 general	 interest	underlying	 them	 because	 of	 its	 direct	 relationship	 with	 people’s	 health,	 pricing	 of	pharmaceuticals	 is	 far	 from	 being	 the	 intersection	 between	 the	 supply	 and	 the	demand	 in	a	 free	market.	On	 the	contrary,	 the	determination	of	 the	pharmaceutical	price	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 complex	 set	 of	 political,	 legal	 and	 economic	 factors	 that,	however,	 do	not	 always	 satisfy	 the	 general	 interest	 of	 the	people	 to	 have	 access	 to	affordable	medicines.			Medicines	 account	 for	 20–60%	 of	 health	 spending	 in	 low-	 and	 middle-income	countries.	Up	to	90%	of	the	population	in	developing	countries	purchases	medicines	through	 out-of-pocket	 payments,	 making	 medicines	 the	 largest	 family	 expenditure	item	after	food.	In	OECD	countries	expenses	of	medicines	account	for	20%	of	health	spending31.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 growth	 in	 pharmaceutical	 expenditures	 greatly	
																																																								
29 Müller-Langer, F. (2009). Legal and Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports. In Creating R&D Incentives for 
Medicines for Neglected Diseases (pp. 140-199). Gabler. 
30 Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff1 FDA Acceptance of Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted Under an 
IND Frequently Asked Questions. This guidance has been prepared by the Office of Good Clinical Practice 
(OGCP) in the Office of the Commissioner (OC) in coordination with the Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) at the Food and Drug 
Administration. It is available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM294729.pdf. 
31 With important differences between countries ranging from 30% of countries like Hungary or Greece to 
6,5% of Denmark and 7,5 of Norway. OECD (2016), Pharmaceutical spending (indicator). doi: 
10.1787/998febf6-en. Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/healthres/pharmaceutical-spending.htm (Accessed 
on 25 February 2016) 
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exceeded	 the	 rate	 of	 growth	 in	 other	 types	 of	 health	 expenditures32	 and	 it	 grows	faster	than	most	of	the	countries’	GPD.		There	 are	many	differences	 across	 countries	 regarding	 the	 spending	 per	 capital	 on	pharmaceuticals	 and	 retail	 prices33.	These	 cross	 country	differences	 also	 take	place	within	OECD	countries,	between	European	Union	countries	and	even	within	a	single	country.	The	 yearly	US	dollar	per	 capita	 spending	on	pharmaceuticals	 substantially	range	among	the	1034	dollars/person	of	the	USA	and	the	288	dollars/person	expense	of	 Denmark34.	 The	 retail	 price	 includes	 the	 payment	 received	 by	 the	manufacturer	plus	 wholesale	 and	 retail	 mark-ups,	 plus	 any	 VAT	 or	 other	 tax	 paid	 by	 the	 final	purchaser.	 Accordingly,	 retail	 price	 levels	 may	 differ	 across	 countries	 due	 to	differences	 in	 the	 average	 price	 for	 the	 product	 received	 by	 the	 manufacturer.	However,	they	can	also	reflect	differences	in	the	distribution	margins	(wholesale	and	retail)	and	in	the	level	of	tax	included	in	the	price.			It	 is	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 up	 to	 five	 stages	 into	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 price	 of	pharmaceuticals35;	 first	 the	 price	 from	 the	 manufactures	 (normally	 the	 most	important	 input	 of	 the	 final	 price)	 which	 depends	 on	 the	 level	 of	 competition,	 the	quantity	sought	by	the	buyer,	the	number	of	alternative	buyers	in	the	same	country	for	the	same	medicine	and	the	price	regulation;	second	the	landed	price:	fees,	charges	and	 profits	 by	 transporters,	 insurers	 and	 warehouses,	 level	 of	 taxes	 levied	 by	 the	state	and	tariffs	on	imported	medicines;	third,	the	wholesale	selling	price;	fourth	the	retail	 selling	 price	 (profit	 margins,	 costs	 of	 storage	 and	 transport)	 and;	 fifth,	 the	dispensed	selling	price	and	VAT.		Price	of	 the	manufacturers	does	not	reflect	 the	cost	of	production	plus	a	margin.	 In	reality,	manufacturers	attempt	to	charge	the	highest	price	that	 the	consumer	would	pay	in	a	specific	market	and	institutional	environment	in	order	to	maximize	profits.	In																																																									
32 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). Pharmaceutical pricing policies in a 
global market. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
33 There are not complete and clear public databases on pharmaceutical prices around the world. However, 
some ilustrative disparities between countries can be observed in the International Drug Price Indicator Guide 
at: erc.msh.org/priceguide. 
34 OECD (2016), Pharmaceutical spending (indicator). (see footnote 31) 
35 World Health Organization. (2008). Measuring medicine prices, availability, affordability and price 
components. 
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this	sense,	 the	relationship	between	production	cost	and	medicine	price	 is	tenous36.	This	partly	explain	the	price	differentiation	(also	known	as	tiered	pricing)	applied	by	producers	in	the	different	national	markets.	Selling	the	same	product	–medicines-	at	a	different	 price	 to	 different	 populations	 or	 different	 national	 markets	 could	 be	 an	“equity	 pricing”	 when	 this	 differentiation	 intends	 to	 improve	 the	 affordability	 of	medicines	 in	 low-income	 countries	 or	 regions.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 of	 the	pharmaceutical	market	where	low-income	countries	do	not	always	obtain	the	lowest	prices	for	medicines.		Differences	 of	 prices	 across	 different	 countries	 gives	 path	 to	 the	 so-called	 “parallel	trade”	of	medicines;	the	practice	of	importing	pharmaceutical	products	from	a	lower-priced	country	to	a	higher-priced	one	without	the	authorization	of	the	owner	of	the	IPRs	 associated	 with	 the	 medicines.	 The	 underlying	 justification	 to	 allow	 parallel	imports	 is	 that	 since	 the	 inventor	 has	 been	 rewarded	 through	 the	 first	 sale	 or	distribution	of	the	product,	he	or	she	has	no	right	to	control	the	use	or	resale	of	goods	put	 on	 the	market	with	 his/her	 consent	 or	 in	 otherwise	 authorized	 form.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 inventor’s	 rights	 have	 been	 “exhausted”.	 In	 economic	 terms,	 the	acceptance	 of	 parallel	 imports	 may	 prevent	 market	 segmentation	 and	 price	discrimination	by	pharmaceutical	producers.				This	reality	has	received	considerable	policy	attention	and	there	is	an	ongoing	global	debate	on	the	issue.	As	we	have	seen	in	chapter	2,	the	WTO	leaves	the	determination	of	exhaustion	of	IP	rights	up	to	the	individual	members.	This	is	stated	in	Article	6	of	the	 TRIPS.	 There	 is	 currently	 a	 tendency	 to	 take	 a	 more	 permissive	 approach	 to	pharmaceuticals,	 specially	 a	 limited	 regional	 exhaustion	 as	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	Court	decisions	by	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	during	the	last	30	years	have	applied	the	principle	of	free	movement	of	goods	within	the	EU	to	establish	a	policy	of	“community	 exhaustion”	 of	 patent	 rights	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 intellectual	 property.	This	is	aimed	at	achieving	the	goal	of	a	single	internal	market.	Also,	there	have	been	proposals	in	the	US	to	permit	parallel	imports	of	pharmaceuticals	from	Canada	(and	other	countries)	in	the	last	several	years.	Also,	developed	countries	like	Switzerland,																																																									
36 Loff, B., & Heywood, M. (2002). Patents on drugs: manufacturing scarcity or advancing health?. The Journal 
of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 30(4), 621-631. 
94		
New	Zealand	and	Australia	have	also	extended	 their	policies	 towards	a	pro-parallel	trade	approach.37	Parallel	trade	is	most	significant	between	EU	countries,	but	even	so	only	 accounts	 for	 an	 estimated	 2%	 of	 the	 EU	 market	 (share	 of	 parallel-traded	pharmaceutical	products	in	the	main	importing	Member	States	stands	between	1.7%	in	 Finland	 and	 16.5%	 in	 Denmark).	 Canadian	 cross-border	 trade	 with	 the	 United	States	peaked	 in	2004	at	about	8%	of	 total	Canadian	sales,	which	 represented	only	0.5%	of	the	US	market	in	terms	of	value38.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 parallel	 trade	 in	 patented	 pharmaceuticals	 has	 important	advantages	 for	 developing	 (and	 least	 developed)	 countries.	 Parallel	 imports	 are	 of	particular	 importance	 in	 the	 drug	 field.	 As	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 generally	 sets	prices	 differently	 throughout	 the	world	 for	 the	 same	medicines	 to	maximize	profit,	importation	of	a	(patented)	medicine	from	a	country	where	it	is	sold	at	a	lower	price	will	enable	more	patients	in	the	importing	country	to	gain	access	to	the	product.	It	is	widely	assumed	that	an	international	exhaustion	rule	would	result	in	the	increase	of	a	variety	of	on-patent	pharmaceuticals	and	consumers	would	more	easily	have	access	to	 them39.	 Some	 countries,	 especially	 in	 countries	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 South	 East	Asia	 Asian	 Nations	 (ASEAN)	 and	 in	 other	 countries	 of	 the	 south	 hemisphere	 have	adopted	international	exhaustion	principles	regarding	pharmaceuticals	–the	Andean	Group,	the	South	African	Medicines	Act,	or	the	Argentinean	act-.			Pharmaceutical	 companies	have	expressed	an	 important	opposition	against	parallel	trading.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 parallel	 imports	 would	make	 companies	 charge	 a	single	 price	worldwide,	 leading	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 (supposedly	 lower)	 price	 that	may	otherwise	be	charged	in	low-income	countries.	Also,	the	pharmaceutical	industry	argue	 that	 this	policy	 could	 reduce	 its	profit	margins	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 recoup	R&D	investments,	all	this	slowing	down	innovation	of	new	drugs.	Finally,	it	is	said	that	this	figure	 could	make	 it	 difficult	 for	 health	 authorities	 in	 different	 countries	 to	 sustain	differential	price	controls	and	regulatory	regimes.																																																										
37 Kyle, M. K. (2009). Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals: firm responses and competition policy. International 
Antitrust Law & Policy, 339-358. 
38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2008). Pharmaceutical pricing policies in a 
global market. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
39 Nguyen Nhu, Q. (2011). Parallel Trade of Patented Pharmaceuticals: A Discussion from Developing 
Country Perspective. 
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	Contrary	to	Pharmaceutical	companies’	views,	some	empirical	studies	reach	different	conclusions	about	the	impact	of	parallel	trade	of	pharmaceuticals	and	recommend	a	middle	 way	 to	 reconcile	 all	 the	 interest	 at	 stake.	 In	 particular,	 in	 a	 report	commissioned	 by	 WIPO,	 Maskus40	 -who	 is	 not	 suspicious	 of	 being	 an	 “alter-globalization	 activist”	 finds	 that	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 shows	 that	 apart	 from	existing	substantial	price	differences	across	countries	in	identical,	brand-name	drugs,	
there	 are	 many	 instances	 of	 prices	 that	 are	 higher	 in	 developing	 nations	 than	 in	
developed	 countries.	 This	 fact	 -the	 report	 finds-	 may	 be	 attributed	 to	 imperfectly	competitive	distribution	systems	and	a	decision	by	firms	to	sell	small	volumes	at	high	markups	 to	 price	 insensitive	 consumers	 in	 poor	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	 the	Report	states	that	the	“Community	exhaustion	right”	in	the	EU	has	not	implied	a	price	convergence	 of	 the	 European	 market,	 a	 market	 with	 significant	 price	 differences	across	 countries	 -	 transport	 costs	 and	 earn	 rents	 by	 intermediaries	 jeopardize	somehow	the	expected	benefit	to	drug	consumers-.	The	Report	concludes	that	there	is	no	detectable	relationship	between	parallel	imports	and	R&D	performance	within	OECD	nations.			Finally,	it	is	recommended	that	in	order	to	avoid	the	negative	impact	on	R&D	activity	of	the	pharmaceutical	business	high	income	nations	could	be	encouraged	to	prohibit	parallel	imports	in	pharmaceuticals	from	low-income	countries.	However,	they	could	permit	 parallel	 exports	 from	 their	 markets	 to	 poor	 countries	 in	 essential	 drugs.	Additionally,	parallel	importation	by	low-income	nations	should	be	permitted	if	they	wish	in	order	to	avoid	problems	with	high	prices	charged	in	low-volume	products.	At	the	 same	 time,	 these	 countries	 also	 should	 be	 permitted	 to	 ban	 parallel	 exports	 to	high-income	economies	in	order	to	keep	supply	available	locally41.			Apart	from	how	governments	regulate	the	parallel	trade	of	pharmaceuticals	and	IPRs	exhaustion	of	rights,	governments	use	a	variety	of	tools,	both	on	the	supply	side	(for																																																									
40 Maskus, K. E. (2001). Parallel imports in pharmaceuticals: implications for competition and prices in 
developing countries. Final Report to World Intellectual Property Organization, 13. 
41 Taking into account the unilateral engagement taken by some developed countries in order not to import 
medicines produced from compulsory to manufacture and export to low-income countries (WTO General 
Council Decision of 30 August 2003) there is no reason to think that the recommended scenario is not 
possible. 
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determining	both	prices	as	well	as	the	share	of	prices	that	are	reimbursed)	and	on	the	demand	 side	 -policies	 to	 encourage	 physicians	 to	 prescribe	 lower-priced	 generic	pharmaceuticals,	as	well	as	requirements	that	patients	pay	a	share	of	pharmaceutical	costs).	These	measures	are	aimed	at	intervening	the	market	and	making	medicines	as	available	and	affordable	as	possible,	specially	taking	 into	account	that	patients	have	insufficient	information	on	their	health	needs	and	largely	rely	on	health	professionals	to	make	the	treatment	decision	on	their	behalf	and	that	patients	do	not	usually	pay	directly	 for	 most	 pharmaceuticals,	 which	 are	 usually	 covered	 by	 national	 health	systems.	 Needless	 to	 say	 that	 government	 intervention	 in	 prices	 and	 markets	 is	 a	controversial	 topic	 specially	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 hegemony	 of	 the	 neoliberal	agenda	over	other	political	and	economic	considerations.		On	 the	 supply	 side,	 governments	 through	 their	 health	 systems	 usually	 negotiate	prices	with	manufacturers	based	on	a	range	of	different	methods,	and	this	 is	one	of	the	 reasons	 explaining	 price	 differences	 for	 pharmaceuticals.	 The	 most	 “intrusive”	interventions	of	governments	in	the	pricing	of	pharmaceuticals	are	the	price	controls	on	 the	 manufacturer	 (restricting	 medicine	 prices	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 plus	 a	profit	 margin	 –cost-plus	 pricing-)	 and	 the	 profit	 caps	 on	 the	 manufacturer.	 South	African	legislation	is	an	example	of	these	measures.	The	main	problems	associated	to	these	contention	techniques	are	the	difficulties	related	to	the	accessibility	of	reliable	and	 accurate	 cost	 information	 of	medicines	 from	manufacturers,	 especially	 if	 these	are	multinationals,	as	long	as	the	determination	of	R&D	costs	in	the	cost	structure	of	the	 medicines.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 and	 depending	 on	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	 the	buyer	 (most	 low-income	 countries	 have	 a	weak	 bargaining	 power),	 low	 prices	 can	reduce	the	attractiveness	of	certain	countries	to	manufacturers	and	importers	which	might	result	in	important	products	not	being	produced	and	marketed	in	a	particular	country	or	at	least,	being	marketed	with	substantial	delays42.			Another	widely	used	tool	for	determining	prices	is	external	price	referencing.	Under	this	 mechanism,	 health	 authorities	 set	 a	 pharmaceutical’s	 price	 based	 on	 a																																																									
42 Cameron, A., Ewen, M., Ross-Degnan, D., Ball, D., & Laing, R. (2009). Medicine prices, availability, and 
affordability in 36 developing and middle-income countries: a secondary analysis. The lancet, 373(9659), 240-
249. 
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comparison	 with	 prices	 in	 other	 countries	 or	 markets.	 There	 is	 an	 important	controversy	on	which	markets	constitute	the	basket	to	determine	the	reference	price.	The	reference	price	 is	 the	price	 that	 the	buyer	 is	 ready	 to	pay.	Therefore,	 the	more	power	have	the	national	or	public	health	systems,	the	bigger	impact	and	effectiveness	will	 have	 its	 decisions	 in	 the	 market.	 This	 mechanism	 can	 lower	 substantially	pharmaceutical	 prices,	 in	 particular	 when	 the	 reference	 is	 based	 on	 the	 lowest	comparison	 prices	 rather	 than	 an	 average.	 Most	 European	 countries	 use	 this	mechanism	(except	UK,	Germany	and	Sweden).			Prices	 vary	 substantially	 between	 price	 regulated	 countries	 such	 as	 most	 UE	countries	 and	 unregulated	 price	 countries.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 prices	 for	 150	pharmaceuticals	shows	that	the	average	price	for	this	“basket”	among	11	EU	Member	States	 found	 a	 25%	 difference	 between	 the	 lowest	 and	 highest	 EU	 Member	 State	(Germany)	as	prices	 in	the	USA	are	significantly	higher	than	any	of	 the	11	analyzed	EU	 countries.	 However,	 strict	 regulation	 of	 prices	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	penetration	 of	 generics	 once	 the	 IPRs	 are	 expired	 as	 reduced	 profitability	 keeps	generic	producers	from	covering	the	cost	of	market	entry.	Maybe	because	of	that,	in	unregulated	 countries,	 generics	 have	 a	 greater	 share	 -it	 is	 over	 50%	 of	 the	 total	volume	 of	 pharmaceuticals	 consumed	 in	 the	 US,	 Germany,	 Denmark	 and	 Sweden-.	Some	 countries	 like	 UK	 which	 are	 based	 on	 free-pricing	 systems,	 are	 likewise	regulated	 through	 other	means	 such	 as	 profit	 control	 or	 reimbursement	 regulation	through	 internal	 reference	 pricing	 and/or	 use	 of	 Health	 Technology	 Assessments	(HTA).43		Taking	into	account	the	fact	that	patients	do	not	have	the	expertise	to	make	informed	choices	 –being	 those	 decisions	made	 by	 health	 professionals-,	 that	 neither	 patients	nor	health	professionals	bear	the	full	cost	of	their	treatment	and	that	cultural	reasons	generate	differences	 in	 the	number	of	medicines	prescribed	across	 countries44,	 it	 is	important	for	governments	to	intervene	on	the	demand	side.	Additionally,	the	type	of	remuneration	 pharmacists	 receive	 –if	 pharmacists	 take	 advantage	 by	 dispensing																																																									
43 Kanavos, P., Vandoros, S., Irwin, R., Nicod, E., & Casson, M. (2011). Differences in costs of and access to 
pharmaceutical products in the EU. 
44 Evidence suggests that over 87% of all patient visits to physicians results in a prescription in Spain, Italy 
and France, but this percentage is lower (less than 75%) in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
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more	 expensive	 medicines	 even	 if	 cheaper	 alternatives	 exist-	 is	 important	 to	determine	the	final	price	of	medicines.			Among	 the	measures	on	 the	demand	 side,	 it	 is	 important	 to	mention	 those	policies	addressed	 to	 change	 the	 prescribing	 patterns	 of	 health	 professionals	 and	 policies	targeted	at	patients	including	information	provision	and	cost-sharing	of	medicines.	As	to	 the	 prescribing	 patterns,	 in	 some	 countries	 like	 Spain,	 prescribing	 health	professionals	are	 instructed	to	prescribe	the	active	substance	rather	than	the	brand	name	 of	 the	 medicine45.	 Other	 measures	 on	 the	 demand	 side	 would	 be	 the	establishment	of	fixed	percentage	of	the	wholesale	price	(an	average	of	30	percent	of	the	wholesale	price)	and	capitation	systems	where	pharmacists	are	reimbursed	with	a	fixed	sum	based	on	the	number	of	patients	per	year	or	a	fixed	fee	per	prescription	in	order	to	reduce	intermediary	margins.						Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 pricing	 of	 medicines	 in	 developed	 countries	 is	mainly	 a	 problem	 for	 public	 budgets	 of	 governments	 as	 citizens	 expenses	 are	normally	 covered	 by	 national	 health	 systems.	 Universal	 coverage	 is	 however	 being	jeopardized	 in	today’s	world	even	 in	apparently	developed	countries.	 In	Greece,	 the	recent	 sovereign	 debt	 related	 crisis	 has	 led	 to	 a	 loss	 in	 health	 insurance	 coverage	among	 long-term	 unemployed	 and	 many	 self-employed	 workers.	 In	 Spain,	undocumented	 migrants’	 previous	 full	 rights	 to	 health	 care	 coverage	 have	 been	seriously	 limited.	 	 In	 the	United	States,	before	 the	Affordable	Care	Act	 (Obamacare)	the	percentage	of	 the	population	uninsured	was	of	approximately	15	percent	of	 the	total	population	and	this	can	be	reverted	again	by	Trump’s	administration.46																																																													
45 The recent Spanish Supreme Court Ruling STS 488/2016 of February 2016, has dismissed the motion of 
the Spanish Pharmaceutical Industry Association against the regulation instructing health professionals to 
prescribe the active substance instead of using the branded name of medicines. Pharmaceutical companies 
considered this to be discriminatory against producers of branded drugs and unfairly favoring producers of 
generic drugs.  
46 Indicators, O. E. C. D. (2015). Health at a Glance 2015. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/health/health-
systems/health-at-a-glance-19991312.htm 
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Intellectual	Property	Rights	and	pharmaceuticals.		The	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 said	 to	 be	 –together	 with	 the	 chemical	 and	 the	biotechnology	industry-	one	of	three	technology-based	industries	in	which	the	patent	virtually	 equals	 the	 product.	 Unlike	 other	 industries	 which	 require	 expensive	 and	complex	manufacturing	 infrastructures	 and	 investments,	 pharmaceutical	 producers	cannot	keep	their	inventions	–new	medicines-	secrets	as	medicines	can	be	easily	and	cheaply	 replicated	by	 copiers	with	 little	 capital	 investment.	 	 Patents	would	be	 then	the	only	effective	way	to	protect	and	recoup	the	great	investment	incurred	to	develop	new	drugs47.			Additionally,	 those	 standing	 for	 a	 strong	 patent	 system	 –	 combined	with	 a	market	without	 price	 controls	 –	 argue	 that	 price	 controls	 and	 a	 restrictive	 implementation	and	application	of	IPRs	explain	the	shift	of	a	massive	flow	of	investment	from	Europe	into	the	American	industry.	As	it	has	been	previously	explained,	these	views	striving	for	 a	 stronger	 global	 IPRs	 have	 been	 ideologically	 and	 financially	 supported	 and	endorsed	 by	 the	 powerful	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 and	 can	 explain	 the	“globalization”	of	stronger	 IPRs	worldwide	either	 through	TRIPS	or	bilateral	TRIPS-Plus	 international	 agreements.	 Some	 authors	 have	 baptized	 these	 views	 as	 global	intellectual	property	protection	(GIPP)	ideology.48		Apart	 from	 patents,	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 enjoys	 other	 types	 of	 IPRs	 for	 its	inventions:	 supplementary	 protection	 certificates	 and	 regulatory	 data	 protection.	Patents	 are	 maybe	 the	 strongest	 IPR.	 A	patent	is	 an	 exclusive	 right	granted	to	 an	inventor	 (individual	 or	 legal	 entity)	 for	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time	 in	 exchange	 for	detailed	 public	 disclosure	 of	 an	invention.	 An	 invention	 is	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 specific	technological	problem	and	is	a	product	or	a	process.	A	patent	application	includes	one	or	 more	claims	that	 define	 the	 invention.	 These	 claims	 must	 meet	patentability	requirements,	 such	 as	novelty,	usefulness,	 and	non-obviousness	(following	European	Patent	Convention,	 the	 invention	must	meet	novelty,	 inventive																																																									
47 Lehman, B. (2003). The pharmaceutical industry and the patent system. International Intellectual Property 
Institute. 
48 Faunce, T. A. (2006). Global intellectual property protection of “innovative” pharmaceuticals. Globalization 
and Health, 87-107. 
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step	 and	 it	must	be	 capable	 of	 industrial	 application).	The	 exclusive	 right	 gives	 the	patentee	 the	 right	 to	 prevent	 others	 from	 commercially	making,	 using,	 offering	 for	sale,	 selling,	 importing,	 or	 distributing	 a	 patented	 invention	 without	 the	 owner’s	consent.	Under	the	TRIPS	(art.	27),	patents	must	be	available	for	any	invention,	in	all	fields	 of	 technology,	and	 the	term	 of	 protection	available	 should	 be	 a	 minimum	 of	twenty	years.			In	 addition	 to	 patents,	 the	 Supplementary	 Protection	 Certificate	 (SPC)	 is	 another	exclusive	 right	 conferring	 to	 the	 owner	 of	 an	 invention	 an	 additional	 period	 of	protection.	 As	 already	 mentioned,	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 heavily	 regulated	 by	governments	to	guarantee	the	safety	and	efficacy	of	medicines.	This	encompasses	the	obligation	 of	 carrying	 out	 clinical	 trials	 and	 administrative	 proceedings	 and	authorizations	 before	 the	 new	 product	 enters	 the	market.	 The	 lengthy	 time	 period	between	 patent	 filing	 and	 placing	 a	 product	 on	 the	 market	 implies	 that	pharmaceutical	manufacturers	enjoy	shorter	periods	of	product	monopoly	than	is	the	case	for	other	patent	dependent	industries.	In	response	to	this	perceived	insufficiency	of	the	period	of	protection	conferred	by	patents	to	pharmaceutical	inventions,	many	laws	have	provided	 for	extensions	of	patent	 term	to	compensate	 for	 the	 inability	 to	market	inventions	due	to	safety	and	efficacy	regulation.	However,	it	is	argued	by	the	pharmaceutical	industry	that	time	periods	permitted	for	such	extensions	do	not	equal	the	time	lost	in	ability	to	market.	In	terms	of	its	scope,	SPC	extends	the	initial	patent	protection	by	up	to	5	years.			Other	 type	 of	 exclusive	 right	 related	 to	 pharmaceuticals	 is	 the	 “Regulatory	 Data	Protection”	 (RDP)	 is	 a	 form	 of	 exclusive	 right	 which	 protects	 a	 pharmaceutical	company’s	 proprietary	 safety	 and	 efficacy	 data	 for	 its	 new	 medicine.	 A	pharmaceutical	 company	 releasing	 a	 new	medicine	 on	 the	market	must	 submit	 an	extensive	data	as	to	the	new	medicine’s	safety	and	efficacy,	as	well	as	its	physical	and	chemical	characteristics	in	order	to	obtain	the	necessary	authorization	to	market	its	medicine.	 A	 producer	 wishing	 to	 obtain	 a	 marketing	 authorization	 for	 a	 generic	version	of	a	branded	medicine	can	either	1)	generate	its	own	regulatory	data	to	show	safety	and	efficacy	of	 its	generic	product,	or	2)	rely	on	regulatory	data	submitted	to	the	regulatory	authority	for	the	originator	of	the	new	drug.	The	possibility	of	generics	
101		
producers	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 originator's	 safety	 and	 efficacy	 data	 for	 generic	pharmaceutical	 approval	 provides	 them	with	 significant	 commercial	 and	 economic	advantages.	 RDP	 prevents	 generic	 producers,	 during	 a	 limited	 period	 (the	 limited	RDP	 term),	 from	 relying	 on	 the	 previous	 producer's	 proprietary	 data	 in	 order	 to	obtain	marketing	 authorizations	 and	market	 follow-on	generic	products.	Therefore,	in	order	for	the	producer	of	generics	to	market	the	same/equivalent	medicine	it	must	either	 generate	 its	 own	data	 or	wait	 a	 certain	 period	 (RDP	 term)	 until	 it	would	 be	permitted	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 data	 provided	 by	 the	 previous	 producer	 of	 the	 innovative	product.	Article	39.3	of	TRIPS	adopts	this	approach	and	it	requires	all	WTO	Members	to	protect	the	data	submitted	to	regulatory	authorities	against	unfair	commercial	use	and	disclosure.			Pharmaceutical	 companies	 support	RDP	as	 an	 independent	 IPR,	 separate	 and	apart	from	patent	protection.	The	ambiguity	of	 the	TRIPs	agreement	on	 the	 issue	of	data	exclusivity	 has	 contributed	 to	 include	 this	 figure	 in	 many	 TRIP-Plus	 Bilateral	Agreements	 according	 to	 the	 US	 standards.	 The	 term	 “unfair	 commercial	 use”	 of	TRIPS	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Government	 (Health	 authorities)	 for	protecting	 this	 data.	 There	 may	 be	 two	 dimensions	 of	 this	 duty:	 The	 first	 -	 non-
disclosure-	which	keeps	generic	producers	from	gaining	access	to	the	registration	file	of	the	original	medicine	and;	the	second	-	non-reliance	 -	 is	more	controversial.	Non-reliance	prevents	the	authorities	themselves	from	relying	on	the	registration	file	of	an	original	in	order	to	compare	it	to	the	chemical	and	toxic	levels	of	a	potential	generic	substitute	 (so-	 called	bio-equivalence	 tests).	While	 the	US	and	EU	 take	 the	position	that	 any	 form	 of	 reliance	 is	 prohibited,	 some	 other	 countries	 such	 as	 Canada49	consider	that	this	issue	is	not	so	clear50.	Also, pharmaceutical	producers	have	argued	that	package	labels	and	inserts	that	contain	physician	and	consumer	information	are	protected	by	copyright	and	as such	generic	producers	cannot	use	similar	information,	this	constituting	another	setback	for	generic	producers.		
																																																								
49 Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (T.D.) Date: 1998-11-03, 1 F.C. 553, T-1154-97 (1999). 
50 Pugatch, M. P. (2004). Intellectual property and pharmaceutical data exclusivity in the context of innovation 
and market access. ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for Affordable Access to Essential 
Medicines, Bellagio, Italy. 
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In	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 GIPP	 ideology	 is	 extending	 its	 views	 and	 IPRs	 protection	worldwide,	as	it	has	been	evidenced	through	this	dissertation,	the	current	IPRs	based	system	 seems	 to	 be	 unlikely	 to	 provide	 acceptable	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 achieving	public	 health	 and	 in	 particular,	 access	 to	 affordable	medicines.	 	 Although	 IPRs	 are	mainly	 grounded	 on	 utilitarian	 considerations	 aimed	 at	 balancing	 incentives	 for	innovation,	 societal	 benefits	 and	 public	 welfare,	 today	 those	 legitimate	 original	grounds	are	rarely	claimed	or	analyzed	in	relation	to	pharmaceutical	IPRs	regime.	On	the	contrary,	those	legal	and	philosophical	considerations	seem	to	have	been	replaced	with	profit	maximization	analysis.			Furthermore,	 there	 have	 been	 identified	 some	 conducts	 performed	 by	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 which	 may	 generate	 a	 distortion	 and	 abuse	 of	 IPRs	legitimate	 aims,	 this	 hampering	 public	 health	 and	 development.	 These	 legally	doubtful	 strategies	 are	normally	 aimed	 at	 extending	 the	breadth	 and	 scope	of	 IPRs	and	at	blocking	or	delaying	the	entry	of	generics	into	the	market.			Apart	 from	 the	 already	mentioned	 allegations	 claiming	 that	 generic	 products	were	less	safe,	 less	effective	and/or	of	inferior	quality,	pharmaceutical	companies	adopt	a	number	of	“extension	strategies”	of	their	IPRs	which	are	highly	controversial.	These	measures	 can	 be	 divided	 into	marketing	 strategies	 (pricing,	 promotion,	 divestiture,	differentiation,	over-the-counter	drugs,	and	branded	generics),	R&D	strategies	(new	indications,	reformulations,	combination	drugs,	and	next-generation	drugs),	and	legal	strategies	(generic	settlements	and	patenting).	However,	these	strategies	–which	are	openly	acknowledged	and	discussed	by	the	pharmaceutical	industry51-,	may	amount	to	an	infringement	of	the	Antitrust	legislation	or	constitute	an	abuse	of	IPRs-.		Even	 if	 the	 term	 evergreening	 has	 not	 a	 legal	 definition,	 European	 Competition	Authorities	have	adopted	the	European	Consumers’	Association’s	description	of	this	as	a	specific	tactic	used	by	originators	to	extend	patents	by	seeking	to	obtain	as	many	
patents	as	possible	during	the	development	of	the	product	and	the	marketing	phase,	and	
to	 obtain	 a	 patent	 extension	 for	 new	manufacturing	 processes,	 new	 coating	 and	 new																																																									
51 Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., & Stremersch, S. Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry. (See 
footnote 27). 
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uses	of	established	products…Originators	can	also	slightly	change	an	active	 ingredient	
and	present	 an	 old	medicine	 as	 a	 new	product	 and	 register	 a	 new	patent52.	 In	 short,	originators	 introduce	 minor	 variations	 in	 product	 characteristics	 and	 features	 in	order	to	generate	a	new	patent	(a	second	generation	product	through	a	secondary	or	follow-on	patent).	In	this	manner,	some	pharmaceutical	companies	take	advantage	of	the	law	by	unduly	extending	some	lucrative	blockbuster	to	block	or	delay	entrance	of	generics.	 In	 legal	 literature	 “evergreening”	 has	 frequently	 been	 considered	 as	 an	unfair	and	abusive	practice	which	should	be	restrained	with	stricter	legislation53.		One	 of	 the	 most	 illustrative	 cases	 was	 the	 ruling	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	European	 Union54	 	 where	 one	 originator/producer	 of	 a	 branded	 under	 patent	medicine	were	 found	 to	have	committed	 two	abuses	of	a	dominant	position,	one	of	those	 consisting	 of	 the	 selective	 deregistration	 of	 the	marketing	 authorizations	 for	one	 medicine	 capsules	 in	 Denmark,	 Norway	 and	 Sweden	 combined	 with	 the	withdrawal	 from	 the	 market	 of	 that	 medicine’s	 capsules	 and	 the	 launch	 of	 a	 new	version	of	that	product	in	those	three	countries.	The	abuses	found	constituted	abuses	of	regulatory	proceedings.			Other	 tactic	 to	 be	 mentioned	 is	 the	 “patent	 thickets”	 or	 “patent	 clusters”.	Pharmaceutical	producers	file	numerous	broad	and	weak	patents	around	the	original	invention.	The	original	patent	(parent	patent)	is	splitted	into	one	or	several	narrower	patent	applications	(divisional	patents).	Divisional	patents	cannot	extend	the	content	of	 the	 original	 application	 nor	 the	 protection	 period.	 But	 they	 can	 extend	 the	examination	period	of	the	patent	office	(as	the	examination	of	divisional	applications	continues	even	if	the	parent	application	is	withdrawn	or	revoked)	and	can	add	to	the	legal	 uncertainty	 for	 generic	 companies,	 as	 it	 is	 more	 difficult	 and	 complex	 to	properly	 determine	 the	 breadth	 of	 the	 originator’s	 IPRs	 over	 the	 new	 invention	 or	medicine.			
																																																								
52 Competition, D. G. (2008). Pharmaceutical sector inquiry-preliminary report. 
53 Bansal, I. S., Sahu, D., Bakshi, G., & Singh, S. (2009). Evergreening-a controversial issue in pharma 
milieu. Journal of intellectual property rights, 14(7), 299-306. 
54 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca v Commission, Judgment of 6 December 2012. 
104		
Other	 than	 using	 litigation	 in	 certain	 instances	 to	 deter	 generic	 entrants,	 other	pharmaceutical	 companies’	 conduct	 subject	 to	 antitrust	 scrutiny	has	 to	do	with	 the	settlement	 agreements55	 between	 originators	 and	 generic	 producers,	 whereby,	 in	exchange	 for	 delaying	 market	 entry,	 the	 generic	 companies	 accept	 compensation	payments	 (reverse	 payment)	 or	 other	 benefits	 (license	 or	 distribution	 agreement)	from	originators56.	This	kind	of	agreements	may	raise	 important	antitrust	problems	when	 the	 generic	 producer	 agrees	 on	 restrictions	 that	 go	 beyond	 the	 exclusivity	conferred	by	a	patent.				Finally,	 similar	 legally	 doubtful	 agreements	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	 are	 those	 between	originator	 and	 generic	 companies	 concerning	 the	 sale/distribution	 of	 generic	medicines	 agreements	 concluded	 before	 the	 originator’s	 medicine’s	 expiry	 ("early	entry	 agreements").	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 early	 entry	 agreements	 contained	 clauses	that	 provided	 for	 a	 certain	 type	 of	 exclusive	 relationships	 between	 the	 contracting	parties.	In	Europe,	half	of	the	early	entry	agreements	were	concluded	in	the	last	year	before	 loss	 of	 exclusivity	 and	 may	 be	 used	 to	 anticipate	 generic	 competition	 by	impairing	or	slowing	it.	The	duration	of	these	agreements	exceeded	the	date	of	loss	of	exclusivity	 on	 average	 by	 more	 than	 two	 years.	 For	 most	 of	 those	 agreements,	 -European	DG	Competition	says-	the	generic	products	were	the	first	generic	products	on	the	market	and,	thus,	were	likely	to	benefit	from	certain	first	mover	advantages.		 	
																																																								
55 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Competition DG. 6th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: 
January-December 2014) Published on 2 December 2015 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report6_en.pdf. 
56 Barazza, S. (2014). Pay-for-delay Agreements in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Towards a Coherent EU 
Approach. Eur. J. Risk Reg., 79. 
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3.3.			 Critical	aspects	of	pharmaceutical	industry's	value	chain:	innovation	not	
so	new.		In	 today’s	 pharmaceutical	 business’	 view	 the	 success	 of	 a	 branded	 drug	pharmaceutical	 company	 is	narrowly	 related	 to	 innovation	of	new	products	 and	 its	marketing	strategy	to	get	as	many	profits	as	it	is	possible	from	a	new	product.			Innovation	 is	 of	 key	 importance	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector	 and	 for	 society	 in	general.	 Innovation	 has	 enabled	 the	 creation	 of	medicines	which	 have	 dramatically	improved	people’s	life.	From	a	strict	business	perspective,	the	launch	of	an	innovative	drug	 may	 have	 positive	 long-lasting	 economic	 impacts	 for	 the	 pharmaceutical	company	 which	 may	 develop	 other	 follow-on	 drugs	 based	 on	 the	 innovative	 one.	Other	 than	 being	 fundamental	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 business,	 innovation	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 has	 been	 featured	 by	 the	 following	 three	 dimensions:	innovation	is	a	matter	of	life	or	death	(a	firm	cannot	possibly	survive	if	its	innovation	level	 decreases	 substantially	 and	 it	 can	 no	 longer	 generate	 new	 drugs	 with	sufficiently	profitable	patent	protection);	 it	 is	 large	in	size	(means	each	innovation	-new	drugs-	tends	to	generate	a	large	amount	of	revenue	for	a	firm),	and	it	has	a	finite	lifespan	(innovations	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry	have	a	finite	time	to	create	value	for	its	shareholders).57		As	it	has	been	previously	mentioned,	and	although	serendipity	and	chance	still	play	a	role	in	the	process,	the	discovery	and	development	of	new	medicines	are	today	more	oriented	 through	 a	 more	 targeted	 rational	 path.	 Most	 new	 medicines	 have	 been	preceded	 by	 years	 of	 research	 and	 development.	 R&D	 activities	 are	 increasingly	costly	 for	 companies’	 budgets.	 In	 fact,	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 justify	 the	 high	prices	of	medicines	and	strong	IPRs	by	arguing	the	huge	investments	made	on	R&D	and	the	necessity	to	recoup	them.	As	it	will	be	analyzed	there	is	a	controversy	about	an	eventual	productivity	crisis	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	a	somehow	slower	innovation	 pace.	 In	 this	 sense,	 apparently	 bigger	 budgets	 on	 R&D	 are	 not	 being	materialized	in	an	increasing	number	of	new	medicines.																																																										
57 Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., & Stremersch, S. Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry. (see 
footnote 27). 
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 marketing	 and	 sales	 strategies	 play	 an	 important	 role.	Pharmaceutical	 companies	 are	 very	 aware	 of	marketing	 strategies	 to	maximize	 the	profit	of	 its	 innovation.	 In	 their	attempt	 to	maximize	sales	and	profits	out	of	a	new	drug,	 some	 companies	 have	 undertaken	 some	 highly	 ethically	 controversial	marketing	 actions	 which	 will	 be	 discussed	 later.	 In	 this	 sense,	 pharmaceutical	companies	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 abusing	 of	 the	 direct-to-consumer	 advertising	 (in	those	few	countries	where	this	is	legal);	unduly	orienting	health	professionals’	habits	and	methods	 in	 prescribing	 drugs	 and	 inappropriately	 influencing	 institutions	 and	health	authorities	in	setting	up	their	agenda	and	their	decisions.				
What	is	innovation?		Before	 entering	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 different	 issues	 and	 particularities	 of	 the	innovation	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 field,	 it	 is	 important	 to	have	an	 insight	of	what	 is	innovation.				There	are	different	views	about	what	should	be	meant	by	innovation.	Pharmaceutical	industry	has	adopted	a	customer-oriented	definition	of	innovation.	In	this	sense,	even	acknowledging	 that	 the	 market	 of	 medicines	 is	 particular	 because	 a	 third	 party	usually	 pays	 the	 product,	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 adopts	 a	 customer	 oriented	concept	of	innovation.	In	this	sense,	they	argue	the	consumer	should	be	the	ultimate	arbiter	–or	this	should	be	used	as	a	reference-	to	determine	whether	a	new	product	is	innovative	 or	 not.	 Therefore,	 other	 than	 scientific	 discoveries,	 innovation	would	be	also	the	result	of	economics,	corporate	management	and	marketing58.			Schumpeter	-probably	one	of	the	scholars	who	has	contributed	most	to	the	concept	of	innovation-	says	that	consumer	preferences	are	already	given	and	they	rarely	are	the	cause	of	the	economic	change	(or	innovation).	In	this	sense,	consumers	would	play	a	
																																																								
58 Mestre-Ferrandiz, J., Mordoh, A., & Sussex, J. (2012). The many faces of Innovation. A report for the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) by the Offi ce of Health Economics (OHE). Available 
on the World Wide Web: http://www.abpi.org.uk/our-work/library/industry/Pages/many-faces-of-
innovation.aspx. 
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passive	 role	 in	 the	process	of	 economic	development59.	On	 the	other	hand,	 starting	from	making	a	clear	distinction	between	invention	(the	inventor	produces	ideas)	and	innovation	 (the	 entrepreneur	 gets	 things	 done),	 Schumpeter	 distinguishes	 in	 the	process	of	creative	destruction60	 the	following	types	of	 innovations;	the	introduction	of	a	new	product;	 the	 introduction	of	 technological	novelties	 into	 the	production	of	old	products;	introduction	on	new	commercial	combinations	such	as	new	markets	or	new	 sources	 of	 supply	 of	 materials	 and;	 introduction	 of	 a	 new	 structure	 or	 new	organization	of	any	 industry	such	as	 the	creation	of	a	monopoly	out	of	 it61.	For	our	purposes,	innovation	in	the	pharmaceutical	field	should	be	rather	related	to	the	first,	new	product-type	of	innovation.			In	 particular,	 from	 a	 general	 interest’s	 view	 and	 regarding	 the	 public	 systems	 of	rewards	 –including	 public	 intervention	 and	 pricing-	 dealing	with	 innovation	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	field,	one	the	most	important	factors	in	order	to	consider	that	we	are	in	presence	of	 an	 innovation	 is	 the	 therapeutic	 advance	or	progress	 implied	by	 the	new	medicine.	In	many	legislations	such	as	the	Spanish	one	for	example,	for	purposes	of	pricing	(reference	pricing	system)	innovation	plays	a	role	and	it	is	judged	in	terms	of	the	therapeutic	improvement	obtained	by	the	new	medicine.			In	 particular,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 a	 distinction	 is	 made	between	radical	innovation	and	incremental	innovation.	As	radical	innovation	implies	the	 introduction	 of	 new	 medicines	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 new	industry,	incremental	innovation	are	referred	to	the	creation	of	minor	improvements	or	 simple	 adjustments	 in	 an	 existing	 product.	 	 Radical	 innovations	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 are	 usually	 associated	 with	 the	 development	 of	 novel	chemical	 entities	 or	 new	 molecular	 entities	 (NME)62.	 Furthermore,	 within	 NMEs,																																																									
59 Sledzik, K. (2013). Schumpeter's View on Innovation and Entrepreneurship Management Trends in Theory 
and practice (ed) Stefan Hittmar Faculty of Management Science and Informatics. University of Zilina and 
Institute of Management by University of Zilina. 
60 The process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. Schumpeter, J. A. (2013). Capitalism, 
socialism and democracy. Routledge. 
61 Schumpeter, J. A. (1947). The creative response in economic history. The journal of economic history, 
7(02), 149-159. 
62 According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, a NME is a drug that contains an active ingredient that 
has never been marketed in the US. 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm079436.htm#chemtype.  
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there	are	those	medicines	credited	as	First-in-Class,	meaning	drugs	which	use	a	new	and	 unique	mechanism	 of	 action	 for	 treating	 a	medical	 condition.	 These	 drugs	 are	normally	known	as	breakthrough	drugs	in	the	pharmaceutical	marketplace.	Together	with	 radical	 innovation,	 incremental	 or	 follow-up	 innovation	 consists	 of	improvements	on	existing	medicines	or	ingredients,	improvements	involving	greater	efficacy,	 or	 fewer	 or	 less	 severe	 side	 effects,	 a	 more	 convenient	 dosage	 regimen,	changes	in	the	application	method,	modified	formulations,	or	new	indications	(follow-on	drugs	or	me	too	drugs).			
Innovation	not	so	new.		With	the	exception	of	the	two	last	years	(2014	and	2015),	the	pace	of	the	introduction	of	innovative	medicines	has	slowed	in	the	last	fifteen	years.	As	in	the	90’s	the	average	introduction	of	NMEs	was	of	41	NMEs	a	year,	the	average	has	decreased	to	less	than	30	NMEs	a	year	since	2000.	At	the	same	time,	the	R&D	expenses	necessary	to	develop	a	new	medicine	-a	radical	innovation-	has	paradoxically	increased	quite	significantly.	In	this	respect,	and	according	to	widely	circulated	study63,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	most	popular	 cost	 calculations	have	been	called	 into	question	as	being	overinflated	and	not	very	transparent	 in	order	to	be	really	and	effectively	audited64,	 the	average	cost	 of	 developing	 an	 innovative	 new	 drug	 is	 said	 cost	 more	 than	 $800	 million,	including	 expenditures	 on	 failed	 projects	 and	 the	 value	 of	 forgone	 alternative	investments.	 This	 corresponds	 to	 a	 study	 of	 2003.	 According	 to	 the	 European	Federation	of	Pharmaceutical	Industry	and	Associations	(EFPIA)	that	cost	would	rise	to	$1506	million	in	2013.65	There	is	then	a	clear	mismatch	between	the	higher	costs	of	R&D	expenses	to	develop	a	NME	and	the	lower	pace	in	the	introduction	of	NME.			
																																																								
63 DiMasi, J. A., Hansen, R. W., & Grabowski, H. G. (2003). The price of innovation: new estimates of drug 
development costs. Journal of health economics, 22(2), 151-185. 
64 Morgan, S., Grootendorst, P., Lexchin, J., Cunningham, C., & Greyson, D. (2011). The cost of drug 
development: a systematic review. Health Policy, 100(1), 4-17. 
65 http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_2015_Key_data.pdf 
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66 
In	2000	NME	was	32,	2001	31	NME,	2002	28	NME,	2003	26	NME,	2004	24	NME	and	2005	28	NME67		More	than	half	of	the	new	brands	of	drugs	introduced	in	the	market	were	not	novel	chemical	 entities	 or	 biopharmaceuticals,	 but	 improved	 versions	 and	 altered	formulations.	 In	 this	 sense,	 16	 of	 the	 45	 novel	 drugs	 approved	 in	 2015	 (36%)	 are	First-in-Class	(meaning	really	innovative	to	treat	or	cure	an	illness).		As	 to	 the	 higher	 R&D	 spending	 per	 NME,	 a	 Congress	 of	 the	 US	 study68mentions	 a	number	of	reasons	to	explain	it;	first,	higher	failure	rates	in	clinical	trials	because	of	eventually	greater	 research	challenges	or	a	willingness	 to	 test	 riskier	drugs	 in	 such	trials;	Second,	the	shift	of	the	focus	of	 larger	pharmaceutical	 firms	away	from	drugs	for	acute	illnesses	and	toward	drugs	for	chronic	illnesses	of	developed	world	-drugs	that	treat	chronic	illnesses	require	larger,	longer	and	more	expensive	clinical	trials-;	Third,	greater	 technological	 complexity	 in	drug	development	and	greater	specificity	in	disease	targets	have	helped	to	raise	average	R&D	costs,	as	firms	now	identify	drugs	with	particular	molecular	characteristics	rather	than	using	trial-and-error	methods	to	find	compounds	that	work	in	some	desired	way.		
																																																								
66 http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/DrugInnovation/ucm474696.htm 
67 http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Modules/Documents/figures-2007-update.pdf 
68 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/18176 
110		
The	decline	 in	 the	production	of	new	NME	has	contributed	 to	 the	debate	about	 the	eventual	crisis	of	productivity	of	pharmaceutical	industry69.	Some	of	the	cited	reasons	explaining	 the	 decline	 in	 the	 approval	 of	 new	 medicines	 are	 among	 others	 the	following:	1.	 the	 industry	does	not	 invest	 enough	 in	 real	R&D	because	of	 the	 lower	returns	 of	 R&D	 spending.	 2.	 The	 increasingly	 stricter	 approval	 procedures	 and	 the	fact	that	the	existing	regulatory	review	process	and	its	standards	are	not	well	adapted	to	the	new	research	technologies	3.	Many	diseases	have	been	satisfactorily	addressed,	which	limits	the	space	for	big	medical	breakthroughs.	Today´s	pharmaceuticals	have	already	created	sufficiently	good	solutions	to	the	“easy”	medical	problems,	leaving	the	more	challenging	and	complex	diseases	(e.g.,	cancer,	HIV/AIDS,	obesity,	Alzheimer’s,	Parkinson’s,	 diabetes)	4.	The	 current	 extent	of	 collaboration	 in	 innovation	between	drug	companies	could	be	insufficient	5.	The	industry	has	not	yet	developed	the	right	competences	to	be	successful	in	developing	new	treatments	that	are	biological	rather	than	chemical	in	nature70.		However,	according	to	some,	the	reason	why	production	of	NME	has	decreased	seems	to	be	due	to	the	fact	that	R&D	efforts	are	rather	devoted	to	the	development	of	“me-too”	or	 “follow-on	 innovation”	drugs	 than	to	 the	development	of	a	really	 innovative	drug	 or	 NME.	 Me-too	 medicines	 or	 copycat	 drugs	 are	 drugs	 which	 are	structurally/chemically	 very	 similar	 to	 already	 known	 drugs,	 with	 only	 minor	differences	 or	 variations.	 Producers	 of	 me-too	 drugs	 are	 late	 entrant	 or	 market	followers	 of	 a	 breakthrough	 drug.	 Other	 than	 the	 fact	 that	me-too	 drugs	may	 have	fewer	 side	 effects,	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 claims	 that	 in	 today’s	world	 there	 is	no	such	thing	as	a	“one-size-fits-all”	drug	and	therefore	me-too	drugs	would	create	the	necessary	variety	of	similar	but	different	treatments	to	be	available	for	everybody.	In	this	 sense,	 the	 availability	 of	 extra	 therapeutic	 options	would	 be	 not	 only	 clinically	advantageous	in	case	of	adverse	side	effects	induced	by	the	pioneer	drug,	but	is	also	economically	and	socially	beneficial71.																																																										
69 Cockburn, I. M. (2006). Is the pharmaceutical industry in a productivity crisis?. Innovation policy and the 
economy, 7, 1-32. MIT Press. 
70 Ding, M., Eliashberg, J., & Stremersch, S. Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry. (see 
footnote 27). 
71 Goozner, M. (2004). The $800 million pill: The truth behind the cost of new drugs. Univ of California Press. 
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It	 is	 alleged	 that	pharmaceutical	 companies	have	 turned	 to	 cheaper	 “me-too”	drugs	because	the	development	of	these	drugs	is	more	profitable	and	it	does	not	encompass	the	risks	and	uncertainties	associated	with	true	innovation.	Both	the	producer	of	the	breakthrough	 drug	 and	 the	market	 competitor	may	 be	more	 tempted	 to	 develop	 a	me-too	 (or	 follow-on	 innovation)	 drug	 rather	 than	 searching	 a	 totally	 innovative	blockbuster	drug.	As	the	cost	of	development	of	a	me-too	drug	is	usually	much	lower	than	 the	 cost	 of	 developing	 a	 breakthrough	 drug,	 they	 are	 priced	 at	 slightly	 lower	level	than	the	price	of	the	pioneer	drug	in	the	market.			In	effect,	 incremental	 innovations	are	easier	to	generate	and	there	is	a	 lower	risk	of	failure.	Therefore,	 rather	 than	 investing	 in	new	pharmaceuticals,	 a	 firm	may	simply	switch	 its	 manufacturing	 and	 marketing	 efforts	 to	 develop	 and	 market	 the	 next	patent-protected	successor	me-too	drug,	with	little	need	for	extra	costs	in	production	or	 distribution	 and	 at	 almost	 the	 same	 price.	 This	 strategy	 based	 on	 sequential	incremental	 innovations,	 could	also	overcome	 the	uncertainties	 associated	with	 the	pursuit	of	breakthrough	drugs	and	generate	steady	 flows	of	cash	 instead.	 In	 fact,	at	the	 time	of	 launching	a	new	drug,	many	 competitors	have	already	accumulated	 the	necessary	knowledge	to	develop	it.	This	is	perfectly	possible	if	we	take	into	account	that	 in	 many	 occasions,	 competitors	 work	 in	 parallel	 on	 similar	 research	 projects	thanks	 to	 public-funded	 basic	 research	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	 from	 open	 and	public	science.				Me-too	 drugs’	 strategy	 has	 received	 important	 critics.	 Incremental	 innovations	developed	 by	 competitors	 are	 said	 to	 erode	 pioneer	 drug’s	market	 exclusivity,	 this	diminishing	 incentives	 to	 invest	costly	breakthrough	or	radical	 innovation.	This	can	actually	undermine	the	justification	of	IPRs	and	market	exclusivity	 in	the	sense	that	R&D	investments	to	develop	a	me-too	drug	has	been	recouped	in	excess.	On	the	other	hand,	 these	 improved	versions	which	also	enjoy	market	exclusivity,	would	not	offer	additional	therapeutic	benefits	or	lower	price	to	patients72.			
																																																								
72 Petrova, E. (2014). Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: The process of drug discovery and 
development. In Innovation and marketing in the pharmaceutical industry (pp. 19-81). Springer New York. 
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Therefore,	 the	 observed	 crisis	 of	 the	 innovative	 process	 could	 rather	 respond	 to	 a	change	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry’s	philosophy;	a	philosophy	where	the	search	of	profitability	 would	 prevail	 over	 any	 other	 consideration.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 more	money	would	 be	 invested	 today	 in	 research	 into	 the	 prevention	 of	 disease	 such	 as	drugs	 to	 reduce	 cholesterol	 than	 to	 its	 treatment.	 Doing	 so,	 it	 is	 said	 that	pharmaceutical	investments	are	diverted	away	from	the	sick	towards	the	well,	away	from	the	old	towards	the	young	and	away	from	the	poor	to	the	rich73.						
Innovative	marketing	versus	innovative	scientific	discovery.		Pharmaceutical	 industry	 justifies	 a	 strong	 patent	 protection	 and	 the	 high	 prices	 it	charges	to	medicines	by	arguing	that	their	R&D	costs	are	huge	and	that	they	need	to	be	recouped.	Also,	they	complain	that	because	of	the	long	administrative	procedures	to	 authorize	 their	 sale	 and	 a	 more	 permissive	 approach	 to	 generics,	 their	 market	exclusivity	has	been	drastically	reduced.			Notwithstanding	this,	it	is	not	clear	that	neither	the	cost	of	developing	new	drugs	nor	the	uncertainty	associated	with	 it	are	so	high	as	 the	 industry	alleges.	Regarding	the	R&D	 expenditure,	 apart	 from	 some	 doubts	 as	 to	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 cost	 of	developing	 a	 new	 drug,	 there	 are	 important	 differences	 between	 the	 estimates	presented	 by	 the	 Industry	 (PhRMA)	 and	 other	 public	 institutions	 like	 the	 National	Science	 Foundation	 (NSF),	 being	 those	 presented	 by	 PhRMA	 bigger	 than	 twice	 the	numbers	presented	by	NSF.	Apart	 from	the	data	base	of	companies	to	be	taken	into	account,	and	according	to	a	study	elaborated	by	the	US	Congressional	Budget	Office,	those	 differences	 are	 explained	 by	 some	 different	 criteria	 when	 considering	 what	R&D	 expenditure	 is.	 In	 this	 respect,	 PhRMA	 include	 spending	 on	 phase	 IV	 clinical	trials	 (those	 trials	 conducted	 after	 a	 drug	 has	 already	 been	 authorized	 and	 has	entered	the	market)74.	Those	post	marketing	expenditures	should	not	count	as	R&D	expenditure	as	the	drug	has	been	already	developed	and	sold	and	there	is	a	grey	line	between	real	R&D	expenditures	and	marketing/promotional	expenses.																																																										
73 Schacht, W. H. (2012). Federal R&D, drug discovery, and pricing: insights from the NIH-university-industry 
relationship. DIANE Publishing. 
74 https://www.cbo.gov/publication/18176 
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On	the	other	hand,	and	regarding	the	uncertainty,	it	is	important	to	note	that	it	is	the	expenditure	of	basic	research	–the	research	with	highest	uncertainty-	 is	mainly	and	increasingly	 borne	 by	 public	 funding.	 	 A	 study	 elaborated	 by	 the	 nonprofit	organization	Public	Citizen	reveals	 that	public	 funding	played	an	 important	 role	 for	the	 most	 of	 the	 top-selling	 drugs75.	 Sometimes	 basic	 research	 is	 configured	 as	 a	“public	 good”	 which	 is	 beneficial	 for	 the	 whole	 society	 and	 cannot	 be	 neither	recouped	nor	captured	by	any	private	company76.	Letting	aside	the	interesting	debate	about	how	much	public	funding	is	justified	and	compensated	among	society,	it	is	true	that	public	funding	bears	an	important	weight	of	the	process	to	develop	new	drugs,	in	particular	 basic	 research	 which	 is	 the	 one	 with	 the	 highest	 uncertainty,	 thus	importantly	reducing	the	great	uncertainty	alleged	by	the	Pharmaceutical	Industry.				Also,	 it	 seems	 paradoxical	 that	 being	 qualified	 the	 investments	 on	R&D	 as	 huge	 by	those	 supporters	 of	 strong	 IPRs,	 Pharmaceutical	 companies	 spend	 far	 more	 on	marketing	drugs	-	in	some	cases	twice	as	much	-	than	on	developing	them77.			 World's	largest	pharmaceutical	firms	
Company Total revenue ($bn) R&D spend ($bn) Sales and marketing spend($bn) Profit ($bn) Profit margin (%) 
Johnson & Johnson (US) 71.3 8.2 17.5 13.8 19 
Novartis (Swiss) 58.8 9.9 14.6 9.2 16 
Pfizer (US) 51.6 6.6 11.4 22.0 43 
Hoffmann-La Roche (Swiss) 50.3 9.3 9.0 12.0 24 
Sanofi (France) 44.4 6.3 9.1 8.5 11 
Merck (US) 44.0 7.5 9.5 4.4 10 
GSK (UK) 41.4 5.3 9.9 8.5 21 
AstraZeneca (UK) 25.7 4.3 7.3 2.6 10 
Eli Lilly (US) 23.1 5.5 5.7 4.7 20 
AbbVie (US) 18.8 2.9 4.3 4.1 22 																																																								
75 Citizen, P. (2001). Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D ‘Scare Card’. 
https://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF 
 
77http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223  
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This	 can	 be	 also	 confirmed	 by	 the	 numbers	 exposed	 in	 the	 Form	 10	 and	 Annual	Reports	submitted	by	Pharmaceutical	companies	every	year	following	legal	duties.				As	 it	 has	 been	 previously	 observed,	 business	 strategists	 highlight	 the	 marketing	capabilities	 of	 a	 company	as	 one	of	 the	key	 areas	of	Pharmaceutical	 business	 to	be	successful.	 Pharmaceutical	 companies	 attempt	 to	 maximize	 profits	 and	 capture	 as	large	a	market	share	as	possible	during	the	 life	of	a	product	by	trying	to	extend	the	period	of	market	exclusivity	and	by	engaging	 in	promotional	activities.	The	types	of	marketing	and/or	advertising	activities	vary	in	different	countries.78These	are	carried	out	 imaginatively	 –and	 sometimes	 controversially-	 through	 representatives	 of	Pharmaceutical	 companies,	 industry	 sponsored	 medical	 events	 or	 conferences,	journal	 articles	 and	 supplements	 supporting	 the	 company’s	drug,	direct	 advertising	aimed	at	doctors	and	nurses	and	direct	 to	 consumer	advertising	 (only	permitted	 in	USA	and	New	Zealand).	The	problem	may	arise	-as	it	will	be	analyzed-,	when	all	the	efforts	 and	 investments	 tend	 to	 be	 addressed	 to	 ensure	 a	 profitable	 product	placement	 into	 the	 market	 rather	 than	 creating	 new	 medicines	 capable	 of	 curing	diseases.		
	 	
																																																								
78 OECD Pharmaceutical pricing policies in a global market. (see footnote 32). 
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3.4.		 Ethical	dilemmas	of	the	drug	industry:	pursuit	of	profit	at	any	“price”.		If	 one	 introduces	 the	words	 “drugs”	 and	 “ethics”	 in	 the	 search	 engine	of	 the	digital	New	 York	 Times,	 one	 gets	 635	 articles	 on	 this	 issue,	 the	 front	 page	 displays	 the	eventually	 most	 relevant	 results	 among	 which	 the	 following:	 Ethics	 in	 drug	 tests;	
corrupt	practices?;	Ban	on	federal	Scientists’	consulting	nears	–about	private	consulting	
arrangements	 between	 drug	 companies	 and	 scientists-;	 Ethics	 in	 the	 Lab;	 Advertising	
drugs;	Medical	Ethics	in	the	Dock;	Psychiatrist	and	Drugs	(…)79.							In	 effect,	 there	 are	 many	 ethical	 controversies	 associated	 with	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	pharmaceutical	industries.	Furthermore,	these	controversies	are	not	encapsulated	in	the	 academic	 reign	 but	 they	 constitute	 the	 subject	 of	 heated	 debates	 in	 the	 mass	media	 and	 between	 people.	 Different	 public	 opinion	 pools	 rank	 pharmaceutical	companies	at	the	bottom	of	reputation	of	different	business	sector	together	with	oil	companies	 or	 tobacco	 companies80.	 Even	 if	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 have	developed	an	 important	array	of	 life-saving	and	 life-enhancement	drugs	 there	 is	an	increasing	 collective	 belief	 that	 drug	 companies	 take	more	 from	 society	 than	what	society	 receives	 from	 them.	 In	 this	 sense,	 according	 to	 some,	 the	 implicit	 social	contract	 existing	between	 society	 and	pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 today	unbalanced	with	 companies	making	bigger	 and	bigger	profits	 as	 innovation	 slows	down,	prices	are	 higher	 and	 contributions	 to	 the	 common	 good	 are	 lesser.	 The	 main	 problem	seems	 to	 be	 the	 obvious	 conflict	 of	 interest	 between	 pharmaceutical	 companies’	private	 interest	 in	 maximizing	 profits	 and	 the	 medical	 need	 of	 people	 in	 terms	 of	accessible	 and	 affordable	 medicines.	 	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 market	 offers	 products	responding	 to	consumer	demand,	 i.e.	 consumers	with	 the	wealth	and	ability	 to	pay.	Human	 medical	 needs	 however	 are	 universal	 and	 common	 between	 people	 with	means	and	underprivileged	and	deprived	people.		There	are	many	fronts	where	this	conflict	arises,	where	there	 is	a	collision	between	profit-driven	interest	and	human	needs	and	global	population’s	wellbeing.	Maybe	the																																																									
79 This research was done on March 31, 2016. 
80 http://www.fiercepharmamarketing.com/story/big-pharmas-reputation-strikes-out-again-and-profit-
perceptions-may-be-blam/2015-08-24 
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most	recurring	ethical	controversies	have	 to	do	among	others	with	 the	priorities	of	scientific	research	and	how	this	research	is	a	profit-driven	one;	criteria	about	which	patients	are	 to	be	 included	 in	drug	 trials	 for	hopeful	drugs;	ethical	 issues	regarding	stem	 cell	 research;	 IPRs	 validity	 and	 enforceability	 when	 there	 are	 other	 human	rights	at	stake	or	prices	charged	to	medicines.	Due	to	the	purpose	of	this	dissertation	and	 extension	 reasons,	 this	 chapter	 is	 focused	on	 two	particular	 issues	which	have	generated	 interesting	 debates	 and	 analysis;	 1)	 the	 ethical	 issues	 surrounding	 the	conduction	of	research	involving	human	subjects,	in	particular	citizens	of	developing	countries	 and	 other	 vulnerable	 subjects;	 2)	 marketing/promotional	 activities	 and	undue	influence	of	drug	companies	in	their	search	of	profit.		
Clinical	Trials	in	developing	countries.	Some	ethical	issues.		The	 number	 of	 clinical	 trials	worldwide	 has	 increased	 steadily	 during	 the	 last	 two	decades.	Furthermore,	clinical	research	is	undergoing	the	same	globalization	process	as	 other	 industries.	 In	 particular,	 clinical	 research	 is	 shifting	 from	 high-income	countries	 to	 low-	and	middle-income	countries.	There	are	many	reasons	 to	conduct	clinical	trials	in	developing	countries,	especially	the	lower	cost	of	conducting	trials	in	low-income	 countries.	 Although	 there	 are	 sound	 economic	 reasons	 to	 explain	 this	shift	of	 location	of	clinical	trials	to	developing	countries	 in	a	“global	world”,	 the	fact	that	population	of	those	countries	may	be	in	need,	that	their	public	health	systems	do	not	have	the	necessary	 tools	 to	satisfy	 the	same	standards	of	care	as	 they	do	 in	 the	developed	 world	 at	 the	 time	 of	 conducting	 trials	 and	 that	 regulatory	 environment	may	be	more	 lenient,	 all	 this	may	derive	 in	 a	 logic	of	 exploitation	which	underpins	many	ethical	concerns81.			We	all	have	been	moved	by	the	movie	The	Constant	Gardener	(2005)	a	film	based	on	a	John	 Le	 Carre’s	 novel	 where	 the	 plot	 deals	 with	 an	 activist	 (Rachel	Weisz)	 who	 is	brutally	murdered	when	she	discovers	the	malpractices	of	a	powerful	pharmaceutical	company	 which	 is	 using	 African	 population	 for	 fraudulent	 testing	 of	 a	 drug	 with	harmful	side	effects	that	the	company	knows	and	deliberately	disregards	and	hides.																																																									
81 Li, R., Barnes, M., Aldinger, C. E., & Bierer, B. E. (2015). Global clinical trials: Ethics, harmonization and 
commitments to transparency. GLOBAL HEALTH. 
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Leaving	aside	the	dramatic	and	prosaic	tone	of	the	movie	and	the	fact	that	the	plot	is	pure	fiction	and	it	is	not	based	on	any	actual	person,	corporation	or	facts,	there	have	been	some	real	cases	where	there	have	been	detected	some	malpractices	operated	by	pharmaceutical	 companies	when	carrying	out	clinical	 trials	 in	developing	countries.	Maybe	one	of	the	most	illustrative	cases	was	the	Rabi	Abdullahi	v.	Pzifer,	Inc	case.				In	 this	case82	 the	US	Court	of	Appeals	 for	 the	Second	Circuit	ruled	 that	 the	Nigerian	victims	 and	 their	 families	 were	 entitled	 to	 bring	 suit	 against	 Pfizer	 in	 the	 United	States	under	the	Alien	Tort	Statute	alleging	that	Pfizer	may	have	violated	a	customary	international	law	norm	prohibiting	involuntary	medical	experimentation	on	humans	when	 it	 tested	 an	 experimental	 antibiotic	 on	 children	 in	 Nigeria,	 including	themselves,	without	their	consent	or	knowledge.	Even	if	Pfizer	subsequently	settled	the	case	out	of	court	with	a	75	million	dollars	–in	a	settlement	that	was	subject	to	a	confidentiality	clause-,	the	case	is	powerful	enough	to	illustrate	how	some	developing	countries	 (specially	 African	countries)	 have	 been	 sites	 for	clinical	 trials	by	
																																																								
82 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed. 2d Cir. N.Y., October 8, 2003. in April 1996, Pfizer, dispatched three of its 
American physicians to work with four Nigerian doctors to experiment with Trovan on children who were 
patients in Nigeria’s Infectious Disease Hospital (“IDH”) in Kano, Nigeria. Working in concert with Nigerian 
government officials, the team allegedly recruited two hundred sick children who sought treatment at the IDH 
and gave half of the children Trovan and the other half Ceftriaxone, an FDA-approved antibiotic the safety and 
efficacy of which was well-established. Appellants contend that Pfizer knew that Trovan had never previously 
been tested on children in the form being used and that animal tests showed that Trovan had life-threatening 
side effects, including joint disease, abnormal cartilage growth, liver damage, and a degenerative bone 
condition. Pfizer purportedly gave the children who were in the Ceftriaxone control group a deliberately low 
dose in order to misrepresent the effectiveness of Trovan in relation to Ceftriaxone. After approximately two 
weeks, Pfizer allegedly concluded the experiment and left without administering follow-up care. According to 
the appellants, the tests caused the deaths of eleven children, five of whom had taken Trovan and six of 
whom had taken the lowered dose of Ceftriaxone, and left many others blind, deaf, paralyzed, or brain-
damaged. The appellants further alleged that Pfizer failed to follow its protocol in ways that might have 
mitigated the harm suffered by the children. They contend that Pfizer violated the protocol by administering 
Trovan orally even though oral absorption is difficult for sick children; conducting no testing prior to 
administering the drug to determine whether Nigeria’s strain of meningitis might be responsive to Trovan; 
failing to determine that the children in the test had meningitis; and failing to either exclude from the 
experiment children with liver or joint problems or to test for such problems, even though Trovan was known to 
exacerbate them. Although Pfizer’s protocol called for children receiving Trovan to be switched to Ceftriaxone 
if they did not respond well to Trovan, Pfizer allegedly did not conduct regular blood tests of the children or 
switch those who suffered from Trovan-related side effects to Ceftriaxone. Appellants claimed that Pfizer, 
working in partnership with the Nigerian government, failed to secure the informed consent of either the 
children or their guardians and specifically failed to disclose or explain the experimental nature of the study or 
the serious risks involved. Although the treatment protocol required the researchers to offer or read the 
subjects documents requesting and facilitating their informed consent, this was allegedly not done in either 
English or the subjects’ native language of Hausa. The appellants also contended that Pfizer deviated from its 
treatment protocol by not alerting the children or their guardians to the side effects of Trovan or other risks of 
the experiment, not providing them with the option of choosing alternative treatment, and not informing them 
that the non-governmental organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) was providing a 
conventional and effective treatment for bacterial meningitis, free of charge, at the same site.  
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large	pharmaceutical	 companies	 through	 practices	 which	 have	 raised	 an	 array	 of	human	rights	concerns.		There	is	a	number	of	international	rules	guiding	the	ethical	conduct	of	clinical	trials.	The	 first	 international	 instrument	 of	 this	 type	 was	 the	 Nuremberg	 Code	 of	 1947	which	introduced,	for	the	first	time,	the	concept	of	informed	consent.	The	Code,	which	consists	 of	 a	 series	 of	 ten	 principles,	 was	 applied	 in	 the	 final	 judgement	 held	 at	Nuremberg,	 Germany,	 before	 a	 U.S.	 military	 tribunal	 in	 1946–7.	 Also,	 the	 World	Medical	Association’s	Declaration	 of	Helsinki	 in	 1964	 introduced,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	ethical	principles	 for	physicians	 in	 the	 conduct	of	human	 research.	The	Declaration	has	been	amended	subsequently	being	the	last	amendment	introduced	in	2013.	This	Declaration	 contemplates	 among	 others;	 the	 specific	 protection	 to	 be	 received	 for	vulnerable	 groups	 and	 individuals;	 the	 necessary	 adequately	 informed	 consent	 of	each	 potential	 on	 the	 aims,	 methods,	 sources	 of	 funding,	 any	 possible	 conflicts	 of	interest,	 institutional	 affiliations	 of	 the	 researcher,	 the	 anticipated	 benefits	 and	potential	 risks	 of	 the	 study	 and	 the	 discomfort	 it	may	 entail,	 post-study	 provisions	and	any	other	 relevant	 aspects	of	 the	 study;	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 every	 research	 study	involving	human	subjects	must	be	registered	in	a	publicly	accessible	database	before	recruitment	of	the	first	subject.			Most	 importantly,	 the	 United	 Nations	 International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	Rights	 in	 1966	 recognized,	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 the	 concept	 of	 free	 informed	consent,	as	its	Article	7	states	that	“no	one	shall	be	subjected	without	his	free	consent	to	
medical	or	scientific	experimentation.”			Also,	 the	WHO	 published	 the	 Good	 Clinical	 Practice	 Guidelines	 (GCP)	 for	 Trials	 on	Pharmaceutical	 Products	 and	 the	 International	 Conference	 on	Harmonisation	 (ICH)	also	 published	 a	 Guideline	 on	 Good	 Clinical	 Practice	 (GGCP)	 –for	 adoption	 by	 its	members;	 the	regulatory	authorities	of	 the	EU,	 Japan	and	US-.	 ICH’s	Guideline	has	a	consolidated	version	and	it	has	been	the	subject	of	criticism	for	being	too	focused	on	formal	 procedures	 rather	 than	 moral	 principles	 as	 the	Declaration	 of	 Helsinki	
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eventually	does83.	In	particular,	it	has	been	criticized	in	the	issue	of	placebo	use.	While	the	Declaration	of	Helsinky	states	that	“the	benefits,	risks,	burdens	and	effectiveness	of	
a	new	intervention	must	be	tested	against	those	of	the	best	proven	intervention(s)	[…]”	The	ICH’s	GGCP	does	not	provide	such	provision	and	takes	for	granted	the	possibility	of	using	placebo84.				Therefore,	 there	 has	 been	 in	 recent	 years	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 international	guiding	 principles	 for	 the	 ethical	 conduct	 of	 clinical	 testing	 and	 clinical	 trials	involving	human	subjects.	Notwithstanding	this,	there	are	still	some	shadows	around	the	 effectiveness	 and	 actual	 implementation	of	 these	 codes.	 First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 although	 some	 jurisprudential	 constructions	 (as	 the	 one	 mentioned	 in	Abdullahi	v.	Pfizer,	Inc	which	considered	certain	legal	principles	of	these	codes	as	jus	
cogens),	 the	 enforceability	 nature	 of	 these	 guides	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	implementation	 to	 be	 done	 by	 national	 authorities	 (ethical	 codes	 v.	 ethical	regulation).			Other	 shortcoming	 observed	 in	 the	 current	 system	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 in	relation	with	the	registration	of	clinical	 trials	worldwide.	Despite	the	fact	that	there	have	been	important	improvements	on	clinical	trial	registration,	these	have	not	taken	place	equally	everywhere	in	the	globe.	Also,	some	registered	clinical	trials	would	not	be	 of	 help	due	 to	 the	poor	 quality	 of	 registered	 trial	 data	 and	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	trial	protocols85.	Although	WHO	put	in	place	an	International	Clinical	Trials	Registry	Platform	 (ICTRP),	 it	 should	 play	 a	 more	 important	 role	 in	 centralizing	 and	guaranteeing	all	the	standards	of	care	of	the	Clinical	trials	involving	human	subjects.	WHO	 could	 also	 explore	 the	 creation	 of	 international	 ethical	 committee	 review	 for	clinical	 trials	 to	 ensure	 the	 idea	 of	 dual	 review	 (the	 one	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 host	country	and	the	international	one).			
																																																								
83 Goldacre, B. (2014). Bad pharma: how drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients. Macmillan. 
84 Using placebo versus existent/known effective standards of treatment are known can be misleading when 
showing the efficacy of a treatment. 
85 Viergever, R. F., & Li, K. (2015). Trends in global clinical trial registration: an analysis of numbers of 
registered clinical trials in different parts of the world from 2004 to 2013. BMJ open, 5(9), e008932. 
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On	the	other	hand,	it	has	been	criticized	the	ethical	“variability”	or	interested	reading	and	interpretation	of	ethics	by	drug	companies	depending	on	the	context	where	those	principles	 are	 called	 to	 operate.	 In	 this	 sense,	 some	 authors	 observe	 that	 ethics	involves	 the	 implementation	of	mechanisms,	 tactics	and	dynamics	which	go	beyond	defining	 instances	 of	 moral	 certainty.	 These	 authors	 denounce	 cases	 where	contextual	factors	(crisis	and	its	humanitarianisms)	justify	occasionally	as	legitimate,	conduct	 that	 otherwise	 or	 under	 normal	 parameters	 would	 appear	 as	 highly	scandalous	or	unethical.	In	this	regard,	existing	codes	do	not	impede	the	creation	of	“ethics	 free”	 spaces	 associated	 with	 humanitarian	 crisis,	 precisely	 because	 it	 is	disastrous,	beyond	the	reach	of	regulation.	Also,	there	may	be	certain	temptation	by	some	drug	companies	to	use	those	“unregulated	spaces”	to	get	a	fast	track	and	where	the	long	and	conventional	way	is	disregarded.	In	this	sense,	it	would	be	necessary	to	shift	 the	 focus	 from	 normative	 theory	 of	 ethics	 and	 ideal	 conditions,	 to	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 norms	 are	 being	 refashioned	 and	 transformed	 in	 actual	 and	 diverse	conditions86.		
Marketing	and	advertising	techniques:	bordering	industry’s	undue	influence.			As	 it	has	been	noted,	 there	 is	an	obvious	conflict	of	 interest	arising	 from	the	profit-maximizing	objectives	of	pharmaceutical	companies	and	the	social	goal	of	optimizing	public	health	outcomes.	The	efforts	and	cost	of	companies’	promotional	activities	are	sometimes	 twice	 the	 investments	devoted	to	R&D	towards	 the	development	of	new	medicines.	 There	 is	 an	 ethical	 concern	 about	 the	 possibility	 that	 these	 marketing	tactics	or	techniques	are	bordering	the	legitimate	advertising	activity	and	entering	an	undue	 influence	 of	 the	 industry	 over	 patients,	 prescribers,	 regulators	 and	 political	establishment.					
																																																								
86 Petryna, A. (2005). Ethical variability: drug development and globalizing clinical trials. American Ethnologist, 
32(2), 183-197. 
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a) Patients.		Consumption	of	medicines	is	gradually	increasing	in	the	developed	world.	According	to	 some	 recent	 statistics,	 about	 50%	 of	 the	 population	 in	 the	 US87	 has	 used	 one	prescription	 drug	 in	 the	 last	 30	 days	 –around	 90%	 for	 65	 year	 old	 and	 over	population-.	 This	 percentage	 of	 consumption	 experiences	 a	 gradual	 increase	 every	year.			Except	for	the	rare	cases	of	US	and	New	Zealand,	The	direct-to-consumer-advertising	(DTCA)	 is	 prohibited	 worldwide.	 There	 are	 specific	 regulations	 relating	 to	promotional	 methods	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 the	 unnecessary	 or	 excessive	 use	 of	medicines.	DTCA	advocates	claim	that	this	technique	helps	to	reduce	stigma	or	shame	associated	 with	 seeking	 care	 –sexually	 transmitted	 diseases	 or	 mental	 health	problems-.	 Also	 they	 consider	 that	 DTCA	 may	 improve	 adherence	 to	 medication	therapy	 for	 chronic	 conditions	 and	 it	 may	 be	 an	 effective	 way	 of	 targeting	 clinical	problems,	 which	 are	 generally	 underdiagnosed.	 Finally,	 some	 think	 that	 a	 doctor’s	monopoly	on	information	and	knowledge	about	health	has	contributed	to	an	increase	in	 patients’	 dependency	 on	 the	medical	 profession	 and	 has	 reinforced	 paternalistic	practices88.			However,	most	governments	consider	that	DTCA	does	not	contribute	to	public	health	but	 it	 rather	 leads	 to	 a	 bigger	 and	 eventually	 inappropriate	 consumption	 of	medicines.	In	effect,	health	information	through	commercial	marketing	is	likely	to	be	inadequate,	biased,	untruthful,	 and	restricted	mainly	 to	blockbuster	drugs.	 It	 seems	that	 regardless	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 the	 public	 to	 become	 better	informed	about	medical	treatment	and	health	 issues	 in	general,	 it	should	not	be	the	responsibility	 of	 the	 drug	 industry	 to	 deliver	 this	 information89.	 In	 fact,	 there	 are	studies	showing	 that	DTCA	 increases	patients’	anxieties	and	 fears	of	 serious	 illness,	and	 promote	 the	 impression	 that	medicine	 is	 the	 only	 solution	 to	 health	 problems																																																									
87 National Center for Health Statistics (US. (2015). Health, United States, 2014: With special feature on adults 
aged 55–64. 
88 Hasman, A., & Holm, S. (2006). Direct-to-consumer advertising: Should there be a free market in healthcare 
information?. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 15(01), 42-49. 
89 Coulter, A. (2004). Why the ban on direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription medicine should remain in 
place. Direct to patient communication: patient empowerment or NHS burden, 37-43. 
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(medicalization),	 giving	 confusing	 or	 partial	 information	 about	 risks	 and	 side-effects90.	 Also,	 Prescribers	 feel	 compelled	 to	 prescribe	 medicines	 that	 have	 been	actively	promoted	in	the	media,	this	including a	shift	to	less	appropriate	prescribing,	differential	 effects	 by	 patient	 price	 sensitivity	 and	 drug	 type,	 switches	 to	 less	 cost-effective	treatment,	and	sustained	sales	despite	a	price	increase91.		On	the	other	hand,	and	apart	from	the	most	obvious	impact	of	DTCA	on	people,	there	are	other	more	subtle	ways	for	the	pharmaceutical	industry	to	penetrate	society	and	people’s	day-to-day	life.	In	this	sense,	there	is	an	increased	presence	of	drugs	in	our	daily	 life	 which	 may	 be	 due	 to	 what	 some	 have	 qualified	 as	 a	 “medicalization”	 of	society,	 i.e.,	 the	trend	to	categorize	more	and	more	individuals	as	“abnormal”	or	the	assumption	 that	 every	 problem	 requires	 medical	 treatment.	 There	 are	 many	examples	of	this	trend92	 including	the	medicalization	of	some	“male”	problems	such	as	baldness	and	sexual	impotence	or	the	medicalization	of	some	psychological	moods	such	 as	 “mild”	 depressions	 “suffered”	 by	 unhappy	 and	 distressed	 people	who	 have	been	 the	 target	 of	 intensive	marketing	 activity.	 In	 this	 sense,	 only	 about	 5%	 of	 all	prescriptions	 are	 written	 for	 severe	 depression	 and	 about	 two-thirds	 for	 mild	depressions	even	 if	 there	 is	no	good	evidence	 that	 those	antidepressants	will	 really	help	to	overcome	certain	natural	sadness93.			Also,	pharmaceutical	 industry	may	exercise	an	undue	 influence	on	patients	 through	its	 support	 to	 patient	 organizations	 which	 become	 subtle	 vehicles	 of	 marketing.	Patient	 organizations	 usually	 are	 providers	 of	 theoretically	 unbiased	 and	 objective	information	 and	 they	 often	 campaign	 for	 increased	 access	 to	 certain	 treatments.	Sometimes	 these	 organizations	 share	 the	 same	 interests	 with	 the	 pharmaceutical	industry	 in	 attempting	 to	 influence	 health	 policies.	 However,	 there	 are	 occasions	where	pharmaceutical	industry	provides	direct	funding	or	valuable	contributions	to	a																																																									
90 Kim, Y., Kornfield, R., Shi, Y., Vera, L., Daubresse, M., Alexander, G. C., & Emery, S. (2016). Effects of 
televised direct-to-consumer advertising for varenicline on prescription dispensing in the United States, 2006–
2009. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, 18(5), 1180-1187. 
91 Mintzes, B. (2012). Advertising of prescription-only medicines to the public: does evidence of benefit 
counterbalance harm?. Annual Review of Public Health, 33, 259-277. 
92 Conrad, P. (2008). The medicalization of society: On the transformation of human conditions into treatable 
disorders. JHU Press. 
93 House of Commons Health Committee, & House of Commons Health Committee. (2004). The influence of 
the pharmaceutical industry. Fourth report of session, 5, 2005. 
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patient	 association	 and	 charities.	 This	 implication	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	with	 these	 associations	 may	 erode	 their	 independence	 and	 impartiality	 specially	when	there	is	not	the	necessary	transparency	about	patient	associations’	funding.	In	this	sense,	a	research	conducted	through	internet	(Google	search	strategy)	identifying	major	international	patient	associations	showed	that	only	4	out	of	69	websites	stated	advertising	 and	 conflict	 of	 interest	 policies	 and	 that	 corporate	 donations	 were	identified	 in	 only	 7/37	 reports	 and	 none	 gave	 enough	 information	 to	 show	 the	proportion	of	funding	from	the	pharmaceutical	industry94.							 b) Prescribers	of	medicines.		 	Undue	 influence	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 on	 the	 health	 professionals	 who	prescribe	 medicines	 and	 the	 eventual	 inappropriate	 prescription	 of	 medicines	 are	issues	 of	 particular	 concern.	 There	 is	 a	 variety	 of	 techniques	 whose	 purpose	 is	 to	influence	 prescribers’	 decisions	 and	 considerations	 to	 certain	 treatments;	 direct	advertising,	organization	of	medical	congresses,	pharmaceutical	sale	representatives	and	 public	 relations,	 scientific	 articles	 and	 magazines	 and	 other	 media	 to	communicate	 the	 benefits	 of	 their	 products.	 Sometimes	 prescribers	 experience	important	 difficulties	 in	 finding	 unbiased,	 impartial,	 scientific	 contrasted	 and	objective	 information	 about	 the	 medicines	 to	 be	 prescribed.	 Pharmaceutical	companies	 have	 developed	 sophisticated	 and	 subtle	 instruments	 to	 influence	 the	information	received	by	prescribers	which	find	themselves	flooded	by	biased	interest	driven	 and	 partial	 information	 on	 the	 medicines	 they	 have	 to	 prescribe	 to	 their	patients95.					One	example	of	the	above	is	the	potential	conflicts	of	 interests	in	journal	publishing	and	science	advisory	panels	and	the	creation	of	economic	bones	with	scientists	and	doctors.	 In	a	 research	conducted	on	 the	 independence	of	 the	prestigious	Diagnostic	and	 Statistical	 Manual	 of	 Mental	 Disorders	 published	 by	 the	 American	 Psychiatric	Association,	it	was	examined	the	financial	ties	to	the	pharmaceutical	industry	of	panel																																																									
94 Ball, D. E., Tisocki, K., & Herxheimer, A. (2006). Advertising and disclosure of funding on patient 
organization websites: a cross-sectional survey. BMC Public Health, 6(1), 201. 
95 Goldacre, B. (2014). Bad pharma: how drug companies mislead doctors and harm patients. Supra note 83. 
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members	responsible	for	revisions	of	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders.	 Of	 the	 170	 panel	 members,	 95	 (56%)	 had	 one	 or	 more	 financial	associations	with	companies	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry.	These	financial	ties	are	created	through	permanent	or	limited	collaborations	in	the	field	of	research	funding	(42%),	consultancies	(22%)	and	speakers	bureau	(16%)96.			Also,	medical	journals	which	are	an	important	source	of	information	for	doctors	and	health	 professionals	 are	 riddled	 with	 “ghost-writers”	 which	 do	 not	 present	 an	objective	 assessment	 of	 the	merits	 and	 disadvantages	 or	 dark	 sides	 of	 a	medicine,	there	 being	 a	 bias	 towards	 showing	 presented	medicines	 in	 a	 positive	 light.	 Ghost	writing	 consists	 of	 those	 articles	 which	 appear	 under	 the	 name	 and	 credit	 of	prestigious	 professionals	 when	 they	 have	 not	 written	 –or	 conducted	 the	 research-	themselves	 but	 by	 somebody	 else	who	 has	 been	 committed	 by	 the	 pharmaceutical	company.	In	this	sense,	approximately	75%	of	clinical	trials	published	in	The	Lancet,	the	 New	 England	 Journal	 of	 Medicine	 and	 the	 Journal	 of	 the	 American	 Medical	Association	 were	 industry	 funded.	 Also,	 over	 50%	 of	 articles	 appearing	 in	 these	journals	may	also	be	ghost-written97.			Many	of	 those	 scientific	publications	are	based	on	 selective	 report	of	medical	 trials	which	often	miss	the	negative	aspects	of	a	medicine.	In	a	research	conducted	among	74	FDA-registered	studies,	31%	of	the	studies	were	not	published.	Whether	and	how	the	studies	were	published	seemed	to	be	associated	with	the	study	outcome.	A	total	of	37	 studies	 viewed	 by	 the	 FDA	 as	 having	 positive	 results	 were	 published	 -1	 study	viewed	as	positive	was	not	published-.	However,	studies	viewed	by	the	FDA	as	having	negative	 or	 questionable	 results	 were,	 with	 3	 exceptions,	 either	 not	 published	 (22	studies)	 or	 published	 in	 a	 way	 that,	 in	 the	 research	 author’s	 opinion,	 conveyed	 a	positive	outcome	(11	studies).98		
																																																								
96 Cosgrove, L., Krimsky, S., Vijayaraghavan, M., & Schneider, L. (2006). Financial ties between DSM-IV 
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97 House of Commons Health Committee, & House of Commons Health Committee. See supranote 93.  
98 Turner, E. H., Matthews, A. M., Linardatos, E., Tell, R. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2008). Selective publication of 
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In	 addition	 to	 the	 subtle	 techniques	 of	 influence,	 there	 are	 other	 promotional	techniques	which	may	also	be	highly	objectionable.	Other	than	direct	advertisement,	doctors	 are	 the	 object	 of	 company	 representative	 visits	 and	 are	 invited	 to	 attend	sponsored	 “educational”	 events	 which	 often	 include	 generous	 hospitalities	 which	have	 an	 important	 effect	 on	 prescribing	 practice.	 This	 category	 of	 promotional	activities	 has	 been	 left	 to	 industry’s	 self-regulation	 assuming	 that	 doctors’	professional	 expertise	 and	 ethics	 are	 sufficient	 to	 avoid	 undue	 influence.	 However,	different	 manifestations	 of	 self-regulation	 codes	 and	 bodies	 of	 rules	 have	 been	criticized	 as	 too	 vague,	 too	weak	 and	 too	often	 ignored99.	 This	 emerging	 conflict	 of	interest	 has	 started	 to	 be	 correctly	 addressed	 by	 certain	 laws	 like	 the	 Physician	Payments	 Sunshine	 Act	 (Sunshine	 Act)	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 EU	Member	 States	 such	 as	 France,	 Spain,	 Belgium	 or	 Italy	 with	 specific	 sunshine	legislation	 and	 disclosure	 obligations	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 transparency	 of	relationships	between	physicians	and	health	care	companies.100		 c) Regulators	and	political	establishment.		It	 is	 difficult	 to	 study	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 drug	 industry	 on	 public	 officials	 and	politicians	without	entering	 the	 field	of	 conspiracy	 theories	and	other	works	which	turn	to	be	closer	to	the	noir	novels’	genre.	However,	it	is	important	to	mention	some	facts	 which	 reveal	 important	 links	 and	 influence	 between	 the	 pharmaceutical	industry,	 the	 public	 administration	 and	 public	 agencies	 and	 the	 political	establishment.			According	 to	 the	 Center	 for	 Responsive	 Politics,	 only	 in	 the	 US	 the	 Pharmaceutical	industry	has	spent	during	2015	a	total	of	$238,086,761	for	lobbying	activities.		They	also	 fund	 candidates’	 campaigns	 (Hillary	 Clinton	 has	 received	 so	 far	 $490,583)	 101.	Before	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 the	 registered	 lobbies	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 field	
																																																								
99 Doran, E., & Löfgren, H. (2013). Drug promotion in Australia: Policy contestation and the tightening of 
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100 French law n° 2011-2012 on the Strengthening of Health Protection for Medicinal and Health Products 
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are	 16	 spending	 a	 total	 of	 7.381.800	 euros102.	 Letting	 aside	 the	 earlier	 mentioned	pressure	and	influence	of	Pharmaceutical	 industry	for	the	implementation	of	TRIPS,	there	are	no	clear	evidences	about	the	 influence	that	these	 lobbies	have	on	political	decisions	but	account	taken	of	 the	amounts	devoted	to	 lobbying,	 it	seems	clear	that	they	receive	some	positive	reward.			On	the	other	hand,	there	are	different	manners	by	which	the	industry	exerts	certain	influence	on	 the	 regulatory	agencies.	 In	particular,	 in	1992	 the	US	Congress	passed	legislation	introducing	prescription	drug	“user	fees”	for	the	review	of	new	drugs.	This	made	 the	FDA	dependent	on	 industry	 for	a	portion	of	 its	 funding.	This	dependence	has	raised	questions	about	the	impartial	functioning	of	the	FDA	when	giving	priority	to	some	new	drugs	for	a	faster	review	process	even	when	they	do	not	imply	a	medical	advance103.		Also,	today	the	relationship	between	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	the	regulatory	agencies	is	closer.	There	is	a	permanent	dialogue,	exchanges	of	information	and	staff,	common	 policy	 objectives,	 routine	 contact	 and	 employees	 who	 regularly	 shift	positions	 between	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 sides.	 Even	 if	 collaboration	 between	both	 parties	 is	 necessary,	 there	 is	 a	 risky	 approach	 of	 considering	 the	 relationship	between	the	regulatory	agency	and	the	pharmaceutical	companies	as	one	of	provider	and	client	where	the	pharmaceutical	industry	is	the	client	which	must	be	looked	after.	In	this	sense,	it	is	argued	that	trust	between	the	regulators	and	the	industry	should	be	based	on	robust	evidence	instead	of	a	routine	reliance	on	company’s	information	and	data.	 Otherwise,	 there	 is	 the	 danger	 of	 failing	 in	 the	 so	 named	 regulatory	capture	which	occurs	when	a	regulatory	agency	advances	the	private	interests	of	the	industry	it	is	committed	to	regulate	instead	of	acting	in	the	public	interest104.	
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CHAPTER	4.	 THE	 LEGITIMACY	 CHALLENGE:	 THE	 NORMATIVE	
AND	INSTITUTIONAL	BASIS	FOR	REGIME	CHANGE.		
4.1.	 Social	contestation	and	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	WTO.		On	 November	 30	 of	 1999,	 the	 cradle	 of	 the	 “high-tech”	 sector,	 the	 peaceful	 and	prosperous	American	city,	Seattle	which	once	was	described	as	a	“leading	apostle	of	transnational	 trade”	 awoke	 with	 the	 biggest	 civil	 protests	 and	 disturbances	 of	political	nature	since	the	Vietnam	War	era	in	America.	More	than	40.000	protesters	–students,	organized	labor	unions,	NGOs,	religious	groups,	people	for	fair	trade,	Direct	Action	 Network…-	 were	 congregated	 to	 protest	 against	 the	 third	 World	 Trade	Organization	(WTO)	Ministerial	Conference.	They	wanted	to	make	it	known	that	the	WTO,	 an	 institution	 virtually	 invisible	 to	 the	 general	 public,	 was	 an	 undemocratic,	anti-labor,	 and	 anti-environmental	 organization	 that	 served	 the	 interests	 of	corporations	 over	 people	 and	 the	 environment1.	 The	 protest	 degenerated	 into	 a	major	 clash	 where	 more	 than	 500	 individuals	 were	 arrested	 in	 what	 became	 the	"Battle	 of	 Seattle”2.	 Since	 Seattle,	 the	 premise	 that	 trade	 per	 se	 fosters	 peace	 and	prosperity	was	called	into	question	when	no	wounded	to	death.		There	have	been	 an	 important	number	of	 studies	 and	 analysis	 about	what	was	 the	real	meaning	 around	 the	 “Battle	 of	 Seattle”	 in	 terms	of	 contestation	 against	 “global	governance”	and	the	new	international	economic	regime	represented	by	multilateral	economic	 institutions	 such	 as	 WTO,	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank.	 In	 particular,	 many	scholars	 note	 that	 Seattle	 gave	 birth	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 certain	 global	 civil	society	(GCS)	where	transnational	social	movements	(TSMOs)	and	transnational	non-governmental	organization	(TNGOs)	would	be	extending	democratic	values	globally	and	monitoring	rogue	states	and	corporations;	the	birth	of	a	sort	of	global	conscience,																																																									
1 Taylor, R. (Ed.). (2004). Creating a better world: Interpreting global civil society. Kumarian Press. 
2 After Singapore (1996) and Geneva (1998), Seattle in the US was officially the third WTO Ministerial 
Conference. The ministerial conference is the organization’s highest-level decision-making body and it meets 
"at least once every two years", as required by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO and the 
TRIPS. The Seattle Ministerial Conference was intended to launch a new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations that would have been called “The Millennium Round”. The Ministerial Conference included 
plenary sessions and the Committee of the Whole, as well as four working groups on special topics 
(Agriculture, Market Access, Singapore Agenda and Other Issues, and Implementation and Rules) and a 
Group on Systemic Issues.  
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a	global	society	which	would	be	called	to	overcome	the	national	margins	and	having	a	worldwide	 scale	 as	 the	 field	 of	 its	 concerns	 and	 activity.	 From	 a	 normative	perspective	 the	 idea	 of	 global	 civil	 society	 has	 also	 become	 a	 fruitful	 theoretical	category	to	explore	 in	order	to	revamp	certain	cosmopolitan	ethical	 tradition	based	on	modern	Kantian	 theories	 that	 see	 in	 this	 global	 civil	 society	 the	 realization	 and	implementation	of	universalizable	moral	norms3	and	the	creation	of	a	global	 justice	movement.	Also,	as	we	will	see	in	further	chapters,	the	concept	of	global	civil	society	has	 an	 important	 attractiveness	 for	many	 scholars	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 explain	 and	refashion	the	new	political	world	order.			Notwithstanding	this,	and	according	to	many,	much	of	what	has	been	described	as	a	new	phase	 in	 social	movement	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 transnational	 civil	 society	 has	been	 certainly	 overstated.	 The	 term	 “global	 civil	 society”	would	 have	 been	 vaguely	used	to	refer	to	many	different	organizational	forms	and	types	of	global	action,	a	sort	of	catchall	term	for	TNGOs	and	TSMOs	and	other	social	movements	of	all	shapes	and	sizes	operating	 in	 the	 international	 realm.	 In	 the	 light	of	 the	Seattle	 events	 and	 the	study	of	the	organization,	ideational	preparation	and	constituent	mobilization	behind	them,	it	has	been	found	that	in	the	era	of	globalization	large-scale	social	mobilization	still	relies	on	locally	based	constituencies	and	the	resources	that	can	be	mobilized	in	national	scale	following	national	interests	rather	than	a	global	mobilization	grounded	on	global	interests.	This	does	not	imply	that	the	Seattle	protest	did	not	encompass	an	international	component	and	important	shifts	in	the	social	movement	field;	in	effect,	although	 transnational	 organizations	made	 a	modest	 organizational	 contribution	 to	the	 “revolt”,	 they	 provided	 a	 core	 of	 highly	 informed	 activists	 who	 played	 an	important	 role	as	 speakers	and	authorities	on	 specific	 issues.	But	 this	 international	element	was	not	decisive	at	all4.		On	 the	other	hand,	one	of	 the	main	Battle	of	Seattle’s	contribution	 to	 the	debate	on	the	new	global	order	has	been	the	fact	of	becoming	a	sort	of	template	for	dissent	and	protestation,	 an	 example	 of	 proceedings,	 “protest	 repertoire”	 and	 cooperation																																																									
3 Kaldor, M. (2003). The idea of global civil society. International affairs, 79(3), 583-593. 
4 Murphy, G. H., & Pfaff, S. (2005). Thinking locally, acting globally? What the Seattle WTO protests tell us 
about the global justice movement. In Political Power and Social Theory (pp. 151-176). Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited. 
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between	 diverse	 groups	 which	 without	 requiring	 excessive	 compromise,	 met	together	to	protest	the	WTO,	its	policies	and	practices.	This	mobilization	of	local	and	regional	 communities	 -negatively	 affected	 by	 the	 new	 global	 economic	 regime-	constituted	the	example	and	the	first	mobilization	of	these	characteristics	to	which	all	other	 global	 justice	 protests	 are	 compared.	 The	 Seattle	 example	 has	 inspired	 other	international	meetings	and	summits	around	the	new	economic	order.		On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 coin,	 the	 Battle	 of	 Seattle	 also	 witnessed	 new	 forms	 of	government	 repression	 and	 the	 curtailing	 of	 some	 fundamental	 democratic	 rights	such	 as	 the	 freedom	 of	 speech	 in	 the	 never	 ending	 dialogue	 between	 security	 and	democracy.	 Examples	 of	 these	 exceptions	 to	 the	 so	 far	 unassailable	 democratic	scenario,	 are	 inter	 alia	 the	 enforcement	 of	 illegal	 “no	 protest	 zone”	 faced	 by	protesters;	 some	 efforts	 to	 eliminate	 public	 participation	 and	 democratic	accountability	by	promoting	 "fast	 track"	 executive	authority	 –boosted	by	Clinton	 to	eliminate	 the	 Congressional	 role	 in	 trade	 negotiations	 by	 forcing	 the	 legislative	branch	 to	either	reject	or	approve	 the	whole	of	agreements-	or;	 the	organization	of	global	meetings	in	locations	where	freedom	of	speech	and	other	democratic	rights	are	restricted	as	well	 as	public	demonstrations	 (Singapore,	Qatar…).	All	 those	 attitudes	raise	serious	concerns	about	the	ways	that	the	new	global	regime	affects	the	practice	of	democracy5.		In	the	end,	the	Conference	was	unable	to	 launch	the	new	round	of	negotiations,	nor	was	a	Ministerial	Declaration	adopted.	The	outdoors	protests	were	coupled	with	the	resentment	and	dissatisfaction	of	some	developing	country	representative	inside	the	Conference	 about	 the	 efficiency	 and	 transparency	 of	 the	 WTO	 decision-making	process.	In	this	sense,	developing	country	representatives	were	excluded	from	the	so-called	 “green	rooms”,	 those	 forums	where	 the	most	powerful	 countries	did	 the	 real	negotiating,	 this	 leading	 to	a	 legitimate	anger	by	developing	countries.	This	parallel	negotiation	 exemplifies	 the	 sometimes	 enormous	 gap	 between	 the	 legal	 formal	process	under	which	 the	negotiations	 are	 carried	out	 and	 the	 real	 political	process	underneath	where	the	most	powerful	countries	assert	and	enforce	their	interests	by																																																									
5 Smith, J. (2001). Globalizing resistance: The battle of Seattle and the future of social movements. 
Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 6(1), 1-19. 
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offering	incentives	or	by	resorting	to	coercion	methods6.	In	any	case,	in	the	analyses	of	 the	 socioeconomic	 political	 and	 institutional	 context	 surrounding	 IPRs	 and	 in	particular,	 the	 global	 regime	 of	 IPRs,	 this	 chapter	 address	 the	 institutional	environment	 in	which	 IPRs	global	 regime	 is	anchored	ant	 the	crisis	of	 legitimacy	of	the	whole	system	where	IPRs	is	an	integral/constituent	piece.			
The	WTO	legitimacy	crisis.		Therefore	and	focusing	on	the	subject	matter	of	 this	chapter,	 the	Battle	of	Seattle	 is	widely	identified	as	a	turning	point	for	WTO,	and	more	broadly	for	global	economic	governance	 institutions,	 in	 particular,	 a	 questioning	 of	 its	 legitimacy	 to	 adopt	 and	make	decisions	with	an	impact	upon	the	lives	of	billions	of	people.	In	this	sense,	one	of	 the	 immediate	 consequences	 of	 Seattle	was	 the	 strong	 public	 questioning	 of	 the	“Club	Model”	functioning	of	the	trade	regime	which	had	been	operated	until	then	and	the	 interests	and	premises	under	which	they	worked.	For	a	 long	period	of	 time,	 the	trade	 regime	 coming	 from	 GATT	 had	 worked	 discretely,	 with	 low	 profile,	 -even	secretively-	in	pursuit	of	a	vision	of	open	markets	and	deeper	economic	integration.	This	forum	and	the	trade	policymaking	process	were	isolated	and	shielded	from	day-to-day	politics.	This	once	non	disputed	manner	of	operation	of	the	GATTs	is	no	longer	admissible.	 On	 the	 contrary,	WTO	 is	 today	 often	 perceived	 as	 a	 “black-box”	where	elites	and	multinational	corporations	dominate	and	prevail	over	 the	common	good7	affecting	everyday’s	 lives	 in	aspects	which	are	perceived	to	go	beyond	the	technical	issues	they	were	called	for.		
Dancing	with	the	concept	of	legitimacy.		Legitimacy	is	a	central	concept	in	political	theory	for	the	functioning	of	any	decision-making	 and	 political	 authority.	 However,	 it	 seems	 easier	 to	 detect	 that	 there	 is	 a	missing	or	deficient	 legitimacy	 in	a	given	political	 regime	than	 to	reach	an	accurate	definition	of	all	its	contours;	when	it	is	functioning	well,	citizens	take	for	granted	that																																																									
6 Jawara, F., & Kwa, A. (2004). Behind the scenes at the WTO: The real world of international trade 
negotiations. Zed Books. 
7 Esty, D. C. (2002). The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis. World Trade Review, 1(01), 7-22. 
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political	authorities	are	legitimate	and	that	their	actions	are	justified.	When	it	 is	not	functioning	and	it	generates	too	much	of	resistance	and	contestation,	 the	 legitimacy	issue	emerges	as	one	of	the	motives	to	be	evaluated.	In	this	sense,	public	acceptance	and	 justification	 (legitimacy)	 of	 the	 authority	 and	 decisions	 that	 emerge	 from	 the	WTO	may	no	longer	be	taken	for	granted8.			Although	 debates	 around	 the	 concept	 of	 legitimacy	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 and	purposes	 of	 this	 dissertation,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 clarify	 some	 concepts	 on	 the	 issue	before	 entering	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	WTO	 legitimacy	 crisis.	 Legitimacy	 has	 been	 the	object	 of	 research	 of	 different	 social	 disciplines	 such	 as	 philosophy,	 law,	 sociology,	political	science	or	anthropology.	There	are	important	and	major	divergencies	around	the	concept	both	inter	disciplines	and	intra	disciplines.	In	spite	of	those	discrepancies	there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 common	 ground	 for	 understanding	 this	 concept:	 the	 idea	 of	legitimacy	 concerns	 first	 and	 foremost	 the	 “right	 to	 govern”	 or	more	 precisely,	 the	right	 to	make	decisions.	Legitimacy	 is	 the	recognition	of	 the	right	 to	govern.	 In	 this	regard,	 legitimacy	 would	 offer	 a	 solution	 to	 a	 fundamental	 political	 problem;	justifying	simultaneously	political	power	and	obedience9.			The	 first	 distinction	 around	 legitimacy	 for	 our	 purposes	 is	 between	 the	 domestic	legitimacy	 and	 the	 international	 legitimacy.	 Even	 if	 both	 concepts	 are	 intimately	related,	 there	 are	 important	 differences	 regarding	 the	 grounds	 and	 justification	 of	both	legitimacies.	Unlike	what	it	relates	to	domestic	legitimacy	where	political	power	rest	with	 sovereignty	of	 the	people,	 international	 law	and	 international	 institutions	are	 traditionally	 considered	 to	be	 legitimate	as	a	 result	of	 the	 consent	given	by	 the	states	 (pacta	 sunt	 servanda).	 Also,	 there	 is	 held	 to	 be	 a	 tacit	 consent	 to	 customary	international	law,	i.e.	when	a	state	does	not	raise	any	objection	to	certain	regularized	practice,	 that	 state	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 bound	 to	 customary	 international	 law.	Furthermore,	states	are	supposed	to	negotiate	and	tailor	the	agreements	they	enter	into	 by	 means	 of	 reservations	 and	 understandings	 and	 retain	 rights	 of	 exit	 to	 the	agreement,	 convention	 or	 treaty.	 Some	 exceptions	 to	 the	 requirement	 of	 voluntary																																																									
8 Ibidem. 
9 Coicaud, J. M., & Curtis, D. A. (2002). Legitimacy and politics: a contribution to the study of political right and 
political responsibility. Cambridge University Press. 
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consent	 would	 be	 constituted	 by	 Ius	 cogens	 norms	 which	 bind	 states	 no	 matter	whether	 they	consent	or	not.	Therefore,	always	 from	a	 traditional	 international	 law	perspective,	international	legitimacy	-based	on	the	state’s	consent-	emerges	from	the	idea	that	states	are	free	and	sovereign	entities	which	are	the	subjects	directed	to	act	in	international	law10.			In	this	sense,	WTO,	an	international	organization	created	as	a	result	of	an	agreement	or	 treaty	 consented	 by	 eventually	 “free	 and	 sovereign”	 states,	 would	 have	 formal	legitimacy	to	implement	the	obligations	and	duties	set	forth	in	its	constituent	treaties.	In	this	logic,	TRIPS	would	be	a	treaty	binding	WTO	state	members	since	it	comes	from	a	legitimate	international	source.			Notwithstanding	 this,	 legitimacy	 derived	 from	 consent	 by	 states	 is	 experiencing	 an	important	 questioning.	 Former	 international	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 institutions	and/or	 bodies	 of	 international	 norms	was	 based	 in	 a	 “non-intrusive”	 international	law,	an	international	law	which	was	mostly	limited	to	deal	with	the	relations	between	sovereign	 states.	 Today,	 international	 law	 does	 no	 longer	 encompass	 interstate	relations,	but	 also,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	TRIPS,	 it	pertains	 to	 intrastate	 relations	and	therefore,	 it	 enters	 into	 the	 regulation	 of	 specific	 issues	 of	 the	 life	 of	 individuals	alongside	domestic	law.	Besides	the	traditional	sources	of	interstate	international	law	(treaties,	 customary	 law	 and	 general	 principles),	 new	 categories	 of	 intrastate	international	 law	and	 legislation	by	 International	Organizations	have	emerged	with	an	 important	 impact	 on	 individual	 lives	 and	 on	 some	 areas	 such	 as	 health,	environment	or	safety.	The	WTO	is	a	clear	example	of	this	as	 it	 is	entering	new	and	ambitious	 areas	 of	 trade	which	 have	 an	 enormous	 impact	 on	 other	 policy	 domains	such	as	labor,	environment	and	health	(TRIPS).	In	this	new	context	where	structural	changes	 of	 political	 authority	 is	 shifting	 decision	 making	 power	 from	 democratic	states	to	international	organizations,	the	“consent	of	states”	argument	to	uphold	the	decision	making	 process	 at	 the	 international	 stage	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 enough	 to	justify	norms	which	are	affecting	people’s	life	without	a	previous	public	discussion11.																																																									
10 Christiano, T. State Consent and the Legitimacy of International Institutions. 
11 Nanz, P. (2006). Democratic legitimacy and constitutionalisation of transnational trade governance: A view 
from political theory. Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation, 59-82. 
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Also,	 the	 international	 legitimacy	 question	 is	 especially	 important	 today	 due	 to	 the	shift	from	a	set	of	rules	between	nations	(GATT)	to	a	more	formal	organization	such	as	WTO	with	important	policy	reach	and	impact.			At	this	point,	it	is	important	to	note	the	clash	and	the	growing	contradiction	observed	between	 the	 two	 dimensions	 of	 multi-lateral	 international	 legitimacy	 (the	relationship	 between	 states	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 international	 regime	 and	 the	relationship	 of	 each	 state	 with	 its	 population);	 from	 a	 state	 point	 of	 view,	 the	international	agreement	or	 the	creation	of	a	multi-lateral	 international	organization	has	 to	 be	 eventually	 and	 simultaneously	 acceptable	 both	 to	 the	 other	 negotiating	parties	or	states	and	to	their	citizens.	 	This	 is	called	the	normative	two-level	games,	i.e.,	when	governments	make	 commitments	 to	one	 another	 and	 they	 take	 collective	decisions	 in	a	multilateral	 scenario	 they	simultaneously	need	 to	be	responsible	and	accountable	 to	 their	 national	 populations	 to	 retain	 their	 domestic/political	legitimacy12.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 is	 today	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 international	 regime	created	 by	 consent	 of	 the	 states	 and	 the	 increasing	 reluctance	 of	 citizens	 of	 those	states	 to	 accept	 international	 decisions	 derived	 from	 that	 regime	 in	 areas	 formerly	reserved	 to	 their	 sovereign	 states	 and	 where	 previous	 political	 and	 “democratic”	debate	 took	 place	 before	 decisions	 be	 made.	 Thus,	 current	 international	 decision-making	authorities	and	processes	would	fall	short	of	 justifying	and	explaining	today	their	legitimacy	which	is	deeply	questioned.			As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this	 crisis,	 during	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 the	 traditionally	neglected	field	of	international	legitimacy	has	received	an	unusual	attention	both	by	multitude	 academic	 articles	 and	 studies	 and	 legal	 practitioners	 (international	lawyers,	judges,	NGOs)	which	attempt	to	find	and	determine	the	criteria	to	cope	with	the	crisis	of	 international	 legitimacy	and,	 in	particular,	with	WTO’s	 legitimacy	crisis.	The	 common	 concern	 is	 to	 identify	 under	 which	 conditions	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	beyond	the	nation	state	can	be	claimed	to	be	legitimate.	This	leads	for	example,	to	the	questioning	 about	 whether	 the	 states	 or	 the	 citizens	 are	 the	 terms	 of	 legitimacy																																																									
12 Bellamy, R., & Weale, A. (2015). Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, 
constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level games. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(2), 257-
274. 
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reference;	 about	 the	 substrate	 of	 the	 political	 community	 concerned;	 or	 about	 the	democratic	 character	 of	 international	 institutions	 adopting	 decisions	 affecting	people’s	lives.					Many	authors	transfer	automatically	concepts	and	categories	of	 legitimate	authority	developed	for	the	domestic	context	into	the	analysis	of	the	international	legitimacy	or	the	legitimacy	of	the	exercise	of	power	beyond	the	state.	However,	by	ignoring	some	basic	differences	between	domestic	and	multi-level	context	–differences	regarding	its	subjects	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 real	 international	 demos-	 this	 direct	 and	 automatic	extrapolation	 seems	 to	 raise	 more	 problems	 than	 it	 has	 solved13.	 Therefore	 and	bearing	 this	 important	 distinction	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 identify	 what	 it	 is	understood	to	be	legitimacy	when	we	speak	about	WTO	crisis	of	legitimacy.			Even	 if	 intimately	 intertwined,	 the	 concept	 of	 legitimacy	 can	 be	 formulated	 in	descriptive	or	normative	terms.	Descriptive	or	empirical	legitimacy	would	refer	to	the	
de	facto	support	and	acceptance	of	the	people	and	public	opinion	with	a	given	system,	being	this	empirical	legitimacy	beyond	the	purposes	of	this	chapter.	In	normative	or	prescriptive	 terms,	 legitimacy	 refers	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 a	 given	 system	 or	 political	regime	following	and	pursuant	to	certain	normative	criteria.	There	are	authors	who	claim	a	third	way,	the	pragmatic-discursive	approach	which	will	be	analyzed	later	and	that	invokes	a	rational	deliberative	process	to	scrutinize	the	normative	premises	and	normative	 criteria	 of	 the	 different	 and	 multiple	 legitimacies14.	 Also,	 there	 is	 a	distinction	between	procedural	and	substantive	legitimacy.	As	procedural	legitimacy	would	be	 reached	by	 following	a	procedure,	 substantive	 legitimacy	would	be	based	on	material	 grounds	or	 judgements	on	 the	merits.	Again	here,	 it	 is	 important	 to	be	cautious	not	 to	 overestimate	 one	 over	 the	 other;	 apart	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 decisions	should	 come	 for	 example	 from	 democratic	 processes,	 to	 be	 legitimate,	 it	 would	 be	
																																																								
13  Thomas, C. (2013). The concept of legitimacy and international law. LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers. 
14 Cornago, N. (2005). Problemas de legitimación del nuevo régimen mundial del comercio: una exploración 
para internacionalistas. Globalización y comercio internacional. Actas de las XX Jornadas de la AEPDIRI, 
415-427. 
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necessary	 from	 a	 deliberative	 perspective	 to	 give	 rational	 substantive	 reasons	connected	with	agreed	or	constitutional	values15.								Once	considered	the	different	dimensions	of	legitimacy,	it	is	important	to	review	the	sources	of	 legitimacy	of	 a	 system.	 In	 the	political	 science	 literature,	 there	would	be	three	main	sources	of	 legitimacy;	the	functional	or	systemic,	the	legal	or	rule-of-law	based	 legitimacy	 and	 democratic	 sources	 of	 legitimacy.	 In	 fact,	 legitimacy	 will	 be	based	on	the	three	sources	with	a	balance	between	them	which	will	depend	upon	the	context	 and	 the	 type	 of	 decision-making	 and	 political	 authority.	 As	 functional	legitimacy	 would	 highlight	 the	 efficacy	 of	 a	 given	 international	 organization	 in	securing	 the	 goals	 and	 supplying	 the	 goods	 for	 which	 the	 organization	 has	 been	entrusted	 and	 its	 capacity,	 the	 legal	 legitimacy	 emphasizes	 that	 an	 international	organization	is	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	i.e.,	it	observes	procedural	agreed	norms	and	it	goes	 through	stipulated	proceedings	 in	 its	decision	making	processes.	Finally,	 the	democratic	legitimacy	would	refer	to	the	acceptance	of	a	given	political	system	by	its	citizens	 and	 the	 manner	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 those	 citizens	 constituting	 the	relevant	political	community	accept	it.			The	 balance	 between	 the	 three	 sources	 of	 legitimacy	 depends	 upon	 the	 specific	context	 and	 system	 under	 scrutiny.	 Sometimes	 the	 trade-offs	 between	 the	 three	sources	 seem	 to	 be	 incompatible.	 In	 this	 sense,	 for	 example	 the	 increase	 of	 the	democratic	 dimension	of	 the	multilateral	 system	may	be	 considered	 to	 threaten	 its	efficiency	or	the	increased	legalization	of	a	given	international	organization	is	held	to	erode	democratic	politics.	In	particular,	legitimacy	of	international	authorities	is	said	to	have	been	traditionally	based	on	efficacy,	on	their	capacity	and	efficiency	to	deliver	the	 entrusted	 outcomes	 and	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 -international	 decisions	 and	 norms	would	be	 legitimized	 through	 the	procedural	 requirement	of	 the	 consent	of	 states-.	Finally,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 democratic	 dimension	 of	 international	 legitimacy	would	be	covered	 indirectly	 through	 the	consent	of	 states	as	entities	which	emerge	from	 popular	 sovereignty.	 In	 spite	 of	 this	 and	 because	 of	 the	 extended	 reach	 of	
																																																								
15 Cohen, J. (1997). Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy: Essays on 
reason and politics, 407. 
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international	norms	and	institutions	and	its	direct	impact	on	the	domestic	realm,	the	democratic	dimension	of	legitimacy	has	become	a	hot	topic	in	the	academic	arena.			
Democratic	deficit	of	the	WTO	regime.		WTO	was	 conceived	 following	 neoliberal	 premises.	 The	 neoliberal	 approach	would	somehow	distinguish	and	separate	international	governance	from	politics	or	from	the	political	debate.	This	view	claims	the	functional,	utilitarian	view	as	the	only	basis	to	justify	 and	 give	 legitimacy	 to	WTO,	 i.e.,	 norms	produced	 by	WTO	would	 be	market	enhancing	by	permitting	an	efficient	exchange	and	free	movement	of	goods,	services	and	capital.	Those	 functions	would	be	a	 legitimate	constitutional	basis	 for	 the	WTO	and	 for	 international	 economic	 regime.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 would	 be	 some	constitutional	or	superior	rules	–called	general	 rules-	 such	as	 the	protection	of	 free	markets,	 property	 rights,	 legal	 equality	 and	 contract	 law,	 which	 would	 ensure	 the	peaceful	 cooperation	 between	 states	 and	 between	 individuals	 and	would	 avoid	 the	
conflicts	among	the	short-term	interests	of	 individuals	risk	endangering	their	common	
long-term	interests.16These	superior	rules	would	belong	to	the	realm	of	technocratic	rationality	 and	 therefore,	 they	 would	 occupy	 a	 place	 beyond	 –and	 above-	 political	debate.	These	technical	decision	making	process	would	be	technical	and	undergirded	by	 “science”	 and	 thus,	 and	 according	 to	 this	 ideological	 tradition,	 it	 should	 be	 de-politized.	 This	 neoliberal	 view	 of	 the	 international	 economic	 regime	 has	 been	profusely	 studied	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU	 and	 European	Monetary	Union	 and	 it	 is	based	 under	 the	 premise	 that	 certain	 economic	 regulation	 and	 decision	 making	cannot	be	attributed	to	national	states/governments	since	they	would	be	pressed	by	their	populations	and	they	would	be	likely	to	act	with	a	myopic	and	short-term	vision	as	well	as	they	would	free	ride	on	the	cooperation	of	others17.										Notwithstanding	 this,	 and	 apart	 from	 the	 more	 than	 objectionable	 superiority	 or	prevalence	 of	 these	 liberal	 rules	 or	 values	 over	 other	 values	 or	 ends	 related	 to	redistributive	justice,	it	has	been	shown	that	it	is	more	and	more	difficult	to	separate																																																									
16 Petersmann, E. U. (1996). Constitutionalism and international organizations. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 17, 398. 
17 Bellamy, R., & Weale, A. Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and 
the normative logic of two-level games. (see footnote 12). 
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technical	 regulatory	 and	 political	 distributive	 policies;	many	 apparently	 “technical”	questions	and	decisions	do	require	value	judgments	and	are	far	from	being	neutral	as	they	encompass	distributive	consequences	and	have	social	impacts.	Also,	as	we	have	said	before,	WTO	regime	is	eroding	and	reducing	the	room	of	the	autonomy	of	nation-states,	 affecting	 not	 only	 foreign	 trade	 but	 also	 on	 environmental,	 consumer	protection,	 health	 and	 medical,	 tax,	 national	 security	 and	 even	 human	 rights	policies.18Many	 WTO	 decisions	 are	 perceived	 as	 over-reaching	 and	 its	 claim	 to	legitimacy	based	on	“technocratic	reasons”	gets	strained19.				In	view	of	all	 these	circumstances,	we	can	conclude	that	 the	main	reason	 leading	to	the	 legitimacy	 crisis	 of	 WTO	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 democratic	 dimension	 of	 its	legitimacy;	i.e.	with	its	perceived	democratic	deficit.	From	a	democratic	viewpoint	of	legitimacy	 there	 would	 be	 the	 concern	 of	 safeguarding	 the	 priority	 of	 democratic	politics	 and	 political	 debate	 over	 market	 logic.	 In	 this	 sense,	 decision	 making	processes	 invoking	technocratic	rationality	without	the	 input	or	participation	of	 the	citizenry	are	held	 to	usurp	 legitimate	democratic	choices.	The	main	problem	of	 this	derives	 from	the	presumption	of	a	previously	existing	political	community,	a	demos	which	in	this	case	should	be	worldwide.	This	aspect	makes	some	authors	argue	that	international	organizations	cannot	be	democratized	due	 to	 the	heterogeneity	of	 the	eventual	global	citizenry20.	In	effect,	today	the	international	community	seems	too	far	from	constituting	a	world	parliament	and	a	procedural	cosmopolitan	democracy	at	a	global	level	when	there	is	no	a	global	demos	and	the	conditions	of	individual	political	equality	 across	 borders	 are	 not	 yet	 fulfilled21.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 as	 we	 have	previously	mentioned,	 traditional	 justifications	of	 indirect	democratic	 legitimacy	by	the	 states’	 consent	 doctrine	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 enough	 in	 a	 multi-level,	 multi-lateral	regime	 which	 even	 undermines	 domestic	 democracy	 of	 national	 states.	 This	unresolved	 tension	 between	 the	 international	 trade	 regime	 and	 the	 political	
																																																								
18 Krajewski, M. (2001). Democratic legitimacy and constitutional perspectives of WTO law. J. World Trade, 
35, 167. 
19 Dunoff, J. L. (1996). Trade and: Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship--And Their 
Surprising Political Implications. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 17, 759. 
20 Dahl, R. A. (1999). Can international organizations be democratic? A skeptic’s view. Democracy’s edges, 
19-36. 
21 Besson, S. (2011). The democratic legitimacy of WTO law–on the dangers of fast-food democracy. World 
Trade Institute Research Papers. 
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democratic	 values	of	most	 societies	 and	 the	 alternatives	proposed	 to	overcome	 the	current	disruption	and	crisis	of	the	system	will	be	discussed	latter	in	this	chapter.			
In	particular,	TRIPS	through	the	lens	of	legitimacy.				As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 chapter	 2	 of	 this	 dissertation,	 TRIPS	 is	 currently	 the	consequence	 of	 the	 market	 oriented	 international	 regime	 where	 private	 property,	free	 trade,	 efficiency	 grounds	 and	other	neoliberal	 premises	prevail	 over	 any	other	consideration	or	material	value	–including	health-.	Also,	TRIPS	seems	to	contribute	to	impair	 affordable	 and	 universal	 access	 to	 medicines	 for	 everyone,	 deepening	 the	massive	inequalities	in	the	access	to	medicines	not	only	among	different	nations	but	also	within	 the	societies	of	 the	different	nations.	 In	 that	chapter	we	also	mentioned	the	important	objections	raised	around	the		indiscriminate	implementation	of	TRIPS	along	most	 of	 world	 states,	 i.e.	 the	 setting	 of	 high	 standards	 of	 protection	 of	 IPRs	regardless	 the	 economic	 development	 and	 specific	 socio-economic	 and	 industrial	necessities	 of	 each	 country	 under	 the	 “one	 size	 fit	 all”	 mantra.	 Finally,	 after	 some	years	 of	 enforcement	 and	 application	 of	 TRIPS,	 we	 have	 been	 able	 to	 evaluate	 the	suspiciously	low	use	that	developing	countries	and	in	general	the	losers	of	this	new	regime	have	made	of	the	flexibilities,	limitations	and	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	offered	by	the	system	as	long	as	the	new	turn	of	the	screw	derived	from	the	TRIPS-plus	 international	 agreements	 which	 tighten	 even	 more	 the	 maneuverability	 of	developing	countries.						Bearing	 this	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	 now	 “legitimate”	 to	 wonder	 whether	 those	 apparently	pervasive	 effects	 of	 TRIPS	 for	 the	 health	 of	 most	 respond	 and	 are	 somewhat	 the	“collateral	 consequences”	 of	 a	 system	 that	would	 be	 however	 legitimate.	 From	 this	perspective	and	as	we	will	see	next	we	can	conclude	that	TRIPS	has	not	been	able	to	build	 a	 legitimate	 system	 around	 the	 IPRs	 regime.	 Most	 importantly,	 it	 has	 not	achieved	 this	 legitimacy	 neither	 from	 a	 democratic	 point	 of	 view	 nor	 from	 the	traditional	 neoliberal	 functionalist	 viewpoint	 of	 legitimacy.	 This	 lack	 of	 legitimacy	from	the	“functionalist”	efficiency	approach	to	legitimacy	is	even	more	worrying	and	unexpected	than	the	already	known	democratic	deficit	of	the	regime.	As	we	will	see,	
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the	 implemented	 regime	 has	 not	 been	 able	 to	 meet	 the	 expectations,	 eventual	functions	and	virtues	claimed	as	a	justification	for	its	general	application.	 	
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4.2.	 Reacting	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 crisis:	 scope	 and	 limits	 of	WTO	 strategy	 for	
Intellectual	Property	regime.		The	 inclusion	 of	 TRIPS	 into	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 WTO	 was	 the	 result	 of	 intense	lobbying	by	the	United	States	and	its	pharmaceutical	and	media	firms,	supported	by	the	European	 Union,	Japan	and	 other	developed	 nations	 at	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	negotiations22.	As	we	have	seen,	from	a	democratic	point	of	view	of	legitimacy	in	the	international	 context,	 consent	 by	 states	 to	 a	 particular	 regime,	 agreement	 or	institution	is	essential	and	it	plays	a	central	role	to	explain	the	input	legitimacy	of	that	regime,	agreement	or	institution.	However,	it	is	broadly	observed	and	documented	by	different	authors	and	commentators	that	TRIPS	was	not	precisely	the	result	from	real	consent	of	all	the	participating	states	but	the	result	of	the	coercion	exercised	by	the	US	and	to	a	lesser	extent	by	the	EC	and	Japan	for	developing	countries	to	accept	this	legal	 framework.	 In	 fact,	 TRIPS	 was	 included	 in	 the	WTO	 negotiations	 despite	 the	insisting	 opposition	 and	 objection	 of	 most	 developing	 countries;	 Developing	countries	did	not	share	the	concern	of	 the	US	to	 foster	 IPRs	at	a	global	scale	within	the	 trade	 negotiations	 since	 the	 TRIPS	 were	 perceived	 to	 respond	 only	 to	 the	interests	 of	 developed	 countries	 -as	 main	 exporters	 of	 IPRs-	 and	 because	paradoxically,	 IPRs	 may	 be	 perceived	 as	 antithetical	 to	 free	 trade	 –temporary	monopolies	with	trade	restrictive	effects-23.	Furthermore,	this	regime	was	considered	by	developing	countries	as	an	obstacle	to	imitate	and	make	affordable	and	accessible	otherwise	 exclusive	 goods	 under	 IPRs	 protection	 –in	 particular	 medicines-.	 It	 is	illustrative	to	this	respect	that	less	than	20	of	the	106	developing	countries	that	are	today	bound	by	the	TRIPS,	were	involved	in	the	negotiations.			Therefore,	unlike	what	it	happens	with	most	international	treaties,	TRIPS	was	not	the	result	of	the	decision	making	process	of	different	countries	that	decide	to	cooperate	to	be	better	off	in	a	prisoner’s	dilemma	scenario.	Far	from	benefitting	all	the	parties,	as	far	as	TRIPS	is	concerned,	it	has	been	observed	that	the	problem	ran	only	one	way;	it	responded	only	to	the	interests	of	one	of	the	parties	to	the	contract	or	agreement,	in																																																									
22 Picciotto, S.. Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO. See chapter 2 footnote 107. 
23 Shanker, D. (2003). Legitimacy and the TRIPS Agreement. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 6(1), 
155-189. 
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particular,	the	industrialized	countries	that	would	be	the	principal	exporters	of	IPRs.	Why	was	then	TRIPS	approved?	The	reason	why	TRIPS	was	accepted	by	developing	countries	must	 be	 found	 in	 the	 fear	 those	 countries	 had	 to	 get	 trade	 sanctions	 via	Section	301	and	the	withdrawal	of	aid24.	Ironically,	the	list	of	the	countries	suspected	of	being	the	biggest	infringers	of	American	IPRs	-“Priority	Watch	List”-	was	topped	by	those	 relatively	 powerful	 developing	 countries	 with	 their	 own	 generics	pharmaceutical	 industries;	 countries	 like	 India,	 Brazil	 or	 Thailand	 which	 had	expressed	 their	 opposition	 to	 include	 IPRs	 in	 the	 Uruguay	 Round25.	 In	 this	 sense,	acceptance	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 was	 the	 consequence	 of	 coercion	 by	 powerful	 countries	rather	than	a	free	decision	made	by	free	and	sovereign	states.	In	effect,	it	appears	that	developing	 countries	 went	 along	 and	 adhered	 to	 TRIPS	 in	 order	 “not	 to	 make	themselves	better	off	but	to	avoid	being	made	worse	off”26.				Furthermore,	 following	 the	 three	 step	 test	 to	 check	 whether	 there	 has	 been	 a	democratic	bargaining	to	reach	an	international	agreement	proposed	by	Drahos27,	it	seems	clear	that	TRIPS	did	not	comply	with	the	process	to	consider	it	the	result	of	a	democratic	 bargaining	 between	 free	 and	 sovereign	 states.	 Even	 if	 from	 a	 formalist	point	of	view	it	could	be	held	that	both	the	first	condition	–all	the	relevant	interests	have	to	be	represented	in	the	negotiating	process-	and	the	second	–all	those	involved	in	 the	 negotiation	 must	 have	 full	 information	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 various	
																																																								
24 Special Section 301 of the American Trade Act of 1974 is a new provision introduced in 1988 by the 
American Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which allows the U.S. government to 
impose unilateral trade sanctions to those countries whose protection of IPRs is deemed insufficient and a 
barrier to US trade. The threat and coercion was profusely discussed by the EC and the Panel in United 
States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.172 The EC while describing the effect of Sections 301- 
310 of the US Trade Act stated “The European Communities maintains that in particular, the constant threat of 
imposition of unilateral measures has an influence on the behavior and the decisions of the economic 
operators. In practice, the fact of the filing of a petition or the simple publication of a notice in the Federal 
Register announcing the initiation of an investigation, within the concrete context of the provisions contained in 
Sections 301- 310 and the publicly known interpretation given by the US Administration and the Congress 
created “chilling” trade effects that may range from the slowing down of importation of products to the more 
radical stoppage of any bilateral trade with the United States in those products.” 
25 Downes, G. (2010). The TRIPs agreement: A test of the WTO's legitimacy?. Limerick Papers in Politics and 
Public Administration. 
26 Marcellin, S. S. (2010). The political economy of pharmaceutical patents: US sectional interests and the 
African Group at the WTO. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
27 Drahos, P. (2002). Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting. The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property, 5(5), 765-789. The theory of democratic bargaining argues that 
efficiently defined property rights are more likely to emerge if at least three conditions are met:” - Firstly, all 
relevant interests have to be represented in the negotiating process (the condtion of representation). 
Secondly, all those involved in the negotiation must have full information about the consequences of various 
possible outcomes (the condition of full information). Thirdly, one party must not coerce the others (the 
condtion of nondomination). 
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possible	 outcomes-	 were	 formally	 met,	 the	 third	 one,	 i.e.	 the	 condition	 of	 non-coercion	or	non-domination	was	clearly	missing	in	the	negotiations	leading	to	TRIPS.			Furthermore,	 and	 leaving	 aside	 the	 democratic	 deficit	 or	 questioning	 of	 today’s	international	 systems	 which	 enter	 domains	 formerly	 controlled	 by	 domestic	democratic	 governments	 and	 are	 somehow	more	 intrusive	 into	 people’s	 life,	 TRIPS	would	not	be	legitimate	from	a	more	traditional	view	which	weighs	the	legitimacy	of	a	given	international	regime	by	resorting	to	the	consent	between	sovereign	and	free	states.	 The	 fact	 that	 TRIPS	 is	 not	 resulted	 from	 real	 consent,	 does	 undermine	 the	legitimacy	 of	 the	 TRIPS.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 previously	 noted,	 TRIPS	would	 neither	 achieve	 the	 outcomes	 or	 virtues	 which	 is	 supposed	 to	 bring	 and	therefore	 it	would	not	be	 justified	 from	a	 technical	 or	 functional	point	 of	 view28	or	output	legitimacy.		Pursuant	 to	 the	 Preamble	 of	 TRIPS,	 the	 Agreement	 would	 be	 purported	 to	 reduce	distortions	and	impediments	to	international	trade,	and	taking	into	account	the	need	to	promote	 effective	 and	adequate	protection	of	 intellectual	property	 rights,	 and	 to	ensure	 that	measures	and	procedures	 to	enforce	 intellectual	property	 rights	do	not	themselves	become	barriers	to	legitimate	trade.	Apart	from	the	apparent	paradox	of	the	fact	that	artificial	monopolies	–as	it	the	case	for	IPRs-	be	invoked	as	an	instrument	to	ensure	a	trade	regime	free	of	distortions	and	impediments,	TRIPS	has	been	proved	to	 be	 very	 thin	 in	 explaining	 the	 purposes	 and	 the	 benefits	 of	 an	 international	agreement.			Out	of	 the	 legal	wording	of	the	Agreement,	TRIPS	is	said	to	 foster	the	foreign	direct	investment	and	technology	transfer,	as	well	as	more	trade	and	greater	market	access	as	advantages	for	developing	countries.	In	this	sense,	it	is	held	that	foreign	investors	would	 be	more	 willing	 to	 transfer	 technology	 when	 this	 proprietary	 technology	 is	
																																																								
28 In this sense, some authors argue that legitimacy of institutions emanates not merely from “inputs”, e.g. 
procedures and accountability, but also from “outputs”, i.e. the ability to deliver results. Buchanan, A., & 
Keohane, R. O. (2006). The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics & international affairs, 20(4), 
405-437. 
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protected	by	law29.	The	Professor	of	Economics,	Keith	E.	Maskus	is	the	author	of	the	most	 cited	 study	 supporting	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 in	 fostering	 economic	development	(in	terms	of	economic	growth),	 technology	transfer,	and	foreign	direct	investment30.	 TRIPS	 would	 then	 be	 expected	 to	 facilitate	 an	 investment-friendly	environment	 in	developing	countries.	Notwithstanding	 this,	as	 it	has	been	observed	in	 the	previous	chapter	2,	 those	economic	and	social	advantages	are	 far	 from	being	clear	and	undisputed.	China	has	been	one	of	the	main	world	infringers	of	foreign	IPRs	and	 yet	 the	 flows	 of	 FDI	 into	 the	 country	 have	 been	 constantly	 and	 substantially	increased	 above	 average	 over	 the	 past	 decades31.	 If	 we	 agree	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 a	stronger	IPRs	protection	brings	economic	advantages	to	a	country,	the	first	objection	to	be	made	would	be	why	 it	 is	necessary	an	 international	agreement	such	as	TRIPS	instead	of	an	enhancement	of	IPRs	protection	by	the	unilateral	action	of	each	country.		As	Professor	Gerhart	argues,	 if	 IPRs	are	 really	effective	 in	 fostering	development,	 it	would	occur	spontaneously,	and	we	need	no	treaty	to	create	minimum	standards	and	
no	enforcement	mechanisms	to	enforce	compliance	with	the	standards.	We	rarely	need	
the	coercive	power	of	international	law	to	get	countries	to	do	what	it	is	in	their	interests	
to	do.	In	other	words,	why	was	there	a	collaboration	problem	to	be	addressed	in	the	first	
place?	32		Following	Professor	Gerhart,	the	many	times	taken-for-granted	conclusion	about	the	relationship	 between	 intellectual	 property	 and	 development	 is	 surprisingly	 weak.	Furthermore,	 the	relationship	between	a	strong	IPRs	regime	and	the	Foreign	Direct	Investment	(FDI)	seems	to	belong	to	the	realm	of	beliefs	and	speculations	rather	than	being	supported	by	empirical	data.	From	the	different	data	we	could	use	to	justify	this	conclusion,	 it	 is	worth	noting	the	data	contained	 in	the	Global	 Innovation	Index.33In																																																									
29 Mansfield, E. (Ed.). (1995). Intellectual property protection, direct investment, and technology transfer: 
Germany, Japan, and the United States (Vol. 27). World Bank Publications. 
30 Maskus, K. E. (1998). The role of intellectual property rights in encouraging foreign direct investment and 
technology transfer. Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., 9, 109. 
31 Lanoszka, A. (2003). The global politics of intellectual property rights and pharmaceutical drug policies in 
developing countries. International Political Science Review, 24(2), 181-197. 
32 Gerhart, P. M. (2000). Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory--TRIPS as a Substantive Issue. Case W. 
Res. J. Int'l L., 32, 357. 
33 The Global Innovation Index (GII) is a project that is inspired by the latest research on the measurement of 
innovation. The core of the GII Report consists of a ranking of world economies’ innovation capabilities and 
results in its 9th edition this year, is co-published by Cornell University, INSEAD, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) The Confederation of Indian Industry, du, A.T. Kearney and the IMP³rove – 
European Innovation Management Academy collaborate as GII Knowledge Partners. 
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/about-gii 
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its	 2010	 report	 it	 reviews	 among	other	 categories	 the	 degree	 of	 protection	 of	 IPRs	along	 the	 different	 countries34.	 In	 a	 different	 chapter	 the	 report	 collects	 the	 FDI	 in	each	country.			
Countries	with	biggest	FDI	(net	inflows)	 Ranking	in	the	Intellectual	Property	Protection	1. Bulgaria	 108	2. Georgia	 99	3. Guyana	 122	4. Bosnia	 130	5. Netherlands	 9	6. Malta	 38	7. Mongolia	 117	8. Serbia	 100	9. Jordan	 29	10. Gambia	 34	11. Cambodia	 102					If	 we	 compare	 the	 rankings	 of	 both	 categories,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 conclude	 that	 IPRs	regime	is	not	certainly	decisive	in	fostering	FDI.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 setting	 of	 TRIPS	 standards	 in	developing	countries	and	the	impact	in	terms	of	promoting	more	intense	innovation	processes	 is	 not	 conclusive.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 number	 of	 patents	 which	 have	 an	African,	 Latin	 American	 or	 Caribbean	 origin	 has	 not	 increased	 between	 2003	 and	2013	but	have	 rather	 slightly	decreased	 representing	 in	2013	 the	3,1%	of	 the	 total	number	 of	 applications	 (in	 2003	 that	 figure	 was	 of	 3,5%)35.	 Therefore	 we	 could	conclude	that	nor	from	a	democratic	and	legal	point	of	view	neither	from	a	functional	perspective	 of	 legitimacy	 –in	 terms	 of	 outcomes	 or	 benefits	 associated	 to	 a	 given																																																									
34 In the following annual reports from 2010 to date, the category as to the degree of protection of IPRs is no 
longer available. 
35 Economics, W. I. P. O., & Series, S. (2014). World intellectual property indicators. WIPO publication, 
(941E). 
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regime-	TRIPS	 can	be	viewed	as	 a	perfectly	 and	entirely	 legitimate	 regime.	 	On	 the	contrary,	 it	 comes	 clear	 that	 the	 this	 regime	 has	 been	 imposed	 to	 developing	countries	and	that	they	operate	within	an	intellectual	property	paradigm	dominated	by	the	United	States	and	the	EU	or	rather	by	the	demands	of	transnational	capital36.		Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	after	20	years	of	talks	and	deadlock	WTO	not	only	has	not	been	capable	of	making	progress	and	concluding	the	Doha	round,	but	it	is	a	more	and	more	contested	international	organization.	In	this	sense	and	following	Habermas	concept	of	 legitimacy	crisis37,	WTO	seems	 incapable	of	overcoming	 the	contestation	and	resistance	 that	 it	has	generated	 i.e.	WTO	structural	deficiencies	 cannot	provide	the	conditions	and	solve	the	problems	in	the	manner	which	is	necessary	to	ensure	the	continued	 existence	 of	 the	 system.	 One	 of	 the	main	 structural	 problems	 of	WTO	 is	precisely	its	perceived	lack	of	legitimacy.					
The	Road	to	the	Doha	Declaration.		TRIPS	constituted	a	momentum	in	international	intellectual	property	law	making.	As	it	has	been	already	noted,	TRIPS	establishes	minimum	global	standards	of	protection	of	IPRs	(based	on	developed	nations’	standards)	and	a	system	of	dispute	settlement	which	 ensures	 its	 enforcement	 globally.	 It	 covers	 seven	 areas	 of	 IPRs;	 copyrights	(protecting	 original	 works	 of	 authorship);	 geographical	 indications,	 trademarks,	industrial	 designs,	 layout	 designs	 for	 integrated	 circuits,	 trade	 secrets	 and	 patents.	Out	of	these	fields,	the	patent	regime	is	however,	the	area	where	developing	countries	find	more	difficulties	in	complying	with	TRIPS.	Besides	the	fact	that	a	large	number	of	developing	countries	had	very	limited	IPRs	laws	or	no	laws	at	all,	the	requirement	of	the	 minimum	 20	 years	 protection	 and	 the	 patents	 on	 pharmaceutical	 products	implied	 especially	 demanding	 obligations	 to	 comply	 with	 by	 developing	 countries.	These	 demanding	 requirements	 were	 partially	 explained	 by	 the	 pharmaceutical																																																									
36 For a detailed analysis quantifying the negative implications of extending patents to all low-income nations, 
taking into consideration both innovation and projected price increases, see Scherer, Frederic M. "A note on 
global welfare in pharmaceutical patenting." The World Economy 27.7 (2004): 1127-1142. He asserts that “It is 
reasonably well established in the economics literature that, especially in a world of AIDS and resistant 
tuberculosis epidemics, low-income nations enjoy higher economic welfare when they can free-ride on 
pharmaceutical innovations made and patented in the first world than when they must pay monopolistic prices 
for the newest and most effective drugs”. 
37 Habermas, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis Pa Txt (Vol. 519). Beacon Press. 
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companies’	 concern	 that	 cheap	 drugs	 for	 developing	 countries	 begin	 to	 flood	developed	country	markets	and	reduce	profit	margins.	Also,	maintaining	similar	drug	prices	worldwide	regardless	 the	per	capita	purchasing	power	of	people	of	different	countries	 is	explained	by	the	fear	of	pharmaceutical	companies	to	the	pressure	that	low	prices	in	developing	would	generate	from	Western	World	consumers	demanding	the	 same.	 In	 fact,	 many	 activists	 involved	 in	 the	 access	 campaign	 were	 also	demanding	lower	prices	in	pharmaceutical	market	of	the	developed	world38.		Patents	 represent	 the	 most	 controversial	 issue	 of	 TRIPS.	 As	 countries	 may	 have	greater	 incentive	 to	 comply	 with	 copyright	 for	 instance	 (administrative	 costs	 of	 a	copyright	 system	are	 low	and	every	 country	has	artists,	 authors	and	entertainment	industries),	patent	law,	and	especially	pharmaceutical	patents	face	greater	opposition	and	resistance.			In	 particular,	 developing	 countries	 have	been	 concerned	 about	 the	 impact	 that	 this	“enclosure”	of	pharmaceutical	knowledge	and	its	monopolization	are	having	on	their	ability	 to	ensure	access	 to	affordable	pharmaceutical	products,	 i.e.,	 to	pursue	public	health	 for	 their	 populations.	 While	 TRIPS	 hardly	 encourages	 R&D	 in	 developing	countries	 for	 their	 health	 needs	 and	 most	 threatening	 diseases	 (malaria	 and	tuberculosis)	 -because	 of	 their	 poor	 profit	 potential-,	 increased	 levels	 of	 patent	protection	 have	 an	 important	 effect	 on	 higher	 prices	 of	medicines	which	 become	 a	barrier	 to	needed	treatments	and	to	the	accessibility	and	affordability	of	medicines.	Also,	 it	 is	not	clear	whether	and	how	developing	countries	are	enjoying	and	making	use	of	safeguards,	exceptions	and	limitations	to	the	protection	of	strong	IPRs	offered	by	TRIPS39.		The	impact	of	TRIPS	on	public	health	and	the	debate	regarding	the	primacy	of	trade	and	other	efficiency-based	considerations	over	health	has	been	especially	questioned	in	 the	 context	 of	 TRIPS	 implementation	 and	 interpretation.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	initial	developing	country	resistance,	opposition	to	TRIPS	emerged	rather	later	after																																																									
38 Lanoszka, Anna. (2003). The global politics of intellectual property supranote 31. 
39 FM’t Hoen, E. (2002). TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents and access to essential medicines: Seattle, Doha and 
beyond. 
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its	adoption.	Until	Doha	in	2001,	this	debate	TRIPS-public	health	was	not	one	of	the	main	 issues	during	 the	negotiation	process.	 It	 is	 somehow	 ironic	 that	 at	 the	Seattle	Ministerial	the	debate	TRIPS-Public	Health	was	just	mentioned	by	the	Holy	See	with	concern	over	the	lack	of	technology	transfer.	At	the	2001	Doha	Ministerial	Conference	however,	 the	 TRIPS-Public	 Health	 issue	 exploded.	 The	 percentage	 of	 participants	whose	 statements	 referred	 to	 public	 health	 jumped	 from	 10	 percent	 at	 Seattle	 in	1999	to	39	percent	at	Doha.	At	the	Doha	Conference	and	after	a	strong	domestic	and	international	 political	 pressure	 the	WTO	 declared	 that	 “the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 does	not	and	should	not	prevent	Members	from	taking	measures	to	protect	public	health.”	Before	analyzing	the	meaning	and	the	path	of	the	Doha	declaration,	it	is	important	to	review	the	background	which	preceded	and	leaded	to	it	and	which	constituted	one	of	the	major	 crises	of	 the	 IPRs	 regime	so	 far	and	probably,	of	 the	whole	WTO	regime.	The	 crises	 leading	 to	 the	 Doha	 Declaration	 was	 motivated	 by	 a	 number	 of	 factors	which	 came	 to	 shape	 the	 debate	 on	 TRIPS	 and	 public	 health	 (access	 to	 affordable	medicines).			 a) HIV/AIDS	Global	pandemic	crisis.		According	 to	UNAIDS40,	HIV/AIDS	pandemic	 affects	 36.9	million	 people	worldwide,	living	 the	majority	of	which	 in	 low	 to	middle	 income	countries,	particularly	 in	Sub-Saharan	Africa.	Of	 the	36,9	million	people,	 22	million	people	do	not	 have	 access	 to	HIV/AIDS	 treatment.	 Each	day	near	10	 thousand	people	die	 of	AIDS.	This	 dramatic	pandemic	 not	 only	 affects	 the	 health	 of	 people	 but	 it	 has	 an	 important	 impact	 on	households,	 communities,	 and	 the	 development	 and	 economic	 growth	 of	 societies.	There	 are	 several	 reasons	 behind	 the	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 essential	medicines	 to	 treat	AIDS	 or	 alleviate	 suffering	 of	 it,	 but	 one	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 is	 the	 high	 prices	 of	medicines.	The	drama	of	this	pandemic	contributed	to	focus	the	attention	on	TRIPS	as	an	eventual	burden	or	obstacle	to	access	of	essential	medicines.	In	particular,	TRIPS	raised	concerns	as	to	the	fact	that	increased	patent	protection	leads	to	higher	prices	–out	 of	 reach	 of	 most	 people	 especially	 of	 the	 developing	 world-	 and	 that	 the	enforcement	 of	 WTO	 rules	 would	 have	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 local	 manufacturing																																																									
40 http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/documents/2015/AIDS_by_the_numbers_2015 
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capacity	 and	 would	 reduce	 the	 sources	 of	 generic	 drugs	 on	 which	 developing	countries	depended.	The	AIDS	crisis	has	illustrated	more	than	anything	the	impact	of	the	patent	policy	on	the	access	to	medicines.	In	this	sense,	as	prices	for	a	three-drug	combination	of	HIV	therapy	in	2000	had	a	price	above	USD	$10.000	per	person	per	year,	generic	versions	of	that	therapy	could	provide	that	same	treatment	for	less	than	USD	$	75	per	person	and	per	year.	This	fact	exemplifies	that	strong	IPRs	is	 likely	to	undermine	access	to	affordable	medicines41.			In	contrast	to	the	rhetoric	of	“free	trade”	and	“property	rights”	by	which	TRIPS	was	wrapped,	 AIDS/HIV	 crisis	 gave	 rise	 to	 an	 alternative	 framing	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 public	health	issue.	Public	health	emerged	so	as	an	increasingly	effective	counter-discourse	to	the	pro-IPRs	activists	and	lobbyists	which	successfully	made	the	link	between	IPRs	and	 the	 inadequate	protection	of	 IPRs	abroad	and	an	eventual	barrier	 to	 legitimate	trade.	Framing	TRIPS	within	public	health	debate	permits	to	open	a	new	perspective	where	 a	 set	 of	 diverse	 and	 competing	 interests,	 rights	 and	 duties	 emerge	 around	implementation	and	interpretation	of	IPRs42.			Even	 if	 AIDS	 is	 not	 the	 only	 infectious	 disease	 which	 is	 seriously	 damaging	 the	population	of	developing	countries	Tuberculosis	and	malaria	are	also	on	the	rise),	the	fact	that	AIDS	affected	also	to	the	developed	world	and	it	has	attracted	an	important	media	 interest,	 made	 AIDS	 become	 an	 important	 spur	 to	 mobilize	 activists	 of	 the	Western	World	who	 play	 an	 important	 and	 complementary	 role	 with	 other	 voices	from	 the	 developing	 world.	 At	 the	 dawn	 of	 the	 new	 century,	 pharmaceutical	companies	 went	 under	 mounting	 pressure	 in	 order	 to	 make	 essential	 medicines	affordable.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 in	 May	 2000,	 five	 global	 pharmaceutical	 companies	together	with	 UNAID	 announced	 plans	 to	 reduce	 prices	 of	 AIDS	 drugs	 for	 selected	African	countries.	Also,	former	president	Clinton	issued	an	executive	order	saying	the	government	would	not	interfere	with	African	countries	that	violate	American	patent	law	to	obtain	cheaper	AIDS	drugs43.																																																												
41 Rights, I. P. (2002). Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy. Londres, sèptanbr. 
42 Sell, S. K. (2001). TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign. Wis. Int'l LJ, 20, 481. 
43 http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/12/world/companies-to-cut-cost-of-aids-drugs-for-poor-
nations.html?pagewanted=all 
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However	 those	 initiatives	 were	 rapidly	 criticized	 as	 cynical	 attempts	 to	 prevent	developing	 countries	 from	 using	 compulsory	 licensing	 and	 other	 compensatory	options.	 As	 the	 NGO	Médecines	 Sans	 Frontières	 (MSF)	 accurately	 pointed	 out	This	
agreement	does	nothing	to	stimulate	countries'	rights	to	produce	or	import	inexpensive	
high-quality	 generic	 drugs,	 a	 key	 component	 to	 long-term,	 sustainable	 solutions	 for	
improving	access	to	essential	medicines44.		 b) The	role	of	other	international	organizations.		As	 early	 as	 in	 1996,	 the	 WHO	 first	 raised	 concerns	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	globalization	and	international	trade	agreements	with	respect	to	drug	access	during	its	 Assembly.	 A	 resolution	 on	 the	 Revised	 Drug	 Strategy	 requested	 its	 Director	General	“to	report	on	the	impact	of	the	work	of	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	
with	respect	to	national	drug	policies	and	essential	drugs	and	make	recommendations	
for	 collaboration	between	WTO	and	WHO,	as	appropriate.”	This	 resolution	enhanced	the	WHO	the	mandate	 to	publish,	 in	1998,	 the	 first	guide	with	recommendations	 to	Member	States	 for	 implementing	TRIPS	while	 limiting	the	negative	effects	of	higher	levels	 of	 patent	 protection	 on	 drug	 availability.	 Afterwards,	 in	 its	 54th	 Assembly	(Scaling	up	the	response	to	HIV/AIDS)	 in	2001	where	debates	over	 IPRs	and	public	health	 started	 to	 flourish	everywhere,	WHO	adopted	 some	 resolutions	urging	WHO	Member	 states	 to	 	 increase	 	 access	 	 to	 	medicines,	 	 to	 	 cooperate	 	 constructively	 	 in		
strengthening	pharmaceutical			policies			and			practices,			including			those			applicable			
to			generic			drugs			and	intellectual		property		regimes,		in		order		further		to		promote		
innovation		and		the		development		of	domestic	industries	consistent	with	international	
law.		Also,	 the	 European	 Parliament	 adopted	 some	 important	 resolutions	 expressing	 a	clear	 and	 surprisingly	 unambiguous	 support	 of	 a	 pro-public	 health	 approach	 to	TRIPS45.	I	have	used	the	term	“surprisingly”	because	the	pro	public	health	premises	in																																																									
44 https://www.msfaccess.org/about-us/media-room/press-releases/msf-statement-new-unaids-proposal-and-
clintons-executive-order 
45 The European Parliament resolution on access to drugs for HIV/AIDS victims in the Third World adopted in 
March 15, 2001 (B5-0182/2001) includes some surprisingly public health approach based views: 1.  Calls for 
the development of a system allowing developing countries equitable access to medicines and vaccines at 
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which	 this	 resolution	 is	 embedded	 have	 not	 been	 followed	 either	 by	 the	 European	Commission	or	EU	State	Members	in	the	diverse	forums.					In	August	2000	and	August	2001,	the	UN	Sub-Commission	on	Human	Rights	adopted	Resolution	2000/7	and	2001/13	on	IPRs	and	Human	Rights.	Those	Resolutions	stated	that	TRIPS	 could	affect	 the	enjoyment	of	Human	Rights	 and	 they	urged	all	national	governments	to	take	fully	into	account	existing	state	obligations	under	international	human	 rights	 instruments.	 Also,	 in	 1999,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Development	Programme’s	 (UNDP’s)	 annual	 Human	 Development	 Report	 made	 a	 plea	 for	 re-writing	the	rules	of	globalization	to	make	them	work	“for	people	–	not	just	profits.”	To	summarize,	 at	 that	 time	 there	 was	 a	 growing	 chorus	 among	 diverse	 international	institution	which	called	into	question	TRIPS	and	its	effects	on	access	to	medicines.			 c) NGOs	and	civil	society.		In	 Margaret	 Archer’s	 analysis	 of	 agency46,	 the	 author	 draws	 a	 distinction	 between	primary	agents	-	constituted	by	shared	involuntary	social	placement-	and	corporate	agents	–able	to	articulate	efficiently	what	they	want	to	themselves	and	others-.	While	IPRs	 industry	 actors	 rapidly	 became	 to	 articulate	 themselves	 to	 efficiently	 lobby	 to	governments	 and	 political	 power	 to	 consider	 and	 take	 into	 account	 their	 stands,	 it																																																																																																																																																																																			
affordable prices, while expressing its solidarity and support for the Governments of South Africa and Kenya in 
their struggle to use WTO-compliant legislation to gain access to the cheapest possible life-saving medicines; 
2.  In this context welcomes the statement by Commissioner Lamy that the Commission supports the right of 
developing countries to use the safeguards in the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, including compulsory licensing, 
and the commitment by the Commission to launch a debate in the WTO on reconciling the TRIPS Agreement 
with objectives regarding health protection in developing countries; 3.  Calls on the pharmaceutical companies 
that issued a legal challenge to the South African 1997 Medicines Act to withdraw from the case; 4.  While 
respecting the intellectual property rights of the pharmaceutical industry, calls on the Commission to 
strengthen the ability of developing countries to resist the pressure to introduce more stringent patent laws 
than those currently required under the WTO TRIPS Agreement; 5.  Calls on the Commission to work with the 
Member States to show international leadership in the struggle for life-saving medicines by encouraging 
technology transfer and support for the strengthening and/or development of local production capacity; 6.  
Calls for the current review of the TRIPS Agreement to ensure that the rights of developing countries to obtain 
the cheapest possible life-saving medicines, whether patented or generic, are guaranteed, and further calls on 
all the interested parties to actively engage in this process; 
46 Archer, M. S. (1995). Realist social theory: The morphogenetic approach. Cambridge university press. 
Primary actors would be inarticulate in their demands and unorganized for their pursuit, in which case they 
only exert the aggregate effects of those similarly placed who co-act in similar ways given the similarity of their 
circumstances (page 185). 
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took	 long	 for	 the	dispersed	actors	affected	by	the	new	IPRs	regime	on	medicines	to	articulate	 themselves	around	a	common	strategy.	This	strategy	has	been	named	the	
Access	 Campaign.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 accurately	 described	 by	 Susan	 K.	 Sell47,	 this	strategy/campaign	 began	 with	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Consumer	 Project	 on	 Technology,	Médecines	 Sans	 Frontières	 (MSF)	 and	 Health	 Action	 International	 and	 it	 was	expanding	over	 time	 to	 include	developing	countries,	Oxfam,	The	Treatment	Access	Campaign,	Health	Gap,	ACT	UP	Philadelphia	and	ACT	UP	Paris.			These	NGOs	have	played	a	key	 role	 in	 their	 concerted	action	 to	draw	attention	and	call	 into	 question	 those	 TRIPS	 provisions	 which	 impaired	 access	 to	 medicines.	Organized	by	Consumer	Project	on	Technology	(founded	by	Ralph	Nader	and	James	Love	 in	 199548),	Médecines	 Sans	 Frontières	 (MSF)	 and	Health	Action	 International,	the	first	international	meeting	took	place	in	March	1999	at	the	Palais	des	Nations	in	Geneva	 specifically	 on	 the	 use	 of	 compulsory	 licensing	 to	 increase	 access	 to	 AIDS	medicines.	 In	 November	 of	 that	 year,	 the	 same	 NGOs	 organized	 a	 much	 more	comprehensive	and	ambitious	encounter	in	Amsterdam.	The	Amsterdam	Conference	on	 Increasing	 Access	 to	 Essential	 Drugs	 in	 a	 Globalized	 Economy	 brought	 together	350	 participants	 from	 50	 countries	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 Seattle	 WTO	 ministerial	conference.	 The	 Conference	 drew	 up	 a	 statement	 which	 addressed	 very	 different	issues	 on	 public	 health	 and	 IPRs.	 In	 particular,	 the	 Conference	 demanded	 political	action	and	called	for	health	to	be	made	a	priority	at	the	WTO	Seattle	negotiations	with	the	necessary	balance	between	the	rights	of	patent	holders	and	the	rights	of	citizens.	These	views	were	shared	by	representatives	of	UNDP,	the	WHO,	the	WTO,	members	of	 the	 Governments	 of	 the	 Netherlands	 and	 Thailand,	 as	 well	 as	 nongovernmental	organizations	 attending	 the	 Amsterdam	 conference.	 Amsterdam	 also	 proposed	 a	working	 group	 to	 deal	 with	 some	 issues	 and	 concerns	 that	 are	 still	 highly	 topical	today	 in	 the	 field	 of	 compulsory	 licensing,	 neglected	 diseases	 or	 R&D	 funding	 and	innovation49.	This	created	an	important	conceptual	framework	in	the	debate	of	public	health	and	IPRs.																																																											
47Sell, S. K. TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign. See supranote 42.  
48 This Association was founded with the concern in growing drug pricing and in the fact that important and 
blockbuster drugs such as taxol were developed and publicly funded by the National Institutes of Health which 
licensed the drug to Bristol-Myers-Squibb. 
49 The proposed working group on access to medicines would examine a number of important issues in the 
implementation of the existing TRIPS Agreement, such as: Compulsory licensing of patents, as permitted 
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d) September	11	Terrorist	Attack	and	subsequent	biological	attacks.		September	 11	 terrorist	 attack	 over	 NYC	 cut	 short	 certain	 optimism	 about	 the	discourse	of	globalization	–and	free	trade	and	all	the	WTO	machinery	attached	to	it-	perceived	 so	 far	 by	 western	 countries	 as	 a	 bed	 of	 roses	 where	 nothing	 but	 happy	progress	 could	 happen.	 Ironically,	 the	 terrorist	 attacks	 implied	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	World	Trade	Center,	maybe	 one	 of	 the	 icons	 of	 globalization.	 These	 attacks	 had	 an	important	 impact	not	only	at	 the	economic,	political,	 international	relation	 level	but	also	at	a	psychological	level.	In	a	sense,	developed	countries	became	aware	that	trade	negotiations	could	not	be	separated	from	other	important	issues	and	realities	such	as	poverty,	equity	and	dignity.		Furthermore	and	shortly	after	these	dramatic	attacks,	there	followed	diverse	anthrax	attacks	in	the	US	producing	some	casualties	and	grave	illnesses.	Both	Canada	and	the	US	 rushed	 out	 to	 stockpile	 a	 suitable	 supply	 of	 Cipro,	 a	medicine	 to	 treat	 anthrax.	Cipro	was	in	hands	of	the	German	Bayer	who	had	IPRs	over	the	medicine.	As	Canada	ordered	 a	 million	 tablets	 of	 a	 generic	 version	 of	 Cipro	 from	 a	 Canadian	 company	overriding	Bayer’s	IPRs	(even	if	there	had	not	been	cases	of	anthrax	and	the	seizure	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. The working group should look at the best way to bring this article 
into operation; Allowing for exceptions to patent rights (under Article 30 of TRIPS) for production of medicines 
for export markets when the medicine is exported to a country with a compulsory licence. This would ensure 
that countries with small domestic markets can benefit from compulsory licensing; allowing for exceptions to 
patent rights (under Article 30 of TRIPS) for medical research, so that patents are not used to stop research 
and hamper the introduction of generic medicines; avoiding overly restrictive and anti-competitive 
interpretations of TRIPS rules regarding protection of health registration data or other unnecessary regulatory 
barriers to competition; avoiding restrictive interpretations of trademark rights on issues such as generic 
labelling and prescribing practices; assessing the impact of inadequate reviews of patentability standards 
(novelty and usefulness) on access to medicines; Recommending differential rules for essential medicines, 
such as simplified and fast track compulsory licensing procedures; Examining new paradigms for intellectual 
property rights and health care, including "burden sharing" approaches for research and development that 
permit countries to consider a wider range of policy instruments to promote research and development; 
Assessing the practical burdens on poor countries of administering patent systems and resolving disputes 
over rights; National governments need to develop mechanisms to ensure funding for research and 
development for neglected diseases; Innovative approaches to stimulating research in essential medicines 
need to be devised, including: Increased public and donor funding of health care research; Compulsory 
research obligations, such as requirements that companies reinvest a percentage of pharmaceutical sales into 
research and development, either directly or through public or private sector research and development 
programs; Development of a "Neglected Disease Act" that could be used to stimulate private investment for 
communicable disease vaccines and medicines. 
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process	 of	 the	 drug	was	 neither	 observed),	 US	 Government	 obtained	 –right	 after	 a	serious	threat	to	Bayer-	a	major	price	concession	from	Bayer	for	the	supply	of	Cipro.			Developing	 countries	 and	 the	 international	 community	 were	 critical	 with	 these	actions	and	accused	US	Government	of	following	double	standards,	this	tarnishing	the	legitimacy	 of	 its	 stances	 on	 the	 demand	 of	 high	 protection	 of	 IPRs.	 Developing	countries	were	 quick	 to	 compare	 national	 emergencies	 in	 both	 blocks	 of	 countries	and	 ask	 how	 US	 could	 be	 so	 belligerent	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 IPRs	 in	 developing	countries	even	 in	 the	 face	of	 genuine	public	health	 crises.	 In	any	 case,	 these	events	served	 to	 show	 that	 nobody	 and	 no	 country	 is	 immune	 or	 is	 safe	 to	 suffer	 health	crises	and	 it	 raised	certain	solidarity	and	calls	 for	a	more	sensitive	approach	 to	 the	debate	of	public	health	and	IPRs50.		 e) Nelson	Mandela	vs.	Big	pharma	and	other	David	vs.	Goliath	cases.			In	1997	the	South	African	government,	as	the	result	of	the	HIV/AIDS	crisis	affecting	50	 percent	 of	 its	 citizens	 in	 some	 districts	 (one	 in	 every	 five	 South	 Africans	 was	infected	 with	 AIDS)	 and	 high	 prices	 of	 anti-retroviral	 medications	 enacted	 its	Medicines	 and	 Related	 Substances	 Control	 Amendment	 Act.	 This	 Act	 allowed	 the	health	minister	 to	 import	 generic	 drugs,	 or	 compulsorily	 license	 patents	 under	 the	limited	 exigency	 of	 a	 national	 emergency	 expanding	 the	 conditions	 for	 compulsory	licenses	and	parallel	importation	to	facilitate	the	capacity	of	more	poor	South-African	citizens	 gaining	 access	 to	 cheap	 anti-HIV/AIDS	pharmaceuticals.	 After	 some	 cordial	persuasions	 by	 the	 US	 Government,	 the	 US	 threatened	 to	 bring	 the	 South	 African	Government	 before	 a	WTO	Dispute.	 In	 1998,	 the	 European	 Commission	 joined	 the	United	 States	 in	 pressuring	 South	 Africa	 to	 repeal	 the	 legislation.	 However	 US	Government	 support	dropped	at	 the	 end	of	 1999	because	of	 a	 successful	 campaign	before	 the	American	public	 opinion.	AIDS	 activists	 effectively	 highlighted	American	policies	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 these	 policies;	 profoundly	 embarrassing	 then-presidential	candidate	Al	Gore	confronted	at	election	campaign	rallies.																																																												
50 Singh, K. (2002). Anthrax, drug transnationals, and TRIPS. Foreign Policy in Focus, 29. 
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Under	the	TRIPS	shadow	and	based	on	a	restrictive	interpretation	of	TRIPS,	in	1998,	forty-one	pharmaceutical	companies	sued	 the	South	African	Government	before	 the	law	 courts	 of	 South	 Africa,	 partly	 based	 on	 TRIPS	 (and	 their	 fundamental	 right	 to	property),	 against	 the	 South	 African	 controversial	 piece	 of	 legislation.	 A	 concerted	campaign	by	members	of	the	international	civil	society,	local	activists	(the	Treatment	Action	Campaign	led	by	the	brilliant	activist,	Zachie	Achmat,	intervened	in	the	dispute	as	 an	 amicus	 curiae)	 and	 relevant	 NGOs	 provoked	 the	withdrawal	 of	 the	 action	 in	2001	 in	 what	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 first	 achievements	 of	 an	 “embryonic”	international	civil	society’s	conscience.	Also,	by	the	time	the	case	finally	reached	the	courtroom	in	May	2000,	the	drug	companies	could	no	longer	count	on	the	support	of	their	home	governments.		A	 similar	case	 took	place	 in	Brazil	 in	 the	US	vs.	Brazil	dispute.	AIDS	 is	also	a	major	health	problem	 in	Brazil,	 since	 the	decade	of	 1990	 the	Brazilian	AIDS	program	has	been	 quite	 effective	 in	 reducing	 deaths	 and	 providing	 universal	 access	 to	antiretroviral	 treatment.	 In	2001,	 the	US	 filed	a	 complaint	 against	Brazil	before	 the	WTO	DSU	arguing	that	its	Patent	Law	infringed	the	TRIPS.	In	particular,	art.	68	of	the	Patent	law	encompassed	what	is	is	known	as	the	Local	Working	clause.	According	to	this,	 compulsory	 license	 could	 be	 granted	 by	 the	 government	 in	 the	 event	 that	 a	patented	 invention	 was	 not	 locally	 manufactured	 within	 three	 years	 of	 the	 patent	grant.	 US	 pleaded	 that	 this	 was	 a	 protectionist	 measure	 inconsistent	 with	 TRIPS.	Following	bilateral	consultations	both	countries	announced	that	 they	had	reached	a	mutually	 agreed	 solution.	 In	 particular,	 they	 created	 a	 bilateral	 consultative	mechanism	 to	 be	 notified	 before	 the	 controverted	 provision	 is	 utilized	 by	 Brazil.	Brazil	 has	 maintained	 in	 this	 respect	 that	 the	 threat	 of	 compulsory	 licensing	 has	helped	it	to	negotiate	reasonable	drug	prices.	MSF	has	praised	Brazilian	approach	to	this	issue	permitting	it	to	pursue	universal	access	to	affordable	medicines	as	long	as	keeping	 local	 capacities	 to	 manufacture	 drugs	 for	 its	 population	 and	 for	 people	beyond	 its	 borders51.	 There	 are	 other	 not	 so	 happy	 stories	 at	 that	 time	 as	 the	 one	facing	Thailand	with	the	US	over	the	 former’s	plans	to	produce	a	generic	version	of	
																																																								
51 http://www.msf.org/en/article/20020305-msf-response-boys-brazil 
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certain	 AIDS	medicine.	 Thailand	was	 obliged	 to	 drop	 it	 compulsory	 licensing	 plans	after	a	strong	pressure	from	the	US	in	1997	and	1998.			These	conflicts	seem	to	be	the	logical	conclusion	of	a	too	restrictive,	 formalistic	and	pro-IPRs	 interpretation	 of	 TRIPS,	 an	 interpretation	 decontextualized	 from	 social	realities	 as	 long	 as	 from	 other	 norms	 and	 value	 of	 bioethics,	 public	 health	 law,	 or	international	human	rights.		 	
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4.3.	 Doha	Declaration	and	beyond;	the	shortcomings	of	quick	fix	solutions	for	
persistent	structural	problems.		
The	Doha	Declaration.		The	 growing	 recognition	 of	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	 failures	 by	 national	 governments	and	the	international	civil	society,	led	the	WTO	members	to	agree	the	Declaration	on	the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 Public	 Health	 (Doha	 Declaration)	 at	 the	 fourth	 WTO	Ministerial	Conference	in	Doha	in	2001.	The	“African	Group”	statement	to	the	TRIPS	Council	 about	 the	 need	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 access	 to	 medicines	 issue	 initiated	preparations	for	the	Declaration.	In	June	2001,	the	TRIPS	Council	held	its	first	session	devoted	to	TRIPS	and	access	to	medicines.	It	was	the	first	time	that	the	TRIPS	Council	discussed	 intellectual	 property	 issues	 in	 the	 context	 of	 public	 health.	 The	 African	Group	 presented	 a	 draft	 text	 for	 a	 Declaration	 on	 TRIPS	 and	 Public	 Health.	 This	proposal	addressed	political	principles	 to	ensure	 that	TRIPS	did	not	undermine	 the	legitimate	right	of	WTO	Members	to	formulate	their	own	public	health	policies.	The	text	 also	 aimed	 at	 clarifying	 provisions	 related	 to	 compulsory	 licensing,	 parallel	import,	 data	 protection,	 and	 production	 for	 export	 to	 a	 country	 with	 insufficient	production	 capacity.	 For	 their	 part,	 the	United	 States,	 Japan,	 Switzerland,	Australia,	and	 Canada	 presented	 and	 alternate	 draft	 emphasizing	 the	 importance	 of	 IPRs	protection	 for	 R&D	 in	 discovering	 new	 life-saving	 medicines	 to	 treat	 diseases	 and	thus	contributing	to	public	health	objectives	globally.	The	EU	submitted	its	own	draft,	which	proposed	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	production	for	exports.		Most	academia	and	NGOs	note	that	the	finally	approved	text	more	closely	resembles	the	developing	countries	draft	underscoring	that	public	health	outweigh	IPRs.	Also,	it	was	observed	that	the	Declaration	gives	broad	discretion	to	developing	countries	 in	how	to	manage	to	cope	with	TRIPS	most	negative	impacts52.		
																																																								
52 FM’t Hoen, E. (2002). TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents and access to essential medicines... (see footnote 
39). 
157		
The	core	of	Doha	Declaration	affirms	that	the	TRIPS	Agreement	does	not	and	should	not	 prevent	 members	 from	 taking	 measures	 to	 protect	 public	 health	 and	 that	 the	Agreement	can	and	should	be	interpreted	and	implemented	in	a	manner	supportive	of	WTO	members'	right	to	protect	public	health	and,	in	particular,	to	promote	access	to	medicines	for	all	(Paragraph	4)	and	it	recognized	that	each	Member	has	the	right	to	grant	 compulsory	 licenses	 and	 the	 freedom	 to	 determine	 the	 grounds	 upon	which	such	licenses	are	granted.	It	also	states	in	paragraph	5(c)	that:	Each	Member	has	the	right	to	determine	what	constitutes	a	national	emergency	or	other	circumstances	of	extreme	 urgency,	 it	 being	 understood	 that	 public	 health	 crises,	 including	 those	relating	 to	 HIV/AIDS,	 tuberculosis,	 malaria	 and	 other	 epidemics,	 can	 represent	 a	national	emergency	or	other	circumstances	of	extreme	urgency.	The	Declaration	also	resolves	the	question	of	whether	TRIPS	authorizes	parallel	trade	by	noting:	The	effect	of	 the	 provisions	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 exhaustion	 of	intellectual	property	rights	is	to	leave	each	Member	free	to	establish	its	own	regime	for	such	exhaustion	without	challenge.			A	key	issue	remained	unresolved	in	Doha	is	how	to	ensure	that	production	for	export	to	a	country	that	has	 issued	a	compulsory	 license,	but	does	not	have	manufacturing	capacity,	 can	 take	 place	 within	 a	 country	 that	 provides	 TRIPS,	 Pharmaceutical	Patents,	and	Access	to	Essential	Medicines.	The	cause	of	the	debate	was	Article	31	(f)	of	 TRIPS	 which	 provides	 compulsory	 licenses	 issued	 by	 supplying	 Member	 to	 be	
authorized	 predominantly	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 domestic	market	 of	 the	member	 granting	
the	compulsory	 license.	This	provision	was	criticized	by	countries	with	 limited	or	no	manufacturing	 capacity	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector	 as	 they	 considered	 it	 as	 a	limiting	 clause	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 did	 not	 allow	 them	 to	 import	 those	pharmaceutical	 medicines	 from	 countries	 with	 such	 capacity	 through	 compulsory	license.			The	Doha	Declaration	acknowledged	the	problem	in	Paragraph	6	-We	recognize	that	WTO	Members	with	insufficient	or	no	manufacturing	capacities	in	the	pharmaceutical	sector	could	face	difficulties	in	making	effective	use	of	compulsory	licensing	under	the	TRIPS	Agreement-	but	it	did	not	resolve	it	and	it	mandated	the	Council	for	TRIPS	to	find	an	expeditious	solution	to	this	problem.	The	US	for	instance,	wanted	the	draft	to	
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include	exceptions	for	compulsory	licensing	and	parallel	importing	measures	for	only	the	‘big	three’	diseases,	these	being	HIV/AIDS,	tuberculosis	and	malaria.		This	instruction	to	the	Council	was	finally	implemented	by	a	decision	of	the	General	Council	in	August	in	August	2003	(WTO	General	Council	Decision	of	30	August	2003).	According	to	this	Decision,	it	was	agreed	to	waive	article	31	(f)	of	the	TRIPS,	so	that	LDC	 members	 and	 other	 members	 lacking	 sufficient	 manufacturing	 capacity	 may	import	pharmaceutical	products	created	under	compulsory	license,	subject	to	certain	conditions.	Under	the	system	established	by	the	WTO	General	Council	Decision	of	30	August	 2003,	 provided	 that	 these	 conditions	 are	 satisfied,	 any	WTO	 member	 may	issue	 a	 compulsory	 license	 to	 manufacture	 and	 export	 pharmaceutical	 products	needed	 to	address	public	health	problems	by	an	eligible	 importing	Member.	 In	 this	respect,	 all	 LDC	 members	 are	 eligible	 importing	 members,	 and	 any	 other	 WTO	member	may	become	an	eligible	 importing	member	simply	by	notifying	the	Council	for	TRIPS	of	its	intention	to	use	the	system	as	an	importer.	Even	if	all	WTO	member	countries	 are	 eligible	 to	 import	 under	 this	 decision,	 23	 developed	 countries	announced	voluntarily	that	they	will	not	use	the	system	to	import.			The	 Decision	 contemplated	 some	 conditions	 for	 using	 the	 system	 as	 for	 example	conditions	 related	 to	 the	 notification	 (names	 and	 expected	 quantities	 of	 the	pharmaceutical	products);	that	the	products	manufactured	under	the	license	must	be	clearly	 identified	 and	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 production	 must	 be	 exported	 to	 that	member;	 that	 importing	 member	 must	 take	 reasonable	 measures	 to	 prevent	 re-exportation.	 The	 impact	 and	 benefits	 brought	 by	 this	 waiver	 has	 been	 limited	 in	practice.	On	17	July	2007,	Rwanda	became	the	first	member	to	notify	the	Council	for	TRIPS	of	its	intention	to	import	a	pharmaceutical	product	under	compulsory	license	pursuant	the	WTO	General	Council	Decision	(concerning	a	HIV/AIDS	pharmaceutical	manufactured	by	a	Canadian	generic	pharmaceutical	company)	and	in	turn,	Canada’s	notification	 as	 an	 eligible	 exporting	member	 to	 enable	 the	 export	 to	 Rwanda.	 This	case	 is	 the	 exception	 rather	 than	 the	 general	 rule	 as	 this	has	been	 to	date	 the	only	notification	submitted	to	the	Council	for	TRIPS.	According	to	some	commentators	and	NGOs,	 the	 reasons	behind	 the	 limited	use	of	 this	provision	by	developing	 countries	have	to	do	with	 its	onerous	and	burdensome	character.	 In	effect,	 in	practical	 terms,	
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Generic	manufacturers	have	to	monitor	and	handle	bureaucracies	and	administrative	process	of	two	administrations.			Furthermore	 and	 under	 certain	 pressure,	 the	 TRIPS	 council	 initiated	 work	 on	 the	preparation	 of	 an	 amendment	 to	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement	 and	 the	 proposal	 was	submitted	in	December	2005.	Article	31	was	amended	by	article	31	bis	to	create	an	exception	 to	 the	 requirement	 set	 out	 in	 article	 31(f)	 which	 requires	 the	 use	 of	compulsory	 license	 to	 be	 authorized	 predominantly	 for	 the	 supply	 of	 the	 domestic	market	 of	 the	Member	 authorizing	 such	 use.	 The	 article	 31	 bis	 establishes	 that	 the	
obligations	of	an	exporting	Member	under	Article	31(f)	shall	not	apply	with	respect	to	
the	 grant	 by	 it	 of	 a	 compulsory	 license	 to	 the	 extent	 necessary	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
production	 of	 a	 pharmaceutical	 product(s)	 and	 its	 export	 to	 an	 eligible	 importing	
Member(s)	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 terms	 set	 out	 in	 paragraph	 2	 of	 the	 Annex	 to	 this	
Agreement.			Despite	this	article	implements	Paragraph	6	of	the	Doha	Declaration	and	it	seems	to	constitute	an	improvement	to	the	existing	obstacles	of	import-exportation	when	the	importing	 country	 does	 not	 have	 capacities	 to	 manufacture	 the	 medicines,	 the	likewise	 burdensome	 and	 onerous	 nature	 of	 the	 proceeding	 in	 place	 to	 make	 this	provision	 effective	 (expectant	 to	 the	 scope	 of	 new	 article	 31bis)	 together	with	 the	open	 and	 indeterminate	 question	 of	 the	 remuneration	 to	 the	 patent	 owner	 had	reduced	substantially	the	value	of	this	amendment.			
Post-Doha.		There	 are	 several	 uncertainties	 as	 to	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 Doha	 Declaration.	 In	 this	sense,	this	Declaration	is	not	framed	as	a	“decision”	and	it	 is	not	intended	to	amend	the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 it	 would	 be	 rather	 an	 authoritative	 interpretation	 of	 TRIPS.	During	negotiations,	this	was	an	important	point	to	be	taken	into	account.	Some	WTO	Members	feared	that	the	negotiations	could	lead	to	changes	in	TRIPS	and	wanted	to	include	a	confirmation	that	the	Declaration	was	purely	a	clarifying	exercise.			
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Even	 if	 initially	 and	 formally	 they	 were	 happy	 with	 the	 outcome,	 pharmaceutical	companies	 argued	 from	 the	 beginning	 that	 the	 Declaration	 was	 not	 necessary	because:			a)	patents	were	not	a	problem;	b)	 Weakening	 patent	 protection	 would	 have	 devastating	 effects	 on	 the	 R&D	capabilities	 of	 the	 research-based	 industry.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 generic	 drug	industry	regretted	that	the	Declaration	did	not	provide	an	interpretation	for	the	data	protection	issue	addressed	in	article	39.3	TRIPS.	As	we	have	already	seen,	an	overly	restrictive	 interpretation	 of	 exclusive	 data	 lead	 to	 delays	 in	 introduction	 of	 generic	medicines	and	it	may	rise	to	increase	barriers	to	the	registration	of	generic	medicines	including	those	produced	under	a	compulsory	license53.		After	15	years,	many	of	the	problems	existing	at	the	time	of	Doha	Declaration	remain	the	same.	Even	if	during	the	years	after	Doha	the	number	of	compulsory	licenses	was	substantially	 increased	 –especially	 between	 2003	 and	 2005-	 this	 figure	 has	diminished	 markedly	 since	 2006	 due	 to	 countervailing	 pressures	 from	 major	countries54.	Also	and	according	to	Oxfam55,	 little	has	changed	as	medicines	continue	to	 be	 unaffordable	 and	 trade	 rules	 remain	 a	 major	 barrier	 to	 accessing	 medicines	(generic	medicines).	This	NGO	observes	that	TRIPS	Plus	Bilateral	Agreements	tend	to	ensure	 that	 the	 strictest	 levels	 of	 intellectual	 property	 protection	 are	 imposed	worldwide	 thus	neutralizing	 the	Doha	Declaration.	 In	 the	same	vein,	 the	Discussion	Paper	 elaborated	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	UNDP56	 the	 proliferation	 of	 TRIPS-Plus	Agreements	 jeopardizes	 the	 application	 of	 TRIPS	 flexibilities	 to	 increase	 access	 to	medicines.		
																																																								
53 FM’t Hoen, E. (2002). TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents and access to essential medicines... (see footnote 
39). 
54 Beall, R., & Kuhn, R. (2012). Trends in compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals since the Doha 
Declaration: a database analysis. PLoS Med, 9(1), e1001154. 
55 Malpani, R., & Kamal-Yanni, M. (2006). Patents versus patients: five years after the Doha Declaration. 
Oxfam International. 
56 Matthews, D. N., & Correa, C. (2011). The Doha declaration ten years on and its impact on access to 
medicines and the right to health. 
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As	it	has	been	profusely	documented	by	t	Carolyn	Deere57,	Doha	Declaration	on	TRIPS	and	 Public	 Health	 explains	 the	 shift	 of	 pharmaceutical	 lobby’s	 strategy	 to	 strength	IPRs	 through	 bilateral	 private	 Free	 Trade	 Agreements	 (“FTAs”)	 which	 are	 not	administered	by	an	international	institution.	In	the	IP	field,	these	FTAs	add	to	TRIPS	protection	 new	 more	 demanding	 provisions58	 (TRIPS-plus)	 and	 establish	 an	alternative	system	to	settle	disputes,	these	limiting	the	flexibilities	within	TRIPS	and	circumventing	 the	 WTO	 process	 and	 therefore	 the	 Doha	 path.	 Indeed,	 those	developing	 countries	 engaged	 in	 FTAs	 negotiations	 have	 used	 TRIPS	 as	 a	 defense	against	 raising	 TRIPS	 standards	 by	 appealing	 to	 TRIPS	 as	 the	maximum	 threshold.	The	shameless	prevalence	of	private	interests	encompassed	in	Trips	Plus	Agreements	and	 the	 stark	 exercise	 of	 	 power	 of	 developed	 countries	 have	made	 some	 scholars	term	these	TRIPS	Plus	FTAs	as	bilateral	corporate	colonization	agreements59				There	 are	many	 examples	 of	 TRIPS-Plus	 FTAs	 including	 the	 criticized	 Australia-US	FTA,	 FTAs	 negotiated	 with	 thirty-four	 countries	 in	 the	 Free	 Trade	 Area	 of	 the	Americas	 Agreement,	 five	 Central	 American	 countries,	 the	 Dominican	 Republic-Central	 America	 FTA,	 the	 Southern	 African	 Customs	 Union,	 Morocco,	 Bahrain	 and	Singapore,	the	US-Jordan	free	trade	agreement	–as	long	as	many	other	middle	eastern	countries-	and	the	currently	under	negotiation	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	Agreement	(TPP)	between	12	Pacific-Rim	countries	and	the	controversial	TTIP	US-EU.			The	 legitimacy	 crisis	 affecting	 WTO	 and	 the	 TRIPS	 regime,	 the	 absence	 of	 the	announced	substantive	benefits	and	outcomes	of	it	and	the	situation	of	deadlock	after	20	 years	 of	 its	 inception,	 demand	 a	 serious	 reinterpretation	 of	 TRIPS	 regime	(including	TRIPS	Plus)	as	long	as	a	deep		transformation	of	it.																																																												
57 Deere, Carolyn. The implementation game: the TRIPS Agreement and the global politics of intellectual 
property reform in developing countries. (see chapter 2, footnote 126). 
58 They often include the elimination and reduction of transitional periods, the extension of pharmaceutical 
patent protection as long as supplementary protection through regulation on exclusive marketing rights and 
exclusivity data; compulsory licensing is expressly limited, to situations such as “national emergencies of 
extreme urgency; finally, these FTAs contemplate restrictions on research and early working exceptions (Bolar 
exception). 
59 Faunce, T. A. (2007). Globalization and Health: Challenges for Health Law and Bioethics: 87-108 
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The	transit	from	the	grant	of	privileges	to	IPRs	fundamentalism.		The	 implementation	 of	 TRIPS	 has	 been	 problematic.	 The	 poor	 balance	 of	 TRIPS	implementation	 in	most	of	developing	 countries	 and	 the	 fact	 that	TRIPS	and	TRIPS	Plus	often	become	an	 impairment	 to	public	health	and	 important	human	rights	has	been	described	in	preceding	chapters	in	some	detail	and	it	is	briefly	summarized	here	in	 order	 to	 note	 the	 new	 paradigm	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 set	 of	 absolute	 rights	 of	 private	property	in	what	it	can	be	denominated	as	IPRs	fundamentalism.							Unlike	it	happened	previously,	TRIPS	stipulates	that	certain	minimum	standards	for	IPRs	protection	–mostly	western	standards-	have	to	be	met	by	WTO	countries.	In	the	patent	 field	 for	 example	 (the	 most	 disturbing	 IPR	 for	 developing	 countries	 in	socioeconomic	 terms)	 TRIPS	 establishes	 a	 minimum	 protection	 of	 20	 years,	 WTO	Members’	obligation	to	protect	any	invention	no	matter	whether	this	is	a	process	or	a	product60,	 specific	 rules	 on	 enforcement	 of	 IPRs	 –a	 detailed	 set	 of	 enforcement	administrative	and	 judicial	procedures	 including	counterfeit	 trade	prevention	at	 the	borders-	 protection	 and	 among	 others,	 the	 possibility	 of	 bringing	 domestic	 IPRs	regimes	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	WTO	dispute	settlement.	The	previously	existing	international	treaties	–The	Paris	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Industrial	Property	of	1883	and	the	Berne	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Literary	and	Artistic	Works-	did	not	establish	minimum	standards	to	be	implemented	by	Member	States	but	they	basically	imposed	nondiscrimination	between	citizens	and	companies	of	the	different	signatory	 nations	 –whatever	 the	 protection	 is	 provided	 to	 domestic	 works	 and	inventions,	foreign	works	and	inventions	are	entitled	to	get	the	same	degree	or	level	of	protection-.						Essentially,	 TRIPS	 and	 the	 “One	 size	 fit	 all”	 premise	 on	 which	 is	 based	 –decontextualized	 of	 the	 specific	 socioeconomic	 situation	 of	 countries-	 are	controversial	because	of	the	persistence	of	the	asymmetry	in	the	level	of	development	and	 capacities	 between	 developing	 and	 developed	 countries.	 There	 is	 historical																																																									
60 Many countries like India or Italy and Spain (before the UE accession) did not protect product patents in the 
pharmaceutical field, local industries were able to reengineer the way some medicines were produced and 
developed a new process method to get the same pharmaceutical. 
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evidence	teaching	us	that	currently	developed	and	wealthy	and	innovating	countries	prospered	 by	 imitating	 first	 and	 innovating	 later.	 Some	 authors	 hold	 that	 learning	how	to	innovate	is	a	previous	and	essential	step	towards	learning	how	to	innovate.	In	this	sense,	Korea	copied	 from	Japan,	 Japan	copied	 from	the	West	and	the	US	copied	from	 the	 European	 Countries	 which	 in	 their	 turn	 copied	 from	 each	 other.	 This	copying	and	imitative	conduct	would	be	illegal	today.	In	this	respect,	it	seems	difficult	to	see	why	the	effects	of	 this	historical	 imitative	conduct	would	not	also	be	true	for	today’s	developing	countries61.		While	the	first	European	and	American	IPR	laws	were	designed	to	ensure	a	diffusion	of	knowledge	and	create	a	public	domain	for	new	inventions	and	knowledge	and	as	an	 incentive	 for	 technology	 transfers62,	 protection	 of	 the	 private	 property	 of	 the	works	 and	 inventions	 seem	 to	 be	 today	 the	main	 and	 even	 the	 exclusive	 rationale	behind	the	new	IPRs	regime.	TRIPS	has	imposed	IPR	standards	of	protection	on	many	developing	 countries	 -with	 no	 previous	 legislation	 on	 the	 matter-	 in	 a	 dogmatic	manner	by	asserting	 like	a	mantra	 that	 IPR	 regime	 is	one	of	 the	essential	pillars	 to	ensure	 economic	 development.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 little	 or	 no	 empirical	 or	theoretical	 research	 was	 conducted	 to	 dully	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 implementing	 a	western	modelled	new	IPR	regime.			Leaving	 aside	 the	 contested	 economic	 rationale	 under	 which	 IPRs	 are	 deemed	necessary	for	inventors	and	creators	to	engage	in	innovative	activity	and	production,	TRIPS	 were	 said	 to	 bring	 important	 long-run	 benefits	 to	 developing	 countries	 in	terms	 of	 economic	 growth,	 foreign	 investment,	 and	 technology	 transfer.	 However,	and	 in	 view	 of	 some	 literature	 and	 data	 presented	 previously	 in	 this	 dissertation,	there	are	not	empirical	studies	showing	consistent	evidence	in	the	sense	that	TRIPS	has	 had	 a	 favorable	 economic	 impact	 on	 developing	 countries.	 For	 those	 countries	which	have	experienced	economic	growths	in	the	period	1995-2016	it	is	not	easy	to	make	a	link	between	their	better	conditions	and	the	implementation	of	TRIPS	in	their	domestic	 legislation	 and	 in	 any	 case	 the	 economic	 development	 is	 far	 from	 being																																																									
61 Dutfield, G. (2008). Knowledge diplomacy and the new intellectual property fundamentalism. Interpreting 
and Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Is it Fair. 
62 Lanoszka, Anna. The global politics of intellectual property rights and pharmaceutical drug policies in 
developing countries. Supranote 31. 
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generalized	 to	 every	 country.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 TRIPS	 may	 undermine	 rather	 than	foster	economic	and	technological	development.	In	this	respect,	an	interesting	study	conducted	by	a	Korean	author	concludes	that	IPR	protection	would	hinder	technology	transfer	 and	 domestic	 learning	 in	 the	 early	 stage	 of	 industrialization	 and	 that	 IPR	legislation	must	 fit	 and	 adapt	 the	 different	 contexts	 of	 development	 of	 countries63.	Also	in	Spain,	a	combination	of	relatively	weak	patent	protection	-including	national	novelty	and	process	and	no	product	patent	in	the	pharmaceutical	field-	together	with	other	 IPR	 figures	 such	 as	 industrial	 designs	 and	 utility	 models,	 permitted	technological	 learning	 and	 minor	 adaptations	 and	 improvements	 made	 by	 local	companies	and	a	nascent	national	technological	industry.			As	 we	 will	 see	 further	 in	 next	 chapters,	 the	 progressive	 strengthening	 of	 IPRs	emphasizes	 the	 property	 nature	 of	 these	 conventional	 rights	 and	 converts	 IPRs	 in	
iuris	et	de	iure	rights	with	almost	no	exceptions	or	limitations	to	be	confronted	with.	Furthermore,	 this	 alteration	 of	 the	 IPR	 regime	 towards	 one	 of	 its	 dimensions	(represented	 by	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 IPRs’	 owners)	 has	 gone	 accompanied	 by	 an	adequate	 terminology	 and	 conceptual	 framing	 of	 the	 issues.	While	 for	much	 of	 the	20th	 century,	 IPRs	and	 in	particular	patents	were	viewed	as	monopolies	–subject	 to	the	 disciplining	 evaluation	 of	 Antitrust	 Law-	 and	 historically	 as	 grants	 of	 privilege,	today	 the	prominent	discursive	 framing	of	 those	 is	 centered	 in	property	 rights	 and	“right	talks”.	Instead	of	privilege	we	speak	of	rights.	As	privileges	are	expected	to	go	through	 strict	 scrutiny	 in	 order	 not	 to	 benefit	 somebody	 beyond	 what	 is	 just	 and	reasonable,	 rights	 suggest	 that	 they	 are	 natural	 and	 deserved.	 Right	 talks	 together	with	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 “free	 trade”	work	 conveniently	 to	present	 IPRs	 and	TRIPS	 in	 a	positive	 light64.	 Also,	 there	 are	 concerns	 about	 the	 tendency	 of	 the	 new	 IPRs	fundamentalism	 to	 label	 copying	 as	 piracy	 as	 if	 both	 words	 were	 synonymous.	 In	2003,	Kamil-Idris,	Director	General	of	WIPO	linked	piracy	to	terrorism	declaring	that	they	exist	everywhere	and	that	they	are	dangerous65.																																																														
63 Kim, L. (2003). Technology transfer & intellectual property rights. UNCTAD-ICTSD project on intellectual 
property rights and sustainable development, (2). 
64 Sell, Susan K. See supranote 42. 
65 Dutfield, G. (2006). “To copy is to steal”: TRIPS,(un) free trade agreements and the new intellectual property 
fundamentalism. Journal of Information, Law, and Technology, 1, 1. 
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TRIPS,	a	concerted	marriage	without	love.		At	this	point	it	seems	clear	that	TRIPS	has	not	been	adopted	in	the	best	social	welfare	interest	 of	 all	 WTO	 signatories,	 especially	 developing	 countries	 which	 acceded	 to	TRIPS	without	having	consistent	evidences	of	its	economic	and	social	benefits.	While	developed,	 innovation-producing	nations,	 especially	US,	were	 strong	 and	persistent	advocates	 for	 the	 strengthening	 and	 global	 extension	 of	 IPRs,	 developing	 countries	showed	their	reluctance	to	adopt	this	strategy	since	they	–as	net	IPRs’	importers-	had	reasonable	 fear	 to	 face	 important	 and	 substantial	 increases	 in	 the	 cost	 of	 imported	goods	and	services	which	embodied	IPRs	–as	it	has	been	the	case-.	Neither	seems	to	be	clear	that	TRIPS	operates	in	favor	of	workers	and	customers	in	general.			Therefore,	it	is	clear	that	TRIPS	is	not	the	result	of	seduction	or	conviction.	In	fact,	it	is	not	the	consequence	of	a	shared	concern	of	WTO	Members	to	strengthen	IPRS	based	on	 philosophical	 or	 economic	 considerations	 as	 to	 the	 virtues	 and	 benefits	 of	 IPRs	regime.	Neither	is	it	the	consequence	of	the	ability	of	TRIPS	proponents	to	show	the	positive	impact	on	the	economy	of	countries.			As	we	have	mentioned,	the	reasons	explaining	the	accession	of	developing	countries	to	TRIPS	have	to	be	found	in	international	relations,	 international	political	economy	considerations	 and	 above	 all,	 in	 a	 new	 phase	 of	 capitalism	 rather	 than	 in	 the	consensual	 agreement	 of	 eventually	 sovereign	 convinced	 and	 free	 nation	 states.	Under	 the	 undisguised	 threat	 of	 the	 US	 and	 other	 developed	 nations,	 the	 TRIPS	Agreement	was	presented	as	part	of	a	WTO	package	deal	where	developing	countries	were	forced	to	adhere	to	TRIPS	in	exchange	for	benefits,	concessions	and	reduction	of	trade	 barriers	 provided	 for	 other	 WTO	 agreements.	 Furthermore,	 beyond	 the	national	interests	of	the	proponents	of	the	new	regime	of	IPRs,	TRIPS	will	be	framed	and	 will	 be	 one	 of	 the	 instruments	 and	 pillars	 of	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 strategy	leading	 to	 extend	 capitalist	 social	 relations	 of	 production	 on	 a	 global	 scale.	 This	 is	made	possible	not	only	through	political	coercion	of	the	US	or	the	most	powerful	and	pro-IPR	regime	countries	but	also	by	a	more	subtle	hegemony	(Gramscian	hegemony)	
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where	one	class	or	class	fraction	control	other	classes	via	the	moral	and	intellectual	leadership	of	key	elements	of	society	and	the	state	apparatus	(extended	state).66			Therefore,	TRIPS	is	an	instrumental	device	and	part	of	the	infrastructure	of	the	new	international	 regime	 –an	 instrument	 of	 Gramscian	 hegemonic	 control-,	 it	 would	respond	 to	 a	 certain	 model	 or	 vision	 of	 the	 world,	 to	 the	 architecture	 of	 a	 new	international	 order	 premised	 in	 neoliberal	 principles	 and	 dominated	 by	 global	accumulation	of	 capital67.	Also,	TRIPS	contributes	 to	solidify	a	perpetuate	economic	dependence	relations	between	north	and	south	(center	and	periphery)	and	a	global	division	of	 labor	where	 low-level	 and	unsophisticated	activities	 coupled	with	 lower	labor	costs	reside	mostly	in	the	developing	countries	while	technically	sophisticated	processing	 and	manufacturing,	 R&D	 activities,	 design,	 finance	 and	 other	 high	 level	innovative	and	creative	activities	are	carried	out	in	the	developed	countries	imposing	their	 dominant	 cultural	 model	 of	 production	 and	 preserving	 their	 technological	superiority	 and	 control.	 Consequently,	many	 developing	 countries	 suspect	 that	 the	TRIPS	 Agreement	 conceals	 a	 policy	 of	 technological	 protectionism	 intended	 at	consolidating	 an	 international	 division	 of	 labor	 where	 the	 industrialized	 nations	generate	 innovations	and	developing	countries	are	the	“world	maquiladora”	and	the	market	for	the	resulting	products68.	In	this	respect,	one	may	wonder	why	there	is	no	such	 thing	as	an	effective	 international	agreement	on	minimum	 labor	standards	 for	workers,	an	 international	Agreement	 for	a	basic	harmonization	of	certain	corporate	taxes	and	financial	transactions,	both	of	which	(trade	related	labor	standards	or	trade	related	 tax	 policies)	 substantially	 affecting	 trade	 and	 that	 would	 ensure	 every	worker’s	 dignity,	 a	 better	 distributive	 policy	 of	 wealth	 and	 a	 less	 distorted	 social	dumping-free	trade	within	the	frame	of	WTO.																																																														
66 The hegemonic class has to be able to articulate a unifying ideology which presents itself as universal. 
Hegemony in the new world order would not consist in a particular state’s dominance in the pursuit of its 
narrow self-interest but rather in pursuing the interests of a transnational class whose interests are presented 
as universal, consensual and part of a global welfare. The identification of the US as the hegemonic state 
derives from its capacity to shape the infrastructure within which the capital accumulation globally takes place 
not only in the interest of US capitalist competitiveness, but in the interest of a transnational class and 
transnational capital accumulation. In this sense, TRIPS would not be the ideological manifestation of a 
particular class interest but rather as serving global welfare. 
67 Richards, D. G. (2004). Intellectual property rights and global capitalism. ME Sharpe. 
68 Correa, C. M. (2000). Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS agreement 
and policy options. Zed books. 
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4.4.		 Hierarchy	of	international	law	sources	and	alternative	foundation	in	the	
field	of	access	to	medicines:	significance	and	scope	of	the	Human	Rights	
regime.		Before	 entering	 the	 analysis	 and	 study	 of	 the	 different	 normative	 and	 legal	constructions	 that	 from	 a	 deliberative	 perspective	 may	 be	 argued	 and	 applied	 to	transform	the	current	global	regime	of	IPRs	into	a	more	legitimate	regime,	it	is	worth	exploring	the	existence	of	other	bodies	of	law,	in	particular,	human	rights	law	which	encompass	 some	 rules	 on	 health	 and	 access	 to	 medicines	 that	 eventually	 might	conflict	 with	 some	 of	 the	 most	 restrictive	 and	 decontextualized	 interpretations	 of	IPRS,	in	particular	in	the	field	of	pharmaceutical	patents	and	likewise	exclusive	rights.	Furthermore,	 Human	 rights	 regime	 and	 compliance	with	 human	 rights	 is	 for	 some	scholars	 one	 of	 the	 main	 pillars	 of	 the	 international	 legitimacy	 of	 international	organizations	 such	 as	 WTO.	 In	 particular,	 it	 is	 held	 that	 international	 institutions	should	 not	 violate	 the	 least	 controversial	 human	 rights	and	 it	must	 ensure	 people’s	most	 fundamental	 rights69.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 important	 to	 review	 how	 and	 to	 which	extent	 human	 rights	 regime	 may	 influence,	 contradict	 and	 “alleviate”	 the	consequences	and	the	impact	of	a	global	regime	of	IPRs	represented	by	TRIPS.	In	this	respect,	 this	chapter	 is	not	 intended	to	evaluate	and	study	WTO	DSU	functioning	or	other	 judicial	or	adjudicative	processes	on	IPRs	claims	but	 it	will	rather	analyze	the	eventual	conflicts	between	both	legal	bodies.			
Human	rights	and	access	to	affordable	medicines.					The	 International	Covenant	on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights	 (ICESCR)70	has	substantially	 contributed	 to	 the	 codification	 of	 the	 human	 right	 to	 health	 and	 the	access	to	medicines	as	one	of	its	manifestations.	As	we	have	previously	said,	access	to	medicines	would	be	one	of	the	fundamental	components	of	the	human	right	to	health.	The	 ICESCR	 provides	 that	 states	 parties	 are	 obliged	 to	 take	 steps	 toward	 the	 full	realization	 of	 the	 highest	 attainable	 standard	 of	 mental	 and	 physical	 health	 for	 all																																																									
69 Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O. Keohane. (2006). The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics & 
international affairs 20.4, 405-437. 
70 ICESCR is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966, 
and in force from 3 January 1976. 
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persons.	 In	 General	 Comment	 14,	 the	 Committee	 on	 Economic	 Social	 and	 Cultural	Rights	(CESCR)	has	interpreted	this	article	to	demand	the	provision	of	primary	health	services	and	essential	medicines	as	defined	by	the	WHO.		Human	 rights	 and	 IPRs	 are	 two	 different	 bodies	 of	 law	 which	 have	 evolved	historically	separately	until	the	adoption	of	TRIPS.	The	fact	that	TRIPS	has	motivated	the	 enforcement	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 worldwide	 implies	 an	 impact	 on	 the	access	to	affordable	medicines	–in	the	form	of	increases	of	drug	prices-	and	therefore,	on	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 human	 right	 to	 health	 that	 eventually	 could	 amount	 to	 a	violation	 of	 it.	 This	 eventual	 conflict	 between	 both	 bodies	 of	 law	 and	 in	 particular,	between	the	right	to	health	and	the	IPRs	has	become	a	hot	topic	especially	since	the	HIV/AID	crisis	and	the	access	to	drugs	for	patients	in	developing	countries	which	are	the	 most	 severely	 affected	 by	 the	 epidemic	 and	 it	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 important	discussions	and	concerns	at	the	international	level.			
Resolving	the	tension	between	Human	rights	vs.	 Intellectual	Property	rights.	 Is	there	a	
conflict?		First	of	all,	 it	 is	important	to	note	that	some	academics	hold	that	there	is	not	such	a	conflict	between	human	rights	and	TRIPS	at	 the	 level	of	 international	principles.	 In	Petersmann’s	 controversial	 views,	 WTO	 objectives	 of	 protecting	 freedom,	 non-discrimination,	 and	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 the	 worldwide	 division	 of	 labor,	 and	 to	 thereby	increase	economic	welfare	and	mutually	beneficial	cooperation	among	citizens	across	frontiers,	would	complement	the	human	rights	objectives	of	promoting	personal	and	democratic	 self-development	 through	 legal	 protection	 of	 equal	 basic	 rights	 and	fulfilment	 of	 basic	 needs	 necessary	 for	 a	 life	 in	 dignity71.	 This	 opinion	 has	 been	criticized	by	various	authors	who	claim	that	the	relationship	between	human	rights	and	 market	 freedom	 is	 much	 more	 complex	 that	 Petersmann	 shows	 and	 who	
																																																								
71 Petersmann, E. U. (2004). The ‘Human Rights Approach’Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is it Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?. Journal 
of International Economic Law, 7(3), 605-627. 
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reproach	 Petersmann’s	 tendency	 to	 use	 human	 rights	 to	 achieve	 economic	 policy	objectives72.			In	fact,	as	it	is	acknowledged	by	most	academics,	there	may	cases	where	human	rights	and	TRIPS	or	 the	global	 regime	of	 IPRs	may	come	 into	 conflict.	 Legal	 systems	have	developed	different	 techniques	 in	order	 to	resolve	 those	conflicts	between	different	rules	 which	 regulate	 the	 same	 subject	 matter	 in	 a	 different,	 even	 contradictory	manner.	Basically,	these	techniques	are	those	which	make	rules	derived	from	a	given	source	to	prevail	over	rules	from	another	source	(lex	superior	derogat	inferiori).	If	this	first	 technique	 is	 not	 applicable	we	 resort	 to	 the	 following	 techniques;	 a	 particular	rule	prevails	over	a	general	rule	(lex	specialis	derogat	generali)	and	later	rule	prevails	over	earlier	rules	(lex	specialis	derogate	generali).			
Is	global	IPRs	regime	a	“self-contained	regime”?		Before	initiating	the	analysis	of	the	various	techniques	for	the	resolution	of	potential	conflicts	of	law,	it	is	important	to	see	whether	the	IPR	new	regime	and	in	general,	the	trade	regime	is	subject	to	be	coherent	with	a	more	general	system	which	will	be	the	wider	 corpus	 of	 international	 law,	 i.e,	 are	 WTO	 rules	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 public	international	law	whose	rules	may	potentially	conflict	with	other	international	public	rules?	This	question	 is	not	 trivial	 since	 there	are	 scholars	who	regard	 international	law	as	no	more	than	the	sum	of	fragmented	subsystems	of	law	which	may	constitute	normative	closure	of	a	particular	regime73	in	a	pluralistic	and	horizontal	framework	of	international	law	and	thus,	they	resolve	their	potential	contradictions	within	their	own	system	of	rules	and	interpretations.		
																																																								
72 Howse, R. (2002). Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann. 
European Journal of International Law, 13(3), 651-659. and Alston, P. (2002). Resisting the merger and 
acquisition of human rights by trade law: a reply to Petersmann. European Journal of International Law, 13(4), 
815-844. 
73 Simma, B., & Pulkowski, D. (2006). Of planets and the universe: self-contained regimes in international law. 
European Journal of International Law, 17(3), 483-529. 
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The	 phrase	 “self-contained	 regime”	 was	 first	 coined	 by	 the	 Permanent	 Court	 of	International	Justice	in	the	S.S.	Wimbledon	case74and	became	popular	in	the	Teheran	
Hostages	 judgement75where	 the	Court	 concluded	 that	 the	 rules	of	diplomatic	 law,	 in	
short,	 constitute	 a	 self-contained	 regime	 which,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 lays	 down	 the	
receiving	 State’s	 obligations	 regarding	 the	 facilities,	 privileges	 and	 immunities	 to	 be	
accorded	to	the	diplomatic	missions	 […].	This	phrase	and	the	context	in	which	it	was	used	served	to	some	scholars	to	conceptualize	the	notion	of	“self-contained	regime”	as	an	entirely	autonomous	and	isolated	legal	system	from	general	international	law,	a	system	which	intends	to	totally	exclude	the	application	of	general	 international	 law,	in	particular,	the	consequences	and	effects	resulting	from	wrongful	acts	or	from	the	breach	of	 commitments	and	obligations.	WTO	with	 its	 focus	on	 trade	 liberalization,	and	 all	 the	 machinery	 of	 new	 procedures	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 and	 surveillance	intended	 to	 deliver	 the	 regime	 with	 the	 attributes	 of	 security	 and	 certainty	 while	encapsulating	 the	 system	 and	 its	 functioning	 from	 any	 alien	 and	 unwanted	interference,	could	be	an	example	of	what	we	have	said.		Most	 international	 law	 scholars	 and	 lawyers	 hold	 that	WTO	 rules	 and	 TRIPS	 are	 a	branch	of	general	international	law.	In	this	sense,	even	international	law	scholars	in	favor	 of	WTO	 rules	 argue	 that	 the	 fact	 that	many	 negotiators	 and	 lobbyists	 of	 the	WTO	treaty	did	not	 think	of	public	 international	 law	when	negotiating	and	drafting	the	WTO	 treaty	 is	 not	 a	 valid	 legal	 argument	 to	 isolate	WTO	 law	 from	 the	 rest	 of	international	 law.76The	Appellate	Body	of	the	WTO	itself	has	acknowledged	that	the	GATT	is	imbedded	in	general	international	law,	asserting	that	the	Agreement	is	not	to	be	read	in	public	isolation	from	public	international	law77.	In	this	sense,	despite	being	a	 strong	 regime,	WTO	 rules	would	 constitute	 lex	 specialis	 vis-à-vis	 certain	 rules	 of	general	 international	 law.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 WTO	 rules	 are	 lex	specialis	 vis-à-vis	 all	 rules	 of	 international	 law	 since	 WTO	 rules	 have	 a	 potential																																																									
74 Britain et al. v. Germany, (1923) PCIJ Series A01 is a judgment rendered on August 17th, 1923. The case 
primarily dealt with issues pertaining to attributes of sovereignty, treaty obligations qua internal law, and the 
jurisprudence related to international canals. The Court was faced with the question whether the provisions of 
a given specific treaty should be applied by prevailing over other more general rules on watercourses. The 
Court used the term of “self-containment” to resolve in favor of the application of the specific treaty. 
75 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, United States v Iran, Judgment, ICJ GL No 64, 
[1980] ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 124 (ICJ 1980), 24th May 1980 
76 Pauwelyn, J. (2001). The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go?. American 
Journal of International Law, 535-578. 
77 Report on “United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline” (WT/DS2/AB/R) 
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impact	on	almost	all	other	fields	of	law	which	should	be	dully	assessed.	Also,	as	it	is	implied	by	art.	3.2	of	the	Dispute	Settlement	Understanding	which	sets	out	that	WTO	covered	 agreements	 must	 be	 clarified	 “in	 accordance	 with	 customary	 rules	 of	interpretation	of	public	international	law”,	WTO	is	partially	incomplete	in	areas	such	as	interpretation,	standard	of	review,	burden	of	proof	and	other	procedural	issues	for	which	general	international	law	has	to	be	referred.			Notwithstanding	this,	and	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	above	legal	construction	of	the	treaties	integrating	WTO	and	TRIPS	permit	to	formally	conclude	that	WTO	treaty	and	WTO	 dispute	 settlement	 are	 integral	 parts	 of	 public	 international	 law	 and	 that	consequently,	 they	 are	 not	 “self-contained”	 regimes,	 the	 functioning	 and	jurisprudence	to	date	shows	us	a	quite	different	picture.	In	effect,	the	strict	formalism	of	WTO	 panels	 into	 the	 interpretation	 of	WTO	 norms,	 its	 official	 aim	 of	 providing	security	and	predictability	to	the	multilateral	trading	system	and	the	alleged	“judicial	economy”	 to	 avoid	 pronouncing	 on	 issues	 which	 are	 not	 necessary	 to	 resolve	 the	specific	 complain-every	 non-trade	 concern	 is	 suspicious	 of	 favoring	 potential	protectionism-,	 has	 led	 to	 a	 situation	where	no	 state	has	 yet	 invoked	human	 rights	obligations	 in	 a	dispute	under	 the	WTO78.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	account	 that	 in	practice,	 and	 in	 view	of	 the	WTO	 remedial	machinery	 (DSU),	 states	would	 prefer	 to	 comply	 with	 specific	 trade	WTO	 rules	 such	 as	 TRIPS	 even	 if	 that	compliance	 does	 not	 fully	 respect	 other	 general	 international	 law	 obligations.	 In	short,	 TRIPS	 could	 have	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 succeeded	 in	 insulating	 IPRs	 from	interferences	 of	 other	 bodies	 of	 law	 which	 demand	 to	 frame	 WTO	 rules	 and	 in	particular,	 TRIPS	 into	 a	 larger	 global	 public	 law	 and	 humanitarian	 health	 concerns	context.							In	 the	opposite	direction	 to	 the	above	mentioned	 “voluntary	pursued	 insulation”	of	TRIPS	 autonomous	 functioning,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 say	 that	 the	 mentioned	shortcomings	 of	 WTO	 and	 in	 particular	 of	 TRIPS	 regime	 in	 terms	 of	 lack	 of	international	legitimacy	and	democratic	deficit	together	with	the	increasing	openness	of	WTO	to	a	common	culture	of	international	lawyers	and	international	law	scholars																																																									
78 Picciotto, Sol. (2011). Regulating global corporate capitalism. Cambridge University Press. 
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is	 making	 this	 system	 gradually	 permeable	 to	 general	 international	 law	considerations	 other	 than	 the	 specific	 trade-focused	 concerns.	 In	 effect,	 in	 the	dynamic	 tension	 between	 universalistic	 or	 all-the-factors	 approach	 and	particularistic	 view	–favoring	 a	 factual	 prevalence	 of	 some	 (neoliberal)	 values	 over	the	 remaining	 considerations-	 the	 last	 word	 could	 not	 have	 been	 spoken	 yet.	 The	intended	isolated	and	autonomous	regime	which	purports	to	factually	put	free	trade	and	property	at	the	very	first	place	by	giving	them	a	quasi-constitutional	status	in	the	new	international	order,	is	being	–as	we	have	seen	in	previous	chapters-	increasingly	questioned	and	threatened	by	legitimacy	challenges	which	suggests	a	shifting	in	the	hegemonic	 discourse	 towards	 more	 inclusive	 models	 where	 internationally	recognized	ethical	positions,	 counterhegemonic	voices	and	concerns	and	other	 type	considerations	claim	their	place.						
Ius	cogens,	a	beautiful	utopia	with	a	difficult	landing.		Therefore,	and	assuming	that	theoretically	TRIPS	has	to	be	confronted	to	other	legal	norms	of	public	international	law,	it	is	important	to	analyze	how	WTO	rules	such	as	TRIPS	 coexist	 with	 other	 bodies	 of	 law	 and	 how	 the	 international	 legal	 order	 and	some	 superior	 rules	 such	 as	 ius	 cogens	 could	 affect	 the	 IPR	 system	 from	 an	international	legal	reasoning.			As	 we	 know,	 in	 principle	 there	 is	 not	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 sources	 in	international	law.	International	law	is	decentralized	–fragmented	for	many-	and	does	not	have	a	central	legislator	or	legislators	creating	the	rules.	Furthermore,	states	are	at	the	same	time	the	legislators	of	the	rules	and	the	subjects	of	such	rules.	The	lack	of	formal	hierarchy	in	international	law	is	the	result	of	the	assumptions	that	all	rules	in	the	international	realm	derive	from	state	consent,	states	which	on	the	other	hand	are	formally	 equals	 as	 creators	 of	 law,	 therefore,	 they	 are	 presumed	 to	 have	 the	 same	binding	 and	 formal	 value.	 These	 premises	 are	 seen	 by	 some	 international	 law	scholars	 as	 necessary	 to	 guarantee	 the	 neutrality	 of	 international	 law79;	 the	 same	legal	 value	 of	 international	 rules	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 peaceful	 co-existence																																																									
79 Weil, P. (1983). Towards relative normativity in international law. Am. J. int'l L., 77, 413. 
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between	 states	 and	 to	 enhance	 the	 cooperation	 –in	 contrast	 with	 subordination-	between	equal	states	in	the	achievement	of	common	goals.			Despite	 the	 above,	 since	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 as	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 Second	World	War	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 UN,	 there	 has	 been	certain	 emerging	 hierarchy	 of	 some	 values	 and	 rules	 which	 are	 considered	 to	 be	superior,	 universal	 and	 binding	 worldwide	 beyond	 the	 state	 consent	 itself.	 Those	superior	rules	are	gathered	under	the	term	ius	cogens.	The	Vienna	Convention	defines	
ius	cogens	in	its	art.	53	as	one	accepted	and	recognized	by	the	international	community	
of	States	as	a	whole	as	a	norm	from	which	no	derogation	is	permitted	and	which	can	be	
modified	 only	 by	 a	 subsequent	 norm	 of	 general	 international	 law	 having	 the	 same	
character.		Vienna	Convention	does	not	determine	the	source	where	those	rules	of	ius	
cogens	should	derive	from.	The	high	status	of	these	kind	of	rules	do	not	derive	then	from	 their	 source,	 but	 it	 is	 rather	 based	 on	 its	 acceptance	 and	 recognition	 by	 the	international	community	from	which	derogation	is	not	permitted.	Although	there	is	a	near-universal	consensus	about	the	existence	of	the	category	of	ius	cogens	norms,	the	contours	of	this	concept	and	its	scope	are	however	far	from	being	uncontroverted.			One	of	the	first	discrepancies	on	this	type	of	rules	 is	referred	to	which	sources	may	create	 ius	 cogens.	 While	 some	 consider	 that	 only	 customary	 law	 could	 create	 ius	
cogens,	other	scholars	hold	however	that	both	treaties	and	principles	of	law	would	be	also	able	 to	create	 ius	cogens	norms	and	rules.	Historically	 ius	cogens	was	rooted	 in	the	 theory	of	natural	 law.	 In	 this	 sense,	 a	 treaty	 could	be	 void	 if	 it	was	 contrary	 to	natural	law,	morality	or	basic	principles	of	international	law.	The	Vienna	Convention	would	 come	 to	 first	 codify	 the	 concept	 of	 ius	 cogens,	 a	 concept	 existing	 however	outside	 the	 treaty	context80.	The	Vienna	Convention	(art.	64)	clearly	establishes	 the	effects	and	the	consequences	of	the	existence	of	peremptory	norms;	a	treaty	 is	void	and	null	 if	 it	 conflicts	with	a	norm	belonging	 to	 ius	 cogens81.	 For	our	purposes	 it	 is	important	to	examine	whether	the	human	right	to	health	and	the	access	to	affordable	medicines	 fall	 within	 the	 category	 of	 ius	 cogens	 or	 any	 other	 category	 of	 superior																																																									
80 Weatherall, Thomas. (2015). Jus Cogens: International Law and Social Contract. Cambridge University 
Press. 
81 Article 64 explicitly states: If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing 
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates 
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rules.	 Once	 this	 aspect	 will	 be	 clarified,	 a	 second	 step	 shall	 consist	 of	 assessing	whether	TRIPS	or	certain	TRIPS	grounded	impairments	to	access	to	medicines	could	be	considered	as	amounting	to	a	violation	of	the	human	right	to	health.			As	we	have	mentioned	previously,	apart	from	the	discussion	about	the	sources,	there	is	 also	 an	 important	 discrepancy	 as	 to	 which	 rules	 or	 which	 content	 should	 be	considered	 and	 categorized	 as	 ius	 cogens	 or	 peremptory	 norms.	 There	 are	 some	scholars	who	consider	that	human	rights	–in	general-	should	be	recognized	as	having	peremptory	status	–as	the	European	legislation	tends	to	do-.82This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	 at	 the	 time	 of	 drafting	 the	 Vienna	 Convention,	 some	 states	mentioned	 human	rights	in	their	enumeration	of	peremptory	norms.	However,	the	peremptory	status	of	human	 rights	 or	 of	 all	 human	 rights	 remains	 controversial	 and	 the	 states	 have	different	 views	 on	 the	 matter.	 Some	 other	 scholars	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 three	categories	of	ius	cogens;	1)	the	rules	protecting	the	foundations	of	international	order	(the	prohibition	of	genocide	or	of	the	use	of	force	in	international	relations	except	in	self-defense);	 2)	 the	 rule	 concerning	 peaceful	 cooperation	 in	 the	 protection	 of	common	 interests	 (freedom	 of	 the	 seas)	 and	 the	 rules	 protecting	 the	 most	fundamental	and	basic	human	rights,	and;	3)	rules	for	the	protection	of	the	civilians	in	time	of	war83.	Also,	 the	Barcelona	Traction	case84is	mentioned	as	a	 judicial	decision	which	 implicitly	 defines	 jus	 cogens	 rules	 as	 those	 basic	 rights	 of	 the	 human	 person	including	the	prohibition	of	slavery	and	racial	discrimination	and	the	prohibition	of	aggression	and	genocide85.			Anyway,	it	has	to	be	said	that	even	if	there	is	an	agreement	about	the	convenience	of	the	existence	of	a	non-derogable	moral	order	informing	international	relations	and	its	effects	 and	 consequences,	 the	 definition	 of	 ius	 cogens	 has	 been	 an	 object	 of	 sharp	disagreement	 rather	 than	 a	 catalogue	 of	 unquestionable	 and	 unobjectionable	imperative	 norms.	 Despite	 at	 a	 first	 glance	 and	 following	 Vienna	 Convention	 ius	
cogens	would	be	 at	 the	 top	of	 an	 eventual	 hierarchy	of	 international	 law	norms,	as																																																									
82 Hannikainen, Lauri. (1988). Peremptory norms (jus cogens) in international law: Historical development, 
criteria, present status. Vol. 1. Coronet Books Inc. 
83 Hossain, K. (2005). The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the UN Charter. Santa Clara J. 
Int'l L., 3, i.  
84 Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep. 1970, 
85 Malanczuk, P. (2002). Akehurst's modern introduction to international law. Routledge. 
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noted	by	 some	 scholars,	 the	 indeterminate	 contents	 of	 these	 rules	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	suspicion	 that	 either	 jus	 cogens	norms	 are	 so	 indisputable	 that	 its	 codification	 and	definition	is	not	necessary	and	adds	nothing	to	their	quality,	or	so	disputed	that	they	never	meet	the	criteria	for	their	creation,	namely,	the	acceptance	and		recognition	by	the	international	community	of	States86.			In	this	sense,	this	vagueness	of	the	concept	suggest	that	ius	cogens	does	not	constitute	a	closed	order	with	their	own	immanent	coherence	and	autonomous	rationality	and	“emancipated	 life”	 but	 rather	 a	 site	 of	 contestation;	 a	 tension	 ridden	 juridical	
field87where	competing	views	of	power	and	scale	of	values	come	to	define	and	give	a	circumstantial	and	short-term	content;	an	appreciated	but	empty	box	which	could	be	filled	conveniently	with	a	range	of	materials	which	do	not	respond	to	the	best	rational	argument	or	the	best	“material”	for	the	general	interest	but	to	a	balance	of	power.	As		Umut	Özsu	explains,	ius	cogens	activists	and	proponents	have	showed	a	poor	capacity	to	achieve	the	emancipation	of	those	special	rules,	a	fact	that	is	due	in	no	small	part	to	the	abstract,	even	speculative,	utopianism	by	which	the	notion	of	jus	cogens	(like	that	of	human	rights)	is	ultimately	inspired.88In	fact,	there	are	virtually	no	cases	where	art.	53	has	been	invoked	to	invalidate	a	treaty	so	the	potential	and	practical	application	of	the	supremacy	of	ius	cogens	remains	to	be	put	to	the	test89.			
Human	rights	vs.	Human	rights?		In	 any	 case	 and	 following	 the	 theoretical	 exercise	 of	 seeing	 whether	 the	 right	 to	health	amounts	to	a	ius	cogens	rule,	thus	having	the	potential	of	invalidating	TRIPS	or	certain	 applications,	 implementations	 or	 interpretations	 of	 TRIPS	 –as	 it	 may	 pose	important	 obstacles	 to	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 right	 to	 health	 in	 terms	 of	 access	 to	medicines-.	 However,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 we	 cannot	 be	 too	 optimistic	 about	 the	results	of	that	confrontation.	In	this	respect	and	due	to	the	fact	that	the	human	right																																																									
86 Weiler, J. H., & Paulus, A. L. (1997). The Structure of Change in International Law or Is There a Hierarchy 
of Norms in International Law?. European Journal of International Law, 8(4), 545-565. 
87 Bourdieu, P. (1986). The force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical field. Hastings LJ, 38, 805. 
88 Özsu, U. (2017). An Anti-Imperialist Universalism? Jus Cogens and the Politics of International Law. 
International Law and Empire: Historical Explorations, 295. 
89 Pauwelyn, J. (2003). Conflict of norms in public international law: how WTO law relates to other rules of 
international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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to	health	is	categorized	as	one	economic	and	social	right	or	third	generation	right90,	scholars	 hold	 that	 the	 right	 to	 health	 would	 be	 not	 a	 non-derogable	 right	 under	present	international	law91.				Assuming	that	the	human	right	to	health	is	not	an	integral	part	of	the	ius	cogens	rules	-	 as	 it	 is	observed	by	most	of	 scholars-,	 one	may	wonder	which	body	of	 law	would	prevail	in	case	of	an	eventual	conflict	between	both.	First,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	human	rights	also	encompass	the	protection	of	 the	moral	and	material	 interest	resulting	from	creative	production	and	thus,	some	IPRs	dimension	could	be	said	to	be	covered	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 human	 rights.	 In	 particular,	 art.	 15	 of	 the	 ESCR	Covenant	 establishes	 that	 The	 States	 Parties	 to	 the	 present	 Covenant	 recognize	 the	
right	 of	 everyone:	 […]	 c)	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 moral	 and	 material	
interests	resulting	from	any	scientific,	 literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he	is	the	
author.	 Also,	 article	 27	 paragraph	 2	 of	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	provides	 that	 everyone	 has	 the	 right	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 moral	 and	 material	
interests	resulting	from	any	scientific,	 literary	or	artistic	production	of	which	he	is	the	
author.			However,	 General	 Comment	 17	 (2005)	 which	 constitutes	 an	 authoritative	pronouncement	 on	 article	 15(1)(c),92shows	 a	 remarkable	 concern	 in	 distinguishing	the	 right	 contemplated	 in	 art.	 15(1)(c)	 from	 IPRs.	 The	 repetitive	 observations	 and	explanations	in	this	sense	may	seem	exaggerated	and	it	even	makes	the	scope	of	the	article	 depart	 from	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 its	 wording	 and	 literalism.	 The	 first	paragraph	of	General	 Comment	17	 explains	 that	 this	 human	 right	 derives	 from	 the	
inherent	 dignity	 and	 worth	 of	 all	 persons	 and	 that	 this	 fact	 distinguishes	 article	 15,	
paragraph	 1	 (c),	 and	 other	 human	 rights	 from	most	 legal	 entitlements	 recognized	 in	
intellectual	 property	 systems.	Although	General	 Comment	 provides	 that	whereas	 the	
human	right	to	benefit	from	the	protection	of	the	moral	and	material	interests	resulting																																																									
90 Right to health would imply for States the obligation to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the 
enjoyment of the right; they should take measures to prevent third parties from interfering with the guarantees 
provided and in positive or active terms, they should adopt appropriate legislative, administrative and other 
measures towards the full realization of the right.  
91 Cullet, P. (2003). Patents and medicines: the relationship between TRIPS and the human right to health. 
International Affairs, 79(1), 139-160. 
92 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fifth session, Geneva, 7-25 November 2005. 
177		
from	 one’s	 scientific,	 literary	 and	 artistic	 productions	 safeguards	 the	 personal	 link	
between	authors	and	their	creations	and	between	peoples,	communities,	or	other	groups	
and	their	collective	cultural	heritage,	as	well	as	their	basic	material	interests	which	are	
necessary	 to	 enable	 authors	 to	 enjoy	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living,	 intellectual	
property	 regimes	 primarily	 protect	 business	 and	 corporate	 interests	 and	 investments,	nothing	in	IPRS	laws	prevents	individuals	and	“artisan	type	authors”	from	enjoying	of	IPRs.	According	to	the	interpretation	given	by	this	Comment,	legal	entities	would	not	be	protected	at	the	level	of	human	rights.	Also,	there	are	some	who	claim	that	art.	15	(1)(c)	 should	 be	 employed	 to	 protect	 intellectual	 creations	 such	 as	 “traditional	knowledge”	which	is	always	out	of	the	scope	of	protection	by	IPRs93.		General	Comment	17	seem	however	to	be	reasonable	when	saying	that	the	protection	provided	by	article	15	(1)(c)	does	not	reflect	the	level	and	means	of	protection	found	in	
present	copyright,	patent	and	other	intellectual	regimes.	In	fact,	one	may	consider	that	the	right	 to	benefit	 from	the	protection	of	 the	moral	and	material	 interests	of	one’s	creative	work	can	be	materialized	by	methods	or	formulas	other	than	exclusive	rights	granted	 by	 IPRs	 such	 as	 public	 compensation	 or	 other	 type	 of	 benefits.	 This	 is	 an	important	point	 to	be	noted	 i.e.	 IPRs	or	exclusive	rights	 is	one	of	 the	ways	–but	not	the	only-	 by	which	 an	 author’s	 right	might	be	protected	by	 the	 State.	 Furthermore,	art.	 11.1	 of	 this	 Covenant	 provides	 that	 the	 States	 Parties	 to	 the	 present	 Covenant	
recognize	 the	 right	 of	 everyone	 to	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living	 for	 himself	 and	 his	
family	[…].	This	goal	“adequate	standard	of	living”	is	directly	linked	with	the	material	
interests	 contemplated	 in	art.	 15	 (1)(c)	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	protection	of	 the	 right	should	contribute	to	ensure	an	adequate	standard	of	living.	Even	if	it	is	not	mentioned	in	 the	 General	 Comment	 17,	 the	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living	 could	 constitute	 an	interesting	threshold	to	be	taken	into	account	when	there	is	a	conflict	between	IPRs	and	 other	 rights	 or	 interests,	 i.e.,	 we	 could	 use	 this	 measure	 (does	 the	 protection	contribute	 to	 an	 adequate	 standard	 of	 living?)	 at	 the	 time	 of	 striking	 an	 adequate	balance	between	all	the	interests	at	stake,	since	many	times	IPRs	provide	their	owner	with	a	 compensation	 remarkably	beyond	 that	 corresponding	 to	 the	 threshold	of	 an	adequate	standard	of	living.																																																										
93 Cullet, P. (2007). Human rights and intellectual property protection in the TRIPS era. Human Rights 
Quarterly, 29(2), 403-430. 
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	On	 the	other	hand,	article	17	of	 the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	 (UDHR)	establishes	that	everyone	has	the	right	to	own	property	alone	as	well	as	in	association	with	 others	 (paragraph	 1)	 and	 that	 no	 one	 shall	 be	 arbitrarily	 deprived	 of	 his	property	(paragraph	2).	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	in	this	thesis	it	is	held	that	IPRs	do	not	have	 the	attributes	of	real	property,	and	that	 the	mention	of	 this	right	 in	 the	UDHR	was	certainly	 controversial,	 the	 recognition	of	 the	human	right	 to	property	and	 the	usually	 unproblematic	 inclusion	 of	 IPRs	 under	 the	 right	 to	 real	 property	 may	 add	another	argument	to	hold	that	some	dimensions	of	IPRs	may	belong	to	the	realm	of	human	 rights94.	 In	 any	 case,	 despite	 the	 pronouncements	 that	 all	 human	 rights	 are	indivisible,	interdependent,	interrelated	and	normatively	equal,	there	is	a	tendency	to	establish	certain	hierarchy	within	the	sphere	of	human	rights	at	the	top	of	which	they	we	will	find	ius	cogens	rules.	While	most	States	and	International	Organizations	have	accepted	 –at	 least	 from	 a	 theoretical	 perspective-	 a	 wide	 ranging	 corpus	 of	 legal	obligations	 in	 the	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 areas,	 the	 strength	 and	 scope	 of	those	 obligations	 may	 be	 different	 depending	 on	 the	 value	 attached	 to	 the	corresponding	norm.	There	are	scholars	who	identify	even	six	normative	categories	of	international	law	with	various	implications	in	terms	of	human	rights	hierarchy.95		This	being	so,	 in	a	hypothetical	violation	of	the	human	right	to	health	and	a	conflict	between	 human	 rights	 law	 and	 IPRs,	 which	 one	 should	 prevail?	 According	 to	 the	Office	 of	 the	High	Commissioner	 for	Human	Rights	 in	 an	 eventual	 conflict	 between	both	 bodies	 of	 law,	 human	 rights	 should	 take	 precedence	 when	 it	 reminds	 all	governments	 the	 primacy	 of	 human	 rights	 under	 international	 law	 over	 economic	
policies	 and	 agreements	 and	 called	 on	 states	 to	 ensure	 that	 TRIPS	 should	 not	negatively	impact	on	the	enjoyment	of	human	rights96.	Also,	there	are	some	who	see	the	 combination	 of	 article	 55	 of	 the	 UN	 Charter	 -which	 provides	 that	 UN	 shall	promote	 among	 others	 the	 observance	 of	 human	 rights-	 and	 article	 103	 -which	establishes	that	in	the	event	of	conflict	between	obligations	under	the	UN	Charter	and	obligations	 under	 any	 other	 international	 agreement,	 UN	 Charter	 obligations	 shall																																																									
94 Art 17 of UDHR is often framed within the field of natural persons regarding their possessions where 
property is used for personal consumption rather than production.   
95 Seiderman, I. D. (2001). Hierarchy in international law: the human rights dimension. Intersentia.  
96 Sub-Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/21 
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prevail-,	as	an	additional	argument	to	claim	the	de	jure	primacy	of	human	rights	over	obligations	resulting	from	TRIPS.			Therefore,	the	following	question	to	be	raised	is	whether	TRIPS	can	be	said	to	be	at	certain	 point	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 human	 right	 to	 health,	 in	 which	 cases	 and	 under	which	 conditions.	 In	 this	 respect,	 CESCR	 General	 Comment	 No.	 1497	 establishes	different	types	of	violations	of	the	human	right	to	health	in	its	paragraph	46	to	52.	In	particular,	within	the	category	of	acts	of	commission,	the	CESCR	mentions	the	formal	
repeal	or	suspension	of	legislation	necessary	for	the	continued	enjoyment	of	the	right	to	
health	or	the	adoption	of	legislation	or	policies	which	are	manifestly	incompatible	with	
pre-existing	domestic	or	international	legal	obligations	in	relation	to	the	right	to	health.	Therefore,	if	compliance	with	TRIPS	leads	to	rises	in	drug	prices	and	the	destruction	of	 local	pharmaceutical	 industries	which	 lead	to	reduced	access	 to	pharmaceuticals,	this	 could	 imply	 in	 theory	 a	 substantive	 violation	of	 the	human	 right	 to	 health	 and	ultimately	 the	 human	 right	 to	 life	 and	 the	 ESCR	 Covenant	 –a	 “deliberately	retrogressive”	step-.			Notwithstanding	 that,	 the	 judicial	 pronouncement	 –or	 by	 any	 other	 adjudicatory	organ-	on	 the	violation	of	 the	human	 right	 to	health	by	TRIPS	 seems	difficult	 to	be	effectively	made.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 ESCR	Covenant	 does	 not	 require	 immediate	 full	implementation	of	the	right	to	health	but	to	achieve	progressively	the	full	realization	of	 it	 (art.2)	without	establishing	a	precise	deadline	as	 it	 is	 for	example,	 the	case	 for	TRIPS	implementation	deadlines.	Also,	while	TRIPS	obligations	are	precisely	drafted	and	backed	by	an	effective	dispute	settlement	mechanism,	human	rights	treaties	and	covenants	 are	 drafted	 in	 much	 broader	 and	 vague	 terms	 and	 there	 is	 no	 any	enforcement	 mechanism.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 attempt	 to	reconcile	 all	 their	 international	 obligations	 and	 to	 avoid	 conflicts.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	could	 be	 argued	 by	 those	 favoring	 the	 implementation	 of	 TRIPS	 that	 States	 could	make	 compatible	 both	 international	 obligations	 –human	 right	 to	 health	 and	 TRIPS	obligations-	by	adopting	measures	to	offset	price	increases	such	as	providing	public	subsidies	 to	make	medicines	affordable	 for	 the	poorest	–as	 it	was	suggested	by	 the																																																									
97 Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 11 
August 2000 (Contained in Document E/C.12/2000/4) 
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World	Bank98-	 and/or	 investing	 public	 resources	 for	 R&D	 addressed	 to	 diseases	 of	developing	countries.							Therefore,	in	order	to	conclude	this	chapter,	it	is	important	to	note	that	human	rights	regime	does	not	seem	to	be	a	helpful	instrument	or	a	valid	framework	to	balance	or	to	offset	TRIPS	worse	effects	at	 least	 in	a	simple	and	direct	way.	First,	 the	peremptory	status	 of	 some	 superior	 norms,	 such	 as	 the	 primacy	 for	 all	 human	 rights,	 remains	controversial.	Prevalence	of	human	rights	resides	in	the	rhetoric	realm	of	the	“ought	
to	 be”	 rather	 than	 in	 the	 field	 of	 effective	 applications	 of	 law.	 Furthermore,	 the	pervasive	 disagreement	 about	 the	 scope	 and	 definition	 of	 human	 rights	 does	 not	permit	human	rights	to	constitute	a	sufficient	basis	for	the	legitimacy	of	international	law99.	 Many	 of	 the	 commitments	 embodied	 in	 the	 human	 rights	 treaties	 and	covenants	 are	 expressed	 in	 vague	 and	 idealistic	 language	 rather	 than	 prescribing	legal,	detailed	and	enforceable	obligations.	In	this	sense,	in	most	cases	human	rights	would	constitute	moral	aspirations	with	a	controversial	and	diluted	legal	value.								However,	human	rights	could	play	an	important	role	as	an	instrument	to	measure	and	value	 the	 “moral	density”	of	 certain	decisions	 in	a	democratic	deliberative-dialogue	context.	Human	 rights	 could	 constitute	 an	 ethical	 threshold	of	 certain	 international	decisions,	 in	 particular	 those	 decisions	 concerning	 TRIPS	 and	 IPRS	 regime	with	 an	impact	 on	 public	 health.	 Human	 rights	 should	 therefore	 contribute	 to	 define	 and	determine	 the	 framework	 and	 limits	 of	 the	 application	 of	 TRIPS	 and	 global	 IPRs	regime	as	a	conceptual	tool	to	frame	TRIPS	discourses,	a	valid	standard	to	be	claimed	and	argued	by	all	 the	voices	and	actors	 involved	 in	public	health	so	as	 to	allow	 the	recovery	of	international	legitimacy	and	effectiveness	of	some	international	decisions	which	are	 today	highly	 contested	and	challenged	due	 to	 its	 reductionist	and	partial	interest	bearer	character.	
																																																								
98 Global economic prospects and the developing countries 2002: making trade work for the world's poor 
where it states that […] remove from patent eligibility those drugs that are on, or will be on, the WHO Essential 
Drugs list, it is unlikely that such discrimination by product would be acceptable… A better alternative is to use 
public funds to purchase drugs or licenses […]  
99 Meyer, L. H. (2009). Legitimacy, justice and public international law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
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CHAPTER	5.	 GLOBAL	 PUBLIC	 GOODS	 AND	 GLOBAL	 PUBLIC	
INTEREST:	TOO	GLOBAL	TO	BE	TRUE?			
5.1.	 Health	and	Global	Public	Goods.		After	 having	 considered	 the	 new	 international	 scenario,	 its	 institutional	 dimension	and	 the	 market-oriented	 policies	 of	 health	 at	 a	 global	 scale,	 we	 have	 identified	 a	number	of	“market	failures”.	 In	this	sense,	we	have	identified	certain	conduct	of	the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 which	 jeopardizes	 the	 right	 to	 health	 (and	 access	 to	medicines)	while	it	does	not	ensure	any	of	the	virtues	announced	by	their	supporters.	Finally,	we	have	reviewed	the	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	today’s	called	global	governance,	in	particular	that	related	to	WTO	and	TRIPS,	a	crisis	that	is	related	to	its	democratic	deficit	 and	 its	 shortcomings	 in	 complying	 with	 certain	 goals.	 This	 chapter	 will	 go	through	 the	 legal	 and	 institutional	 formulae	 proposed	 by	 hegemonic	 forces	 of	globalization	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 compensate/alleviate	 the	 denounced	 failures	 and	ramping	inequality.				The	concept	of	Global	Public	Goods	(GPG)	in	the	context	of	international	governance	is	 borrowed	 from	 the	 public	 economics	 literature.	 It	 has	 been	 devised	 as	 a	way	 of	addressing	 and	 giving	 response	 to	 certain	 global	 problems	 by	 implementing	international	 cooperation.	 Taking	 for	 granted	 and	 assuming	 the	 paradigm	 of	Globalization,	 some	 authors1	 observe	 that	many	 of	 today’s	 international	 challenges	could	 be	 explained	 by	 an	 important	 undersupply	 or	wrong	 supply	 of	 global	 public	goods.	While	in	the	past,	most	areas	and	issues	of	public	policy	were	of	national	reach	and	therefore,	they	were	addressed	by	national	governments	overcoming	the	failures	of	the	market	and	providing	national	public	goods,	nowadays,	many	of	the	problems	affecting	human	beings	spill	across	borders	and	national	states	are	overwhelmed	and	unable	to	properly	handle	these	problems	of	international	dimension.	These	authors	argue	that	a	globalized	world	would	require	the	adoption	of	a	theory	of	global	public	goods,	a	political	solution	based	on	the	cooperation	between	states	and	other	private																																																									
1 Kaul, Inge, et al., eds.(2003). Providing global public goods: managing globalization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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agents	 to	achieve	crucial	goals	 to	society	such	as	 financial	stability,	human	security,	health	 or	 the	 reduction	 of	 environmental	 pollution.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 world	government,	GPGs	should	be	supplied	through	the	anarchic	and	horizontal	system	of	
international	governance2,	i.e.,	multilateral	cooperation.				Assuming	that	the	theoretical	model	of	GPG	does	not	question	the	present	trade	and	IPRs	 regime,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 explore	whether	 and	how	 this	 figure	may	 be	 applied	 to	 health,	 in	 particular,	 to	 the	 problem	 suffered	 by	some	 developing	 countries	 finding	 difficulties	 in	 ensuring	 to	 their	 population	 the	access	to	medicines	as	result	–among	others-	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	implemented	by	TRIPS	and	TRIPS	Plus.	In	this	sense,	GPG	would	be	analyzed	within	the	category	of	exogenous	 remedies	 proposed	 by	 today’s	 system	which	 attempt	 to	 counterbalance	the	undesired	effects	of	the	allegedly	inevitable	globalization	process.							
From	public	goods	to	global	public	goods.		The	idea	of	“public	goods”	can	be	traced	back	to	David	Hume’s	discussion	of	providing	for	the	“common	good”3.	Also,	economists	like	Adam	Smith,	David	Ricardo	and	David	Malthus	drew	attention	to	the	necessity	of	some	sort	of	concerted	action	to	provide	the	 community	with	public	or	 collective	goods.	Notwithstanding	 this,	 a	 general	 and	systematic	theory	of	public	goods	in	the	economics	literature	was	formulated	by	the	economist	 Paul	 A.	 Samuelson	 in	 1954	 in	 his	 article	 “The	 Pure	 Theory	 of	 Public	Expenditure”.	 Samuelson	 considered	 two	 categories	 of	 goods;	 ordinary	 private	consumption	 goods	 and	 collective	 consumption	 goods	 (public	 goods).	 This	 last	category	of	goods	would	be	 those	consumption	goods	which	all	enjoy	 in	common	 in	
the	sense	that	each	individual’s	consumption	of	such	a	good	leads	to	no	subtraction	from	
any	other	individual’s	consumption	of	that	good4.	Therefore,	these	types	of	goods	are	non-rivalrous,	 i.e.,	 they	 may	 be	 consumed	 by	 one	 consumer	 without	 preventing	simultaneous	consumption	by	others.																																																									
2 Barrett, Scott A. (2001). Financing global public goods. Global Public Policies and Programs: Implications for 
Financing and Evaluation, Proceedings from World Bank Workshop (Washington, DC: World Bank). 
3 Sagasti, F., & Timmer, V. (2008). An approach to the CGIAR as a provider of international public goods. A 
contribution to the work of the Independent Review Panel (IRP) of the CGIAR. 
4 Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. The review of economics and statistics, 
387-389. 
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	This	 concept	was	 applied	 to	 political	 science	 by	Mancur	Olson	 in	 1965	 in	 his	 book	“The	 logic	 of	 Collective	 Action”5.	 The	 most	 interesting	 point	 raised	 by	 Olson	 is	 the	questioning	of	the	premise	that	groups	of	individuals	with	common	interests	usually	attempt	 to	 advance	 collectively	 those	 common	 interests.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Olson	observes	interestingly	that	in	the	absence	of	coercion	or	some	other	special	device	or	incentive	 to	make	 individuals	 act	 in	 their	 common	 interest,	 rational,	 self-interested	individuals	 will	 not	 act	 to	 achieve	 their	 common	 or	 group	 interests	 but	 their	individual	 interests.	 Hence,	 without	 selective	 incentives	 to	 motivate	 participation,	collective	action	is	unlikely	to	occur	even	when	large	groups	of	people	with	common	interests	 exist.	 This	 professor	 argued	 that	 individuals	 in	 any	 group	 attempting	collective	action	will	have	incentives	to	"free	ride"	on	the	efforts	of	others	if	the	group	is	working	to	provide	public	goods.	Needless	to	say	that	this	could	also	be	the	case	for	states	 or	 other	 international	 actors	 -when	 speaking	 of	 collective	 or	 multilateral	action-	in	the	international	arena.			In	the	realm	of	 international	relations	scholarship,	the	notion	of	global	public	goods	raised	 an	 important	 interest	 throughout	 the	 1990s.	 Joseph	 Stiglitz	 extended	 the	concept	 of	 public	 goods	 to	 the	 international	 scenario6	 and	 Todd	 Sandler	 observed	that	actions	at	the	national	or	regional	 level	were	no	longer	sufficient	to	tackle	with	global	challenges7.	However,	 the	concept	of	Global	Public	Goods	(GPG)	has	gained	a	prominent	relevance	in	the	context	of	the	UN’s	Millenium	Development	Goals	and	it	was	 popularized	 by	 researchers	 associated	 with	 the	 United	 Nations	 Development	Program	 (UNDP)	 and	 the	 World	 Bank8.	 In	 particular,	 UNDP	 sponsored	 a	 research	project	(International	Development	Cooperation	and	Global	Public	Goods)	leaded	by	Inge	 Paul,	 the	 Director	 of	 the	 UNDP’s	 Office	 of	 Development	 Studies	 from	 1995	 to	2005.	These	works	were	closely	linked	to	foreign	aid	and	the	result	of	this	project	was	captured	in	3	books.																																																										
5 Olson, M. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups, second printing with 
new preface and appendix (Harvard Economic Studies). 
6 Stiglitz, J. E. (1995). The theory of international public goods and the architecture of international 
organizations. Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, United Nations. 
7 Sandler, T. (1997). Global challenges: an approach to environmental, political, and economic problems. 
Cambridge University Press. 
8 Ferroni, M. (2000). Reforming Foreign Aid: The Role of International Public Goods. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
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	The	first	book	(Global	Public	Goods:	International	Cooperation	in	the	21st	century)9	was	published	 in	1999	and	 it	was	an	 initiatory	 theory	on	GBGs.	 In	 this	book,	UNDP	brought	 GPGs	 from	 the	 national	 scale	 to	 the	 international	 realm.	 From	 the	 very	beginning	 the	 book	 recognizes	 that	 in	 order	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 new	 transnational	issues,	 it	 is	necessary	to	overcome	the	failure	of	the	markets	which	can	be	achieved	by	means	of	GPGs	and	that	there	are	 inadequate	 incentives	for	the	private	sector	to	supply	GPGs.	Also,	the	book	claims	that	we	should	be	willing	to	spend	money	on	these	GPGs	 through	 innovative	mechanisms	 that	would	 go	 beyond	 the	 concept	 of	 official	development	assistance.		According	 to	 this	 first	 book,	 in	 order	 for	 national	 public	 goods	 to	 qualify	 as	 global,	GPGs	must	cover	more	than	one	group	of	countries	(groups	determined	by	regional	forums,	 trade	 blocs,	 defense	 alliances	 or	 clubs);	 their	 benefits	 must	 reach	 a	 broad	spectrum	of	the	global	space	and;	they	must	meet	the	needs	of	the	present	generation	without	 jeopardizing	 those	 of	 future	 generations.	 Categorization	 of	 public	 goods	 as	global	public	goods	is	said	to	require	a	careful	assessment	and	impact	analysis	as	well	as	 participatory	 policy	 dialogue	 among	 all	 concerned	 actors	 and	 beneficiaries.	Furthermore,	 this	 book	 suggested	 three	 categories	 of	 GPGs:	 1)	 natural	 global	commons	 –such	 as	 climate	 and	 environmental	 issues-;	 2)	 human-made	 global	commons	–such	as	transnational	infrastructures	or	the	world’s	common	heritage	and;	3)	 global	 intangible	 conditions	 such	 as	 peace,	 health	 and	 financial	 stability.	 Also,	authors	 of	 this	 theory	 distinguish	 between	 final	 GPGs	 which	 may	 be	 tangible	(environment)	or	intangible	(peace	or	financial	stability)	and	Intermediate	GPGs	such	as	international	regimes	which	contribute	towards	the	provision	of	public	goods.		Due	to	criticism	about	the	fuzziness	of	the	concept,	the	second	book	(Providing	Global	
Public	 Goods:	managing	 Globalization)10	was	 published	 in	 2003.	 The	 second	 of	 this	series	of	works	redefine	in	a	broader	sense	the	definition	of	GPG	as	goods	that	are	in	the	public	domain	and	 it	 adopts	a	more	political	approach	 to	GPGs.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it																																																									
9 Kelleher, David. (2000). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. International 
Review of Public Administration 5.2: 153-156. 
10 Kaul, I., Conceicao, P., Le Goulven, K., & Mendoza, R. U. (Eds.). (2003). Providing global public goods: 
managing globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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explains	 that	 GPGs	 are	 largely	 a	matter	 of	 public	 policy	 choices.	 Finally,	 the	 UNDP	published	 a	 third	 book	 in	 2006	 (The	 New	 Public	 Finance:	 Responding	 to	 Global	
Challenges)11	 where	 the	 working	 group	 explored	 a	 number	 of	 new	 policies	 and	financing	instruments	to	cope	with	globalization	deficits	and	negative	effects.			
What	is	a	global	public	good?		Focusing	 on	 GPGs	 as	 it	 has	 been	 theorized	 by	 the	 above	 mentioned	 Project	underpinned	by	the	UNPD,	a	GPG	has	been	usually	defined	by	its	counterpart,	private	goods.	Unlike	 private	 goods	which	 tend	 to	 be	 excludable	 and	 rival	 in	 consumption,	GPGs	 have	 two	 essential	 characteristics:	 Non-excludability	 and	 non-rivalry.	 Non	excludability	 means	 that	 it	 is	 either	 impossible	 or	 prohibitively	 costly	 to	 exclude	those	who	do	 not	 pay	 for	 the	 good	 from	using	 or	 consuming	 it;	 once	 the	 good	 has	been	produced,	 its	 benefits	 accrue	 to	 all.	 The	non-rivalry	property	 implies	 that	 any	one	person’s	consumption	of	the	public	good	has	no	effect	on	the	amount	available	for	others;	it	does	not	detract	anything	from	its	consumption	by	other,	additional	person.			According	 to	 the	 traditional	 definition	 of	 public	 goods,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 because	 of	their	 nature	 as	 non-rivalrous	 in	 consumption	 and	non-excludable,	 public	 goods	 are	generally	 undersupplied	 and	 have	 to	 face	 free	 riding	 problems.	 This	 phenomenon	refers	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 incentives	 for	 private	 agents	 to	 finance	 supply	 of	 public	 goods	when	they	can	rely	on	others	 to	pay	 for	 their	provision.	This	undersupply	of	public	goods	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 case	 of	 market	 failures.	 In	 a	 national	 context	 this	undersupply	 or	 market	 failure	 justifies	 state	 intervention	 which	 traditionally	provides	public	goods	by	adopting	public	policies	and	binding	decisions	to	coordinate	and	regulate	the	necessary	resources	for	that	purpose.	However,	at	a	global	scale	and	in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 global	 government	 or	 superior	 authority	 and	 lack	 of	 legal	obligation,	provision	of	GPGs	can	only	be	obtained	–they	argue-	by	effective	and	real	cooperation	between	both	states	and	private	actors	(civil	society,	NGOs,	enterprises).			
																																																								
11 Kaul, I., & Conceição, P. (2006). The new public finance: responding to global challenges. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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Therefore,	GPGs	 theory	 is	especially	concerned	on	 the	analysis	of	 the	 incentives	 for	international	cooperation	(collective	action),	the	study	of	the	underlying	structure	of	incentives	 that	 promote	 or	 discourage	 collaboration	 among	 individuals,	 groups	 or	nation-states	and	the	free	ride	problem	that	it	arises	therefrom,	a	free	ride	problem	which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 or	 “rational”	 actors	 would	 tend	 to	pursue	exclusively	their	self-interest.	Hence,	the	states	would	be	initially	reluctant	to	cooperate	 if	 they	 can	 benefit	 of	 a	 certain	 good	without	 the	 necessity	 to	 pay	 for	 it.	Based	 on	 new	 institutional	 economics	 and	 game	 theory,	 authors	 of	 GPG	 concept	analyze	the	incentives	and	conditions	to	booster	international	cooperation.			Notwithstanding	 this,	 the	 important	 shortcomings	 faced	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 GPGs	which	 will	 be	 further	 discussed,	 has	 motivated	 a	 more	 and	 more	 complex	 and	confusing	configuration	of	the	concept.	In	this	sense	and	recognizing	that	only	a	few	goods	 qualify	 as	 purely	 private	 or	 purely	 public,	 GPGs’	 theorists	 find	 intermediate	categories	of	impure	GPGs	in	the	pure	private-pure	public	continuum.	Hence,	impure	public	 goods	 would	 fall	 into	 two	 categories;	 goods	 that	 are	 non-rivalrous	 in	consumption	but	excludable	are	club	goods	and	goods	that	are	mostly	non-excludable	but	rivalrous	in	consumption	are	common	pool	resources	which	tend	to	be	overused	in	the	absence	of	rules	and	binding	mechanisms	to	regulate	their	use	or	consumption.			A	 new	 proposal	 on	 public	 goods	 defended	 by	 Inge	 Kaul	 adopts	 a	 new	 definition	integrating	 three	 elements	 (the	 triangle	 of	 publicness);	 public	 goods	 have	 to	 be	inclusive,	 i.e,	 individuals	 and	 groups	 must	 have	 access	 to	 the	 good	 (publicness	 in	consumption);	based	on	participatory	decision-making	and	involvement	of	all	major	actors	 and	 stakeholders	 including	 developing	 countries	 and	 non-state	 actors	(publicness	in	provision)	and	must	offer	a	fair	and	meaningful	deal	for	all	(public	in	the	 distribution	 of	 benefits).	 Advocates	 of	 GPGs	 hold	 that	 providing	 GPGs	 offers	important	and	timely	suggestions	on	how	to	move	in	a	more	feasible	and	systematic	way	towards	a	fairer	process	of	globalization	that	works	in	the	interests	of	all.	As	we	will	 see,	 this	 new	 proposal	 constitutes	 a	 new	 step	 forward	 in	 moving	 away	 the	concept	of	public	good	from	its	original	economic	sense,	thus	distorting	even	more	its	meaning	and	scope.						
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One	important	feature	to	remark	about	the	theory	of	GPG	is	the	prominent	role	given	to	private	actors	other	 than	governments	 in	 the	provision	of	GPG.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	production	 of	 GPG	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of	 a	 “multi-actor”	 activity,	 involving	 the	public	at	 large,	civil	society	organizations,	private	enterprises	and	the	state.	Also,	as	we	will	see	and	in	order	to	avoid	a	growing	concern	about	the	possibility	that	GPGs	would	 be	 financed	 by	 new	 taxes,	 GPGs	 promoters	 explained	 that	 financing	 public	goods	is	a	question	of	optimizing	allocation	of	existing	resources	rather	than	raising	more	funds.			
Is	there	room	for	Health	in	GPGs	theory?		Most	economists	 think	 that	good	health	 is	not	properly	a	GPG	but	a	private	good12.	Besides	 the	 vagueness	 of	 the	 concept,	 framing	 health	 within	 the	 category	 of	 GPGs	tends	to	emphasize	the	 instrumental	nature	of	health	as	a	condition	to	 facilitate	the	globalization	process,	 i.e.,	the	smooth	development	of	global	capitalism	and	creation	of	a	global	market.	 In	spite	of	 the	fact	that	some	considerations	are	made	regarding	social	 exclusions	 and	 equity,	 GPGs	 theory	 under	 the	 UNDP	 project	 takes	 a	 similar	approach	when	GPGs	study	comes	to	health.	In	this	sense,	the	above	mentioned	UNDP	project’s	 first	 book	 (Global	 public	 goods:	 International	 cooperation	 in	 the	 21st	century)	 considers	health	 as	 an	 instrument	 at	 the	 service	 of	 capitalism	and	market	functioning;	people	and	companies	are	more	likely	to	 invest	 in	countries	where	health	
risks	are	manageable	 […]	Not	 surprisingly,	 a	 strong	 correlation	exists	between	health	
and	wealth.	Creating	a	healthy	environment,	then,	would	seem	to	make	good	economic	
sense	(p.	111).	 In	similar	 terms	 the	second	book	when	 it	 states	 for	example	 that	an	
educated	 and	 healthy	 population	 generates	 important	 private	 and	 public	 benefits.	
Educated	 people	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 productive	 and	 to	 contribute	 more	 to	 economic	
growth	and	development	[…]	(p.85).	This	approached	is	well	aligned	with	hegemonic	actors	of	 the	new	scenario	such	as	the	World	Bank	which	makes	the	case	that	good	health	is	critical	to	economic	development.13																																																										
12 World Health Organization. (2002). Global public goods for health: The report of working group 2 of the 
commission on macroeconomics and health.  
13 World Bank. (1993). World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health. New York: Oxford University 
Press retrieved from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5976. 
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The	above	mentioned	extensive	publications	emphasize	two	dimensions	of	health	as	a	 GPG;	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 global	 epidemiological	 surveillance	 and	 the	 problematic	raised	by	the	reluctance	of	governments	to	report	disease	outbreaks	and	the	lack	of	capacity	 of	 many	 countries	 to	 monitor	 public	 health	 and	 secondly;	 global	 non	communicable	 diseases	 due	 to	 bad	 consumption	 habits	 which	 are	 more	 and	more	global.	 As	 part	 of	 bad	 global	 consumption	 habits,	 global	 tobacco	 control	 and	 the	control	 of	 other	 illicit	 addictive	 substances	 are	 said	 to	 have	 strong	 public	 goods	characteristics.							GPGs	theory	notes	that	health	interdependence	is	deepening	as	result	of	globalization,	this	posing	new	challenges	 and	problematic	 issues.	As	 to	 the	 first	 challenge	 (global	epidemiological	 surveillance),	 it	 is	 held	 that	 the	 increased	 mobility	 of	 people	 and	goods	 in	 the	world	 there	may	be	 increasing	health	 risks	and	 threats	everywhere	 in	the	 world.	 Because	 of	 that,	 precise	 and	 complete	 information	 about	 current	 and	existing	 risks	 is	 of	 great	 interest	 and	 benefit	 to	 all	 countries	 and	 therefore	international	health	surveillance	would	constitute	a	GPG	itself	since	knowledge	about	the	world’s	health	is	non-rivalrous	in	consumption	and	non-excludable.		GPG	theory	is	then	 devised	 to	 foster	 international	 cooperation	 in	 disease	 surveillance	 through	specific	 proposed	 measures	 which	 tend	 to	 overcome	 the	 suspicion	 of	 affected	countries	 in	sharing	the	 information	and	contribute	 to	 the	creation	of	 the	 identified	GPG	–affected	countries	would	fear	the	negative	impact	of	the	publicity	about	a	health	outbreak	in	terms	of	faltering	tourism,	investments	or	even	trade	embargoes-.				As	to	the	treatment	for	non-communicable	diseases	as	a	GPG,	it	is	first	assumed	that	it	is	mostly	 private	 –the	 risk	 factors	 associated	with	 non-communicable	 diseases	 are	often	related	to	individual	choices	in	lifestyle	and	human	behavior	such	as	diet	or	lack	of	exercise-.	However,	it	is	held	that	due	to	globalization	many	health	threats	derived	from	 emerging	 infections,	 environmental	 threats	 and	 behavioral	 pathologies	 have	today	 a	 planetary	 reach	 and	 the	 characteristics	 to	 become	 a	 global	 public	 bad.	 For	instance,	it	is	argued	how	consumption	of	tobacco	(and	addiction	to	it)	is	not	a	totally	voluntary	 and	 free	 personal	 action	 but	 it	 is	 highly	 determined	 by	 the	 powerful	behavioral	influence	of	commercial	advertising.	Also,	passive	smoke	is	hazardous	and	most	 tobacco-related	 costs	 would	 be	 passed	 on	 to	 the	 public	 through	 medical	
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insurance	and	social	security.	All	this	-it	is	argued-is	a	strong	motive	to	consider	that	global	tobacco	control	–as	well	as	control	of	illicit	addictive	substances	facilitated	by	transnational	shipment	and	money	laundering-	may	be	a	global	public	good.			Similarly	one	of	the	most	serious	studies	about	the	application	of	the	GPG	concept	to	the	 health	 -Global	 public	 goods	 for	 health;	 health	 economic	 public	 perspectives14-	identifies	three	main	 issues	related	to	health	GPGs:	(1)	the	control	or	eradication	of	select	 communicable	 conditions	 (including	 polio,	 tuberculosis,	 antimicrobial	 drug	resistance),	and	the	health	consequences	of	a	number	of	global	environmental	”bads”	(such	 as	 the	 global	 climate	 change	 or	 the	 depletion	 of	 the	 ozone	 layer);	 (2)	 the	importance	 of	 knowledge	 (including	 medical	 knowledge,	 genomics	 knowledge,	 or	public	 health	 infrastructure	 and	 knowledge)	 as	 a	 critical	 element	 to	 improve	 to	people’s	 health;	 and	 (3)	 how	 to	 enable	 global	 public	 goods	 for	 health,	 such	 as	international	 law,	health	regulations	and	financing.	Interestingly	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	this	study	introduces	knowledge	in	the	field	of	health	as	an	eventual	GPG.	Pharmaceuticals	are	mostly	based	on	knowledge	obtained	through	sophisticated	and	costly	 processes.	 Pharmaceuticals	 patents’	 subject	matter	 is	 referred	 to	 knowledge,	knowledge	about	different	compounds	for	the	treatment	of	diseases.	In	this	sense,	the	non-rivalrous	and	non-excludable	nature	of	knowledge	(also	the	knowledge	covered	by	IPRs)	would	make	it	a	priori	the	perfect	candidate	to	become	a	GPG.	
	
GPGs	and	access	to	medicines.		However,	 the	 UNDP	 project	 did	 not	 address	 the	 access	 to	 medicines	 and	 the	pharmaceuticals	 –the	 knowledge	 implied	 in	 it-	 as	 potential	 candidates	 to	 become	GPGs.	In	general,	this	GPGs	approach	does	not	question	the	global	IPRs	regime.	UNDP	project	somehow	takes	for	granted	this	new	regime	as	part	of	the	inevitable	process	of	 globalization.	 	 Among	 the	 new	 economic	 realities	 caused	 by	 “global	 change”	 the	mentioned	seminal	UNDP’s	first	book	(p.	287)	expressly	recognizes	the	link	between	patent	 protection	 of	 new	 technologies	 under	 trade-related	 Intellectual	 Property	agreements	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 benefits	 of	 new	 technologies	 developed	 in	 the	 global																																																									
14 Woodward, David, and Nick Drager (2003). Global public goods for health; health economic public 
perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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market	 are	 unaffordable	 to	 the	 poor.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 IPRs	 and	 pharmaceutical	patents	 are	 even	 seen	 as	 a	 safeguard	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 public	good15.			Therefore,	 GPG	 theory	 takes	 for	 granted	 the	 “propertization”	 of	 knowledge	 in	 the	form	of	IPRs	and	patents.	GPG	theorists	keep	a	favorable	view	about	the	IPRs	regime	as	 the	 indispensable	mechanism	 to	 spur	 innovation	 in	 the	pharmaceutical	 field	and	provide	 new	 pharmaceuticals	 for	 the	 society,	 this	 including	 people	 living	 in	developing	countries.	 It	 is	believed	somehow	that	 innovative	products	developed	 in	wealthy	markets	will	 probably	 later	 ‘trickle-down’	 to	 the	 developing	world.	 In	 this	sense,	 GPGs	 theory	 would	 be	 addressed	 to	 resolve	 and	 alleviate	 the	failures/shortcomings	 of	 the	 current	 system	 of	 IPRs	 formally	 reflected	 globally	 in	TRIPS.					The	specific	consideration	of	medicines	as	GPG	has	been	discussed	in	the	context	of	the	AIDS	pandemic	and	the	difficulties	experienced	by	some	countries	to	have	access	to	 anti-retroviral	 treatments.	 The	 importance	 of	 these	 patented	 medicines	 -in	 the	fight	 against	 AIDS-	 reframed	medicines	 from	being	 understood	 as	 private	 goods	 to	eventual	GPG16.	The	fact	that	AIDS	also	affected	developed	world,	and	in	particular,	a	social	 sector	 with	 deep	 links	 with	 media	 –artistic	 and	 gay	 communities-	 probably	facilitated	 a	worldwide	 solidarity	 and	 political	mobilization	 regarding	 the	 rights	 of	developing	 countries	 to	 access	 generic	 versions	 of	 costly,	 patented	 antiretroviral	drugs	to	treat	HIV/AIDS17.		Notwithstanding	that,	and	taking	into	account	that	GPG	theory	takes	for	granted	and	does	 not	 question	 the	 IPRs	 regime	 as	 a	 valid	 tool	 to	 foster	 innovation	 and	 new	medicines,	 the	 emphasis	 of	 GPG	 theorists	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 field	 has	 been	centered	around	its	financing;	who	pays	what	and	for	whom.	In	this	sense,	a	special	focus	has	been	placed	on	the	underfunding	of	the	so-called	“neglected	diseases”	that																																																									
15 Brandi, C. (2010). Intellectual property rights as a challenge to providing global public goods: the cases of 
public health, food security and climate stability. 
16 Moon, S. (2009). Medicines as global public goods: The governance of technological innovation in the new 
era of global health. Glob Health Gov, 2(2), 70. 
17 t Hoen, E. F. (2009). The global politics of pharmaceutical monopoly power: drug patents, access, 
innovation and the application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health. AMB. 
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predominantly	 affected	 poor	 populations.	 In	 effect,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 the	current	regime	and	dominant	institutional	arrangements	for	the	development	of	new	medicines,	 in	which	 the	market	 fixes	 research	 priorities,	 lead	 to	 underfinance	R&D	investments	 in	 neglected	 diseases.	 According	 to	 the	 Global	 Forum	 for	 Health	Research,	 10/90	 Report	 on	 Health	 Research	 reflects	 that	 only	 10	 percent	 of	 the	world’s	R&D	dollars	are	addressed	to	improve	health	conditions	affecting	90	percent	of	 the	 population.	 This	 reality	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 an	 unethical	 imbalance	 that	needed	to	be	corrected18.	This	concern	is	said	to	be	justified	and	coherent	with	GPG	new	paradigm	of	global	health	which	deals	with	the	health	needs	of	the	people	of	the	whole	planet	versus	national	health	and	international	health	which	is	predominantly	focused	on	the	control	of	epidemics	across	the	boundaries	between	nations19.		In	this	respect,	GPG’s	characterization	of	governance	and	global	health	 fits	well	 into	the	 previously	 analyzed	 Public-Private	 Partnerships	 (PPPs)	 previously	 analyzed	 in	chapter	2	and	 their	 role	 regarding	neglected	diseases	where	public	administrations	partner	with	private	agents	such	as	companies,	corporations	and	non-governmental	organizations	to	develop	new	tools	for	health	needs	specific	to	the	developing	world.			The	 new	 PPPs	 are	 viewed	 as	 a	 new	 instrument	 to	 cope	 with	 shortcomings	 of	 the	existing	regime	of	 IPRs20.	While	 respecting	 the	current	 IPRs	regime,	PPPs	would	be	then	 the	 response	 to	 the	 new	 challenges	 posed	 by	 the	 globalization	 process	 in	 the	sense	that	PPPs	would	work	for	the	provision	of	GPGs	by	investing	in	medicines	for	neglected	diseases;	by	making	them	affordable	 for	all	and;	by	mobilizing	public	and	private	 expertise	 and	 resources.	 Among	 diverse	 PPPs	 -	 Bill	 &	 Melinda	 Gates	Foundation,	Medicines	for	Malaria	Venture	(MMV,	1999),	Global	Alliance	for	TB	Drug	Development	 (2000),	 Institute	 for	 OneWorld	 Health	 (IOWH,	 2001),	 the	 Drugs	 for	Neglected	Diseases	Initiative	(DNDi,	2001),	the	Foundation	for	Innovative	Diagnostics	(FIND,	2003)	-	it	is	very	illustrative	of	this	new	thinking	the	Malaria	Vaccine	Initiative	(MVI,	 1999),	 which	 purports	 to	 achieve	 the	 vaccine	 against	 malaria	 which	 must																																																									
18 Global Forum for Health Research (Organization). (2002). The 10/90 Report on Health Research, 2001-
2002. Global Forum for Health Research. 
19 Brown, T. M., Cueto, M., & Fee, E. (2006). The World Health Organization and the transition from 
“international” to “global” public health. American journal of public health, 96(1), 62-72. 
20 Sandler, T., Arce, M., & Daniel, G. (2002). A conceptual framework for understanding global and 
transnational public goods for health. Fiscal Studies, 23(2), 195-222. 
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ensure	that	malaria	vaccines	are	not	only	available	but	also	affordable.	To	achieve	this	goal,	 MVI	make	 a	 call	 to	 international	 donors,	 agents	 of	 the	 industry,	 government,	national,	 regional,	 and	 international	 policymakers	 and	 academia	 to	 invest	 their	resources	and	political	and	intellectual	capital	for	malaria	vaccine	delivery	and	use21.		Following	 this	 scheme,	 the	 private	 sector	 would	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 developing	 new	pharmaceuticals	 for	 diseases	 that	 affect	 the	 developed	 world,	 funded	 by	 a	combination	of	public	support	for	basic	research	and	monopoly	profits	from	sales	of	patented	medicines	and	PPPs	would	undertake	 the	responsibility	of	 combatting	 the	neglected	 diseases	 for	 which	 market	 mechanisms	 had	 failed	 to	 attract	 sufficient	investment,	 and	 must	 be	 financed	 by	 philanthropists	 and	 donor	 governments.	However,	 as	 we	 have	 previously	 seen,	 PPPs	 have	 raised	 numerous	 concerns	regarding	its	sustainability	along	time	due	to	its	donor-dependent	nature;	its	obscure	and	 opaque	 governance	 mechanism,	 lack	 of	 representation	 and	 participation	 of	southern	stakeholders	and	the	management	of	its	conflicts	of	interest	–	how	priorities	are	 set,	 allocation	 of	 resources	 -	 or	 distortion	 of	 public	 systems	 of	 health	 of	 the	countries	where	 PPPs	 operate.	 Ultimately,	 PPPs	may	 be	 reinforcing	 existing	 power	and	decision-making	imbalances	rather	than	advancing	true	global	cooperation22.		Furthermore,	PPPs	may	be	at	best,	 a	helpful	 instrument	 to	 cope	with	 the	problems	rising	around	neglected	diseases	but	there	remain	still	 for	developing	countries,	 the	serious	problems	associated	with	the	access	and	affordability	of	pharmaceuticals	for	diseases	 affecting	 both	 north	 and	 south.	 Pharmaceutical	 companies	 are	 willing	 to	contribute	with	PPPs	in	combatting	neglected	diseases	as	this	contribution	may	give	them	a	more	friendly	and	kind	commercial	image	before	their	customers	with	no	cost	in	 terms	 of	 loss	 of	 profits,	 competitive	 advantage	 or	 disclosure	 of	 relevant	 and	confidential	information.			However,	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 are	 significantly	 more	 reluctant	 to	 cooperate	where	sizable	profits	are	at	stake.	In	this	sense,	we	will	be	in	front	of	the	typical	case	described	by	GPGs	 theory;	 considering	pharmaceuticals	 as	GPGs,	we	 could	 see	how																																																									
21 http://www.malariavaccine.org/malaria-and-vaccines/access/financing 
22 Soane, J. (2010). Health for Some: The Political Economy of Global Health Governance. 
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these	public	goods	are	undersupplied	by	the	market	because	there	is	no	commercial	incentive	 to	 produce	 them.	 Also,	 it	 would	 be	 necessary	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 classic	economic	problem	with	public	goods:	underinvestment	and	free-riding	and	how	this	lack	of	 investment	 and	 incentive	would	 require	public	provision	or	 financing.	GPGs	theorists	 face	 then	 the	 challenge	 of	 determining	who	 should	 pay	 for	 the	 affordable	provision	 of	 patented	 medicines.	 Apart	 from	 vague	 calls	 to	 collective	 action	 of	international	 actors	 and	new	governance	arrangements,	 as	we	will	 see	below	GPGs	does	not	seem	to	be	able	to	articulate	any	formula	to	resolve	the	problem	of	ensuring	universal	 affordability	 of	 pharmaceuticals	 or	 how	 to	 share	 the	 burden	 of	pharmaceutical	research	alternative	funding.		 	
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5.2.	 Access	to	medicines	as	a	GPG:	not	good	enough?		As	we	 have	 seen,	 the	 concept	 and	 the	 theory	 of	 GPG	 to	 the	 international	 relations	realm	 has	 been	 originated	 and	 advanced	 by	 the	 UNDP	 –the	 team	 composed	 of	Professor	 Inge	Kaul	 and	her	 collaborators-	 and	 it	has	been	 resulted	 in	 three	books.		Borrowing	 the	notion	 from	 the	public	 economics	 literature,	 GPG	 theory	proposes	 a	model	to	cope	with	certain	international	problems	resulting	from	the	globalization	of	many	realities	and	processes	and	whose	resolution	goes	beyond	national	boundaries.	GPGs	 have	 been	 used	 to	 describe	 almost	 every	 international	 progress	 from	 peace,	knowledge,	 financial	 stability,	 global	 environment	 or	 security;	 in	 positive	 terms	(something	 that	has	 to	be	created	such	as	knowledge)	and	negative	(the	absence	of	something	 such	 as	 terrorism).	 The	 same	UNDP	 team	has	 proposed	more	 and	more	complex	version	of	GPGs	referring	to	pure	GPG,	impure	GPGs,	club	goods	(those	goods	that	 having	 non-rival	 properties	 are	 however	 excludable	 such	 as	 that	 knowledge	subject	 to	 IPRs	 protection),	 global,	 regional	 and	 national	 public	 goods	 and	 some	initially	private	goods	which	become	public.			Ultimately,	 GPGs	 is	 addressed	 to	 deal	with	 the	 traditional	 problem	 of	 international	cooperation,	 i.e.	 collective	 action	 problems	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 and	 the	 free	rider	challenge.	While	nation	states	have	sufficient	prerogatives	and	powers	(taxing	powers	and	the	monopoly	of	the	use	of	force)	to	produce	public	goods	which	are	not	created	by	the	market,	GPGs	production	is	argued	to	be	dependent	upon	cooperation	among	 nation	 states	 and	 other	 actors.	 However	 this	 cooperation	 is	 far	 from	 being	easy	to	implement.	On	the	one	hand,	it	would	be	necessary	to	share	mutual	interests	and	 understandings	 –	 neither	 nation-state	 nor	 other	 actors	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	provision	of	GPGs	if	they	do	not	get	any	benefit	–	and	there	is	always	the	risk	that	no	one	would	cooperate	if	they	can	free	ride	on	the	investment	of	others.	Therefore	GPGs	theory	comes	to	deal	with	old	acquaintances	 in	 the	realm	of	 international	relations.	As	to	health	and	access	to	medicines,	GPGs	theory	does	not	address	this	issue	from	an	integral	 perspective,	 it	 conceives	 health	 as	 an	 instrumental	 element	 to	 permit	 and	optimize	market	functioning.	Among	its	recipes,	GPGs	theory	entrusts	the	problem	of	the	access	to	medicines	to	PPPs,	a	previously	overviewed	formula	which	casts	a	large	shadow	over	its	real	benefits	and	which	has	been	critically	contested.				
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Dispersed	nature	of	the	concept.		In	spite	of	the	initial	enthusiasm	and	strong	advocacy	generated,	GPGs	proposal	has	received	a	number	of	important	critiques.	One	of	those	critiques,	which	have	been	in	fact	 acknowledged	by	 the	 theory	 sponsors	 themselves	–	who	have	 tried	 to	 reorient	some	 of	 the	 characterizations	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 concept	 -	 ,	 are	 referred	 to	 the	dispersed,	 expansive	nature	 and	 lack	of	 concreteness	of	 the	 concept.	 In	 effect,	 such	expanded	 definition	 of	 what	 it	 is	 a	 GPG	 risks	 making	 the	 concept	 subject	 to	arbitrariness,	 distortion,	 malleability	 and	 somehow,	 irrelevance.	 Some	 of	 the	 most	severe	 critics	 of	 GPG	 theory	 argue	 that	 GPGs	 are	 better	 understood	 as	 a	 rhetorical	device	than	as	an	analytical	tool23.	In	fact,	in	2003	the	authors	of	the	seminal	book	on	GPGs	 released	a	 second	book	on	GPGs	 in	 response	precisely	 to	 the	 fuzziness	of	 the	concept.			GPGs	 are	 an	 umbrella,	 a	 catch-all	 concept	 under	 which	 a	 diverse	 and	 sometimes	contradictory	number	of	 issues	 (clean	air,	 health,	 knowledge,	 education,	 absence	of	terrorism,	 property,	 peace,	 security,	 financial	 stability	 …)24	 fit	 in	 an	 idealistic,	certainly	naïf	and	politically	correct	manner.	The	comprehensive	nature	of	the	term	is	made	possible	due	to	the	abstraction	of	the	concept.	The	persistent	abstraction	of	the	concept	 avoids	 systematically	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 real	 issues	 as	 long	 as	 the	operational	aspects	of	the	political	solutions	and	measures	to	be	adopted	in	order	to	implement	this	open	“wish	list”.	Saying	that	health	or	knowledge	or	financial	stability	are	 GPGs	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 add	 anything	 new.	 The	 real	 challenge	 is	 precisely	 the	manner	 in	 which	 those	 GPGs	 can	 be	 achieved	 and	 how	 to	 manage	 the	 different	conflicts	of	interest	around	the	different	choices.	As	we	go	down	to	the	ground	we	can	see	 that	 ensuring	 health	 or	 good	 education	 for	 everybody	 depends	 on	 how	 we	manage	material	 resources	 that	 are	 not	 unlimited	 but	 rival	 and	 excludable.	 This	 is	precisely	 the	 challenge	 it	 has	 to	 be	 dealt	with	 and	 for	which	GPGs	 theory	does	 not	seem	 to	 have	 any	 specific	 remedy.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 observed	 by	 some	 scholars,	 the																																																									
23 Long, D., & Woolley, F. (2009). Global public goods: Critique of a UN discourse. Global Governance: A 
Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 15(1), 107-122. 
24 In the previously mentioned first UNPD book Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st 
century the following cases are studied as GPGs: equity and justice, market efficiency, environment and 
cultural heritage, health, knowledge and information, peace and security. 
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urgency	to	demonstrate	the	utility	and	applicability	of	this	concept	has	transformed	a	rigorous	and	restrictive	concept	into	a	slogan	and	a	product	of	wishful	thinking25.					Also,	much	of	GPGs	theory	is	just	descriptive	or	explanatory	of	certain	realities	but	it	does	not	prescribe	the	ways	to	achieve	those	tangible	outcomes,	situations	or	GPGs.	Nothing	 is	 said	 about	 how	 to	 finance	 and	materialize	 these	GPGs.	 Except	 for	 vague	references	to	the	need	of	an	adequate	allocation	of	resources	–public	and	private-	or	the	obvious	consideration	of	the	production	and	financing	of	GPGs	as	the	result	of	a	“highly	political	process”	GPGs	theory	does	not	give	any	new	formula	or	mechanism	to	finance	and	produce	GPGs	so	the	most	important	questions	about	financial	aspects	and	how	to	produce	GPGs	at	global	scale	remain	too	open	and	unanswered.			Regarding	health,	as	we	have	seen,	while	the	UNDP	explicitly	addresses	the	strategies	devoted	 to	monitor	 and	 control	 and	 restrain	 cross-border	 spread	 of	 communicable	diseases.	Paradoxically	nothing	is	said	in	the	PNUD	project	about	access	to	medicines	which	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 indispensable	 instrument	 to	 combat	 both	 communicable	 and	non-communicable	 diseases.	 Subsequent	 academic	 constructions	 of	 GPGs	 have	explored	 the	 possibility	 of	 considering	 pharmaceuticals	 and	 access	 to	medicines	 as	GPGs	and	 the	public-private	partnerships	as	an	example	of	new	 formulae	 to	ensure	the	 provision	 of	 GPGs	 –	 in	 particular,	 to	 get	 the	 necessary	 investments	 to	 develop	pharmaceuticals	to	combat	the	“neglected	diseases”.	However,	as	we	have	suggested	regarding	PPPs,	the	perspective	on	health	of	GPGs	and	in	particular,	the	approach	to	pharmaceuticals	and	access	to	medicines	tends	to	hide	the	conflicts	and	interests	at	stake	surrounding	access	to	medicines	and	the	pharmaceutical	business.	In	this	sense,	GPGs	 ignores	 the	 complexity	 of	 health	 and	 all	 the	 factors	 and	 conflicts	 of	 interests	involved.												
																																																								
25 Carbone, M. (2007). Supporting or resisting global public goods? The policy dimension of a contested 
concept. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 13(2), 179-198. 
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GPGs	as	a	rhetoric	device	justifying	a	hegemonic	discourse.				As	we	have	mentioned,	GPGs	theory	has	been	criticized	as	being	a	rhetorical	device	rather	 than	 an	 analytical,	 scientific,	 helpful	 tool.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 an	 excessive	dispersion	and	abstraction	of	the	concept	of	GPGs	does	not	bring	any	input	–	or	little	input	–	to	cope	with	the	main	challenges	of	today’s	world	and	international	scene.	On	the	other	hand,	GPGs	do	not	enter	the	details	and	the	operational	aspects	necessary	to	achieve	 certain	outcomes	under	 the	 term	GPGs.	Neither	does	 it	 handle	 some	of	 the	contradictions	 implied	 in	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 different	 GPGs	 whose	materialization	could	happen	not	to	be	compatible.		Therefore,	 the	 validity	 of	 GPGs	 as	 an	 analytical	 or	 scientific	 tool	 remains	 highly	controversial	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	 improve	 today’s	 challenges	 and	 conditions,	almost	null	or	non-existing.	In	this	sense,	GPGs	theory	has	been	said	to	belong	to	the	realm	 of	 the	 family	 of	 political	 manifestos	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 tool	 for	 serious	analytical	 research.	However,	what	 it	 seems	 clear	 is	 that	 GPG	 theory	 could	 play	 an	important	discursive	role	in	legitimizing	the	current	and	hegemonic	system	of	values	and	 interests.	 In	 fact,	 GPGs	 theory	 is	 committed	 to	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 system	 and	consequently	–as	we	have	seen	with	the	IPRs	regime-	it	does	not	question	the	status	quo	 or	 the	 structural	 causes	 and	 forces	 behind	 it26.	 Under	 this	 perspective,	 GPGs	theory	is	everything	but	new	and	it	could	be	adequately	explained	and	framed	within	the	theory	of	hegemonic	stability	of	Kindleberger27.			Charles	 Kindleberger	 links	 the	 “stability”	 of	 the	 world	 economy	 to	 unilateral	leadership	–	a	gentle	way	of	talking	about	hegemony	–	of	a	dominant	power.	Based	on	this	theory,	it	is	explained	how	the	hegemon	or	hegemons	would	be	willing	to	provide	GPGs28.	This	willingness	 is	 far	 from	being	an	altruistic	gesture,	on	 the	 contrary,	 the	hegemon	benefits	greatly	from	a	well-ordered	system	and	the	cost	of	supplying	them	born	by	the	hegemon	is	less	than	the	benefit	obtained	in	terms	of	influence,	privileges																																																									
26 Constantin, François. (2002). Les biens publics mondiaux: un mythe légitimateur pour l'action collective?. 
Editions L'Harmattan. 
27 Kindleberger, C. P. (1986). The world in depression, 1929-1939 (Vol. 4). Univ of California Press. 
28 Haggard, S., & Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of international regimes. International organization, 41(03), 
491-517. 
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and	 advantages	 associated	 with	 providing	 the	 others	 with	 certain	 GPGs.	 That	hegemon	or	hegemons	–	 some	authors	argue	 that	 there	may	be	more	 than	a	 single	leader	sharing	hegemony29-	would	be	also	able	to	articulate	a	unifying	ideology	which	presents	itself	as	universal	and	creates	the	basis	for	hegemonic	domination.			Furthermore,	it	 is	important	to	note	that	it	 is	not	usual	that	hegemons	provide	pure	public	goods,	in	the	sense	of	being	unconditionally	non-rival	and	non-excludable	but	most	 regimes	 put	 in	 place	mechanisms	 to	 enhance	 and	 ensure	 compliance	 through	exclusion	–	especially	in	the	WTO	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	the	European	Union	-.	As	examples	 of	 these	 “carrot	 and	 stick”	 mechanisms	 would	 be	 precisely	 the	 WTO	promise	of	free	trade	and	open	markets	without	barriers	to	agricultural	products	as	long	 as	 every	 country	 accepts	 the	 adherence	 and	 implementation	 of	 a	 given	 –demanding-	 IPRs	 regime,	 or	 the	 commitment	 of	 developed	 countries	 with	technological	 assistance	 and	 technological	 transfer	 to	 developing	 countries	 in	exchange	 for	 adherence	 to	 	 non-proliferation	 	 agreements	 or,	 finally	 the	 grant	 of	European	Structural	Funds	to	peripheral	Europe	associated	with	budgetary	austerity	of	southern	governments.							By	 hegemony	 at	 the	 international	 level	we	 do	 not	 refer	merely	 to	 an	 order	 among	states	 or	 a	 state	 centered	 hegemony.	 Following	 Robert	 Cox30,	 we	 hold	 that	 state	power	 and	apparent	hegemonic	 states	 are	 instrumental	 to	other	 interests	 and	 they	are	controlled	by	certain	dominant	classes	and	dominant	modes	of	production.	This	dominant	mode	of	production	penetrates	into	all	countries	connecting	social	classes	and	interests	of	different	countries.	Additionally,	 this	hegemony	implies	the	consent	of	 other	 controlled	 classes	which	 accept	 that	 control/domination	 not	 only	 through	coercive	methods	but	 also	by	means	of	 intellectual	 leadership	 and	other	 softer	 and	subtle	methods	(the	extended	state	in	Gramscian	terms).	This	hegemony,	furthermore,	is	reflected	in	universal	norms,	institutions	and	mechanisms	which	lay	down	general	rules	of	behavior	for	states	and	for	those	forces	of	civil	society	that	act	across	national	
																																																								
29 Lake, D. A. (1993). Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked emperor or tattered 
monarch with potential?. International Studies Quarterly, 37(4), 459-489. 
30 Cox, R. W., & Sinclair, T. J. (1996). Approaches to world order: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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boundaries,	 rules	 which	 support	 the	 dominant	 mode	 of	 production31.	 Therefore,	hegemony	 is	related	to	and	framed	within	the	 international	capitalist	system	rather	than	within	the	world	political	system	of	national	states.				In	 this	 sense,	GPGs	approach	 to	health	 in	general	 and	 to	 the	access	 to	medicines	 in	particular	 fits	 to	 perfection	 into	 the	 dominant	 and	 hegemonic	 view	 of	pharmaceuticals	 and	 pharmaceutical	 knowledge	 as	 marketable	 commodities	worldwide.	This	has	been	made	possible	thanks	to	the	invaluable	and	indispensable	assistance	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 without	 which,	 there	 would	 not	 have	 been	 a	global	market	for	these	intangibles.	As	we	have	previously	seen	regarding	the	prelude	to	 TRIPS,	 this	 scenario	 has	 been	 spurred	 and	 realized	 by	 powerful	 transnational	corporations	which	illustrate,	maybe	in	one	of	the	crudest	and	least	subtle	example	of	the	 last	 decades,	 the	 influence	 of	 corporate	 lobbies	 over	 the	 government	 and	 the	servile	stance	of	states	at	the	service	of	corporate	interests,	interest	which	sometimes	seem	to	be	far	from	people	necessities.								
Distributive	consequences	of	GPGs	theory.			Closely	related	to	the	above,	it	is	necessary	to	highlight	that	GPG	theory	has	important	distributive	 consequences	 in	 terms	 of	 winners	 and	 losers.	 	 These	 distributive	consequences	 are	 somehow	 disguised	 in	 the	 overarching	 approach	 made	 by	 its	proponents	in	the	academic	debate.	The	distributive	impact	or	consequences	of	GPGs	may	 be	 distinguished	 in	 three	 dimensions32;	 1)	 regarding	 the	 terms	 of	 cooperation	and	 contribution	 to	 produce	 the	 GPGs;	 2)	 the	 choice	 to	 produce	 some	 GPGs	 over	others	 in	 a	world	of	 limited	 resources	 and;	3)	 conflict	 among	different	GPGs	which	may	turn	to	be	contradictory.		Regarding	the	first	dimension	(terms	of	cooperation);	as	we	have	said,	GPGs	theory	is	focused	 on	 articulating	 cooperation	 between	 different	 international	 actors	 –states	
																																																								
31 Cox, R. W. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. Millennium, 12(2), 
162-175. 
32 Shaffer, G. (2012). International law and global public goods in a legal pluralist world. European journal of 
international law, 23(3), 669-693. 
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and	other	private	entities-	to	produce	GPGs.	This	cooperation	is	mostly	based	on	the	premises	of	 the	prisoner’s	dilemma	adopted	 from	game	 theory.	Prisoner’s	dilemma	does	not	consider	eventual	distributive	consequences	of	the	different	choices;	it	takes	for	granted	that	states	share	a	common	interest	which	is	more	easily	reachable	if	they	cooperate,	 being	 the	 first	 barrier	 to	 cooperation	 the	 fear	 to	 be	 cheated	 by	 others.	However	 the	 prisoner	 dilemma’s	 approach	 ignores	 the	 distributive	 nuances	 of	 the	choices	adopted	and	the	terms	implied	in	the	cooperation	terms;	distribution	of	costs	and	benefits	resulting	from	cooperation33.	In	fact,	when	states	cooperate,	they	do	not	decide	 in	 binary	 terms:	 cooperation	 or	 lack	 of	 cooperation	 but	 they	 arrange	 and	negotiate	 specific	 terms	of	 cooperation	which	 imply	different	distributive	 issues	on	how	much	each	one	must	contribute	and	how	many	rewards	is	entitled	to	receive.		Secondly,	 actors	 often	 have	 different	 preferences	 about	 which	 GPGs	 should	 be	produced	in	a	world	of	limited	resources.	They	face	opportunity	costs	and	they	may	decide	 not	 only	 which	 GPGs	 to	 produce	 or	 which	 production	 they	 are	 able	 to	contribute	to	but	also	how	much	and	to	which	extent	they	are	ready	to	contribute	or	to	fund	in	order	to	provide	a	given	GPG.		Finally,	 different	GPGs	 can	 be	 contradictory	 and	 they	may	 conflict	with	 each	 other.	Account	 taken	 of	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 outcomes	 to	 be	 produced	 as	 GPGs	 it	 turns	unavoidable	to	find	GPGs	which	interfere	at	best	with	each	other	and	which	may	be	incompatible	and	contradictory.	For	instance,	as	we	have	previously	suggested,	in	the	field	 of	 the	 access	 to	medicines,	 there	may	 be	 involved	many	 GPGs	 such	 as	 public	health,	 patent	 protection,	 free	 knowledge,	 human	 rights,	 free	 trade	 and	 so	 on.	Production	of	all	these	goods	may	conflict	irremediably.	Enforcement	of	patent	rights	under	 TRIPS	 can	 constitute	 incentives	 for	 the	 production	 of	 new	 knowledge	 in	 the	form	 of	 new	 pharmaceuticals	 and	 therapeutic	 treatments	 but	 this	 protection	 can	impair	 access	 to	 medicines	 and	 human	 rights	 to	 health	 as	 long	 as	 distorting	liberalized	trade.																																																										
33 Krasner, S. D. (1991). Global communications and national power: Life on the Pareto frontier. World politics, 
43(03), 336-366. Krasner explains how cooperation have distributive consequences. In the context of 
cooperation in the field of telecommunication, allocation of electromagnetic spectrum, he notes that while all 
the actors are better off with some form of cooperation, coordination affects them differently in terms of 
distribution of rewards. This different distribution may make conflicts arise over how and why that distribution 
is operated.    
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	Therefore,	 GPGs	 dynamics	 is	 somehow	 oversimplified,	 GPGs	 have	 important	distributive	consequences	that	have	not	been	properly	reviewed	or	studied.	Choices	over	 GPGs	 involve	 the	 prioritizing	 of	 certain	 values	 and	 interests	 over	 other	legitimate	 interests	and	perspectives.	Therefore	and	even	 if	within	 the	definition	of	GPGs	we	 can	 find	 the	non-rivalry	and	 the	non-excludability,	GPGs	may	be	 rivalrous	between	 them	 and	 conflicts	 may	 arise	 over	 which	 GPGs	 produce,	 how	 much	contribute	for	their	production	and	how	many	rewards	each	actor	or	state	is	entitled	to.					
GPGs	recent	historical	survey.		Other	 than	 the	above	mentioned	conceptual	 shortcomings	and	 ideological	bias,	 it	 is	important	to	examine	the	reception	and	practical	utility	and	implementation	of	GPGs	theory	along	these	recent	years.	 	That	will	permit	us	to	assess	the	real	and	effective	impact	of	this	theory	and	the	perspective	of	its	future	application	and	feasibility.		Following	the	first	publication	in	1999	of	the	UNDP	of	the	GPGs	project,	this	concept	has	imbued	a	large	part	of	the	debate	on	international	development	and	in	general	on	globalization	 –and	 the	possibility	 that	 an	 adequate	 provision	 of	GPGs	 could	help	 to	overcome	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 some	 consequences	 of	 globalization-.	 Both	international	organizations	–UNDP,	World	Bank	or	the	Organization	for	the	Economic	Coordination	and	Development	(OECD)-	states	(EU,	Germany,	France,	Sweden	…)	and	philanthropic	associations	and	foundations	(Melinda	Gates	or	Soros	Foundation)	have	resorted	 to	 the	 discourse	 of	 GPGs.	 Notwithstanding	 that,	 GPGs	 concept	 as	 an	instrument	 to	 transform	 the	 reality	 of	 our	 world	 has	 become	 irrelevant	 in	 the	international	 arena	 and	 it	 could	 be	 at	 best,	 a	 rhetoric	 device	 to	 post	 support	 and	justify	realities,	facts	and	policies	from	a	specific	perspective.			The	first	problem	to	begin	with	regarding	the	application	of	this	concept	was	related	with	 the	 “additionality”	 question	 or	 how	 the	 provision	 of	 these	 GPGs	 should	 be	financed.	Countries	in	the	developing	world	had	concerns	on	the	possibility	that	the	
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so	 called	 Official	 Development	 Assistance	 (ODA)	 -the	 government	 economic	 aid	 of	developed	countries	designed	to	promote	the	development	and	welfare	of	developing	countries-	was	diverted	to	the	provision	of	GPGs.	According	to	some,	 this	was	not	a	question	 of	 diverting	 funds	 from	 ODA	 to	 a	 different	 purpose	 since	 donors	 had	allocated	 for	 decades	 some	 of	 the	 substantial	 quantities	 of	 ODA	 to	 finance	 public	goods	such	as	international	agricultural	research	or	research	on	disease	eradication,	even	without	the	explicit	conceptual	frame	of	GPGs34.	Other	analysts	considered	that	an	important	part	of	that	aid,	ODA,	was	being	diverted	to	GPGs	provision	and	that	this	aid	should	not	be	used	for	financing	eventual	GPGs35.			Other	GPGs	researchers	explored	the	possibility	of	raising	new	financial	resources	to	finance	 GPGs36	 mooted	 as	 alternatives	 or	 supplements	 to	 a	 simple	 schedule	 of	governmental	 contributions:	 use	 of	 IMF	 Special	 Drawing	 Rights	 (SDRs);	 globally	coordinated	 taxes	 (on	 arms	 exports,	 deep-ocean	 mineral	 rents,	 international	 air	transport,	 greenhouse-gas	 emissions,	 consumption	 of	 fossil	 fuels	 or	 currency	transactions	 –Tobin	 tax-).	Apart	 from	 the	 controversial	EU	 financial	 transaction	 tax	(EU	 FTT)	 a	 proposal	 made	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 embraced	 by	 10	 EU	member	 states37,	 those	 FTTs	 enacted	 in	 Brazil,	 South	 Korea	 and	 India	 and	 Bernie	Sanders’	 proposal38	 of	 a	 FTT	 as	 part	 of	 his	 campaign	 for	 the	 Democratic	 Party’s	presidential	nomination,	none	of	the	alternative	ways	of	financing	GPGs	seem	to	have	been	implemented	on	a	large	scale.	On	the	other	hand,	the	UNDP	held	that	financing	GPGs	 did	 not	 mean	 raising	 additional	 resources	 but	 a	 better	 allocation	 of	 existing	resources.		Furthermore,	attempts	 to	 include	GPGs	 in	 the	 international	multilateral	agenda	met	with	an	 important	 resistance	 from	both	developing	and	developed	countries.	 In	 the	preparatory	process	of	the	Financing	for	Development	(FfD)	Conference	of	Monterrey																																																									
34 Te Velde, D. W., Morrissey, O., & Hewitt, A. (2002). Allocating aid to international public goods. In 
International Public Goods (pp. 119-156). Springer US. 
35 Anand, P. B. (2004). Financing the provision of global public goods. The World Economy, 27(2), 215-237. 
36 Clunies-Ross, A. (2004). Alternative ways of paying for global public goods. Journal of International 
Development, 16(7), 971-982. 
37 The tax would only impact financial transactions between financial institutions charging 0.1% against the 
exchange of shares and bonds and 0.01% across derivative contracts. 
38 https://berniesanders.com/issues/reforming-wall-street/. His campaign proposed a financial transaction tax 
to reduce risky and unproductive high-speed trading and other forms of Wall Street speculation; proceeds 
would be used to provide debt-free public college education. 
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in	 2002	 and	 after	 an	 intense	 controversy	 preceded	 by	 a	 report	 –the	 Zedillo	 report	which	 explicitly	 contemplated	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 GPGs	 and	 a	 first	economic	 assessment-39,	 all	 reference	 to	GPGs	 concept	was	 excluded	 from	 the	 final	papers	 and	 resolutions	 (Monterrey	 consensus).	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 support	 of	 GPGs	 by	some	prominent	American	 analysts40	 –aligned	with	 the	hegemonic	 stability	 theory-	US	 and	 Japan	 strongly	 opposed	 to	 this	 concept	 questioning	 economic	 and	 political	foundation	of	GPGs.	In	particular,	they	were	not	in	favor	of	exploring	any	additional	international	 taxes,	 levies	 or	 user	 fees	 to	 finance	 provision	 of	 GPGs.	 The	 final	consensus	 reflected	 their	 views	 in	 favor	 of	 international	 trade	 as	 an	 engine	 from	development,	FDI	and	traditional	international	financial	and	technical	cooperation	for	development41.			On	the	other	hand	and	account	taken	of	the	uncertainty	about	additional	resources	to	finance	GPGs,	developing	countries	 feared	that	 this	concept	could	divert	 funds	 from	ODA	 to	 the	provision	of	 these	 intangibles	which	additionally	 could	be	not	based	on	recipient’s	needs.	On	the	contrary,	GPGs	framework	was	perceived	by	some	as	a	new	subtle	form	of	conditionality,	nothing	more	than	another	imposition	by	the	North	to	the	South	which	implied	a	soft	alternative	to	the	neoliberal	approach	to	development.			After	 the	 new	 opposition	 faced	 by	 GPGs	 supporters	 in	 the	 World	 Summit	 on	Sustainable	Development	 Johannesburg,	South	Africa	of	2002,	an	International	Task	Force	on	GPGs	was	established	in	2003	by	France	and	Sweden	with	the	support	of	the	UNDP,	and	other	EU	Member	states	(namely	Germany,	Denmark	and	Austria)	and	a	permanent	 Secretary	 in	 Stockholm.	 This	 initiative	 reached	 a	 consensus	 on	 the	definition	and	a	list	of	six	priority	areas	–among	which	the	control	of	communicable	diseases	 by	 increasing	 knowledge	 for	 vaccines	 and	 treatment-.	 In	 2006,	 a	 first	document	 was	 published	 with	 some	 suggestions	 on	 new	 policies	 and	 financing	instruments	 of	 GPGs.	However,	 these	 efforts	were	 overlapped	 and	diluted	 by	 other																																																									
39 Assembly, UN General. Fifty-fifth session. High-level international intergovernmental consideration of 
financing for development.(agenda item 101) Report of the High Level Panel on Financing for Development. 
A/55/1000. 
40 Nye Jr, J. S. (2002). The American national interest and global public goods. International Affairs, 78(2), 
233-244. 
41 UN A/CONF.198/11. Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, 
Mexico 18-22 March 2002. 
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events,	 approaches	 and	 initiatives	 of	 the	 international	 agenda	 which	 somehow	attracted	 more	 attention	 and	 consensus.	 The	 best	 evidence	 of	 this	 and	 of	 the	abandonment	of	GPGs	concept	 is	 that	 the	web	page	of	 its	main	supporter42	–-	 is	no	longer	operative.			Once	 analyzed	 the	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 reasons	 to	 show	 the	 failure	 of	 GPGs	concept	 as	 a	 device	 to	 help	 solving	 some	 of	 the	 current	 challenges	 of	 our	 time,	 in	particular	the	worldwide	access	to	medicines,	one	could	wonder	whether	GPGs	could	at	 best	 offer	 guidance	 in	 the	 financing	 and	 provision	 of	 global	 health	 programs	 by	providing	 with	 a	 framework	 for	 collective	 action	 at	 the	 global	 level	 and	 by	demonstrating	the	advantages	for	the	rich	in	helping	the	poor	as	long	as	providing	a	rationale	 for	 industrialized	 countries	 to	use	national	health	budgets	 to	 complement	traditional	aid	as	it	is	suggested	by	the	WHO43.			 	
																																																								
42 www.gpdtaskforce.org 
43 Smith, Richard D. (2003). Global public goods and health. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 81.7: 
475-475. 
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5.3.	 Global	Public	Interest	overcoming	state	borders.		In	this	section	we	will	review	the	scope	and	the	meaning	of	public	interest	and	other	associated	 institutions	 such	 as	 public	 policy,	 or	 ordre	 public.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	important	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 learn	 the	 role	 of	 these	 figures	 as	 legal	mechanisms	to	offset	and	counterbalance	what	it	would	be	unwanted	consequences	of	an	eventual	“rigorous	and	ruthless”	application	of	global	IPRs	norms.	In	particular,	it	 will	 be	 examined	 the	 possibility	 of	 using	 these	 figures	 as	 exceptions	 to	 the	application	of	IPR	norms	or	juridical	defences	to	be	raised	in	the	context	of	a	litigation	for	IPRs	breach,	for	instance,	infringement	of	a	pharmaceutical	patent.	Also,	it	will	be	analyzed	whether	there	is	an	international	dimension	of	these	traditionally	national	figures	 and	 the	 feasibility	 and	 potential	 of	 these	 figures	 in	 order	 to	 transform	 the	current	IPRs	regime.				
Public	interest	between	politics	and	the	law.			On	the	occasion	of	the	transition	from	a	political	regime	based	on	the	sovereignty	of	the	states	to	the	multilateral	and	multilayered	new	global	architecture	-still	in	process	of	definition-,	a	renewed	interest	has	emerged	around	the	concept	of	public	interest	and	global	public	interest	as	a	figure	to	articulate	conveniently	the	perceived	melting	between	 previously	 well	 separate	 public	 and	 private	 spheres.	 Public	 interest	 is	 a	recurrent	term	which	is	profusely	used	in	a	wide	variety	of	contexts.	In	this	sense,	and	in	order	 to	achieve	a	more	 integral	 insight	of	what	public	 interest	 implies,	we	must	consider	this	concept	from	a	threefold	perspective;	a	formal-legal	dimension,	i.e.,	the	way	in	which	public	interest	has	been	defined	from	the	different	legal	traditions	and	legal	 practitioners;	 a	 pragmatic-discursive	 dimension	 or	 the	 contextual	interpretations	 given	 to	 the	 term	 “public	 interest”	 from	 the	 different	 disciplines	 of	knowledge	and;	a	historic-critical	approach	to	the	public	interest	which	will	permit	us	to	achieve	a	more	precise	and	historically	contextualized	meaning	and	effective/real	
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use	 of	 this	 concept	 along	 the	 diverse	 political	 transformations	 of	 our	world44	 –this	third	dimension	will	be	addressed	in	the	following	section-.		Starting	 from	 the	 formal-legal	 dimension,	 public	 interest	 belongs	 to	 the	 realm	 of	indeterminate	 legal	 terms.	 Despite	 its	 ubiquitous	 nature	 in	 political	 philosophy,	economics	or	legal	literature	(public	law	but	not	only),	and	the	numerous	attempts	to	define	this	term,	there	is	not	a	precise	and	concise	definition	of	it.	Public	interest	is	an	elusive	 concept,	 an	 ambiguous	 and	 fluid	 term	 with	 multiple	 connotations	 which	mostly	accompanies	and	confers	legitimacy	to	a	given	political	or	judicial	decision.	In	this	 sense,	 legislators,	 public	 agencies	 and	 law	 courts	 take	 recourse	 in	 the	 term	“public	interest”	as	an	argument	for	justifying	certain	actions	and	decisions	but	there	are	 not	 true	 efforts	 to	 define	 the	 term	 exhaustively.	 Some	 scholars	 consider	 that	rather	than	indeterminate,	public	interest	would	be	an	abstract	institution	which	only	attains	 determinateness	when	 is	 juxtaposed	with	 a	 specific	 legal	 rule	 or	 decision45.	Hence,	 the	 notion	 of	 public	 interest	 would	 be	 a	 deontological	 rather	 than	 an	ontological	 concept,	 a	 normative	 rather	 than	 a	 descriptive	 one.	 Ultimately,	 it	 is	 a	counterfactual	construction	such	as	Habermas’	ideal	speech	situation.	Also,	according	to	 some	 Administrative	 Law	 scholars,	 indeterminate	 legal	 terms	 are	 not	 that	indeterminate	but	they	would	have	a	“sphere	of	positive	certainty”	(what	is	certain	to	be),	a	“sphere	of	negative	certainty”	(what	is	certain	not	to	be)	and	a	“halo	of	doubt	and	uncertainty”46.			Despite	 the	 difficulty,	 probably	 insurmountable,	 of	 establishing	 a	 specific,	 concrete,	steady	 and	 objective	 definition	 of	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 public	 interest,	 this	 notion	gathers	some	specific	features.	First,	it	denotes	an	interest	of	the	society	as	a	whole.	In	this	sense,	public	 interest	 is	something	else	than	the	mere	aggregation	of	 individual	interests	or	social	 factions,	 it	 should	be	 “generalizable”	 to	 the	whole	society.	Hence,	public	 interest	 is	 not	 the	 interest	 of	 a	 majority	 of	 members	 of	 the	 public	 but	 an																																																									
44 Cornago, N. (2013). De la filosofía política a la gobernanza global: un acercamiento crítico a la noción de< 
interés público global>, Bouza, N, García-Segura, C. Rodrigo,A, eds La gobernanza global del interés público 
global.Madrid: Tecnos. 
45 Belohlavek, Alexander J. (2012). Public Policy and Public Interest in International Law and EU Law. CYIL-
CZECH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: Public Policy and Ordre Public: 117-147. 
46 Moreno, F. S. (1976). Conceptos jurídicos, interpretación y discrecionalidad administrativa. Madrid: Editorial 
Civitas. 
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abstraction	about	what	is	best	for	the	society	as	a	whole47.	Upon	the	fiction	that	the	common	interest	of	society	can	be	discernable	and	identifiable,	public	interest	would	benefit	 every	 citizen	 by	 giving	 priority	 to	 the	 “common	 good”.	 As	 it	 happens	 with	other	counterfactual	constructions	(for	instance,	the	previously	analyzed	legitimacy),	it	 is	 easier	 to	 detect	 when	 the	 ideal	 is	 not	 realized	 than	 defining	 it	 in	 a	 specific	manner.	Hence,	 the	public	 interest	 is	 often	defined	 “ex	negativo”,	 i.e.	 by	 identifying	interpretations,	decisions	or	application	of	the	concept	that	are	not	in	the	interest	of	the	society	as	a	whole48.							Furthermore,	and	in	order	to	approach	conveniently	to	the	meaning	of	the	notion	of	global	 public	 interest,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 somehow	 different	significance	that	this	term	has	in	the	different	 legal	traditions;	Civil/Continental	 law	and	Common	law	systems.	While	Continental	law	emphasizes	the	role	of	the	state	in	protecting	 the	 public	 interest	 and	 it	 provides	 civil	 servants	 of	 the	 public	administration	 with	 the	 power	 to	 enforce	 their	 decisions	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 the	common	 interest,	 the	 definition	 of	 public	 interest	 in	 Common	 law	 jurisdictions	encompass	 not	 only	 governmental	matters	 but	 also	 private	 conduct	 that	 impacts	 a	broad	segment	of	society	and/or	that	affects	a	community	in	a	manner	similar	to	that	of	a	governmental	entity49.	These	different	approaches	to	the	notion	of	public	interest	are	grounded	on	the	historical	experience	and	perceptions	of	the	public	and	private	realms.	 In	 this	 sense,	 and	 in	 reaction	 to	 totalitarianism	 after	 World	 War	 II,	 any	substantive	conception	of	public	 interest	 in	the	common	law	system	was	suspicious	
																																																								
47 Cox, JW Roxbee. (1973). The appeal to the public interest. British Journal of Political Science 3.02: 229-
241. 
48 Steffek, Jens. (2015). The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest. 
International Theory 7.2: 263-293. 
49 Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 85 Cal. 4th 468 (Ct. 
App. 2000) stated the following: “The definition of "public interest" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP 
statute has been broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that 
impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a 
governmental entity. (See Macias v. Hartwell, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 674, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222; Church of 
Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 650-651, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 620.) "`Matters of public 
interest . . . include activities that involve private persons and entities, especially when a large, powerful 
organization may impact the lives of many individuals.'" (Macias v. Hartwell, supra, 55 Cal. App.4th at p. 674, 
64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222.) In Macias, the court found that campaign statements made during a union election 
constituted a "public" issue because the statements affected 10,000 union members and concerned a 
fundamental political matter—the qualifications of a candidate to run for office. (Id. at pp. 673-674, 64 
Cal.Rptr.2d 222.)” A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a lawsuit that is intended to 
censor, intimidate, and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon 
their criticism or opposition. Such lawsuits have been made illegal in many jurisdictions on the grounds that 
they impede freedom of speech. 
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of	opening	 the	door	 to	 totalitarianism	so	 that	 the	 idea	of	public	 interest	came	to	be	formulated	 in	 the	 purely	 proceduralist	 terms	 of	 interest-group	 no	matter	what	 the	substantial	outcome	be50.				The	resort	to	the	public	interest	is	materialized	in	various	and	different	legal	contexts	in	 both	 Continental	 and	 Common	Law	 systems;	 first,	 some	Administrative	 Lawyers	and	scholars	of	Administrative	law	note	that	this	indeterminate	legal	concept	is	a	tool	to	reduce	the	margin	of	discretion	of	public	administration	and	government	agencies	which,	 following	 the	 public	 interest	 mandate,	 would	 be	 obliged	 to	 act	 upon	 the	premises	 of	 justice	 and	 reasonableness51;	 Another	 way	 of	 using	 public	 interest	 –specially	 in	 Continental	 law	 systems	 an	 European	 Union	 law	 and	 the	 European	Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)-	 is	 in	 relation	 with	 some	 limitations	 on	individual’s	 rights	where	 there	 is	 a	 “public	 interest”	 justification	 for	 doing	 so.	 Such	justifications	 are	 often	 raised	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 compulsory	expropriation	where	public	 interest	 provides	meaning	 and	 significance	 to	 the	main	ground	 of	 “causa	 expropiandi”	 necessary	 to	 effect	 the	 expropriation.	 Hence,	 public	interest	would	be	a	legal	limitation	on	the	absolute	right	to	property52.		Also,	 ECHR	 sets	 forth	 that	 individual’s	 rights	 are	 not	 necessarily	 absolute	 and	 it	 is	permissible,	in	some	circumstances,	for	States	to	place	limitations	on	an	individual’s	rights	where	 there	 is	 a	 “public	 interest”	 justification	 for	doing	 so	 (article	2.4	of	 the	Protocol	 No.	 4	 to	 the	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Human	 Rights	 and	Fundamental	 Freedoms	 securing	 certain	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 other	 than	 those	already	included	in	the	Convention	and	in	the	First	Protocol	thereto).		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 legislation	 often	 uses	 the	 term	 “public	 interest”	 by	 requiring	 a	named	 decision-maker	 to	 take	 decisions	 in	 the	 light	 of	 “the	 public	 interest”.	 Those																																																									
50 For a more extended review of the historical evolution of this, see Horwitz, M. J. (1982). The history of the 
public/private distinction. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130(6), 1423-1428. 
51 García de Enterría, E. (1962). La lucha contra las inmunidades del Poder en el derecho administrativo 
(Poderes discrecionales, poderes de gobierno, poderes normativos). Revista de Administración pública, 
13(38), 159-205. 
52 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional. STC 48/2005, de 3 de marzo de 2005. Cuestión de 
inconstitucionalidad 48/1998 Planteada por la Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo del Tribunal Superior de 
Justicia de Canarias en relación con la Ley del Parlamento de Canarias 2/1992 de 26 de junio, sobre 
declaración  de  utilidad  pública  de  la  expropiación forzosa  de  varios  edificios  en  Santa  Cruz  de 
Tenerife  para  proceder  a  la  ampliación  de  la  sede del Parlamento. 
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appeals	 are	 frequently	made	with	 regard	 to	 certain	 types	 of	 information	which	 are	subject	 to	 a	 “public	 interest”	 test;	 that	 is,	 the	 public	 authority	 that	 holds	 the	information	must	decide	whether	or	not	the	“public	interest”	favors	disclosure	of	the	information	 to	 an	 individual	 who	 is	 requesting	 it.	 In	 the	 event	 that	 the	 authority	concludes	that	the	information	should	not	be	disclosed,	the	individual	may	challenge	that	decision	before	 law	courts	 in	order	that	 the	 judiciary	determines	whether,	as	a	matter	of	law,	the	“public	interest”	requires	disclosure.					Other	than	appeals	to	the	“public	interest”,	a	new	practice	of	law	has	emerged	around	the	concept	of	public	interest	in	some	Common	law	systems	which	may	be	helpful	for	us	to	better	define	or	approach	to	this	indeterminate	legal	term	“Public	Interest	Law”.	It	 is	not	a	body	of	 law	or	a	 legal	 field,	the	definition	of	public	 interest	 law	would	be	referred	 to	 a	 practice	 of	 law	whose	 distinctiveness	 comes	 from	 the	 clientele	 public	law	 lawyers	represent.	 Instead	of	serving	powerful	economic	 interests,	 it	stands	 for	the	 advocacy	 of	 otherwise	 under-represented	 or	 vulnerable	 individuals,	 especially	those	living	in	poverty.	This	new	practice	of	law	has	been	called	public	interest	law.	In	the	US	public	interest	law	traces	its	origins	to	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	of	the	1960s	–some	 of	 them	 rallied	 behind	 Reverend	 Martin	 Luther	 king’s	 “dream”-	 when	 an	increasing	number	of	American	law	school	graduates	began	to	seek	social	“relevance”	in	 their	 work	 and	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 social	 issues	 that	 were	 debated	within	American	society	at	that	time.	They	defined	themselves	as	public	interest	lawyers	in	order	to	distinguish	themselves	from	“corporate	attorneys”.	As	it	has	been	noted	by	some,	 these	 original	 premises	 and	 purposes	 have	 moved	 toward	 a	 procedural	definition	 of	 “public	 interest	 law”	 as	 representation	 of	 the	 unrepresented	 and	underrepresented53,	 this	 –the	 prevalence	 of	 procedural	 terms	 rather	 than	 the	achievement	 of	 substantial	 targets-	 being	 	 the	 cause	 of	 an	 eventual	 crisis	 of	 public	interest	law.			Even	if	public	interest	law	does	not	encompass	a	different	body	of	law	or	an	accurate	definition	of	public	 interest,	 this	perspective	has	permeated	 the	performance	of	 the	three	 branches	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 US.	 One	 example	 is	 the	 creation	 in	 some																																																									
53 Esquivel, D. R. (1996). The identity crisis in public interest law. Duke Law Journal, 46(2), 327-351. 
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jurisdictions	 of	 departments	 of	 the	 Public	 Advocate	 in	 States54or	 its	 judicial	recognition	which	contributes	to	confer	it	an	autonomous	and	meaningful	entity	and	reality.	As	an	illustrative	example	of	this,	the	Court	in	Mt.	Laurel	Tp.	v.	Dept.	of	Public	
Advocate	 of	 NJ	 noted	 that	 “[…]	The	 practice	 of	 public	 interest	 law	 is	 a	much	 needed	
catalyst	in	our	legal	system.	It	helps	to	create	a	balance	of	economic	and	social	interests	
and	 to	 assure	 that	 all	 interests	 have	 a	 fair	 chance	 to	 be	 heard	 with	 the	 help	 of	 an	
attorney.	 	 Public	 interest	 lawyers	 today	 provide	 representation	 to	 a	 broad	 range	 of	
relatively	powerless	minorities	—	for	example,	the	mentally	ill,	children,	and	the	poor	of	
all	races.	They	also	represent	neglected	but	widely	diffuse	interests	that	most	of	us	share	
as	 consumers	 and	 as	 individuals	 in	 need	 of	 privacy	 and	 a	 healthy	 environment.	
[Marshall,	"Financing	Public	Interest	Law	Practice:	The	Role	of	the	Organized	Bar]"	The	
vital	need	to	hold	the	government	accountable	to	those	it	serves	and	the	need	to	provide	
legal	 voices	 for	 those	 muted	 by	 poverty	 and	 political	 impotence	 cannot	 be	
overemphasized.	 The	 Public	 Advocate	 goes	 far	 toward	 satisfying	 these	 needs,	 thereby	
nourishing	 and	 revitalizing	 our	 political	 system.	 The	 legislative	 definition	 of	 "public	
interest"	constitutes	a	realistic	attempt	to	create	an	effective	advocate	 for	the	general	
public	[…]”55		Similarly	to	“public	interest	law”	in	the	US,	and	in	an	effort	to	recapture	its	legitimacy	during	 the	 1970s56,	 Indian	 judiciary	 has	 developed	 a	 judicial	mechanism	 known	 as	Public	 Interest	 Litigation	 (PIL)	 which	 purports	 to	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 India’s	impoverished	and	disadvantaged	citizens	and	through	which	law	courts	may	assume	a	more	legislative	role	in	enforcing	rights	by	issuing	writs	of	mandamus	that	force	the	government	 to	 pass	 legislation	 dealing	 with	 rights	 disparities.	 PIL	 invokes	 the	Constitution,	in	particular	article	21	(No	person	shall	be	deprived	of	his	life	or	personal	
liberty	except	according	to	procedure	established	by	 law)	 in	order	 to	enforce	various	socioeconomic	rights	such	as	rights	to	education,	clean	air,	food	and	clothing57.																																																									
54 Schraub, J. J. (1975). Office of Public Counsel: Institutionalizing Public Interest Representation in State 
Government, The. Geo. LJ, 64, 895. 
55 Mt. Laurel Tp. v. DEPT. OF PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF NJ, 416 A.2d 886, 83 N.J. 522 (1980). 
56 During the historical period known as the Emergency Period (June 25, 1975 to March 21, 1977), Minister 
Indira Gandhi-the daughter of India's first prime minister, suspended elections and civil liberties in response to 
great political instability. Many citizens were expecting the Supreme Court to intervene. The Court failed to do 
so and instead capitulated to Indira Gandhi's autocratic tendencies. The Supreme Court's expansion of locus 
standi, therefore, is explained by its efforts to recapture its legitimacy. 
57 Holladay, Z. (2012). Public Interest Litigation in India as a Paradigm for Developing Nations. Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, 19(2), 555-573. 
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	Public	interest	is	a	term	which	has	been	developed,	for	the	most	part,	on	the	level	of	national	states.	If	as	we	have	seen,	the	notion	of	public	interest	seems	to	be	doomed	to	 imprecision	 and	 ambiguity,	 global	 public	 interest	 is	 still	 more	 imprecise	 and	obscure.	It	is	certainly	difficult	to	find	studies	addressing	the	notion	of	“global	public	interest”	from	a	scientific	perspective.	As	it	has	explained	for	the	first	time	by	Alfred	C.	 Aman	 in	 1999	 during	 the	 third	 annual	 Snyder	 Lecture	 at	 the	 University	 of	Cambridge	 in	 the	 Lauterpacht	 Center	 for	 International	 Research58,	 the	 fact	 that	national	 states	 are	 immersed	 in	 the	 globalization	 process	 and	 that	 they	 are	themselves	 agents	 of	 globalization,	 make	 it	 necessary	 to	 identify	 and	 achieve	 a	definition	of	“global	public	interest”	which	would	be	the	result	of	a	political	discourse	that	 going	 beyond	 national	 interests	 would	 seek	 to	 consider	 the	 interests	 of	humankind,	conceived	of	from	a	global	point	of	view.	This	first	mention	and	analysis	of	the	global	public	interest	is	confined	to	its	use	into	domestic	law.	In	this	sense,	the	author	wonders	whether	domestic	law	of	national	states	could	encourage	a	political	discourse	of	this	kind.			More	recently,	an	original	study	which	seeks	to	include	public	interest	considerations	(especially	 human	 rights,	 corruption	 and	 the	 environment)	 within	 the	 realm	 of	international	investment	law,	defines	global	public	interest	as	comprising	all	interests	inhering	 a	 pivotal	 importance	 for	 the	 international	 community	 and	 thus	 bearing	relevance	on	both	 the	domestic	 and	 international	 level59.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	both	studies	 mention	 expressly	 the	 existence	 of	 global	 public	 interest	 as	 something	different	 to	what	would	be	national	public	 interest,	neither	study	really	attempts	 to	give	 a	 clear	 and	 precise	 definition	 of	 global	 public	 interest	 so	 that	 it	 would	 be	reasonable	to	say	that	the	“sphere	of	certainty”	of	this	indeterminate	legal	term	is	that	it	is	global,	its	global	character	and	that	the	sphere	of	uncertainty	of	the	global	public	interest	is	still	greater	than	its	national	version.		
																																																								
58 Aman Jr, A. C. (1999). Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy 
and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 397-419. 
59 Kulick, Anthony. (2012). Global Public Interest and International Investment law. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.  
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Global	 Public	 Interest	 at	 the	 service	 of	 discursive	 constructions	 in	 the	 international	
realm.		Even	 though	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 realistic	 to	 flesh	 out	 a	 scientific	 definition	 of	 public	interest,	never	mind	that	of	global	public	interest,	it	is	interesting	for	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation	to	explore	the	discursive-pragmatic	approach	of	the	notion	of	public	interest,	 the	 ideological	and	political	context	where	 the	concept	of	public	 interest	 is	framed	following	the	different	perspectives	on	the	international	order	and	the	role	of	international	law.		In	fact,	some	scholars	explain	the	indeterminacy	of	public	interest	arguing	that	it	is	an	instrument	to	achieve	certain	social	and	political	goals	rather	than	an	end	in	itself60.	Hence,	significance	and	scope	of	public	interest	is	and	it	has	been	shifting	along	time	and	 geography	 –different	 legal	 traditions-	 from	 a	 public	 interest	 based	 on	 a	metaphysical	 idea	 of	 natural	 law	 and	 the	 common	 good	 –and	 the	 eventual	 risk	 of	interpretations	which	may	pave	the	way	to	totalitarianism-,	to	a	public	interest	which	is	purported	to	be	democratically	defined	and	legitimated	to	ensure	the	realization	of	a	greater	number	of	private	 interests	–and	 the	associated	risk	of	 the	 tyranny	of	 the	majority-	or	 to	a	public	 interest	which	should	be	the	result	of	an	authentic	and	real	deliberation	which	must	precede	the	decision	making	about	its	definition	and	which	requires	every	citizen	 to	reason	and	 to	be	able	 to	distinguish	between	 their	private	interests	and	the	public	 interest	–this	 is	 in	our	view	the	most	desirable	option	for	a	real	 democratic	 and	 balanced	 definition	 of	 this	 indeterminate	 concept-.	 	 Therefore,	the	 actual	 significance	 of	 this	 notion	 would	 be	 better	 explained	 by	 the	 political	process	and	the	political	debate	which	precedes	its	use	and	its	appellation	rather	than	in	the	attempt	to	get	a	scientific	definition	of	the	notion.			In	this	sense,	public	interest	would	play	different	discursive/rhetoric	roles	following	different	 theories	 or	 constructions	 of	 international	 law,	 international	 politics	 and	international	order.	From	 liberal	political	premises	a	 first	approach	would	consider	global	public	interest	as	having	-in	the	international	context	between	states-	the	same																																																									
60 Calera, N. L. (2010, December). El interés público: entre la ideología y el derecho. In Anales de la Cátedra 
Francisco Suárez (Vol. 44, pp. 123-148). 
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character	 and	 the	 same	 role	 as	 public	 interest	 in	 domestic	 legal	 systems.	 This	 first	approach	 is	 based	 on	 a	 conception	 of	 international	 law	 as	 the	 body	 of	 law	 which	strikes	 a	 balance	 between	 rights	 and	 duties	 among	 States	 as	 equal	 and	 sovereign	subjects	of	international	law	where	the	principle	pacta	tertiis	-a	treaty	does	not	create	either	 obligations	 or	 rights	 for	 a	 third	 State	 without	 its	 consent	 (Art.	 34	 Vienna	Convention)	 -	 informs	 and	 governs	 international	 law.	 Based	 on	 the	 distinction	between	private	 and	public	made	by	 domestic	 law,	 global	 public	 interest	would	 be	analogically	interpreted	as	the	figure	protecting	the	interest	of	the	global	community	that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 “particular”	 –private-	 interests	 of	 national	 states.	 Those	interests	 would	 be	 referred	 to	 issues	 to	 which	 the	 international	 community	 as	 a	whole	 should	 cooperatively	 respond.	 Hence,	 international	 rules	 embodying	 those	issues	 would	 be	 creating	 the	 legal	 order	 protecting	 the	 public	 interests	 of	 the	international	community	as	a	whole.61		In	this	approach	to	international	politics	as	a	scenario	of	cooperation	between	equal	states	 in	order	to	cope	with	eventually	 increasing	transnational	challenges,	 it	would	be	included	the	so	called	“global	administrative	 law”	whose	emergence	is	said	to	be	
little-noticed	and	factual	and	which	would	encompass	various	transnational	systems	of	 regulation	or	 regulatory	 cooperation	 as	 result	 of	 international	 treaties	 and	more	informal	 intergovernmental	 networks	 of	 cooperation,	 shifting	 many	 regulatory	decisions	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 global	 level	 governed	 by	 transnational	administrative	bodies—including	international	organizations	and	informal	groups	of	officials—that	perform	administrative	functions	but	which	are	not	directly	subject	to	control	by	national	governments	or	domestic	legal	systems.	Global	public	interest	in	this	 context	 would	 be	 promoted	 through	 the	 transparency,	 participation	 and	accountability	achieved	by	those	multi-level	and	cooperative	structures	with	shared	responsibility	in	decision-making62.			Also,	private	international	law	or	norms	of	conflict	of	laws	-where	concepts	of	public	interest	 or	 public	 policy	 can	 impede	 the	 application	 of	 foreign	 law	or	 international																																																									
61 Komori, T. (2016). Public interest rules of international law: towards effective implementation. Basingtoke: 
Routledge. 
62 Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart. (2005). The emergence of global administrative 
law. Law and contemporary problems 68.3/4: 15-61. 
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law-	are	held	to	play	a	role	beyond	the	national	borders.	Thus,	it	would	be	rejected	its	conventional	characterization	as	purely	domestic	law,	it	is	argued	instead	that	private	international	 law	 contributes	 to	 effect	 an	 international	 ordering	 of	 regulatory	authority	 in	 private	 law,	 structured	 by	 international	 principles	 of	 justice,	 pluralism	and	subsidiarity.63		Another	approach	which	has	become	a	regular	 issue	of	debate	since	 the	 turn	of	 the	21st	century	has	been	elaborated	around	the	concept	of	global	constitutionalism	as	the	development	 of	 certain	 levels	 of	 decision-making	 capacity	 beyond	 the	 state	 –associated	with	the	demand	for	constitutional	governance-	and	where	public	interest	would	 refer	 to	 a	 specific	 type	 of	 rules.	 Global	 constitutionalism,	 part	 of	 larger	inquiries	 into	 global	 governance,	 has	 raised	 the	 interest	 of	 different	 disciplinary	perspectives	 such	 as	 sociology,	 international	 law	 or	 political	 philosophy	 among	others.	 From	 a	 more	 classical	 legal	 doctrine	 and	 legal	 thought,	 global	constitutionalism	would	 be	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 international	 and	 institutional	order	 as	 a	 constitutional	 system	 where	 a	 global	 constitutionalism	 is	 in	 process	 of	creation	pivoting	upon	ius	cogens	norms	and	erga	omnes	obligations	that	materialize	universal	 values	 and	 somehow,	 hierarchically	 superior	 norms	which	would	 prevail	over	other	international	rules	and	norms	and	that	would	bring	order	to	an	otherwise	fragmented	 legal	 order64;	 by	 specifying	 hierarchy	 among	 rules,	 global	constitutionalism	would	 be	 seen	 then	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 cope	with	 the	 otherwise	chaotic	system	full	of	contradictory	norms,	overlapping	institutions	and	regimes	and	numerous	conflict,	thus	contributing	to	create	more	certainty.						As	 a	 matter	 of	 principle	 and	 except	 for	 some	 scholars65,	 global	 constitutionalism	would	emerge	 independently	 from	a	world	constitutional	charter	expressly	charged	with	 that	 task	 (elaborate	 “the	 constitution	 of	 the	 world”).	 At	 the	 peak	 of	 these	“constitutional”	 norms	 there	 would	 be	 the	 jus	 cogens	 norms	 which	 have	 been	reviewed	 in	 the	previous	chapter.	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECHR)	 for																																																									
63 Mills, A. (2009). The confluence of public and private international law: justice, pluralism and subsidiarity in 
the international constitutional ordering of private law. Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press. 
64 Walker, N. (2008). Taking constitutionalism beyond the state. Political Studies, 56(3), 519-543. 
65 Fassbender, B. (1998). The United Nations Charter as constitution of the international community. Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L., 36, 529. 
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example,	 has	 expressly	 invoked	 the	 constitutional	 character	 of	 the	 European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	to	justify	its	departure	from	established	rules	on	treaty	reservations66.	Some	have	seen	in	this	approach	of	the	ECHR	a	nascent	and	inspiring	“cosmopolitan	 legal	 order”67.	 Also	 in	 this	 context,	 they	 come	 to	 play	 what	 some	authors	have	called	“public	interest	norms”.	Public	interest	norms	are	not	part	of	the	
jus	cogens	category	of	norms,	but	 they	would	have	erga	omnes	effect	on	 the	ground	that	they	serve	a	global	public	interest	and	so	binding	on	all	states	-even	without	their	consent-.	This	approach	is	held	to	purport	to	address	the	free-riders	problem	faced	in	many	fields	of	international	relations	and	it	is	also	related	to	the	provision	of	GPGs68.		However,	 as	 it	 is	 noted	 by	 some	 scholars,	 the	 claim	 that	 constitutionalization	 can	bring	 order	 to	 an	 otherwise	 highly	 fragmented	 legal	 order	 is	 highly	 controversial.	That	argument	presupposes	a	broad	global	agreement	around	core	values	that	simply	does	 not	 seem	 to	 exist.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 status	 of	 a	 set	 of	 norms	 as	 constitutional	would	be	a	contingent	social	 fact	 that	rests	not	on	 textual	provisions,	but	rather	on	the	“Constitution’s	acceptance	as	authoritative	in	the	present”	and	on	facts	external	to	the	constitution.	Also,	some	view	this	defense	of	global	constitutionalism	as	a	political	effort	by	specific	international	actors	–the	powerful	ones-,	to	claim	normative	priority	for	one	set	of	international	legal	norms	over	alternative	norms69.	Also,	it	is	questioned	whether	global	constitutionalism	does	not	mask	the	perpetuation/universalization	of	dominant	political	forms,	in	particular	those	corresponding	to	the	liberal	democratic	
																																																								
66 Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23 (1995) or Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I. 6351 (2008) where the Court said among other things that […] It 
follows from all those considerations that the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have 
the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all 
Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness 
which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by 
the Treaty […] 
67 Sweet, A. S. (2012). A cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe. 
Global Constitutionalism, 1(01), 53-90. 
68 Pauwelyn, Joost. Conflict of norms in public international law: how WTO law relates to other rules of 
international law. (See Chapter 4 footnote 89). Such an approach however is considered to be both risky and 
unfounded. First, because of some questions raised about when is a norm in everyone’s public interest and 
who decides this matter. Second because it could threaten in the author’s view, the function of international 
law as provider of a neutral framework for co-operation. In this sense, it is said that recognizing protection of 
the environment as a “global common” is one thing but to impose detailed treaty obligations on non-parties to 
achieve that global common is quite another. 
69 Dunoff, J. L., & Trachtman, J. P. (2008). A Functional Approach to Global Constitutionalism. Harvard Law  
School Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-57 
216		
tradition	 and	 practice	 that	 creating	 or	maintaining	 a	 possible	 hegemony	 of	 certain	powerful	states,	of	a	political	practice	and	of	a	predominant	culture70.		Furthermore	 and	 beyond	 these	 approaches	which	 in	many	 occasions	 are	 premised	upon	the	extension	of	domestic	legal	or	constitutional	thinking,	ideas	and	doctrine	to	the	 new	world	 order	 and	where	 public	 interest	would	 play	 a	 similar	 role	 but	with	different	 subjects	 and	 recipients	 both	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	 the	 international	 scale,	there	 are	 also	 some	 other	 radical	 views	which	 question	 the	 traditional	 pillars	 and	paradigms	upon	which	most	political,	 legal	and	philosophical	theories	and	doctrines	have	been	constructed	and	which,	with	some	variants,	place	the	state	at	the	center	of	their	rationale.			Inspired	on	 the	 theoretical	 and	 conceptual	work	 around	 transnational	 legal	 theory,	legal	 pluralism71,	 and	 systems	 theory	 developed	 by	 the	 German	 sociologist	 Niklas	Luhman72,	 transnational	 constitutionalism	 challenges	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	domestic	and	the	international	legal	order	and	focuses	its	attention	on	the	emergence	of	norm	creation	outside	the	state’s	law-making	apparatus	–different	sectors	of	world	society	develop	 a	 global	 law	of	 their	 own-	 and	outside	 the	 confines	of	 both	private	and	public	international	law	where	law	and	even	more	state	law	are	just	a	particular	form	of	societal	communication	without	occupying	any	superior	or	privileged	place73.	This	 approach	 which	 some	 have	 called	 Postmodernism	 highlights	 the	 fragmented	nature	of	 society	 and	 the	 complexity	 and	multiplicity	 of	 voices,	 interests	 and	 social	dimensions	 and	 rejects	 the	 existence	 of	 shared	 values	 or	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 public	interest	 which	 would	 be	 shared	 and	 recognized	 by	 all	 the	 members	 of	 society.	Following	this	perspective	which	considers	 that	 the	erosion	of	sovereignty	of	states	and	 of	 the	 traditional	 legal	 institutions	 and	 legal	 framework	 comes	 from	 “below”74	through	an	 increasing	melting	and	 fusion	of	 the	state	with	market	 spheres	of	norm																																																									
70 Schwöbel, C. E. (2010). Situating the debate on global constitutionalism. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 8(3), 611-635. 
71 Teubner, Gunther. (1996). Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world-society. GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT 
A STATE. Gunther Teubner, ed., Dartsmouth: 3-28. In Teubner’s view, the modern experience is of a 
fragmented rather than a uniform globalization in which politics has lost its leading role.  
72 Luhmann, Niklas. (1990). Political theory in the welfare state. Amsterdam: De Gruyter 
73 Zumbansen, P. (2012). Comparative, global and transnational constitutionalism: The emergence of a 
transnational legal-pluralist order. Global Constitutionalism, 1(01), 16-52. 
74Sassen, Saskia. (2003). The state and globalization. Interventions 5.2: 241-248.  
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creation	 –lex	mercatoria-,	 global	 public	 interest	would	 be	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 naïf	conceptual	construction,	a	politically	fabricated	illusion,	a	utopian	vision	of	a	global,	systematic	and	unified	global	order.									
Public	interest	in	TRIPS.		TRIPS	Agreement	uses	the	term	“public	interest”	in	two	articles.	Other	than	article	63	where	public	 interest	 is	mentioned	as	an	exception	 to	 the	disclosure	of	confidential	information,	article	8	of	TRIPS	refers	to	public	 interest	within	the	article	devoted	to	the	principles	under	which	TRIPS	must	be	interpreted	and	implemented.	Article	8(1)	lays	 out	 the	 public	 interest	 principle	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement.	 In	 particular,	 article	8(1)	states	that	“Members	may,	in	formulating	or	amending	their	laws	and	regulations,	
adopt	measures	 necessary	 to	 protect	 public	 health	 and	 nutrition	 and	 to	 promote	 the	
public	 interest	 in	 sectors	of	vital	 importance	 to	 their	 socioeconomic	and	technological	
development,	 provided	 that	 such	 measures	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 this	
Agreement.”		Article	7	(Objectives)	and	article	8	(Principles)	are	two	concessions	which	reflect	 in	large	part	the	concerns	of	developing	countries	during	the	negotiations	of	TRIPS.	As	a	reaction	 to	 the	 proposal	 of	 developed	 countries	 addressing	 the	 protection	 of	 IPRs	within	 the	 frame	of	 the	GATT	 system,	 developing	 countries	 proposed	 another	 legal	text	where	they	insisted	on	the	need	to	link	IPRs,	its	implementation	with	economic	and	 social	 development	 objectives.	 Needless	 to	 say	 that	 the	 final	 text	 essentially	embodies	and	contemplates	priorities	and	norms	proposed	by	 the	developed	world	and	 when	 article	 7	 and	 8	 would	 be	 a	 sort	 of	 consolation	 prize	 for	 developing	countries75.				This	block	of	articles	(objectives	and	principles)	could	play	an	important	role	 in	the	political	 and	 judicial	 processes	 both	 of	 which	 become	 complementary	 in	 the	WTO	context;	the	threat	of	WTO	dispute	process	shapes	multilateral	and	bilateral	political	
																																																								
75 Yu, Peter K. (2009). The objectives and principles of the TRIPS agreement. Houston Law Review 46: 797-
1046. 
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negotiations	 and	 political	 contexts	 and	 interpretations	 inform	 judicial	 decisions.76	Hence,	developing	countries	have	explored	the	use	of	articles	7	and	8	to	support	their	positions	with	a	more	than	limited	success	as	we	will	see	in	next	chapter.	Professor	Correa	has	been	probably	one	of	the	most	salient	academics	exploring	the	potentiality	of	those	two	articles	in	favor	of	the	interests	of	developing	countries.				When	speaking	of	the	necessary	measures	for	promoting	the	public	interest	in	sectors	of	vital	importance	to	their	socioeconomic	and	technological	development	[…]	TRIPS	does	not	offer	any	definition	either	for	public	interest	or	of	the	meaning	of	sectors	of	vital	importance	to	their	socioeconomic	and	technological	development.		Regarding	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 IPRs	 (in	 particular	 of	 Copyright)	 Gillian	Davies	states	in	his	thesis	(p.	1)	that	whether	a	particular	act	is	“in	the	public	interest”	is	not	subject	to	any	objective	tests	and	that	inherent	in	the	noble	motive	of	the	public	good	is	 the	notion	that,	 in	certain	circumstances,	 the	needs	of	 the	majority	override	those	 of	 the	 individual,	 and	 that	 the	 citizen	 should	 relinquish	 any	 thoughts	 of	 self-interest	in	favor	of	the	common	good	of	society	as	a	whole77.		Regarding	 the	 sectors	 of	 vital	 importance	 to	 their	 socioeconomic	 and	 technological	
development,	 Professor	 Correa	 argues	 that	 each	 member	 state	 should	 be	 able	 to	decide	what	constitute	those	sectors	by	looking	at	their	interests,	development	goals	and	 necessities78.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 this	 “public	 interest”	 safeguard	 has	 to	 face	two	 important	 constraints	 -both	 added	 by	 developed	 countries	 when	 negotiations	were	at	their	last	stage-;	the	first	has	to	do	with	the	so-called	“necessity”	requirement	and	the	second	one	with	the	“consistency”	requirement	which	obliges	member	states	to	adopt	measures	consistent	with	the	provisions	of	the	[TRIPS]	Agreement.		The	 first	 constraint	 (necessity)	 is	 explained	 by	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 provision.	 The	article	 does	 not	 state	 that	 members	 could	 implement	 those	 measures	 which	 they	deem	 to	 be	 fit	 in	 order	 to	 fulfill	 their	 vital	 interests	 and	 socioeconomic	 goals	 but																																																									
76 Shaffer, G. (2004). Recognizing public goods in WTO dispute settlement: who participates? Who decides? 
The case of TRIPS and pharmaceutical patent protection. Journal of International Economic Law, 7(2), 459-
482. 
77 Davies, G. (2002). Copyright and the public interest (pp. 76-77). London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
78 Correa, C. (2007). Trade related aspects of intellectual property rights: a commentary on the TRIPS 
agreement. OUP Catalogue. 
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explicitly	 states	 that	 only	 can	 take	measures	 which	 are	 (objectively)	 necessary	 for	those	 purposes.	 The	 objectivity	 given	 to	 the	 required	 necessity	 of	 the	 measures	makes	 its	 interpretation	 subject	 to	potential	WTO	 review	 regarding	 its	 validity	 and	consistency	with	TRIPS79.					The	 second	 constraint	 (consistency)	 is	 even	worse	 and	 it	 could	 have	 a	 blocking	 or	crippling	impact	on	the	application	of	this	article.	In	effect	this	article	could	impede	to	invoke	 an	 exception	 -not	 foreseen	 under	 the	 Agreement-	 to	 the	 compliance	 of	exclusive	 rights	 protected	 by	 TRIPS.	 To	 overcome	 this	 hurdle,	 Correa	 defends	 that	article	 8	 should	 be	 read	 together	 with	 article	 7	 and	 its	 effective	 interpretation	 in	terms	of	balance	of	interests	between	owners	of	rights	and	society	in	general	in	order	to	 remove	 the	 potential	 inconsistency	 of	 certain	measures	with	 IP	 exclusive	 rights.	Also,	the	Ministerial	Declaration	and	the	Doha	Declaration	on	public	health	which	are	generally	 viewed	 as	 the	 only	 serious	 attempt	 made	 by	 the	 WTO	 system	 so	 far	 to	combat	a	certain	decontextualized	pro-IPRs	and	pro-developed	countries	approach	to	TRIPS	and	so	finding	a	balance	between	all	the	interest	at	stake,	gives	article	7	and	8	a	higher	 legal	 status	 as	 indispensable	 references	 to	 interpret	 the	 Agreement.	 In	 this	sense,	paragraph	9	of	the	Ministerial	Declaration	explicitly	states	that	[…]	the	TRIPS	
Council	shall	be	guided	by	the	objectives	and	principles	set	out	in	Articles	7	and	8	of	the	
TRIPS	 Agreement	 and	 shall	 take	 fully	 into	 account	 the	 development	 dimension.	Furthermore,	paragraph	5(a)	of	the	Declaration	on	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	Public	Health,	 adopted	 on	 14	 November	 2001,	 states	 the	 following:	 In	 applying	 the	
customary	 rules	 of	 interpretation	 of	 public	 international	 law,	 each	 provision	 of	 the	
TRIPS	Agreement	shall	be	read	in	the	light	of	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	Agreement	
as	expressed,	in	particular,	in	its	objectives	and	principles.	Hence,	despite	the	fact	that	those	 articles	 are	 “should”	 provisions	 rather	 than	 “shall”	 ones,	 there	 is	 room	 to	consider	 that	 TRIPS	 provisions	 must	 be	 read	 consistently	 with	 its	 principles	 and	objectives	reflected	in	articles	7	and	8.			
																																																								
79 Cann Jr, W. A. (2004). On the Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-
Developed Countries for Accuss to Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply under a Theory of 
Progressive Global Constitutionalism. U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L., 25, 755. 
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Other	than	its	role	as	an	interpretative	instrument	to	counterbalance	the	hegemonic	approach	standing	for	an	expansive	implementation	of	IPRs	as	exclusive	rights	and	to	justify	 an	 open	 and	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 key	 provisions	 of	 TRIPS	 such	 as	strengthening	the	necessary	technical	cooperation	and	technology	transfer	provided	in	 art.	 66.2	 and	 67,	 patentability	 exclusions	 established	 in	 art.	 27.2	 and	 27.3,	exceptions	to	IPRs	application	(art.	30)	or	compulsory	 licenses	(art.	31),	 the	“public	interest”	 safeguard/exception	 provision	 may	 be	 used	 defensively,	 i.e.,	 constitute	 a	defense	 and	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 straight	 forward	 implementation	 of	 TRIPS	 and	application	of	IPRs.	 In	this	manner,	developing	countries	could	use	this	provision	in	the	 WTO	 dispute	 settlement	 process	 to	 provide	 defense	 and	 support	 for	 their	measures80.	In	this	sense,	we	could	even	think	of	the	development	of	a	public	interest	defense	 to	 the	 eventual	 IPRs	 infringement	 as	 it	 is	 usual	 in	 some	 common	 law	jurisdictions	in	relation	to	copyright	infringement81.	However,	as	we	will	see	next,	the	use	 of	 this	 institution	 as	 a	 real	 counterbalance	 against	 the	 hegemonic	mainstream	discourse	has	been	rare	or	non-existing.						
Furthering	the	bewilderment	with	two	other	old	acquaintances	Ordre	public	and	Public	
policy.		In	 close	 connection	with	 public	 interest,	 ordre	 public	 and	 public	 policy	 are	 elusive	legal	 notions	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 interfere	 the	 application	 of	 international	law.	 In	 particular,	 both	 figures	 are	 legal	 concepts	 which	 have	 a	 large	 tradition	 in	Private	 International	 Law	 as	 judicially	 administered	 exceptions	 to	 otherwise	applicable	 foreign	 law	 (or	 international	 law)	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 its	 application	would	 offend	 against	 the	 forum’s	 concept	 of	 fundamental	 norms82.	 Even	 if	 both	figures	are	analogue,	they	are	not	exactly	equivalent.	As	public	policy	exception	has	a	common	 law	 origin,	 ordre	 public	 is	 identified	 with	 civil	 codified	 law	 and	 has	 a	
																																																								
80 Reichman, J. H. (2000). The TRIPS Agreement comes of age: conflict or cooperation with the developing 
countries. Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., 32, 441. 
81 Mendis, D. (2003). The historical development of exceptions to copyright and its application to copyright law 
in the Twenty-First Century. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 7. 
82 Forde, M. (1980). The “Ordre Public” Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 29(2-3), 259-273. 
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statutory	source.	In	spite	of	its	statutory	origin,	ordre	public	externe	–the	exception	to	foreign	law	application-	is	also	dominated	by	judicial	and	juristic	interpretations83.		As	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 global	 public	 interest,	 the	 notions	 of	 public	 policy	 and	 ordre	
public	are	not	limited	to	national	or	domestic	fundamental	norms	or	values	but	they	could	 be	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 international	 public	 policy	 or	 “transnational”	 public	policy	derived	from	international	law,	basically	from	jus	cogens	norms.	Although	this	idea	has	been	developed	mostly	 in	 the	 context	of	 international	 arbitration	where	 it	has	 been	 used	 to	 recognize	 the	 public	 dimension	 of	 a	 dispute,	 it	 could	 be	 equally	applicable	 in	 national	 courts;	 if	 a	 foreign	 or	 international	 law	 or	 judgement	 is	considered	 to	 be	 repugnant	 to	 international	 –constitutional	 like-	 public	 order,	domestic	 court	 could	 not	 apply	 it.	 This	 decision	 process	 would	 imply	 a	 “vertical”	balancing	of	competing	international	norms	and	make	some	international	norms	and	commitments	 prevail	 over	 others	 thus	 having	 national	 or	 domestic	 courts	 the	potential	 to	 somehow	 shape	 a	 sort	 of	 international	 superior	 or	 constitutional	norms.84		Many	 international	 treaties	 provide	 themselves	 for	 an	ordre	 public	or	 public	 policy	exception	 to	 their	 standards.	 The	 safeguards	 available	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 are	 more	restrictive	than	those	contemplated	in	Article	XX85	of	the	GATT	–general	exceptions	to	its	 applicability-	 or	 XIV	 (a)	 of	 the	WTO	 General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 –enabling	 states	 to	 take	measures	necessary	 to	protect	public	morals	or	 to	maintain	public	 order-.	However,	TRIPS	 also	mentions	 the	ordre	public	within	 its	 provisions.	Other	than	the	general	“public	interest”,	TRIPS	uses	the	narrower	term	“ordre	public”	in	article	27(2)	of	the	TRIPS.	Article	27(2)	expressly	states	that	Members	may	exclude	
from	patentability	 inventions,	 the	 prevention	within	 their	 territory	 of	 the	 commercial																																																									
83 Murphy, K. (1981). The traditional view of public policy and ordre public in private international law. Ga. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L., 11, 591. 
84 Mills, Alex. (2009). The confluence of public and private international law… See supranote 63. 
85 As we have previously explained, commentators have explored and discussed whether the general 
exceptions in article XX of the GATT are applicable under the TRIPS Agreement. Many conclusions in this 
respect are skeptical over such application. In this sense, the European Communities—Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Panel Report, 
WT/DS174/R seems to strengthen that skepticism. As the panel declared, ‘there is no hierarchy between the 
TRIPS Agreement and GATT 1994. On the other hand, in India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, Panel Report, WT/DS50/R, the Panel stated that TRIPS is an integral part of 
the WTO system, which itself builds upon the experience of over nearly half a century’ under the GATT. 
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exploitation	 of	 which	 is	 necessary	 to	 protect	 ordre	 public	 or	 morality,	 including	 to	
protect	 human,	 animal	 or	 plant	 life	 or	 health	 or	 to	 avoid	 serious	 prejudice	 to	 the	
environment,	provided	that	such	exclusion	is	not	made	merely	because	the	exploitation	
is	 prohibited	 by	 their	 law.	 In	 doing	 so,	 TRIPS	 endorses	 a	 longstanding	 tradition	 in	Patent	 law	 in	 order	 to	 exclude	 from	patentability	 those	 inventions	which	might	 be	contrary	 to	 morals	 or	 public	 order.	 In	 the	 European	 context,	 the	 European	 Patent	Convention	 (art.	 53	 a))	 establishes	 that	 European	 patents	 shall	 not	 be	 granted	 in	
respect	of	 inventions	the	commercial	exploitation	of	which	would	be	contrary	to	ordre	
public	or	morality.	In	a	very	similar	way,	the	Indian	Patents	Act	(section	3b))	excludes	from	patentability	those	inventions	contrary	to	public	order	and	morality.		Even	if	US	patent	law	does	not	contemplate	this	kind	of	exclusions,	such	requirement	has	been	fixed	and	acknowledged	by	Courts.			In	 spite	of	 the	greater	 conciseness	and	definiteness	of	 the	notion	of	public	order	 in	comparison	with	 the	notion	of	public	 interest,	 there	would	be	still	 room	to	use	 this	concept	 in	 a	manner	 conducive	 to	promote	 the	 interests	of	developing	 countries	 in	ensuring	the	access	to	medicines	by	their	populations.	In	this	sense,	Professor	Correa	suggest	 that	 developing	 countries	 could	 suspend	 the	 patentability	 of	 certain	pharmaceutical	 products	 on	 grounds	 of	 ordre	 public	 which	 should	 be	 configured	beyond	 its	 traditional	 moorings.	 This	 could	 also	 constitute	 an	 exception	 to	 the	“noncommercial	exploitation”	of	otherwise	patented	pharmaceutical	products	if	such	products	were	distributed	on	a	not-for	profit	basis86.									 	
																																																								
86 Correa, C. M. (2000). Integrating public health concerns into patent legislation in developing countries (p. 
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5.4.	 Public	interest	and	ordre	publique,	hostages	of	its	past.		Following	 Professor	 Cornago’s	 threefold	 approach	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 global	 public	interest,	 it	 is	 important	at	 this	moment	to	review	from	a	historical-critical	approach	the	evolution	and	the	development	of	this	concept	within	the	historical	evolution	of	the	 distinction	 between	 private	 and	 public	 interest	 or	 within	 what	 it	 has	 been	perceived	 as	 “common	 good”.	 This	 historical-critical	 analysis	 could	 give	 us	 the	necessary	 lens	 and	 perspective	 to	 value	 adequately	 the	 scope	 and	 potential	 of	 the	notion	 of	 global	 public	 interests	 and	 other	 associated	 terms	 as	 a	 transforming	 or	defining	tool	at	this	precise	moment	when	it	is	observed	the	creation	of	a	new	global	institutional	and	 legal	architecture.	From	the	Roman	utilitas	communis	or	publica	to	today’s	global	public	 interest	or	Global	Public	Good,	 the	notion	of	public	 interest	or	
intérêt	 général	 (as	 this	 concept	 has	 been	 coined	 by	 the	 French	 political	 and	 legal	tradition)	 has	 gone	 through	 very	 different	 historic	 phases	 and	 it	 is	 then	 the	depositary	of	multiple	meanings	and	connotations.		Leaving	 aside	 certain	 philosophical	 lines	 of	 political	 thought	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 very	questionable	the	existence	itself	of	the	public	interest	or	the	possibility	of	a	consensus	around	 it,	 the	 different	 approaches	 and	 historic	 conceptualizations	 of	 the	 public	interest	have	attempted	 to	achieve	 the	significance	of	 the	common	good	as	both	an	instrument	and	goal	of	the	political	action.			Notwithstanding	this,	or	rather	because	of	this,	the	notion	of	public	interest	has	been	historically	variable	and	contingent,	and	deeply	anchored	in	the	distinction	between	the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 realm	 devised	 at	 each	 historical	 period87;	 while	 the	conception	of	public	 interest	 after	 the	Second	World	War	was	 clearly	distinguished	from	 private	 self-interest,	 and	 the	 state	 (l’Etat	 protecteur)	 and	 the	 international	community	 were	 charged	 to	 create	 institutions	 (Bretton	Woods,	 UN)	 addressed	 to	intervene	in	the	economy	and	in	other	fields	to	transcend	the	private	self-interest88,																																																									
87 Horwitz, M. J. (1982). The history of the public/private distinction. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
130(6), 1423-1428. 
88 In fact, prior to the 1980s, ranging from building highways to perform directly public services in the fields of 
education, energy, health or transport, governments took on a variety of tasks that the private sector 
previously had performed. In most Western Europe countries governments nationalized companies, whole 
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during	 the	 last	 decades	 since	 1971	 –when	 the	 previous	 system	 collapsed-	we	 have	observed	that	a	new	conception	of	the	public	interest	and	the	state	makes	its	way.	In	this	new	conceptual	 framework	under	the	premises	of	the	neoliberalism89,	 the	state	and	the	public	interest	are	called	to	become	guards	and	facilitators	of	the	free	market	and	be	 reflection	of	 the	 sum	of	 the	vectors	of	private	 conflict.	 In	 this	 context,	 some	commentators	observe	that	rather	than	retreating,	the	state	is	used	to	enable	a	new	order	 of	 regulation	 by	 enforcing	 socially	 and	 politically	 acceptable	 new	 forms	 of	capitalism.	In	this	new	order,	new	forms	of	governance	also	provoke	the	reassertion	of	 the	public	 interest.90Furthermore,	 as	 observed	by	 some	 scholars	when	analyzing	the	 competition	policy	and	antitrust	 law,	 the	 concept	of	public	 interest	has	had	 the	effect	of	legitimizing	neo-liberal	assumptions	regarding	private,	individual,	economic	interests	 through	 the	 shift	 over	 time	of	 the	policy	 language	and	discourse	of	public	interest	 and	 by	 using	 this	 concept	 to	 secure	 hegemonic	 control	 to	 legitimate	 the	interests	 of	 dominant	 groups91.	 	 Finally	 and	 after	 the	 crisis	 of	 2008,	 and	 some	perceived	excesses	of	 the	 free	market	 and	 capitalism,	we	are	 today	 living	an	era	of	uncertainty	–Brexit,	unexpected	presidential	win	of	Donald	Trump,	rejection	of	TTIP	and	other	trade	agreements	and	the	apparent	collapse	of	the	previous	regime-	where	the	 global	 public	 interest	 or	 any	 attempt	 to	 build	 a	 global	 order	 on	 political,	democratic	and	collective	basis	are	conspicuous	by	their	absence.		
Public	interest,	an	ally	of	the	hegemonic	ideology.		Therefore,	 it	 may	 be	 observed	 that	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 many	 and	substantially	diverse	policies	and	approaches	have	been	adopted	intermittently	along	time	 and	 different	 jurisdictions	 and	 political	 cultures.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 all	 the	different	 implementations	 and	 understandings	 of	 this	 notion	 have	 in	 common	 its																																																																																																																																																																																			
industries, banks, and health care systems. Many of the European current automobile industry has a state 
public funding origin such as Fiat, or Seat.   
89 Goodman, J. B., & Lovemen, G. W. (1990). Does privatization serve the public interest?. Harvard Business 
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91 McDonald, J. (2007). Legitimating private interests Hegemonic control over the public interest 'in National 
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supportive	 role	 to	 the	 hegemonic	 ideology	 and	 political	 thought	 at	 any	 given	 time.	Needless	 to	 say	 that	 global	public	 interest	does	not	 constitute	 any	 exception	 to	 the	national	public	interest’s	tradition.			Following	Gramscian	concept	of	“common	sense”,	public	 interest	would	be	part	of	a	hegemonic	process	to	promote	the	dominant	ideology.	The	hegemonic	process	builds	consent	by	discursively	aligning	the	public	interest	with	the	interest	of	the	dominant	elite.	This	process	would	leave	a	limited	number	of	choices	for	the	public	to	form	an	opinion	or	make	a	choice92.	In	this	sense,	the	hegemonic	ideology	of	today	would	be	dominated	by	the	western	corporate	capitalism;	a	new,	global	regime	of	accumulation	characterized	 by	 an	 unprecedented	 international	 mobility	 of	 capital	 and,	 among	others,	the	commodification	of	knowledge	globally	and	its	insertion	into	the	circuit	of	capital,	 becoming	 TRIPS	 a	 helpful	 instrument	 for	 the	 effective	 creation	 of	 the	 new	global	capitalism	by	easing	 that	global	commodification	(of	knowledge).	Hence,	 in	a	context	where	 global	 capitalism	 has	 dominated	 the	 range	 of	 discourses,	 it	 has	 also	dominated	and	configured	the	notion	of	public	 interest	and	global	public	 interest	to	such	extent	that	it	is	difficult	to	raise	alternative	discourses	and	definitions	of	it93.					Thus,	 the	notion	of	public	 interest	has	 traditionally	been	a	 faithful	partner,	a	 fellow	traveler	of	the	hegemonic	ideology	at	the	different	historical	stages.	It	is	difficult	then	to	devise	the	notion	of	public	 interest	as	an	 instrument	capable	of	 transforming	the	reality	or	bringing	about	change.	We	could	say	then	that	the	concept	of	public	interest	has	never	had	emancipatory	 force	or	 capacity	as	 it	has	never	been	decisive	 for	any	political	or	institutional	transformation.	On	the	contrary,	public	interest	has	deployed	an	undisguised	tendency	to	endorse	hegemonic	ideology	and	practice.	In	this	respect,	the	same	applies	to	the	concept	of	global	public	interest.	Global	public	interest	as	well	as	 it	 happens	with	GPG	would	 play	 a	 discursive	 role	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 explaining	 the	current	 scenario,	 a	 legitimizing	 instrument	 of	 the	 international	 regime	without	 any	pretension	to	promote	changes	in	the	status	quo94.																																																													
92 Artz, Lee, and R. Kamalipour Yahya. (2003). Globalization, Media He-gemony and Social Class. New York: 
SUNY Press. 
93 l'Etang, J. (Ed.). (2012). Public relations: Critical debates and contemporary practice. Routledge. 
94 Coussy, J. (2002). Biens publics mondiaux: théorie scientifique, réalité émergente et instrument rhétorique. 
Les Biens Publics Mondiaux. Un mythe légitimateur pour l’action collective. 
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	Due	 to	 its	 lack	 of	 emancipatory	 power	 or	 of	 autonomous	 character	 in	 order	 to	promote	 transformations	or	 to	bring	about	change	and	 its	condition	as	a	discursive	element	 which	 mostly	 accompanies	 mainstream	 hegemonic	 ideologies	 or	 political	thoughts,	law	courts	are	indisposed	to	reliance	on	these	elusive	concepts	and	actually	eschew	its	frequent	use95.	As	it	is	observed	by	some	commentators	the	fact	that	law	courts	do	not	determine	clear	legal	and	policy	foundations	for	its	application	makes	its	 use	 or	 the	 use	 of	 these	 indeterminate	 legal	 concepts	 such	 as	 public	 interest,	 or	public	policy	or	public	order,	be	frequently	discouraged96.			
Public	interest	in	the	context	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	and	TRIPS.		As	to	the	invocation	or	use	of	public	interest	or	ordre	public	in	the	context	of	TRIPS	or	the	global	IPRs	regime,	it	has	to	be	noted	that	within	the	WTO	dispute	settlement,	the	use	of	articles	7	and	8	(where	the	principle	of	public	interest	is	embodied)	has	been	irrelevant	 in	 the	34	 cases	which	have	been	 filed	 so	 far.	The	panels	of	 the	DSU	 take	views	 which	 are	 mostly	 focused	 on	 the	 IPR’s	 owners	 and	 IPRs	 owners’	 economic	interests.				The	 Panel	 Report	 in	 the	 dispute	 Canada-Patent	 Protection	 of	 Pharmaceutical	Products97encompasses	the	most	illustrative	and	extensive	debate	around	the	extent	and	 scope	 of	 the	 “public	 interest”	 clause	 embodied	 in	 articles	 7	 and	 8	 of	 TRIPS.	 In	particular,	the	EC	alleged	that	Canada’s	legislation	regarding	the	so-called	regulatory	review	 exception	 and	 so-called	 stockpiling	 exception	were	 not	 compatible	 with	 its	obligations	 under	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	 because	 they	 did	 not	 comply	with	 the	 full	protection	of	patented	pharmaceutical	inventions	for	the	entire	duration	of	the	term	of	protection	envisaged	by	Articles	27.1,	28	and	33	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.		
																																																								
95 Murphy, Kent. Traditional View of Public Policy and Ordre Public in Private International Law. See 
supranote 83.  
96 Mills, A. (2009). The confluence of public and private international law: justice, pluralism and subsidiarity in 
the international constitutional ordering of private law. Ca,mbrdige: Cambridge University Press. 
97 WT/DS114/R. 17 March 2000. European Communities v. Canada. Dispute Settlement 114. 
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In	 supporting	 the	 validity	 of	 its	 patent	 legislation,	 Canada	 as	 well	 as	 other	 third	parties	 involved	 in	 the	 dispute	 (in	 particular	 Brazil,	 Thailand,	 India	 and	 Poland)	raised	 the	 necessity	 of	 finding	 a	 balance	 between	 owner’s	 IPRs	 and	 other	 “public	interest”	considerations.	In	this	sense,	those	parties	standing	for	a	liberal	reading	of	articles	 30,	 7	 and	 8	 of	 TRIPS	 argued	 that	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 were	 not	
conferred	in	a	vacuum,	and	that	the	TRIPS	Agreement	therefore	did	not	aim	to	achieve	a	
degree	 of	 protection	 for	 those	 rights	 which	 would	 unduly	 prejudice	 the	 vital	 public	
interest	in	social	and	economic	welfare	or	the	rights	of	others	[…]	(p.19).			On	the	other	hand,	those	who	were	opposed	to	a	broader	understanding	of	article	7	and	8	raised	two	set	of	arguments;	the	first	set	of	arguments	is	based	on	a	formal	and	narrow	interpretation	of	the	text	argued	that	the	phrase	of	article	8.1		"provided	that	such	measures	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 provisions	 of	 this	Agreement"	demonstrated	
that	 the	 public	 health,	 nutrition	 and	 other	 public	 interests	 were	 to	 be	 considered	
subordinate	to	the	protection	of	the	IPRs	insofar	as	the	minimum	rights	guaranteed	by	
the	TRIPS	Agreement	were	concerned	[…]	(p.	53).	Also,	in	EC	view,	articles	7	and	8	are	
statements	 that	 describe	 the	 balancing	 of	 goals	 that	 had	 already	 taken	 place	 in	
negotiation	 the	 final	 texts	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 […]	 (p.	 154).	 The	 second	 set	 of	arguments	has	to	do	with	the	definition	of	public	interest,	for	those	who	stood	for	a	restrictive	interpretation	of	the	exceptions	of	the	rights	conferred	by	a	patent,	public	interest	 was	 also	 achieved	 by	 granting	 IPRs	 to	 a	 patent	 owner	 since	 the	 grant	 of	patent	 rights	 goes	beyond	 the	 simple	unilateral	grant	of	 rights	 to	a	patent	owner:	 it	
was	a	contract	between	the	State	and	individual	innovators	in	which	the	consideration	
for	 the	grant	of	patent	protection	was	the	disclosure	of	 the	 innovative	knowledge	and	
the	 public	 interest	 in	 promoting	 investment	 in	 the	 research	 and	 development	 of	 new	
pharmaceutical	products	[…]	(p.	104).		Neither	this	Panel	nor	any	WTO	panel	and	Appellate	Body	have	made	any	definitive	interpretation	and	application	of	Articles	7	and	8	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	their	scope	and	 their	 role	 in	 balancing	 all	 the	 interests	 and	 objectives	 at	 stake.	 As	 it	 has	 been	observed	by	 some	commentators,	 the	Panel	 avoided	elaboration	of	 the	 content	 and	implications	 of	 Articles	 7	 and	 8.1	 in	 this	 case,	 despite	 the	 specific	 mentions	 and	
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references	 made	 by	 the	 parties	 in	 their	 submission98.	 Interestingly,	 Canada		contended	 	 that	 these	 provisions	 “call	 for	 a	 liberal	 	 interpretation	 	 of	 	 the	 	 three		conditions	 	 stated	 	 in	 	Article	 	30	 	of	 	 the	 	Agreement,	 	 so	 	 that	governments	would	have	the	necessary	flexibility	to	adjust	patent	rights	to	maintain	the	desired	balance	with	 other	 important	 national	 policies”.	 In	 spite	 of	 considering	 that	 the	 so-called	regulatory	review	exception99	was	consistent	with	TRIPS,	the	Panel	seems	to	adopt	a	restrictive	 reading	of	articles	7	and	8	when	 it	 states	 that	 In	 the	Panel's	 view,	Article	
30's	 very	 existence	 amounts	 to	 a	 recognition	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 patent	 rights	
contained	 in	Article	28	would	need	 certain	adjustments.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 three	
limiting	 conditions	 attached	 to	 Article	 30	 testify	 strongly	 that	 the	 negotiators	 of	 the	
Agreement	 did	 not	 intend	 Article	 30	 to	 bring	 about	 what	 would	 be	 equivalent	 to	 a	
renegotiation	of	the	basic	balance	of	the	Agreement.	Obviously,	the	exact	scope	of	Article	
30's	authority	will	depend	on	the	specific	meaning	given	to	its	limiting	conditions.	The	
words	of	those	conditions	must	be	examined	with	particular	care	on	this	point.	Both	the	
goals	and	the	 limitations	stated	 in	Articles	7	and	8.1	must	obviously	be	borne	 in	mind	
when	 doing	 so	 as	 well	 as	 those	 of	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 which	
indicate	its	object	and	purposes	[…]	(p.	154)	thus,	suggesting	that	the	balance	between	the	owner’s	IPRs	and	the	other	public	interest	considerations	are	basically	defined	in	the	literality	and	the	wording	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.			Also,	 the	 reading	 of	 those	 two	 articles	 made	 by	 the	 Panel	 distinguishes	 those	 two	provisions	 from	 the	operative	or	 substantive	provisions,	 thus	making	 those	articles	even	weaker	and	keeping	 them	in	 the	realm	of	 “may”	and	the	“wishful	 thinking”.	 In	this	sense,	according	to	some	commentators,	article	8	could	hardly	constitute	a	legal	basis	for	justifying	an	exception	–different	from	those	expressly	established	under	the	agreement-	but	 rather	a	policy	statement	 to	explain	 the	rationale	under	arts	30,	31	and	40.100		
																																																								
98 Yu, Peter K. The objectives and principles of the TRIPS agreement. See supranote 75. 
99 Under the regulatory review exception, potential competitors of a patent owner are permitted to use the 
patented invention, without the authorization of the patent owner during the term of the patent, for the 
purposes of obtaining government marketing approval, so that they will have regulatory permission to sell in 
competition with the patent owner by the date on which the patent expires 
100 Gervais, D. J. (2003). The TRIPS Agreement: drafting history and analysis. sweet & maxwell. 
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Furthermore,	 although	 the	 case	 is	 not	 related	 to	 patents,	 in	 EC	 -	 Trademarks	 and	Geographical	Indications	(Australia	vs.	EC)101,	and	in	the	course	of	explaining	why	the	TRIPS	Agreement	did	not	contain	a	general	exceptions	provision	and	how	there	is	no	hierarchy	 between	 TRIPS	 and	 GATT,	 the	 Panel	 referred	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 the	Agreement	set	out	in	Article	8.1	stating	that	[…]	These	principles	reflect	the	fact	that	
the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 does	 not	 generally	 provide	 for	 the	 grant	 of	 positive	 rights	 to	
exploit	or	use	certain	subject	matter,	but	rather	provides	for	the	grant	of	negative	rights	
to	 prevent	 certain	 acts.	 This	 fundamental	 feature	 of	 intellectual	 property	 protection	
inherently	grants	Members	 freedom	to	pursue	 legitimate	public	policy	objectives	since	
many	 measures	 to	 attain	 those	 public	 policy	 objectives	 lie	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	
intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	 do	 not	 require	 an	 exception	 under	 the	 TRIPS	
Agreement.	 […]”	 This	 interpretation	 (post-Doha)	 of	 article	 8	 of	 TRIPS	 is	 especially	restrictive	 compared	 to	more	 liberal	 readings	 of	 the	 “public	 interest	 clause”	 and	 it	jeopardizes	 governments’	 room	 to	 implement	 TRIPS	 commitments	 in	 accordance	with	their	particular	interests	and	needs.	In	fact,	when	the	Panel	states	that	the	fact	that	 IPRs	 are	 negative	 rights	 permits	 that	 other	 public	 policy	 objectives	 may	 be	pursued	without	interferences	into	the	IPRs	regime.	Also,	it	implies	that	modifying	or	restricting	 the	 scope	 of	 IPRS	 should	 be	 the	 ultimate	 resort	 to	 be	 considered	when	other	public	interest	needs	knock	the	door.					In	a	more	recent	case	European	Union	and	a	Member	State	-	Seizure	of	Generic	Drugs	in	 Transit	 (in	 phase	 of	 consultations),	 India	 requested	 consultations	 with	 the	European	 Union	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 regarding	 the	 repeated	 seizures	 on	 patent	infringement	 grounds	 of	 generic	 drugs	 originating	 in	 India	 but	 transiting	 through	ports	 and	 airports	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 to	 third	 country	 destinations.	 	 India	 alleges	among	other	 things	 that	 the	measures	at	 issue	are,	 in	 several	 respects,	 inconsistent	with	 article	 8	 of	 TRIPS	 and	 the	 August	 2003	Decision	 on	 TRIPs	 and	 Public	 Health.	India	considers	further	that	the	measures	at	issue	also	have	a	serious	adverse	impact	on	the	ability	of	developing	and	least	developed	countries	to	protect	public	health	and	to	 provide	 access	 to	 medicines	 for	 all102.	 WTO	 DSU	 will	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to																																																									
101 WT/DS290/R. 15 March 2005. On 17 April 2003, Australia requested consultations with the EC concerning 
the protection of trademarks and to the registration and protection of geographical indications for foodstuffs 
and agricultural products in the EC. 
102 WT/DS408/1 19 May 2010 
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clarify,	nuance	and	specify	the	sense	and	scope	of	article	7	and	8	regarding	the	role	of	public	interest.			
Ordre	public	exception:	how	and	where.			Although	 the	 original	 proposal	 of	 article	 8	 suggested	 by	 developing	 countries	mentioned	 additional	 measures	 to	 protect	 ‘public	 morality’	 and	 ‘national	 security’	following	GATT	article	XX	precedent,	both	areas	were	omitted	in	the	final	version	of	Article	8.	These	measures,	however,	are	somehow	foreseen	in	article	27.2	and	73	of	the	TRIPS.			As	we	have	previously	said,	Article	27.2	explicitly	states	that	Members	may	exclude	from	patentability	inventions,	the	prevention	within	their	territory	of	the	commercial	exploitation	 of	which	 is	 necessary	 to	 protect	 ordre	 public	 or	morality,	 including	 to	protect	 human,	 animal	 or	 plant	 life	 or	 health	 or	 to	 avoid	 serious	 prejudice	 to	 the	environment,	 provided	 that	 such	 exclusion	 is	 not	 made	 merely	 because	 the	exploitation	is	prohibited	by	their	law.	On	the	other	hand,	article	73	further	enables	member	 states	 to	 pursue	 their	 essential	 security	 interests	 and	 to	 fulfill	 obligations	under	 the	 United	 Nations	 Charter	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 international	peace	and	security.		Article	 27.2	 of	 TRIPS	 embodies	 in	 this	 manner	 a	 traditional	 legal	 exclusion	 to	patentability.	 The	 exclusion	 of	 ordre	 public,	 public	 order	 or	 “morality”	 vary	 from	jurisdiction	 to	 jurisdiction	 as	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 and	 interpretation	 as	 to	whether	 is	 moral	 or	 not	 depends	 largely	 upon	 cultural	 values	 and	 idiosyncrasy.	Although	there	have	not	been	specific	cases	for	the	DSU	to	define	and	clarify	the	scope	of	 “ordre	 public”	 and	 morality	 under	 the	 TRIPS,	 WTO	 has	 had	 the	 opportunity	 of	expressing	 its	 views	 about	 ordre	 public	 and	 morality	 with	 respect	 to	 other	 GATT	Agreements.	In	the	Internet	Gambling	case103,	the	Panel	made	a	distinction	between	morality	and	public	order.	While	morality	grounds	are	referred	to	“standards	of	right	
																																																								
103 WT/DS285/R 10 Nov 2004. WTO United States: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services—Report of the Panel. 
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or	wrong	 conduct	maintained	 by	 or	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 community	 or	 a	 nation”,	 public	order	 is	 directed	 to	 preserve	 the	 “fundamental	 interests	 of	 a	 given	 society,	 which	would	include	the	maintenance	of	the	rule	of	law”.	In	this	sense,	the	Panel	recognized	that	 there	 is	 no	 single	meaning	 of	 “public	morals”	 and	 “public	 order”	 as	 “these	 can	vary	in	time	and	space,	depending	upon	a	range	of	factors	including	prevailing	social,	cultural,	 ethical	 and	 religious	 values”.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Panel	 showed	 that	 it	was	open	to	accord	some	sensitivity	and	sphere	to	the	involved	WTO	member	in	defining	and	applying	those	terms	in	accordance	with	their	own	system	and	axiology	of	values.	That	autonomy	or	sensitivity	though	is	not	absolute	since	the	Panel	has	to	implement	those	terms	and	give	them	effect	as	a	matter	of	treaty	interpretation.			This	certain	autonomy	or	sensitivity	given	to	 the	values	and	 interpretations	of	each	nation	when	it	comes	to	define	the	concepts	of	morality	or	ordre	public,	is	relevant	in	order	to	foresee	whether	DSU	could	accept	an	interpretation	of	the	morality	or	ordre	
public	 of	 article	 27.2	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 permitting	 exceptions	 to	 patents	 which	 are	considered	 to	 impair,	 for	 example,	 the	 access	 to	 medicines	 or	 other	 public	 health	purposes.						Article	 53(a)	 of	 the	European	Patent	 Convention	 establishes	 that	 European	patents	shall	 not	 be	 granted	 in	 respect	 of	 inventions	 the	 commercial	 exploitation	 of	which	would	be	contrary	to	“ordre	public”	or	morality	and	that	such	exploitation	shall	not	be	deemed	to	be	so	contrary	because	it	is	prohibited	by	law	or	regulation	in	some	or	all	of	the	Contracting	states.	In	the	European	context,	this	exception	has	been	invoked	in	cases	related	to	biotechnology	inventions	and	living	organism.			Maybe	the	most	illustrative	and	with	greater	media	resonance	was	the	case	of	Onco-Mouse104.	 For	 our	 purposes	 and	 leaving	 aside	 the	 interesting	 debate	 about	patentability	of	 living	organisms,	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	both	 in	 the	Onco-Mouse	case	and	 in	other	 similar	 cases	 (T	356/93),	 the	Board	of	Appeal	of	 the	European	Patent	Office	defines	ordre	public	in	the	context	of	patents	as	an	exception	which	covers	the																																																									
104 Decision of 3 October 1990 19/90 (Technical Board of Appeal) and 6 July 2004, T 0315/03 (Boards of 
appeal). The Ono-Mouse is a type of laboratory mouse (Mus musculus) that has been genetically modified 
using modifications designed by members of Harvard University to carry a specific gene called an activated 
oncogene in order to make them more vulnerable to cancer. 
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protection	of	public	security	and	the	physical	integrity	of	individuals	as	part	of	society.	
This	 concept	 encompasses	 also	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 environment.	 Accordingly,	 under	
Article	 53(a),	 inventions	 the	 exploitation	 of	 which	 is	 likely	 to	 breach	 public	 peace	 or	
social	 order	 (for	 example	 through	 acts	 of	 terrorism)	 or	 to	 seriously	 prejudice	 the	
environment	are	to	be	excluded	from	patentability	as	being	contrary	to	“ordre	public”.	Also,	 the	European	Patent	Office	has	held	 in	 the	different	cases	when	 it	has	had	the	opportunity	to	analyze	the	ordre	public	or	the	morality	exception	that	the	exceptions	
to	patentability	under	Article	53(a)	EPC	have	to	be	narrowly	construed,	irrespective	of	
whether	or	not	the	exploitation	of	the	invention	for	which	a	European	patent	has	been	
granted	is	prohibited	by	law(s)	or	regulation(s)	in	some	or	all	of	the	contracting	states.	Therefore,	 in	 the	 European	 context	 the	 ordre	 public	 exception	 must	 be	 narrowly	interpreted	and	it	does	not	contemplate	any	socio-economic	consideration	in	order	to	appreciate	its	applicability.			The	US	 system	has	never	 had	 a	 similar	 exception	 of	morality	 or	 public	 order	 in	 its	patent	legislation	but	it	has	been	rather	a	creation	of	law	courts	which	have	fixed	the	contours	 of	 these	 indeterminate	 legal	 terms.	 However,	 Anglo	 American	 law	 courts’	tradition	has	been	traditionally	reluctant	to	rely	on	public	order	and	have	used	it	or	invoked	 very	 rarely105.	 In	 the	 fifties	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 the	 US	 Patent	 Office	(USPTO)	 started	 banning	 patents	 on	 gambling	 machine	 on	 morality	 grounds106.	However	as	it	has	been	declared	in	more	recent	cases107,	law	courts	have	considered	that	the	rule	which	would	mandate	invalidating	patents	because	one	can	use	the	item	for	deceptive	or	illegal	purposes	is	no	longer	good	law.	Many	commentators	and	law	practitioners	share	the	view	that	morality	should	have	nothing	to	do	with	patents108.	In	 fact	 the	 same	 Onco-Mouse	 (Harvard	 Mouse),	 was	 fairly	 quickly	 granted	 by	 the	USPTO	even	if	there	was	an	intense	public	debate	with	media	resonance	in	the	case.	The	focus	of	the	USPTO	to	grant	patents	related	to	living	organisms	has	been	on	the	subject	 matter	 of	 the	 invention	 rather	 than	 on	 morality	 grounds.	 However,	 as	 it	
																																																								
105 Murphy, K. (1981). The traditional view of public policy and ordre public in private international law. Ga. J. 
Int'l & Comp. L., 11, 591. 
106 Merges, R. P. (1987). Intellectual property in higher life forms: the patent system and controversial 
technologies. Md. L. Rev., 47, 1051. 
107 See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
108 Enerson, B. D. (2003). Protecting society from patently offensive inventions: the risk of reviving the moral 
utility doctrine. Cornell L. Rev., 89, 685. 
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happens	 in	 the	 European	 context,	 in	 the	 US	 patent	 system	 these	 judicially-created	exceptions	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 socio-economic	 considerations	 to	 justify	 the	application	of	the	public	order	or	morality	exception	to	patentability.									The	 Indian	Patent	Law	 in	 turn	contemplates	a	provision	regarding	 the	public	order	and	 morality	 exceptions	 to	 patentability.	 While	 the	 former	 provision	 stated	 that	
‘What	are	not	inventions	–	an	invention	the	primary	or	intended	use	of	which	would	be	
contrary	to	law	or	morality	or	injurious	to	public	health;”	an	amendment	was	brought	in	2002	 to	 comply	with	TRIPS	and	 it	now	recites:	 ‘3(b)	an	 invention	 the	primary	or	
intended	use	or	commercial	exploitation	of	which	could	be	contrary	to	public	order	or	
morality	or	which	causes	serious	prejudice	to	human,	animal	or	plant	life	or	health	or	to	
the	environment.”	Therefore,	there	was	formerly	a	specific	emphasis	on	public	health	which	has	been	so	reflected	by	law	courts.				In	 particular,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Novartis	 AG	 v.	 Union	 of	 India	 &	 Others,	 the	 Indian	Intellectual	 Property	 Appellate	 Board	 (IPAB)	 rejected	 the	 patentability	 of	 a	pharmaceutical	 compound	 Gleevec	 (a	 compound	 having	 valuable	 anti-tumor	properties	 used	 for	 the	 treatment	 of	 Leukemia).	 Apart	 from	 arguing	 its	 lack	 of	inventive	step	(section	3d),	the	IPAB	court	held	in	its	judgment	of	June	26	2009	that	the	 price	 of	 the	 medicine	 whose	 patentability	 was	 being	 challenged,	 was	 too	
unaffordable	to	the	poor	patients	in	India,	that	this	patent	could	create	a	havoc	to	the	
lives	 of	 poor	 people	 and	 their	 families	 affected	with	 the	 cancer	 for	which	 this	 drug	 is	
effective	and	that	this	would	have	a	disastrous	effect	on	the	society	as	well.	As	a	result,	IPAB	considered	that	the	alleged	invention	was	not	worthy	of	a	reward	of	any	product	
patent	 because	 its	 exploitation	 could	 create	 public	 disorder	 and	 that	 is	 expressly	prohibited	 by	 section	 3(b)	 of	 the	 Indian	 Patent	 Law.	 Although	 not	 grounded	specifically	 on	 article	 3(b)109,	 in	 a	 long,	 detailed	 and	 interesting	 ruling,	 the	 Indian	Supreme	 Court	 upheld	 the	 Indian	 Patent	 Office	 and	 the	 IPAB’s	 rejection	 of	 the	Novartis	patent	application.110																																																										
109 Indian Supreme court did not enter to analyze the scope of public order of 3(b). In Supreme Court’s own 
words […] for the purpose of these appeals we need only to focus on clause (d)[…]  (paragraph 93. Page 93) 
110 Supreme Court of India. Civil Appellate Jurisdiction. Civil Appeal No. 2706-2716 of 2013 
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Therefore,	 and	 even	 if	 not	 explicitly	 endorsed	 by	 the	 Supreme	Court,	we	 could	 say	that	the	Indian	judiciary	has	given	an	interpretation	of	the	exception	of	public	order	as	a	notion	with	the	potential	of	encompassing	socio-economic	considerations	of	the	patent	application	and	IPRs	regime	such	as	the	unaffordable	price	of	pharmaceuticals.	This	interpretation	of	the	notion	of	public	order	(together	with	a	greater	sensitivity	to	national	 values	 and	 understandings	 of	 public	 order	 and	 morality	 as	 expressed	 by	some	GATT	decisions)	opens	an	interesting	and	innovative	jurisprudential	line	which	could	be	certainly	replicated	by	law	courts	of	other	jurisdictions.				In	 any	 case,	 except	 for	 the	 above	 mentioned	 liberal	 interpretation	 of	 the	indeterminate	 concept	 of	ordre	public,	 it	 does	not	 seem	 that	neither	public	 interest	nor	 public	 order	 have	 had	 the	 capacity	 and	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 exceptions	 to	 the	application	of	 the	IPRs	regime.	 Its	use	as	exceptions	to	the	scope	of	exclusive	rights	and	 as	 counterbalances	 of	 the	 IPRs	 owner	 has	 been	 testimonial	 or	 non-existing.	Furthermore	and	unfortunately	for	developing	countries,	the	requirements	provided	in	Article	8	have	seemed	to	create	the	perverse	effect	of	privileging	IPRs	over	other	arguably	more	important	socio-economic	goals,	such	as	providing	access	to	essential	medicines.	The	foregoing	is	even	more	certain	for	the	“global	public	interest”	which	is	becoming	an	exotic	concept	living	on	some	cosmopolitan	shelves.					
Concluding	with	a	procedural	and	ethical	proposal	for	Global	public	interest.				As	 we	 have	 seen,	 the	 definition	 and	 the	 contours	 of	 public	 interest	 is	 historically	variable,	contingent,	elusive	and	somehow,	excessively	tied	to	power	and	hegemonic	mainstream.	This	has	made	this	notion	unfit	and	unsuitable	to	transform	the	reality	and	to	become	a	pivotal	axe	or	element	for	change.	The	already	problematic	condition	of	 public	 interest	 is	 combined	 with	 new	 uncertainties	 around	 the	 notion	 of	 global	public	interest	which	seems	to	be	even	more	irrelevant	as	an	instrument	to	reshape	today’s	 international	 architecture	 and	 justify	 certain	 collective	 actions	 at	 a	 global	scale.				
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The	analysis	of	the	main	theoretical	approaches	which	have	dealt	with	the	notion	of	the	public	 interest	reveals	conflicting	positions	regarding	the	concept	and	 its	scope.	While	some	theories	questioned	even	the	existence	and	the	feasibility	of	this	notion	in	view	of	the	impossibility	of	consensus,	either	due	to	the	fragmented	dimensions	and	different	interests	of	individuals	(postmodernism)	or	because	the	division	of	society	into	antagonistic	classes	(Marxism),	the	theories	which	have	studied	this	figure	with	the	intent	of	giving	a	specific	meaning	with	defined	legal	effects	(mainly	the	utilitarian	and	 the	 contractarian	 approaches)	 have	 proved	 to	 be	 incomplete,	 ineffective	 and	unsuccessful	as	to	their	pretension	of	giving	it	legal	substantivity	and	autonomy	from	undue	 interferences	 of	 power	 and	 other	 non-public	 interests.	 Public	 interest	 and	global	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 IPRs	 regime	 engenders	 –as	 it	 could	 not	 be	otherwise-	similar	difficulties	than	public	interest	does	in	other	legal	fields.		It	is	at	this	point	that	it	could	be	noteworthy	to	question	whether	the	relevance	of	this	concept	 resides	 in	 how	 to	 elaborate	 that	 public	 interest	 rather	 than	 in	 its	 specific	meaning.	 The	 emphasis	 should	 be	 therefore	 on	 the	 procedure,	 on	 the	 manner	 in	which	 the	 consensus	 is	 constructed.	 Once	we	 have	 renounced	 to	 achieve	 a	 precise	significance	of	the	notion	of	public	interest	and	in	order	to	make	the	public	interest	be	an	operative	concept	to	guide	and	justify	political	decisions	and	to	monitor	them	–i.e.	to	 evaluate	 that	 the	 decisions	 have	 been	 adopted	 in	 furtherance	 of	 that	 public	interest-	 the	 public	 interest	 should	 be	 the	 result	 of	 a	 socio-political	 debate	 on	 the	objectives	and	priorities	of	society	based	on	a	model	of	deliberative	democracy	and	communicative	 action.	 In	 this	 sense,	 from	 an	 approximate	 deontological	 concept	 of	public	interest,	the	identification	of	it	should	be	the	result	of	a	case	by	case	evaluation	and	the	demonstration	that	the	action	in	question	reflects	the	public	interest111.	This	democratic-process	to	define	on	a	case	by	case	basis	what	the	public	interest	is,	and	in	particular,	what	 the	 global	 public	 interest	 implies	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	 at	 a	 global	scale	through	communicative	action112.			
																																																								
111 de Córdoba, Manuel Benabent F. (2010). Public interest in political philosophy. A necessary ethical and 
regulatory concept for territorial planning. Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos españoles 53.  
112 Habermas, J., Habermas, J., & McCarthy, T. (1985). The theory of communicative action (Vol. 2). Beacon 
press. 
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Communicative	action	is	based	on	human	capacity	for	rationality	and	human	capacity	to	communicate	through	argumentation.	Argumentative	speech	is	only	possible	when	the	participants	get	rid	of	their	personal	interests	and	act	without	coercion	in	an	ideal	community	or	 ideal	public	sphere	where	there	 is	an	undistorted	and	argumentative	dialogue,	 a	mutual	 search	 of	 understanding	 and	 joint	 learning	 from	which	 the	 best	argument	 emerges.	 It	 is	 from	 the	 best	 argument	 –accepted	 by	 all-	 from	which	 the	notion	of	public	interest	is	identified	at	the	time.						Being	aware	of	 the	difficulties	of	 recreating	 this	 ideal	 argumentative	dialogue	 in	an	aseptic	public	sphere	where	pure	reason	rules	combined	with	the	elusiveness	of	the	notion	of	global	public	interest,	this	“deontological”	approach	may	become	however	a	helpful	 tool	 to	 justify	 collective	 and	 political	 actions,	 dynamic	 decision-making	process	 and	 evaluate	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 their	 accordance	with	 the	 idea	 of	 public	interest	at	every	step.	Also,	if	we	assume	that	public	interest	must	be	the	result	of	a	socio-political	process	free	of	private,	less	respectable	interests,	it	may	be	claimed	the	implementation	 and	 adoption	 of	 mechanisms	 in	 all	 the	 decision-making	 processes	which	 entail	 participation	 and	 discussion	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 voices	 and	 interest	 at	stakes.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	Washington	 Declaration	 on	 Intellectual	 Property	 and	 the	Public	Interest113or	the	recent	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary	General’s	High-level	Panel	on	access	 to	medicines	which	has	been	the	result	of	an	 important	participation	of	a	diversity	of	actors	and	agents,	could	be	a	good	starting	point	to	reshape	the	policies	on	IPRs	regime.	
																																																								
113 Flynn, S. M., Baker, B. K., Kaminski, M. E., & Koo, J. (2012). The Washington Declaration on Intellectual 
Property and the Public Interest. 
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CHAPTER	6.	 THE	HISTORIC	NATURE	OF	IPRs	AS	A	SOCIAL	
CONTAINER:	THE	ENCLOSURE	OF	KNOWLEDGE	
WITHIN	A	NEW	HISTORICAL	PHASE	OF	
CAPITALISM.			
Previous		We	have	previously	seen	how	the	international	IPR	regime	implemented	by	TRIPS	is	impairing	 the	 access	 to	 pharmaceuticals	 by	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 world	population.	Furthermore,	we	have	analyzed	the	political,	legal	and	philosophical	basis	under	which	the	new	international	architecture	and	the	IPR	regime	are	constructed.	In	this	analysis,	we	have	been	able	to	detect	several	and	large	shadows	of	the	current	regime	which	is	intimately	linked	to	its	legitimacy	or	the	lack	of	it.	Finally,	along	the	previous	 chapters	 and	 specifically	 in	 the	 last	 one,	 we	 have	 examined	 the	 internal	mechanisms	contemplated	by	the	TRIPS	Agreement	to	reconcile	the	diverse	interests	at	stake,	the	exceptions	to	the	regime	and	other	counterbalances	to	the	IPRs	owner’s	exclusive	 interests.	 Also,	 we	 have	 reviewed	 some	 figures	 and	 principles	 of	international	law	such	as	public	interest	or	public	order	and	some	political	proposals	directed	 to	 correct	 the	 market	 failures	 (Global	 Public	 Goods)	 in	 order	 to	 value	 its	impact	on	the	regime	of	IPRs	and	its	capacity	to	satisfy	other	types	of	concerns	and	interests.		Once	we	have	discussed	the	above	mentioned	issues	and	having	attested	the	limited	results	and	impact	of	TRIPS	internal	and	external	mechanisms	to	counterbalance	the	interests	of	IPRS	owner’s	regime,	we	are	in	a	position	to	address	the	main	proposals	and	the	most	relevant	thesis	suggested	by	this	dissertation.	In	this	sense,	in	these	two	last	chapters	we	are	going	to	uncover	first	the	real	causes	behind	the	expansion	and	enhancement	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	 a	 new	 and	 voracious	 phase	 of	 the	development	 of	 capitalism	 and	 how	 this	 process	 is	 somehow	distorting	 the	 nature,	scope	and	philosophical	foundations	of	IPRs	as	a	legal	institution	which	is	the	result	of	 a	 contingent,	 historic,	 political	 and	 shifting	 process	 rather	 than	 well	 defined,	absolute,	pre-existing	natural	rights.	 In	this	sense,	 IPRs	regime	would	encompass	or	
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“contain”	a	set	of	social	values,	values,	and	functions	which	are	historically	and	thus,	IPRs	would	be	 a	 “social	 container”	 rather	 than	 an	 autonomous	 and	 invariable	 legal	institution.					We	will	 secondly	consider	 the	opportunity	of	modulating	 the	scope	of	 the	exclusive	proprietary	 rights	 of	 the	 IPRs	 from	 a	 iuris	 tantum	 test	 based	 approach,	 i.e.,	 if	 we	assume	that	IPRs	are	intended	to	achieve	certain	social	goals	and	that	they	were	not	preceded	in	their	creation	by	any	tragedy	of	the	commons	scenario,	ça	va	de	soi	that	even	if	presumed,	there	may	be	occasions	where	that	cause/effect	may	be	questioned	and	 challenged	 giving	 way	 to	 the	 necessity	 of	 testing	 whether	 the	 announced	 or	presumed	social	goals	are	being	effectively	met	and	therefore,	whether	the	privilege	of	monopoly	granted	through	IPRs	is	worthy	maintaining	or	 if	 it	has	to	be	adjusted,	modulated,	superseded		or	even	suppressed.	In	this	sense,	IPRs	are	not	natural	rights	which	confer	their	owners	with	absolute	and	decontextualized	rights	no	matter	which	the	 socioeconomic	 circumstances	 are	 and	which	 their	 socioeconomic	 impact	 is.	 On	the	 contrary,	 IPRs	 do	 not	 qualify	 as	 pure	 property,	 they	 are	 not	 simple	 fee.	 Hence,	IPRs	 encompass	 instrumentally	 some	 of	 the	 prerogatives	 or	 entitlements	 of	 the	conventional	property	rights	and	they	are	conferred	to	 their	 title	owners	as	 long	as	those	fulfil	their	social	function.						On	the	other	hand,	it	will	be	reviewed	in	the	last	chapter	some	changes	of	the	global	architecture	 in	 order	 to	make	 the	 system	 coherent.	We	 suggest	 to	 transit	 towards	models	where	participation	and	deliberative	processes	of	argumentation	could	 take	their	place	and	enable	a	greater	legitimacy	of	the	system	in	terms	of	promoting	that	all	 the	voices	and	 interests	 (hegemonic	and	counter-hegemonic)	are	heard	and	 that	the	 general	 interest	 is	 achieved	 and	 accepted	 by	 most.	 Furthermore,	 these	 more	deliberative	 forums	and	decision-taking	processes	are	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	test	 of	 legal	 coherence	 can	 be	 performed	 and	 that	 the	 all-the-factor	 approach	decisions	are	fair	and	balanced.		 	
239		
6.1.	 Intellectual	property	as	the	result	of	a	historical,	contingent	and	shifting	
social	process:	Its	beginnings.					
Why	to	explore	the	historical	origins	of	Intellectual	Property.		The	historical	perspective	of	IPRs	reveals	that	IPRs	and	the	global	IPRs	regime	are	not	an	 autonomous	 and	 trans-historical	 reality	 or	 the	 product	 of	 an	 objective,	dispassionate	economic	and	inalterable	rationale	that	we	should	take	for	granted	but	it	 is	 rather	 the	 result	 of	 a	 contested	 and	 sometimes	 controversial	 political	 process	which	 is	 not	 settled	 or	 closed	 but	 historically	 shifting	 and	 open	 to	 change	 and	transformation.		In	 this	 sense,	 our	 approach	 to	 the	 history	 of	 IPRs	 is	 located	 within	 a	 critical	framework.	 Following	 the	 thoughts	 of	 Susan	 Sell1,	 in	 analyzing	 the	 current	 IPRs	regime	we	 reject	 the	 problem-solving	 approach	held	 by	Robert	 Cox	 in	 the	 sense	 of	taking	 for	 granted	 certain	 realities	 with	 the	 entire	 prevailing	 social	 and	 power	relationships	and	the	institutions	into	which	they	are	organized2.	On	the	contrary,	a	critical	 insight	 of	 IPRs	 origins	 and	 evolution	 permits	 us	 to	 call	 into	 question	 IPRs’	current	justification.	In	this	sense,	it	is	important	in	order	to	conveniently	review	the	current	 regime	 to	be	aware	of	 the	evolution	of	 IPRs	as	a	product	of	 three	elements	which	are	on	the	basis	of	the	political	economic	history	of	the	IPR	regime,	namely	the	political	conception	or	the	ideas	about	the	ownership	of	knowledge;	the	character	of	the	technologies	(material	capabilities)	subject	to	the	protection	of	IPRs	and	technical	change	which	require	new	ways	of	addressing	these	issues	and;	the	legal	institutions,	i.e.	the	legal	construction	of	IPRs.	This	permits	us	to	call	 into	question	the	origins	of	IPRs	and	their	current	justifications.			These	 three	 elements	 have	 been	 shifting	 along	 the	 history	 of	 IPRs	 which	 has	fluctuated	 between	 settlement	 and	 contestation	 in	 a	 permanent	 process	 that	 has	
																																																								
1 Sell, S., & May, C. (2001). Moments in law: contestation and settlement in the history of intellectual property. 
Review of international political economy, 8(3), 467-500. 
2 Cox, Robert W. (2000). Social forces, states and world orders. Beyond international relations theory. 
International Relations: critical concepts in political science 4. 
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vacillated	 between	 the	 public-regarding	 benefits	 of	 the	 dissemination	 of	 technical	advances	 and	 the	 legitimate	 economic	 rewards	 accruing	 to	 those	 controlling	 such	intangibles	(dissemination	and	competition	versus	private	appropriation,	protection	and	exclusion).	Settlements	or	balances	or	imbalances	at	a	certain	historical	moment	are	 placed	 somewhere	 in	 between	 these	 two	 extremes	 of	 the	 road	 (sometimes	favoring	exclusion	some	other	times	favoring	dissemination)	and	are	the	result	of	the	interplay	 between	 contingent	 and	 political	 ideational,	 institutional	 and	 material	forces3.			This	 approach	 is	 presented	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 both	 realist	 and	 functionalist	perspectives	of	 IPRs	history.	While	Realism	overstates	 the	 importance	of	 the	 states	and	has	limited	its	focus	on	the	state	as	legislator	who	creates	the	institution	of	IPRs,	it	fails	to	account	for	the	role	of	private	actors	who	have	prompted	changes	in	IPRs	–especially	 in	 the	 ideational	 and	 material,	 technical	 dimensions-	 both	 directly	 and	through	the	state	and	other	institutions	(historic	bloc).			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Functionalism	 links	 IPRs	 with	 the	 historical	 development	 of	general	 IPRs,	and	 justifies	 IPRs	 in	 terms	of	efficiency.	 Just	as	 conventional	property	rights	which	emerged	as	signals	in	the	market	operation,	to	provide	predictability	in	economic	relations	–where	local	community	trust	cannot	be	relied	on	and	protection	by	force	is	impracticable	in	a	modern	market	with	multiple	and	anonymous	agents-,	IPRs	too	would	be	justified	on	efficiency	grounds,	as	an	efficient	solution	for	society.	However	 this	 approach	 ignores	 first	 that	 IPRs	 does	 not	 face	 any	 tragedy	 of	 the	commons	scenario	but	it	creates	scarcity	out	of	unlimited	knowledge	and	it	intends	to	make	 this	 ex-lege	 scarcity	 legitimate.	 And	 secondly,	 Functionalism	 does	 not	acknowledge	 the	 political	 process	 behind	 efficiency	 and	 it	 eludes	 the	 big	 question;	efficiency	 for	 what	 and	 efficiency	 for	 whom.	 In	 effect,	 the	 efficiency	 searched	 by	society	in	terms	of	dissemination	of	knowledge	is	not	the	same	as	for	the	IPRs	owner	seeking	 for	 protection,	 exclusion	 and	 benefits	 or	 private	 gains.	 Efficiency	 may	 be	applied	in	both	contexts;	the	IPRs	system	may	be	efficient	in	promoting	dissemination	or	in	generating	private	gains	for	their	owners	but	in	neither	case	they	are	assessed																																																									
3 Sell, S. (2004). Intellectual property and public policy in historical perspective: contestation and settlement. 
Loy. LAL Rev., 38, 267. 
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other	type	of	societal	consequences	of	the	system	such	as	its	distributive,	educative	or	cultural	impact.	In	this	sense,	the	very	definition	of	what	constitutes	IP	benefits	some	at	the	expense	of	others	–medicines,	processes,	biotech,	 indigenous	knowledge-	and	the	regulation	as	 to	who	and	 in	what	 terms	controls	certain	knowledge	 innovations	has	important	distributional	consequences	making	IPRs	an	instrument	of	power	and	the	basis	for	further	accumulation	of	power4.										
Chronology	and	significant	moments	in	patent	law	history.			The	 regulation	 of	 IPRs	 has	 been	 always	 a	 form	 of	 public	 policy.	 As	 we	 have	 said	previously,	the	history	of	IPRs	and	of	patents	in	particular,	has	been	the	product	of	a	contested	 political	 process	 leading	 to	 diverse	 phases	 of	 settlement	 or	institutionalization.	 In	 this	 back	 and	 forth	 historical	 process,	 phases	where	 patents	we	called	into	question	and	phases	of	strengthening	of	IP	proprietary	rights	and	their	protection	have	followed	one	another	over	the	last	centuries.			Apart	 from	some	 form	of	patent	 rights	 in	Ancient	Greece	and	grants	 in	 the	 form	of	letters	 patent	 issued	 in	 England	 by	 the	 sovereign	 to	 inventors	who	 petitioned	 and	were	approved,	the	Venetian	Patent	Statute	of	March	19,	1474,	is	said	to	be	the	first	statutory	 patent	 system	 in	 the	world.	 The	 Statute	which	 is	written	 in	 old	 Venetian	dialect,	 provided	 that	 […]	 should	 it	 be	 legislated	 that	 the	 works	 and	 contrivances	
invented	by	 them	[men	with	clever	minds]	could	not	be	copied	and	made	by	others	so	
that	they	are	deprived	of	their	honour,	men	of	such	kind	would	exert	their	minds,	invent	
and	 make	 things	 that	 would	 be	 of	 no	 small	 utility	 and	 benefit	
to	our	State.	Therefore,	 the	decision	has	been	made	 that,	 by	authority	of	 this	Council,	
any	 person	 in	 this	 city	 who	 makes	 any	 new	 and	 ingenious	 contrivances	 not	 made	
heretofore	 in	our	Dominion,	 shall,	as	soon	as	 it	 is	perfected	so	that	 it	can	be	used	and	
exercised,	 give	 notice	 of	 the	 same	 to	 the	 office	 of	 our	 Provveditori	 di	 Comun,	 having	
been	forbidden	up	to	ten	years	to	any	other	person	in	any	territory	and	place	of	ours	to	
make	a	contrivance	 in	 the	 form	and	resemblance	of	 that	one	without	 the	consent	and	
license	 of	 the	 author.	 […]	 But	 our	 Government	 will	 be	 free,	 at																																																									
4 Ibidem. 
242		
its	 complete	discretion,	 to	 take	and	use	 for	 its	needs	any	of	 the	 said	 contrivances	and	
instruments,	 with	 this	 condition,	 however,	 that	 no	 one	 other	 than	 the	 authors	 shall	
operate	them.		However,	the	first	known	patent	is	thought	to	have	been	issued	more	than	fifty	years	earlier	 in	1421	to	Filippo	Brunelleschi.	Apparently	Brunelleschi,	 the	architect	of	 the	Firenze	Duomo,	had	designed	a	new	type	of	ship	to	transport	marble	for	the	cathedral	along	 the	shallow	River	Arno	and	a	patent	was	granted	 in	 this	respect.	The	act	was	then	 the	 codification	 of	 prior	 customs	 and	 practices5.	 In	 any	 case,	 this	 Statute	encompasses	 many	 of	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 today’s	 patent	 law.	 In	 particular,	 it	explicitly	 linked	 innovation	 to	 the	granting	of	monopoly;	 it	 codifies	general	 rules	 to	the	granting	of	patents	rather	 than	conferring	occasional	 individual	 favors	(gratiae)	in	response	to	individual	petitions6;	remarkably,	it	is	focused	on	protecting	individual	inventors	 rather	 than	 organized	 groups	 or	 companies	 referring	 to	 those	 men’s	
honour;	 finally,	 it	 also	 mentions	 the	 benefit	 and	 utility	 of	 those	 inventions	 for	 the	society	and	 it	also	establishes	 the	discretion	of	 the	government	 to	 take	and	use	 the	invention.					In	any	case	and	prior	to	the	formalization	of	the	different	patent	laws,	patents	were	royal	 privileges	 for	 the	 monopolistic	 exploitation	 of	 new	 techniques	 or,	 especially,	unfamiliar	 devices	 which	 were	 brought	 from	 elsewhere	 and	 introduced	 into	 the	sovereign’s	 territory.	 Sovereigns	 used	 those	 instruments	 to	 attract	 and	 retain	talented	artisans	in	their	territory	in	an	attempt	to	limit	imports	and	promote	exports	inspired	by	the	mercantilist	economic	theories	of	the	moment.			Sovereigns	used	this	system	also	to	benefit	certain	families	and	courtiers	(some	with	debts	owed	to	the	Crown)	by	enabling	them	to	profit	from	monopolies.	This	seemed	to	be	the	English	case	where	the	grants	of	 letters	patent	were	 issued	mostly	 for	 tax	reasons.	The	number	of	objectionable	grants	of	letters	patent	(Latin	literae	patentes,	"letters	that	lie	open")	issued	by	the	Crown	for	monopolies	to	persons	who	just	could																																																									
5 Nard, C. A., & Morriss, A. P. (2006). Constitutionalizing patents: from Venice to Philadelphia. Review Of Law 
And Economics, 2(2), 223-321. 
6 Kostylo, J. (2008). Commentary on the Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets (1474). Primary Sources on 
Copyright. 
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afford	to	pay	for	them	without	any	merit,	and	the	fact	that	letters	patent	were	granted	for	basic	products	such	as	salt	(causing	important	price	rises)	led	to	a	public	outcry	and	to	the	enactment	of	the	English	Statute	of	Monopolies	of	1624.	James	I	of	England	was	 forced	 to	 revoke	 all	 existing	monopolies.	 Since	 then	 the	 King	 could	 only	 issue	letters	patent	to	the	inventors	or	introducers	of	original	inventions	for	a	fixed	number	of	years.	It	is	regarded	as	the	foundation	of	the	present	British	patent	system.	This	act	which	is	the	first	statutory	limitation	of	the	royal	prerogatives,	is	also	interpreted	in	terms	 of	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 English	 state,	 from	 feudal	 to	 a	modern	one	(where	the	estate	of	the	monarch	is	distinguished	from	that	of	the	state)	and	so,	a	landmark	in	constitutional	history.			This	 inaugurated	new	British	patent	system	established	 important	barriers	of	entry	to	 patent	 applicants	 by	means	 of	 very	 high	 costs	 and	 fees	 which	 limited	 access	 to	property	 rights	 in	 inventions,	 this	 favoring	 the	 wealthy	 elite.	 Another	 important	feature	is	that	the	“first	and	true	inventor”	was	interpreted	as	to	include	importers	of	inventions	that	had	been	created	abroad.	Hence,	it	was	applied	as	criteria	the	relative	novelty	of	inventions,	thus	giving	importance	to	the	diffusion	and	technology	transfer	implied	 in	patent	 system	 (in	 letters	patent).	The	 important	point	of	 this	 Statute	 for	our	purposes	is	that	invention	patents	were	viewed	above	all,	as	an	exception	to	the	“abusive”	 royal	monopolies.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	bear	 in	mind	 that	 in	 their	genesis,	 IPRs	 constituted	 exceptional	 monopolies	 granted	 in	 view	 of	 certain	 social	benefits.	 The	 configuration	 of	 IPRs	 as	 exceptional	 monopolies	 and	 justified	 or	contingent	privileges	gives	 IPRs	an	unstable	 institution	or	entitlement	 to	be	held	as	long	 as	 they	 are	 not	 the	 product	 of	 an	 abusive	 grant;	 that	 they	 comply	 with	 their	intended	purposes	and	social	benefits.								After	 the	 English	 Statute	 which	 announced	 deep	 political,	 economic	 and	 societal	transformations	 in	 the	 English	 society,	 similar	 laws	 were	 enacted	 across	 the	European	 continent	 and	 in	 America	 as	 the	 transit	 from	 the	 Ancient	 Regime	 to	Modernity	took	place.				
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Industrial	capitalism	and	the	emergence	of	modern	national	patent	systems.		Therefore,	 the	 transition	 from	 the	Ancien	Régime	 to	Modernity	 and	 a	 new	phase	 of	capitalism	known	 as	 “industrial	 capitalism”	 is	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	modern	 national	 patent	 laws	 (end	 of	 18th	 century	 and	 19th	 century).	 Preceded	 by	previous	social	and	political	changes	in	Great	Britain,	the	new	era	is	characterized	by	new	manufacturing	processes	and	new	production	methods	(Industrial	Revolution).	The	political	transition	included	going	from	a	system	of	privileges	and	prerogatives	of	certain	 classes	 under	 absolute	monarchies	 to	 the	 empowerment	 of	 the	 bourgeoisie	who	 supported	 the	 principles	 of	 constitutional	 government	 and	 of	 natural	 right	against	the	Law	of	Privilege	of	the	feudal	regime.			The	new	economic	rationality	seemed	to	require	certainty	as	to	the	merits	to	be	the	beneficiary	of	a	monopoly7.	All	this	had	a	reflection	in	the	previous	patent	system.	In	this	sense,	patents	began	to	be	viewed	as	a	fair	reward	to	their	creators,	as	a	right,	a	form	of	 intellectual	property	right,	rather	than	a	privilege.	This	 implied	that	patents	could	be	“formally”	–even	if	fees	were	still	too	high-	accessible	to	everybody,	to	every	person	beyond	those	members	of	the	elite,	there	was	a	clear	move	to	a	systematic	and	objective	 process	 of	 granting	 patents	 or	 exclusive	 rights.	 Furthermore,	 certain	utilitarian	 arguments	 seemed	 to	be	used	 to	 justify	 the	new	patent	 systems8.	 In	 any	case,	 the	 different	 patent	 laws	were	 designed	 and	 adjusted	 to	 foster	 the	 economic	development	and	national	necessities	of	their	societies.				A	good	example	of	 this	and	of	 the	somehow	“revolutionary”	character	of	 these	new	rights	was	the	modern	French	patent	system9	established	by	the	law	of	1791	enacted	by	 the	 Revolutionary	 Assembly	 and	 based	 on	 the	Rapport	 du	 chevalier	 Stanislas	 de	
Boufflers.	In	that	report,	and	following	some	Diderot’s	and	Locke’s	thoughts,	the	right	to	patent	is	viewed	as	a	natural	right	and	as	a	contract	between	the	inventor	and	the																																																									
7 For an interesting view about the links between the industrial revolution the emergence of capitalism and the 
patent system see MacLeod, C. (2002). Inventing the industrial revolution: The English patent system, 1660-
1800. Cambridge University Press.  
8 Vidaurreta, G. E. (2011). De cómo el criterio utilitarista de justificación primó en los albores del sistema de 
patentes: estudio de casos: Inglaterra, Estados Unidos y Francia: desde el medioevo a la primera revolución 
industrial (Master's thesis, Buenos Aires: FLACSO. Sede Académica Argentina). 
9 Galvez-Behar, G. (2006). Genèse des droits de l'inventeur et promotion de l'invention sous la Révolution 
française. Lille: IRHIS Lille 
245		
society	by	which	a	temporary	monopoly	is	granted	to	the	inventor	in	exchange	of	the	full	 disclosure	of	 the	 secret	 of	 the	 invention.	The	new	patent	 system	 is	 intended	 to	end	 with	 the	 previous	 regime	 of	 discretionary	 privileges.	 Also,	 the	 British	 patent	system	was	mentioned	as	a	model	 to	 follow	due	to	the	 flourishment	of	 the	arts	and	science	that	the	British	patent	system	had	enabled	(une	grande	corporation	d’arts	et	
métiers:	effrayante	association,	dans	laquelle	et	les	plus	habiles	ouvriers	et	les	premiers	
manufacturiers	et	sutout	les	genies	les	plus	inventifs	de	toutes	les	nations	s’empressent	à	
se	faire	agréger).			The	 French	 patent	 law	 also	 adopted	 the	 “relative	 novelty”	 of	 the	 inventions,	 so	importers	 of	 technology,	 the	 first	 introducer	 of	 an	 invention	 covered	 by	 a	 foreign	patent	could	enjoy	the	same	“natural	rights”	as	the	patentee	of	an	original	invention	or	improvement.	Some	other	remarkable	features	of	the	French	patent	law	were	that	medicines	 and	 methods	 to	 produce	 medicines	 were	 excluded	 from	 protection	 and	that	patents	were	void	if	their	owners	attempted	to	file	a	patent	overseas	on	the	same	invention	(in	a	curious	attempt	to	limit	the	diffusion	of	originally	French	inventions).		The	United	States,	 the	 today’s	most	belligerent	 advocate	of	 the	expansion	of	 strong	IPRs	and	strong	prerogatives	of	IPRs’	holders,	has	been	credited	as	having	developed	the	world	industrial	and	economic	supremacy	on	the	basis	of	its	favorable	treatment	of	 inventors	and	 inventive	and	creative	activity.	As	 some	studies	 suggest,	American	patent	 system	 could	 have	 been	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 it	 economic	 growth	 and	 successful	industrial	and	technological	progress10.		However,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 remarking	 that	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 "public-regarding"	conception	of	IPRs	prevailed	until	well	into	the	20th	century	over	the	private	interests	of	 the	 IPRs’	 holder.	 The	 first	 Article	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 includes	 a	 clause	regarding	 IPRs	with	 the	 following	wording:	 to	 “promote	 the	 progress	 of	 science	 and	
useful	 arts	 by	 securing	 for	 limited	 times	 to	 authors	 and	 inventors	 the	 rights	 to	 their	
respective	 writings	 and	 discoveries.”	 Therefore,	 IPRs	 are	 created	 in	 the	 American	Constitution	in	view	of	their	social	utility	or	purpose	and	with	a	neat	utilitarian	scope,																																																									
10 Moser, P. (2005). How do patent laws influence innovation? Evidence from nineteenth-century world's fairs. 
The American Economic Review, 95(4), 1214-1236. 
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i.e.,	as	an	instrument	to	achieve	the	progress	of	science	and	useful	arts.	In	the	first	half	of	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 judiciary	 was	 very	 concerned	 on	 overcoming	 the	 eventual	incoherence	 as	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 a	 democratic	 and	 market-oriented	 political	economy	 was	 consistent	 with	 exclusive	 rights.	 Courts	 explicitly	 attempted	 to	implement	decisions	that	promoted	economic	growth	and	social	welfare	in	a	clearly	utilitarian	interpretation	of	the	patent	law11.		The	US	Congress	quickly	passed	a	patent	statute	in	April	1790.	The	historical	record	indicates	 that	 the	 legislature’s	 creation	 of	 a	 uniquely	 American	 system	 was	 a	deliberate	and	conscious	process	with	many	different	views	and	opinions.	One	of	the	main	 concerns	 of	 the	 debates	 was	 how	 to	 encourage	 the	 introduction	 of	 foreign	technology,	 especially	 from	 UK	 and	 the	 convenience	 of	 adopting	 the	 patents	 of	importation	as	it	was	the	case	of	the	British	practice12.	Notable	figures	such	as	George	Washington	 were	 strongly	 favorable	 to	 use	 the	 patent	 system	 to	 import	 foreign	technology.	 Also	 Hamilton,	 in	 his	 1791	 Report	 on	 Manufactures	 asked	 the	government	 to	 attract	 skilled	 artisans	 and	 foreign	 inventions	 for	 the	 economic	development	of	America13.									American	patent	act	rejected	patents	of	importation14	and	provided	strong	protection	for	 US	 citizens	 and	 restricted	 patent	 property	 to	 foreigners.	 Americans	 could	 not	obtain	patents	 for	 imported	discoveries,	but	 the	earliest	statutes	of	1793,	1800	and	1832,	 restricted	 patent	 property	 to	 citizens	 or	 to	 residents	who	 declared	 that	 they	intended	to	become	citizens.	As	such,	while	an	American	could	not	appropriate	patent	rights	 to	a	 foreign	 invention,	he	 could	 freely	use	 the	 idea	without	any	need	 to	bear	licensing	 or	 similar	 costs	 that	 would	 otherwise	 have	 been	 due	 if	 the	 inventor	 had	been	able	to	obtain	a	patent	in	this	country.	In	1836,	the	stipulations	on	citizenship	or	residency	 were	 removed,	 but	 were	 replaced	 with	 discriminatory	 patent	 fees:																																																									
11 Khan, B. Z. (2002). Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and 
European History." Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, London. In Proceedings of the Conference on 
How IPRs could Work Better for Developing Countries and Poor People. 
12 British Common law had interpreted the Statute of Monopolies “true and first inventor” language to include 
the original inventor as well as the first introducer of the invention or the technology.  
13 Hamilton, Alexander. (1913). Report on manufactures (1791). State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff: 19. 
14 Ben-Atar, D. S. (2008). Trade secrets: Intellectual piracy and the origins of American industrial power. Yale 
University Press. He speculates that the 1790 Act and its official rejection of “technology piracy” was a façade 
for an unofficial policy designed to facilitate technology piracy.  
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foreigners	could	obtain	a	patent	in	the	U.S.	for	a	fee	of	three	hundred	dollars,	or	five	hundred	if	they	were	British.	After	1861	patent	rights	(with	the	exception	of	caveats)	were	 available	 to	 all	 applicants	 on	 the	 same	 basis	 without	 regard	 to	 nationality.	Furthermore,	the	1832	and	1836	laws	stipulated	that	foreigners	had	to	exploit	their	patented	invention	within	eighteen	months.			Therefore,	 the	 recent	 history	 shows	 that	 America	 was	 throughout	 most	 of	 the	nineteenth	century	a	net	importer	of	technology	and	that	American	legislator	adopted	a	 strategy	 consisting	 of	 favoring	 domestic	 invention	 and	 of	 discriminating	 foreign	inventions.	 This	 was	 intended	 to	 serve	 national	 public	 interest	 by	 encouraging	technology	transfer.	Foreign	technology	was	then	introduced	without	any	additional	cost	of	the	inventor’s	monopoly	right	and	there	were	sufficient	incentives	in	place	for	national	 inventors.	 The	 US	 had	 access	 to	 the	 world’s	 technology	 at	 a	 lower	 and	optimum	 cost.	 Furthermore,	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 US	 Patent	 system	reveal	the	protectionist	roots	of	the	US	patent	system	and	the	national	patent	system	suited	to	the	needs	of	its	economy15				In	 fact,	 the	 favorable	 treatment	 for	 American	 inventors	 versus	 their	 foreign	counterparts	 has	 been	 maintained	 until	 recently	 in	 the	 different	 American	 patent	regulations,	the	jurisprudential	understanding	of	the	law	(Hilmer	Doctrine)	and	other	interpretations	 around	 the	 grace	 period	 and	 the	 first	 to	 invent	 rule	 discriminated	foreign	 inventors.	 TRIPS	 made	 some	 provisions	 of	 the	 American	 Patent	 Act	 illegal	among	others	for	barring	foreign	inventors	the	right	to	use	foreign	dates	of	invention	to	procure	patents16.						Thus,	 by	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 three	 leading	 powers	 UK,	France	and	America	had	adopted	modern	patent	protection	and	it	was	spread	to	most	other	main	countries	during	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century;	Russia	(1812),	Prussia	(1815),	Belgium	and	Netherlands	(1817),	Spain	(1820),	Sardinia	(1826),	surprisingly	Vatican	 State	 (1833),	 Sweden	 (1834)	 and	 Portugal	 (1937).	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is																																																									
15 Hubbard, W. (2013). Competitive Patent Law. Fla. L. Rev., 65, 341. 
16 Leffel, Kevin L. (1992). Hilmer Doctrine and Patent System Harmonization: What Does a Foreign Inventor 
Have at Stake. Akron L. Rev. 26: 355. 
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noteworthy	 that	 some	 of	 today’s	 innovative	 and	 developed	 countries	 such	 as	Netherlands	 –which	 repealed	 its	 law	 in	 1869-	 and	 Switzerland	 –which	 rejected	proposals	 for	 a	 national	 patent	 system	 in	 1849	 and	 1867-	 did	 not	 have	 patent	legislation	 in	 force	 for	most	of	 the	19th	 century	 this	permitting	 them	to	protect	and	promote	their	start-ups	and	their	small	and	medium	size	companies	which	basically	were	 followers	 in	 the	 technical	 and	 economic	 fields	 and	 which	 could	 copy	 and	produce	inventions	freely	without	any	royalty	burden.			During	 the	period	of	1850-1875	 the	 tension	and	controversy	around	 IPRs	emerged	again	between	 those	defending	 the	patent	 system	and	 the	monopolies	 related	 to	 IP	and	 those	 who	 stood	 for	 an	 international	 system	 of	 free	 trade	 without	 any	encumbrances	 or	 privileges	which	were	 perceived	 as	 an	 undue	 impairment	 to	 free	trade	and	 liberalism.	Free	 trade	supporters	viewed	 IPRs	as	an	 illegitimate	privilege	that	could	not	be	maintained	between	jurisdictions	as	it	constrained	the	free	trade.					As	 it	has	been	profusely	documented	by	Fritz	Machlup17,	 from	1850	onwards,	 there	was	 an	 important	 anti-patent	 movement	 all	 around	 Europe.	 The	 opponents	 to	 the	patent	system	demanded	not	merely	reform	but	the	abolition	of	it.	The	government	of	Prussia	 decided	 to	 oppose	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 patent	 law	 by	 the	 North	 German	Federation	 and	 in	December	1868	Chancellor	Bismarck	 announced	his	 objection	 to	the	 principle	 of	 patent	 protection.	 In	 Switzerland,	 the	 only	 industrial	 country	 of	Europe	 that	 had	 remained	 without	 patent	 legislation,	 the	 legislature	 rejected	proposals	 to	 enact	 patent	 legislation	 during	 the	 second	 middle	 of	 the	 XIX	 century	considering	patent	protection	to	be	“pernicious	and	indefensible.”	In	effect,	the	patent	system	 was	 conceived	 as	 something	 diametrically	 opposed	 to	 the	 free-trade	movement	 of	 that	 period.	 According	 to	 Machlup,	 in	 the	 attacks	 on	 patent	protectionism,	 free	 trade	 arguments	 were	 used	 and	 economists	 were	 always	unanimous	 in	 the	 condemnation	 of	 the	 system	 –this	 included	 the	 Economist,	 the	famous	magazine	which	is	today	known	for	being	a	strong	supporter	of	TRIPS-.	In	this	anti-patent	wave,	Netherlands	repealed	its	patent	law	in	1869	saying	that	“a	good	law	of	patents	is	impossibility”.	In	this	country,	between	1860	and	1865	most	important																																																									
17 Machlup, Fritz, and Edith Penrose. (1950). The patent controversy in the nineteenth century. The Journal of 
Economic History 10.01: 1-29. 
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patents	 covered	 inventions	 made	 abroad.	 A	 lobby	 of	 small	 and	 medium-sized	enterprises	 successfully	 urged	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 Patent	 Act	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	
growth	of	industry	and	prejudicial	to	the	national	prosperity18.		After	an	intense	propaganda	between	1867	and	1877,	this	anti-patent	tide	turned	in	1873	–following	also	the	rise	of	nationalism	and	protectionism	and	a	great	economic	depression-	and	the	champions	of	patent	protection	eventually	prevailed.	A	German	Bill	in	1871	said	that	it	was	fortunate	that	an	economic	crisis	had	caused	backers	of	the	 pernicious	 theory	 of	 free	 competition	 and	 free	 trade	 to	 turn	 away	 from	 such	foolishness	 and	 embrace	 patents19,	 this	 was	 a	 victory	 of	 the	 allied	 forces	 of	protectionism.	 The	 British	 resolved	 the	 “patent	 controversy”	 in	 1883	 by	 enacting	reforms	 that	 increased	access	 to	patent	 system,	 reduced	patent	protection	 to	 seven	years,	 and	provided	 for	a	 stricter	examination	of	applications,	 forfeit	of	patents	not	worked	after	2	years,	and	compulsory	licensing	of	patents.			Once	 free	 trade	 was	 called	 into	 question,	 opposition	 to	 IPRs	 lost	 its	 momentum;	according	 to	 Professor	 May,	 intellectual	 property	 was	 still	 seen	 as	 a	 restriction	 of	trade	but	such	restrictions,	provided	they	served	the	national	interest,	were	no	longer	problematic20.	According	to	some,	this	settlement	moment	fixed	a	discourse	justifying	IPRs	“as	an	acceptable	and	 legitimate	 form	of	monopoly”.	The	 idea	of	knowledge	as	property	to	ensure	the	efficient	use	of	resources	became	widespread	and	accepted	in	Machlup	words,	paving	the	way	for	the	next	development	of	multilateral	institutions	and	 legal	 framework	 to	 facilitate	an	 increased	 international	commerce	 in	 intangible	assets21.			 	
																																																								
18 Sell, S. (2004). Intellectual property and public policy in historical perspective: contestation and settlement. 
Loy. LAL Rev., 38, 267. 
19 Marshall, A. (2012). The Surprising Design of Market Economies. University of Texas Press. 
20 May, Christopher. (2008). The World Intellectual Property Organisation and the Development Agenda. 
Global Society 22.1: 97-113. 
21 See Id. Supra note at 17. 
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6.2.	 The	 progressive	 expansion	 of	 IPRs	 along	 with	 new	 requirements	 of	
capitalism.			
	The	second	industrial	revolution:	towards	a	multilateral	setting	of	IPRs.		While	 the	 first	 industrial	 revolution	was	basically	 leaded	by	UK	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	steam	engine	and	the	development	of	the	textile,	iron	and	shipbuilding	industries,	the	second	industrial	revolution	was	based	by	the	progress	experienced	by	chemical,	oil	and	electricity	industry	and	the	emergence	of	new	transport	means	and	the	invention	of	 telegraphy,	 all	 of	 which	 was	 likely	 to	 facilitate	 the	 world	 commerce	 and	 the	creation	 of	 large	 business	 with	 international	 ambition22.	 Also,	 economic	 and	technological	 leadership	was	gradually	 shifting	 from	UK	 to	 the	US	and	Germany.	 In	the	second	revolution,	patents	played	a	starring	role23.			The	American	previous	preference	for	weak	protection	was	shifting	in	the	second	half	of	 the	 19th	 century	 as	 American	 companies	 began	 to	 achieve	 technological	breakthroughs.	This	is	well	reflected	in	the	predatory	conduct	of	the	Edison	Company	which	 strongly	 pressed	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 strong	 IP	 protection	 standards	while	attempting	to	get	most	IPRs	related	to	the	electric	 light	to	secure	that	specific	market	 in	 an	 extremely	 litigious	 and	 predatory	 manner.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	Germany,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Siemens	 Corporation	 entered	 the	 political	 arena	 and	became	a	member	of	 the	German	Parliament	 in	order	to	promote	the	1877	German	Patent	Act	provisions	ensuring	the	company’s	ownership	of	the	inventions	instead	of	the	 individual	 inventors24-the	 German	 patent	 act	 excluded	 the	 term	 “inventor”	 in	favor	of	“applicant”	to	enable	firms	to	claim	patent	rights	in	employees’	innovations-.	In	 this	 way	 a	 new	 business	 model	 started	 its	 path,	 a	 business	 model	 based	 on	important	marketing	and	research	and	development	departments	which	eclipsed	the	previous	 “inventor-individual	 entrepreneur”	 system	 and	 where	 Lockean	
																																																								
22 Murphy, C. N. (1994). International organization and industrial change: global governance since 1850. 
London: Polity Press. 
23 Between 1840 and 1910, the annual number of patents granted in the US increased more than fifty fold. 
24 Sell, S. (2004). Intellectual Property at a Crossroads: The Use of the Past in Intellectual Property 
Jurisprudence: Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement. 
Loy. LAL Rev., 38, 267-2347. 
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considerations	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 just	 reward	 for	 human	 work	 remained	 in	 the	background25.						The	 international	 element	 in	 the	 field	 of	 IPRs	 consisted	 of	 bilateral	 agreements	between	countries,	most	of	which	operated	around	the	national	 treatment	principle	and	 reciprocity.	 In	 this	 way,	 states	 could	 secure	 protection	 for	 their	 authors	 and	inventors	 in	 foreign	 jurisdictions.	 But	 this	 protection	was	 never	 satisfactory	 and	 it	was	 felt	 the	 necessity	 of	 adopting	 international	 instruments	 for	 the	 cooperation	between	the	different	jurisdictions	in	the	field	of	IPRs.	In	1873	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire	wanted	to	host	a	World	Exhibition	in	Vienna.	These	international	 fairs	were	very	 relevant	but	both	American	and	German	 inventors	 showed	 their	 reluctance	 to	participate	 as	 they	 feared	 that	 their	 inventions	 were	 not	 properly	 protected.	 The	Empire	then	adopted	a	temporary	law	providing	protection	for	foreigners	in	order	to	foster	their	participation.	Due	to	this	event	and	under	the	pressure	of	patent	lawyers	and	engineers,	the	German	Government	held	a	Congress	in	Vienna	to	deal	with	those	issues.	Several	follow-up	congresses	(in	1878	and	1880)	paved	the	way	for	the	1883	Paris	 Convention	 which	 created	 an	 international	 Union	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	Industrial	Property.			In	 similar	 terms	 and	 circumstances	 the	 Berne	 Convention	 for	 the	 protection	 of	copyright	was	adopted	by	some	states	–not	 the	US-.	Since	 that	moment	until	TRIPS	Agreement,	nations	were	free	to	pass	legislation	and	address	IPRs	in	the	terms	they	suited	 fit	 but	 signatories	 of	 those	 multilateral	 agreements	 were	 obliged	 to	 extend	their	domestic	protection	to	foreigners,	citizens	of	the	other	member	states	(principle	of	 national	 treatment).	 From	 that	 moment	 on,	 the	 twentieth	 century	 saw	 the	proliferation	of	 numerous	 international	 agreements	 in	 the	 field	 of	 IPRs	 such	 as	 the	Madrid	Agreement	for	trademarks	in	1891,	Hague	Agreement	in	1925	for	designs,	the	International	 Convention	 for	 the	Protection	 of	New	Varieties	 of	 Plants	 of	 1961,	 the	Patent	Cooperation	Treaty	of	1970	and	the	Treaty	on	Intellectual	Property	in	respect																																																									
25 For an explanation of the differences between inventor and innovator and the change of paradigm see 
Schumpeter, Joseph, and Ursula Backhaus. (2003). The theory of economic development. Springer US. 61-
116. In this book it is explained how the concepts of inventor and innovator are different and how innovation is 
to be distinguished from “invention” (even where inventor and innovator are the same person), especially 
when invention is restricted to new ideas of a mechanical or technical nature. Innovation involves the (1) 
commercial application of (2) any new idea. 
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of	 Integrated	 Circuits	 of	 1989.	 This	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 international	institutions	which	were	at	certain	point	superseded	by	WIPO,	an	agency	of	the	United	Nations.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 these	 international	 structure	 and	 legal	 frame	did	not	imply	the	harmonization	of	technical	rules,	States	maintained	an	important	room	and	sovereign	maneuver	to	set	out	their	IPRs	standards26.		In	this	back	and	forth	process	and	“swings	of	the	pendulum”	the	last	20th	century	has	known	 phases	 of	 strengthening	 of	 exclusive	 rights	 and	 private	 protection	 together	with	 other	 periods	 of	 questioning	 of	 the	 IPRs	 regime	 and	 weakening	 of	 its	 scope.		During	 the	 late	 19th	 century	 and	 20th	 century	 big	 corporate	 and	 business	conglomerate	and	corporate	cartels	emerged	around	patents	and	other	IPRs.	Not	only	Edison	 purchased	 or	 merged	 with	 rival	 companies	 through	 predatory	 patent	litigation,	 other	 firms	 also	 formed	 corporate	 cartels	 –General	 Electric	 through	 the	Incandescent	Lamp	Manufacturers	Association	or	the	patent	pool	implemented	in	UK	by	British	Thomson-Houston,	Siemens	and	the	General	Electric	Company	through	the	Tungsten	Lamp	Association	in	1912	or	the	Phoebus	Agreement-	by	setting	up	patent	cross-licensing,	 price-fixing	 and	 market	 collaborative	 arrangements	 based	 on	 their	IPRs.	These	IPRs	based	cartels	contributed	to	change	the	structure	of	the	market	from	one	of	free	trade	to	a	monopolistic	or	oligopolistic	one27.	The	patent	system	and	the	uncritical	view	of	IPRs	–in	contrast	with	the	debates	of	the	previous	century	between	free	trade	and	IPRs-	were	an	important	 instrument	to	facilitate	cartel	solidarity	and	conduct.	 More	 and	 more	 sectors	 were	 impregnated	 by	 these	 cartels	 which	subordinated	 competitive	 risk	 to	 security	 and	 control	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 consumers	and	society28.	The	Supreme	Court	decision	in	in	Henry	v.	A.B.	Dick	Company	in	191229	is	credited	to	be	the	moment	when	the	economic	power	of	patents	reached	its	highest	point.	
																																																								
26 Drahos, P. (1999). The universality of intellectual property rights: origins and development. Intellectual 
property and human rights, 13-41. 
27 May, C., & Sell, S. K. (2006). Intellectual property rights: A critical history. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
28 Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds. (1999). Private authority and international 
affairs.(see chapter 2 footnote 26). 
29 Henry v. AB Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 364, 56 L. Ed. 645 (1912). The company required the purchaser 
to buy the unpatented A.B. Dick’s ink when buying the patented mimeograph machine. This today obvious 
anti-competitive tying clause was held legal and valid by Supreme Court saying that the patentee could extract 
whatever price or other concession as a consideration for granting a patent license, including the required 
purchase of un-patented article.  
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Questioning	of	the	Patent	system	as	contrary	to	Antitrust.		This	entire	context	changed	after	World	War	II.	Cartels,	monopolistic	and	oligopolistic	strategies	were	seen	as	suspicious	instruments	at	the	service	of	economic	nationalism	–associated	 to	 militarism	 and	 to	 the	 Japanese	 and	 German	 defeated	 nations-	 and	contrary	 to	 the	 international	 liberal	 economic	 order	which	was	 the	 new	 paradigm	that	the	leading	US	wanted	to	“reestablish”	in	the	planet.	This	approach	justified	the	creation	 of	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	 institutions,	 the	 United	 Nations,	 the	 GATT	 and	 the	European	Economic	Community.		This	multilateral,	economic	liberal	perspective	was	associated	to	democracy,	freedom,	competition	and	welfare	in	contrast	to	cartels	and	inter-firm	cooperation	linked	to	German	militarism.	This	encompassed	somehow	the	return	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 weaker	 IPRs	 and	 free	 competition	 public	 regarding	conception	of	patents.			The	tide	turned	again	the	patent	system	which	started	to	be	considered	as	suspicious	and	some	of	the	patent	system’s	more	restrictive	aspects	came	under	attack.	As	noted	by	Professor	Porter30	 in	1942	Fortune	Magazine	called	 for	abolishing	 the	protection	
which	the	patent	system	gives	to	monopolistic	practices.	From	1940s	to	the	1970s,	the	patent	 system	was	 scrutinized	 and	monitored	 under	 the	 requirements	 of	 vigorous	antitrust	standards	and	judicial	review.	It	was	a	period	which	some	have	referred	as	Dark	Ages	for	patents.	Patent	were	perceived	as	monopolies	giving	a	market	power	to	be	 under	 antitrust	 review.31Also,	 there	 were	 several	 cases	 of	 patent	misuse	 in	 the	1940s.	 In	 this	 sense,	 patent	 misuse32	 became	 a	 usual	 defense	 against	 patents	 in	infringements	law	suits.				It	 is	 at	 this	 time	 when	 American	 Senate	 made	 an	 assignment	 to	 Professor	 Fritz	Machlup	 in	order	to	research	and	review	the	patent	system	and	 its	social	utility33,	 -																																																								
30 Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter, eds. (1999). Private authority and international affairs 
[…] (See chapter 2 footnote 26). . 
31 Silverstein, D. (1991). Patents, science and innovation: historical linkages and implications for global 
technological competitiveness. Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ, 17, 261. 
32 Morton Salt Co. v. GS Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed. 363 (1942). 
33 Machlup, F. (1958). An economic review of the patent system (No. 15) US Government Printing Office.. In 
this respect, it is very interesting to show the American legislator’s concern on the patent system at the time: 
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which	 carried	 out	 his	 research	 following	 an	 assignment	 made	 by	 the	 American	Senate-.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 worthy	 to	 bring	 here	 Professor	 Machlup’s	 certainly	interesting	conclusions	on	the	patent	system:						If	 we	 did	 not	 have	 a	 patent	 system,	 it	 would	 be	 irresponsible,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 our	present	knowledge	of	its	economic	consequences,	to	recommend	instituting	one.	But	since	we	have	had	a	patent	system	for	a	long	time,	it	would	be	irresponsible,	on	the	basis	 of	 our	 present	 knowledge,	 to	 recommend	 abolishing	 it.	 This	 last	 statement	refers	to	a	country	such	as	the	United	States	of	America—not	to	a	small	country	and	not	 a	 predominantly	 nonindustrial	 country,	 where	 a	 different	 weight	 of	 argument	might	well	suggest	another	conclusion.		
Some	remarks	about	patent	system	in	follower	countries:	the	case	of	Spain.		Spain	 adopted	 its	 patent	 system	 after	 the	 liberal	 revolution	 taking	 place	 in	 Spain	under	the	influence	of	France	and	the	French	patent	system34.	As	the	Real-Decreto	of	1811	 copied	many	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 French	 Patent	 system	of	 1791,	 the	 first	Spanish	 patent	 law	was	 passed	 in	 1820.	 As	 a	 follower	 country,	 Spain	 had	 rates	 of	development	lower	than	the	most	developed	countries	at	the	time	–Britain,	France-.	Spanish	 legislation	on	patents	 intended	 to	spur	economic	growth	and	development.	Once	Spain	overcame	–at	least	formally-	the	arbitrariness	of	the	discretional	grant	of	patents/privileges,	 the	 Spanish	 patent	 system	 had	 on	 the	 transfer	 of	 foreign																																																																																																																																																																																			
US Government Printing Office. for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights as part of its 
study of the United States patent system, conducted pursuant to Senate Resolutions 55 and 236 of the 85th 
Congress. It is one of several being prepared under the supervision of John C. Stedman, associate counsel of 
the subcommittee. 
The patent system has, from its inception, involved a basic economic inconsistency. In a free-enterprise 
economy dedicated to competition, we have chosen, not only to tolerate but to encourage, individual limited 
islands of monopoly in the form of patents. Almost 3 million of these have issued in the course of United 
States industrial history. This inconsistency has been rationalized in various ways. It is pointed out that the 
patent monopoly is limited both in scope and time; that this monopoly is more than balanced by the inventive 
contribution; that patented inventions are not actually monopolistic in fact because they are subject to 
competing alternatives and substitutes; that such monopoly as does result is unobjectionable because the 
public is deprived of nothing it had previously possessed; and so on. Such explanations may render the 
conflict less serious, but they do not resolve it. 
34 González, J. P. S. (1995). Propiedad industrial y revolución liberal: historia del sistema español de patentes 
(1759-1929). OFICINA ESPAÑOLA PATENTES MA. 
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technology	one	of	its	major	concerns.	This	was	reflected	in	the	Spanish	system	which	contemplated	 patents	 of	 introduction	 or	 “national	 novelty”	 i.e.	 importers	 of	inventions	 which	 were	 new	 in	 Spain	 could	 obtain	 the	 same	 patent	 rights	 for	 the	imported	 invention	 as	 real	 inventors.	 In	 this	 sense,	 patents	 of	 introduction	 were	granted	to	entrepreneurs	who	wished	to	produce	foreign	technologies	that	were	new	to	Spain,	with	no	requirement	of	claims	to	being	the	true	inventor.			Therefore,	 the	 sole	 objective	 of	 these	 instruments	 was	 to	 enhance	 innovation	 and	production	in	Spain.	This	was	reflected	in	the	fact	that	introduction	patents	enjoyed	a	term	of	protection	of	only	5	years	(this	encouraged	the	production	of	items	covered	by	 the	 introduction	 patents	 after	which	 exclusive	 rights	 expired,	 the	 country	 could	benefit	 from	 dissemination	 of	 that	 foreign	 technology).	 Also,	 there	 were	 working	requirements	for	patents	which	had	to	be	worked	within	2	years	(in	the	patent	law	of	1820)	 and	 3	 years	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 law	 of	 1929.	 Interestingly,	 the	 “working	requirement”	was	interpreted	as	the	obligation	to	either	manufacture	and	implement	the	 invention	 in	 Spain	 or	 grant	 a	 exploitation	 license	 to	 a	 third	 party	 (“puesta	 en	
práctica.	Chapter	V	of	the	Spanish	patent	law	of	1929.	Art.	94).		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 pharmaceuticals	 (preparaciones	 farmacéuticas	 y	 medicamentos)	were	 excluded	 from	 patentability.	 Until	 1986	 when	 Spain	 joined	 the	 European	Community	 (today’s	 EU),	 only	 devices	 and	 processes	 leading	 to	 certain	pharmaceuticals	were	permitted	to	be	covered	by	a	patent.				The	Spanish	example	of	patent	law	shows	how	the	different	patent	laws	of	the	nations	were	 designed	 according	 to	 the	 stage	 of	 development	 where	 national	 laws	 were	intended	to	be	applied	and	how	they	reflect	the	political-economic	context	of	the	time	as	 long	 as	 fulfill	 the	 needs	 of	 	 a	 particular	 stage	 of	 industrial	 development.	 While	technological	leader	would	prefer	strong	protection	for	its	innovations,	a	follower	will	favor	 access	 and	 exploitation	 over	 protection35.	 Also,	 patent	 law	 was	 used	strategically	to	achieve	or	at	least	not	impair	certain	social	goals.	The	fact	that	it	was	not	possible	to	get	a	patent	on	pharmaceutical	products	seems	to	be	evidence	of	it.																																																										
35 Trebilcock, M. J., & Howse, R. (2005). The regulation of international trade. Philadephia: Psychology Press. 
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Paving	the	way	to	the	new	era	of	patent	strengthening.			Going	back	 to	 the	American	 context	 regarding	 IPRs	 regime,	 it	 is	noticeable	 that	 the	negative	(sometimes	hostile)	attitude	toward	strong	patent	protection	came	to	a	halt	in	 the	1980s.	 Starting	with	 the	 famous	Dawson	Chemical	Co.	 v.	Rohm	&	Haas	Co.,36	and	following	with	the	Chakrabarty	case,	the	Supreme	Court	noted	the	importance	of	the	patent	system	as	an	instrument	to	stimulate	invention	and	innovation	and	placed	the	public	policy	of	supporting	patent	rights	on	“equal	footing”	with	supporting	free	competition	 and	 interpreted	 the	 faltering	 patent	 law’s	 history	 in	 favor	 of	 broader	patent	protection37.	Maybe	concerned	by	the	technological	race	against	other	trading	nations	 such	 as	 Japan,	 IPRs	 became	 increasingly	 valued	 as	 tools	 to	 increase	innovation	 and	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 economy38.	 Furthermore,	 in	 1982	 the	 US	Department	 of	 Justice	 issued	 its	 new	 antitrust	 standards	which	were	more	 “patent	friendly”.	In	this	sense,	these	guidelines	established	that	antitrust	laws	should	not	be	applied	in	a	way	that	hinders	the	renewed	emphasis	on	competitiveness.	Finally,	as	it	is	known,	 the	establishment	of	 the	Court	of	Appeals	 for	 the	Federal	Circuit	 in	1982	enshrined	a	pro-patent	approach39.			The	creation	of	the	Federal	Circuit	generated	intense	political	debate	as	the	impact	of	these	law	courts	on	the	IPRs	regime.	Critics	feared	that	the	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	Federal	Circuit	would	strengthen	patents	and	exclusive	rights	of	their	titleholders.	In	effect,	this	specialized	court	has	developed	an	important	pro-patent	jurisprudence;	it	mostly	upholds	the	interests	of	titleholders	over	purported	copiers;	it	rarely	uses	the	term	“monopoly”;	it	seems	to	be	ready	to	grant	generous	compensatory	damages	and	permanent	 injunctions	 and	 the	 social	 impact	 of	 an	 absolute	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	over	 public	 health	 or	 other	 fields	 are	 rarely	 discussed	 or	 taken	 into	 consideration.	Between	1982	and	1990,	 this	court	upheld	on	appeal	90	percent	of	patents	 initially	determined	 to	 be	 valid	 and	 infringed	 (compared	 with	 62	 percent	 in	 the	 various																																																									
36 Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 100 S. Ct. 2601, 65 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1980). 
37 Maggs, P. B. (1980). New Life for Patents: Chakrabarty and Rohm & Haas Co. The Supreme Court Review, 
1980, 57-75. 
38 Kastriner, L. G. (1991). The revival of confidence in the patent system. J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y, 73, 
5. 
39 Susan Sell. See supra note 3. 
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relevant	courts	between	1953	and	1978	and	it	reversed	on	appeal	only	28	percent	of	patents	held	invalid	at	first	instance	compared	with	12	percent	previously40.		Both	the	Dawson	(and	Chakrabarty)	cases	and	the	creation	of	the	Courts	of	Appeals	for	 the	 Federal	 Circuit	 are	 perceived	 as	 pivotal	 elements	 of	 the	 shifting	 of	configuration	 of	 IPRs	 towards	 a	 model	 which	 embraces	 a	 pro-private	 proprietary	approach	to	IPRs	and	a	profit-making	ideology	without	nuances	or	considerations	to	other	social	factors.	In	this	context,	discourses	related	to	the	necessary	protection	of	investments	 and	 revenue	 increase	 are	 emphasized	 over	 the	 social	 grounds	 which	originated	 the	 IPRs.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 US	 background	 is	 important	because	it	was	here	where	the	new	discourse	began	in	an	explicit	and	neat	manner	in	favor	 of	 the	 process	 of	 globalization	 of	 IPRs;	 before	 extending	 this	 new	 paradigm	worldwide,	 it	was	necessary	 to	 settle	 solid	 and	 consistent	basis	domestically	 in	 the	US.					The	 structure	 of	 global	 capitalism	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 shifting	 of	 IPRs	 regime.	Capitalism	has	evolved	to	a	new	paradigm	which	produced	pressures	on	the	domestic	environment	 for	 IPRs	 protection	 towards	 a	 global	 regime	 of	 IPRs.	 However,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 IPRs	 regime	 is	 a	 contingent	 product	 of	 history	 and	 it	 has	 gone	 through	different	 historical	 phases	 and	 interpretations	 as	 to	 its	 scope	 and	 purpose.	What	 it	was	once	a	lawful	act	it	is	today	seen	as	an	act	of	“piracy”	and	conversely,	what	it	was	perceived	as	a	threat	to	the	free	market	and	economic	growth	it	may	be	seen	today	as	a	 necessary	 stimulus	 to	 the	 economic	 competitiveness	 within	 free	 market.	 IPRs	regime	 emerged	 triumphant	 from	 the	 ideological	 battle	 between	 free	 trade	 and	exclusive	 rights	 held	 in	 the	 period	 between	 1850	 and	 1875;	 the	 capitalist	 elites	around	 the	world	 largely	adopted	 the	 liberal	 arguments	 that	 linked	property	 rights	with	 incentives	 to	 invest	 and	 liberal	 markets	 (an	 ideological	 premise	 consecrated	later	by	TRIPS).			Furthermore,	 the	 apparent	 contradiction	 between	 exclusive	 rights	 and	 antitrust	 –which	viewed	IPRs	titleholders	as	agents	having	relevant	market	power	(or	dominant	position)	and	thus,	subject	to	strict	antitrust	standards-	was	somehow	loosen	in	favor																																																									
40 Faunce, Thomas Alured. (2006). Global intellectual property protection of “innovative” pharmaceuticals.(See 
chapter 3, footnote 48). 
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of	 an	 IP	 friendly	 application	 of	 the	 antitrust	 law.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 most	 recent	battlegrounds	 of	 antitrust	 versus	 IPRs	 take	 place	 in	 the	 field	 of	 digital	 economy	especially	in	Europe	where	antitrust	authorities	have	been	belligerent	against	certain	conduct	 deployed	 by	 technological	 giants	 such	 as	 Microsoft41	 or	 Google42.	 In	 this	sense,	 it	 seems	 to	be	 logic	 that	 the	 legal	monopolies	granted	by	patent	 laws	extend	only	as	far	as	the	patentee’s	own	use	or	reasonable	exploitation	of	the	invention.	Also,	some	American	commentators	note	the	delicate	balance	existing	between	the	desire	to	 encourage	 innovation	 by	 rewarding	 inventors	 with	 exclusive	 rights	 to	 their	inventions	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 desire	 to	 promote	 competition	 in	 the	marketplace.	Therefore,	if	a	patent	titleholder	attempts	to	leverage	the	advantage	of	a	patent	 beyond	 its	 intended	 boundaries,	 the	 patent	 owner	 may	 be	 held	 to	 have	
committed	“misuse”43.			Therefore,	the	entire	back	and	forth	process	of	the	history	of	IPRs	between	a	public	regarding	 approach	 and	 an	 exclusivity	 pro-titleholder	 perspective	 or	 the	 last	battleground	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 digital	 economy	 between	 IPRs	 and	 Antitrust	legislation	reveals	to	us	that	there	is	not	any	everlasting	settlement	in	this	area;	every	settlement,	including	the	settlement	encapsulated	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement,	is	subject	to	historical	transformation,	change	and	questioning.							
																																																								
41 In Microsoft Corp v Commission of the European Union (EU) T-201/04 it was decided a case against 
Microsoft for abuse of its dominant position in the market. Following an approach indicating by the Competition 
Commissioner Kroes who stated she believes open standards and open source are preferable to anything 
proprietary, the EU fined Microsoft an additional €899 million (US$1.44 billion) for failure to comply with the 
March 2004 antitrust decision. This represented the largest penalty ever imposed in 50 years of EU 
competition policy until 2009, when the European Commission fined Intel €1.06 billion ($1.45 billion) for anti-
competitive behavior. 
42 Recently on  14  July  2016,  the  Commission  decided  to  initiate  antitrust  proceedings against  Google's 
mother company Alphabet in case AT.39740 within the meaning of Article 11(6) of Council Regulation No 
1/2003 and Article 2(1) of Commission Regulation No 773/2004. The Commission intends to investigate the 
way in which Google displays its own comparison shopping service and that of competitors in its general 
search results. 
43 Durham, A. L. (2013). Patent Law Essentials: A Concise Guide: A Concise Guide. ABC-CLIO. 
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6.3.	 The	new	enclosures	resulting	from	the	globalization	of	IPRs	regime.			The	 international	 history	 of	 IPRs	 is	 often	 divided	 into	 three	 rough	 periods	marked	symbolically	by	different	international	agreements;	the	first	period,	characterized	by	the	absence	of	international	protection	(end	of	18th	century	until	the	end	of	the	19th	century),	 the	 second	 period	 beginning	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 when	 some	countries	 agree	 to	 the	 Paris	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Industrial	 Property	(1883)	 and	 the	Berne	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	 Literary	 and	Artistic	Works	(1886)	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 and	 the	 third	 period,	 the	 so	 called	 “global	period”	which	we	will	analyze	next	and	that	is	said	to	emerge	with	the	Agreement	on	Trade-Related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS)	in	199444.					
Linking	IPRs	with	trade		After	the	Second	World	War	and	resulting	from	the	decolonization	process,	more	and	more	 developing	 countries	 joined	 the	 Paris	 and	 the	 Berne	 Convention.	 These	conventions	were	based	on	the	one-vote-one-state	system	and	developing	countries	started	to	demand	a	model	of	IPRs	international	regime	which	should	be	fit	to	their	stage	of	development	and	 to	 their	condition	as	net	 importers	of	 foreign	 technology.	Developed	countries	were	not	able	to	advance	their	agendas	for	expansion	of	the	IPRs	regime	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 global	minimum	 standards	 for	 IPRs	 through	 the	WIPO	forum	 –these	 attempts	 found	 an	 important	 resistance	 by	most	 of	WIPO	members-.	Neither	 did	 WIPO	 have	 an	 effective	 mechanism	 to	 enforce	 eventual	 IP	 standards	worldwide.	 Furthermore,	 thanks	 to	 the	 fees	 charged	 under	 the	 Patent	 Cooperation	Treaty	 (PCT)45WIPO	 is	 not	 dependent	 on	 its	 member’s	 contributions	 and	 it	 has	 a	great	 autonomy	 to	 sustain	 its	 activities,	 being	mostly	 free	 from	undue	pressures	or	hegemonic	manipulation46.		
																																																								
44 Drahos, Peter. (1999). The universality of intellectual property rights… (see footnote 26). 
45 The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was signed on the last day of the conference on 19 June 1970. The 
Treaty entered into force on 24 January 1978 and it provides a procedure for a single international application 
to protect inventions in each of its contracting parties. The PCT filing establishes the applicant’s priority date of 
the patent and saves time and expenses otherwise required as result of multiple national application 
procedures. A PCT application does not itself result in the grant of a patent since there is no such thing as and 
international patent since the grant of a patent is a prerogative of national or regional authorities.  
46 Richards, Donald G. Intellectual property rights and global capitalism. See chapter 4 footnote 67. 
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In	 this	 sense,	 the	developing	nation’s	discontent	with	 the	prevailing	 structure	of	 IP	relations	reflected	in	the	conventions	administered	by	WIPO	was	expressed	as	early	as	 1952	 at	 the	 Geneva	 Conference	 where	 the	 Universal	 Copyright	 Convention	 was	adopted	and	later	at	Brazzaville	Conference	in	1963.	In	Brazzaville,	 it	was	expressly	stated	that	international	copyright	were	designed	to	meet	the	needs	of	countries	which	
are	 exporters	 of	 intellectual	 works	 and	 that	 for	 their	 universal	 application	 it	 was	
required	review	and	re-examination47.	This	context	and	the	voting	system	in	 force	at	WIPO	enabled	developing	countries	to	succeed	in	adopting	the	Stockholm	Protocol	of	1967	where	 some	provisions	 on	 compulsory	 licensing,	 exceptions	 to	 copyright	 and	term	of	protection	were	favorable	to	developing	countries’	interests.			Interestingly,	 critics	 of	 the	 Paris	 Convention	 complained	 about	 the	 treatment	 of	compulsory	 licensing	 by	 this	 International	 Agreement.	 The	 Convention	 established	the	 possibility	 for	 members	 to	 compel	 the	 IPRs	 holder	 to	 work	 or	 to	 issue	 a	compulsory	 license	 whenever	 the	 titleholder’s	 monopoly	 was	 considered	 to	constitute	an	abuse	of	monopoly	power	-including	restriction	of	output	with	a	view	toward	 increasing	 prices	 above	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 or	 failure	 to	 produce	 at	 all-.	From	the	IPRs	titleholder's	perspective,	the	profit-driven	logic	might	require	that	the	patent	 be	 worked	 in	 only	 a	 few	 locations	 from	 which	 export	 to	 other	 markets.	However,	 patent-granting	 countries	 considered	 that	 IPRs	 and	 patents	 should	 be	useful	 in	 contributing	 to	 create	 employment	 and	 technology	 transfer.	 Also,	compulsory	licensing	was	resorted	for	products	and	production	processes	that	serve	some	social	welfare	goals,	such	as	public	health	or	the	environment.		All	these	shortcomings	of	WIPO	are	identified	as	the	cause	motivating	the	movement	to	establish	the	TRIPS	agreement	as	part	of	the	multilateral	trade	negotiating	system	and	institutional	framework.	The	integration	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	into	the	trade	system	of	GATT	and	WTO	had	many	advantages	for	the	US	and	the	main	exporters	of	knowledge-based	products	and	services.	Via	this	linkage	IP	standards	could	reach	all	the	 states	members	 of	 the	multilateral	 trading	 system	 and	 those	which	 like	 China,																																																									
47 From the Preamble to the recommendations adopted by the Brazzaville Conference, August 10, 1963, as 
quoted in Olian Jr, I. A. (1973). International Copyright and the Needs of Developing Countries: The 
Awakening at Stockholmn and Paris. Cornell Int'l LJ, 7, 81. 
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wanted	to	join	it.	The	GATT	offered	the	possibility	of	implementing	high	standards	of	protection	of	IPRs	and	a	dispute	system	to	enforce	them.	Also,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	WTO	 decision	making	 process	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	 one-member-one	vote	 –and	 developing	 countries	 would	 enjoy	 the	 majority	 of	 votes-,	 the	 particular	system	 of	 “consensus”-based	 decision-making	 and	 the	 informal	meetings	 –formally	contemplated	 in	WTO	 regulations-	 permits	developed	nations	 to	 exert	 control	 over	WTO	main	decisions48.			Ironically,	 for	 this	 approach	 to	be	assumed	and	workable,	 it	was	needed	 to	make	a	drastic	 turn	 from	 the	 traditional	 understanding	 held	 by	 the	 economists	 and	 the	academia	during	the	second	half	of	the	19th	century	and	part	of	the	20th	century	as	we	have	 previously	 noted.	 While	 the	 economic	 mainstream	 of	 the	 western	 societies	during	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 (in	 particular	 in	 the	 period	 from	1850	 to	 1875)	were	 contrary	 to	 IPRs	 as	 an	 inacceptable	 privilege/monopoly	which	 impaired	 free	trade	between	nations,	in	this	new	context	when	it	was	seen	the	necessity	of	linking	IPRs	and	trade,	the	lack	of	a	minimal	harmonization	of	IPRs	protection	all	around	the	world	was	considering	as	an	element	distorted	the	free	trade	governed	by	WTO	rules.				In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	weak	 or	 nonexistent	 protection	 of	 IPRs	 or	 patents	distorts	natural	trading	parterns	and	reduces	the	ability	of	firms	to	transfer	technology	
abroad.	Also,	it	is	held	that	low	or	nonexistent	patent	protection	may	lower	the	world’s	
R&D	by	reducing	incentives,	and	thereby	diminish	worldwide	growth49.	Furthermore,	in	Maskus’	 words,	 the	 GATT	 could	 only	 be	 invoked	 as	 an	 appropriate	 forum	 for	 the	
negotiation	of	disciplines	on	 international	policies	 that	different	 levels	of	 IPRs	 tend	 to	
																																																								
48 Consensus-based decision-making not only deprives developing countries from making full use of the equal 
status that they share with their more developed counterparts as a result of the Agreement; in fact, at times it 
may be found to actively work to the detriment of developing countries. First, consensus decision-making, as 
opposed to unanimity, means simply that no decision is formally objected to by any member present at the 
meeting. However, the key assumption here is presence in the meeting; the consensus-based decision-
making procedure ‘ascribes considerable importance to having a permanent presence or, perhaps more 
accurately, an active “knowledgeable presence” at Blackhurst, R., Lyakurwa, B., & Oyejide, A. (1999, 
September). Improving African participation in the WTO. In Paper commissioned by the World Bank for a 
Conference at the WTO (pp. 20-21). 
49 Taylor, M. S. (1994). TRIPS, trade, and growth. International Economic Review, 361-381. 
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distort	trade	flows,	or,	in	other	words,	that	IPRs	trade	related.	Differential	patent	laws	
influence	international	trade50.					As	we	have	described	in	previous	chapters,	on	15	April	1994	in	Marrakech,	more	than	one	 hundred	 countries	 signed	 the	 GATT	 Agreement	 After	 a	 coercive	 and	 not	 too	subtle	negotiation,	marking	the	culmination	of	the	12-year-long	Uruguay	Round	and	establishing	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organization,	 which	 officially	 came	 into	 being	 on	January	1,	1995.	As	of	July	2016,	the	WTO	has	164	members	representing	more	than	96%	of	global	trade	and	96%	of	global	GDP.51As	we	know,	one	of	the	agreements	is	the	Trade-Related	aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	rights	(TRIPS)	contained	in	Annex	1C	 of	 the	 Final	 Act	 Embodying	 the	 Results	 of	 The	 Uruguay	 Round	 of	 Multilateral	Trade	Negotiations.			TRIPS	Agreement	has	important	consequences	in	the	global	capitalist	economy.	In	the	so-called	“information	society”	control	over	knowledge	replaces	control	over	matter	and	it	emerges	as	the	ultimate	source	of	power.	The	previously	mentioned	interplay	between	 contingent	 and	 political	 ideational,	 institutional	 and	material	 forces	 plays	here	an	important	role	when	it	comes	to	define	which	information	is	commodified,	in	which	 terms	 and	 with	 which	 legal	 scope.	 In	 this	 sense,	 what	 means	 information	society	or	Knowledge-Based	Economy	(KBE)	and	the	game	rules	governing	this	new	economic	paradigm	or	new	phase	of	capitalism	are	hegemonic	narratives52	and	also	the	result	of	a	political,	contingent	and	specific	process	serving	some	interests	at	the	expense	of	others.			First,	 as	 we	 know,	 it	 requires	 every	 member	 to	 implement	 high	 or	 western-type	standards	of	 IPRs	protection;	 in	doing	so	and	as	we	will	see	next,	TRIPS	Agreement	creates	 new	 spatial	 and	 material	 enclosures	 over	 previously	 public	 domain	intangibles	or	 intellectual	 commons.	As	we	have	 seen	previously,	TRIPS	Agreement	extends	 the	 patent	 subject-matter	 to	 virtually	 all	 fields	 of	 technology,	 it	 raises	 the																																																									
50 Maskus, K. E., & Penubarti, M. (1995). How trade-related are intellectual property rights?. Journal of 
International economics, 39(3), 227-248. 
51 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/acc_arc_e.htm 
52 Sum, N. L., & Jessop, B. (2013). Competitiveness, the knowledge-based economy and higher education. 
Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 4(1), 24-44. 
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term	 of	 patent	 protection	 to	 twenty	 years,	 it	 redefine	 the	 usually	 working	requirement	of	the	patents53	and	it	narrowly	regulates	the	exceptions	and	the	regime	of	compulsory	licenses	of	the	patent.	Second,	it	requires	states	to	implement	effective	legal	and	administrative	measures	to	enforce	IPRs	both	in	the	civil	and	in	the	criminal	jurisdiction.	Third,	it	establishes	a	dispute	resolution	system	and	a	Council	for	TRIPS	to	monitor	the	compliance	of	TRIPS.	Both	instruments	have	proved	very	effective	in	order	to	ensure	compliance	with	TRIPS,	specially	its	deterrent	effect	and	the	fear	for	many	developing	 countries	 that	 the	 failure	 to	meet	 their	obligations	 could	 result	 in	important	 commercial	 sanctions	 with	 dramatic	 consequences	 to	 their	 economies.	This	could	explain	the	observed	overcompliance	of	TRIPS	that	we	have	mentioned	in	previous	 chapters.	 Finally,	 through	 the	 worldwide	 commodification	 of	 certain	knowledge,	TRIPS	has	decisively	contributed	 to	create	a	global	profitable	market	of	certain	 intangibles	 or	 information	 which	 became	 commodities	 and	 whose	 main	beneficiaries	at	the	moment	are	those	who	were	its	main	proponents54.			
The	new	global	enclosures.		TRIPS	Agreement	reflects	better	than	anything	today’s	tendency	to	implement	global	processes	 of	 commodification	 and	 appropriation	 of	 knowledge	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	manifestations	of	 global	 capital	 accumulation55.	 Previous	 to	 analyze	how	TRIPS	has	created	 those	 new	 global	 enclosures,	 it	 is	 important	 though	 to	 clarify	 what	commodification	 implies.	 Knowledge	 commodities	 emerge	 in	 the	 contemporary	capitalism	 and	 the	 paradigm	 of	 the	 knowledge	 based	 economy	 where,	 following																																																									
53 Article 27 specifies that patent rights are enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the 
field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. This wording of TRIPS intends to 
avoid the practice of some developing countries that in the same manner as today’s developed countries did 
in the past, imposed the local working requirement on certain strategic categories of products (in particular 
pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals) to use IPRs at the service of development, dissemination of technology 
and other social goals. See. Matthews, Duncan. (2003). Globalising intellectual property rights: the TRIPS 
Agreement. Routledge. 
54 Regarding the creation of a global market around intangibles and information it is noteworthy to mention 
some figures. In this sense, and according to the Balance of Payments Statistics of the International Monetary 
Fund, the receipts from charges for the use of intellectual property have climbed from 41,29 US Dollar billions 
in 1994 to 318,7 US Dollar billions in 2015, almost ten times the volume of operations. According to that 
database, while in 1990 the US received 16,64 US dollar billions in 2015 the US received 124,66 US Dollar 
billions. On the payment’s side, India’s bill for example has increased from 72,46 US Dollar millions in 1990 to 
5 US Dollar billions in 2015 or Honduras from 3 US Dollar millions to 46,36 US Dollar millions. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.GSR.ROYL.CD.  Visited on January 20, 2017.         
55 Capital accumulation as the dynamic that motivates the pursuit of profit as a human action which seeks to 
optimize profits by maximizing revenue while minimizing costs.  
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Professor	Jessop,	knowledge	has	become	the	most	important	factor	of	production	and	the	 key	 to	 economic	 competitiveness.	 However,	 the	 role	 of	 knowledge	 in	 the	economic	shift	is	not	new,	it	has	always	been	behind	the	major	shifts	associated	with	technological	revolutions.	What	seems	to	be	new	today	is	the	growing	application	of	
knowledge	to	the	production	of	knowledge	in	developing	the	technical	and	social	forces	
of	production;	and	the	increased	importance	of	knowledge	as	a	fictitious	commodity	in	
shaping	the	social	relations	of	production.56		In	 this	 context	 dominated	 by	 profit-oriented,	 market-mediated	 activities,	 certain	knowledge	 has	 become	 a	 commodity	 (capitalist	 or	 fictitious	 -quasi-commodity-)	ready	 to	be	 sold	around	 the	world.	As	knowledge	 is	 a	non-rivalrous	good	–it	 is	not	depleted	 by	 use-	 it	 can	 only	 become	 a	 commodity	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 made	 artificially	scarce	 and	when	 its	 use	 or	 access	 is	made	 dependent	 on	 the	 payment	 of	 rent	 or	 a	royalty	 via	 the	 institution	 of	 IPRs	 as	 the	 reward	 for	 suppliers	 of	 knowledge	 or	information	 which	 as	 IPRs	 owners	 may	 earn	 super-profits	 out	 of	 their	 legal	monopolies.	 It	 is	 important	to	remark	the	distinction	between	the	capitalist	and	the	fictitious	 character	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 commodity.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	 said	 that	knowledge	has	become	a	 fictitious	 commodity	because	much	of	 the	 knowledge	has	not	been	produced	to	be	sold	but	the	decision	to	sell	it	and	thus,	converting	it	into	a	commodity	 has	 come	 thereafter.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 capitalist	 commodities	 would	refer	 to	 that	 knowledge	 which	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 profit-oriented	 labor	 process.	 In	Jessop’s	 views,	 knowledge	 is	 a	 collective	 generated	 resource	 and	 it	 is	 mostly	 a	fictitious	commodity	because	even	if	it	has	been	produced	within	capitalist	relations	of	production	much	of	its	creative	process	embeds	previous	knowledge	existing	in	the	public	domain	or	intellectual	commons57.										Furthermore,	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 becoming	 a	 commodity,	 knowledge	 goes	 through	different	processes	and	deep	social	adjustments;	first	it	is	disentangled	from	physical	goods	and	it	acquires	autonomy	as	an	independent	and	exchangeable	good	and	it	is	so	integrated	 into	 the	 profit-oriented	 labor	 process	 –	 or	 social	 class	 relations	 of																																																									
56 Jessop, Bob. (2000). The state and the contradictions of the knowledge-driven economy. Knowledge, 
space, economy: 63-78. 
57 Jessop, B. (2007). Knowledge as a fictitious commodity: insights and limits of a Polanyian perspective. In 
Reading Karl Polanyi for the twenty-first century (pp. 115-133). Palgrave Macmillan US. 
265		
production	by	divorcing	intellectual	labor	from	control	over	the	means	of	production	that	it	deploys	–58;	second	it	is	separated	from	it	social	roots	and	social	motives	which	motivated	 its	 production.	 As	 a	 commodity	 knowledge	 is	 valued	 under	 the	 premise	profitable/unprofitable	 getting	 rid	 of	 previous	 codes	 to	 distinguish	 and	 consider	knowledge	 as	 true/false	 or	 sacred/profane	 or	 distributive/exclusive,	 it	 is	 so	transformed	 from	 a	 collective	 resource	 (intellectual	 commons)	 into	 exclusive	property	(IPRs)	and;	third	knowledge	does	not	circulates	along	domestic	closed	units	(through	 reciprocity	 and/or	 distribution)	 but	 is	 allocated	 through	 profit-oriented	markets	 and	product-consumption	process	 that	 is	 controlled	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 capital	accumulation59.	 In	 this	 respect,	 we	 could	 say	 that	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 global	pharmaceutical	sector	conducts	its	business	and	the	profit	driven	performance	of	its	research	 and	 innovative	 activities	 –and	 how	 profit	 seeking	 prevails	 over	 any	 other	(social)	consideration-	seem	to	fit	perfectly	into	the	patterns	described	above.	In	this	sense,	we	could	say	as	Professor	Picciotto	that	pharmaceutical	companies	are	devoted	to	seek	pills	for	affluent	people’s	ailments.								Notwithstanding	 this,	 there	 are	 inherent	 tensions	 and	 contradictions	which	 do	 not	permit	 to	 treat	 all	 knowledge	 as	 if	 it	were	 a	 simple	 commodity.	While	 “intellectual	commons	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge”60-and	 its	 use-value	may	increase	when	shared	thanks	to	network	economies	and	cooperative	“wikipediative”	efforts	 and	 attitudes-,	 IPRs	 are	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 accumulation	 of	 informational	capitalism;	whereas	every	capital	wants	free	access	to	knowledge,	it	also	seeks	profit	by	 charging	 for	 knowledge	 that	 it	 supplies.	 This	 contradiction	 is	 not	 new	 but	 it	somehow	 reproduces	 the	 inherent	 contradiction	 of	 capitalism	 between	 the	socialization	 of	 productive	 forces	 and	 private	 control	 of	 the	 means	 of	 production	(intellectual	 commons	 versus	 IPRs,	 information	 society	 vs.	 information	 economy,	public	 regarding	 approach	 vs.	 exclusivity	 one).	 States	 are	 charged	 with	 resolving	
																																																								
58 German Patent Act of 1877 including the provision which contemplated the company’s ownership of 
individual inventor employees’ inventions as result of Siemens’ influence and pressure over the German 
legislature or the US Supreme Court decision of 1871 in United States v. Burns, which amended the 1791 
Patent Act to permit employment contracts to include a clause requiring employees to assign patents or other 
invention rights to the employer, are a clear reflection of this process of knowledge towards capitalist 
commodities. 
59 Jessop, Bob supra note 57. 
60 Dawson, A. C. (1998). The intellectual commons: A rationale for regulation. Prometheus, 16(3), 275-289. 
Quoted by Jessop supra note 53. 
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these	 contradictions	 and	 balance	 the	 necessity	 to	 stimulate	 innovation	 processes	through	 IPRs	 and	 the	dissemination	of	 knowledge	 as	 extensive	 as	possible	 through	the	protection	of	the	intellectual	commons.	As	we	have	seen,	the	states	address	this	issue	differently	depending	mostly	on	their	economic	development	stage.		TRIPS	 Agreement	 has	 substantially	 strengthen	 the	 global	 commodification	 and	appropriation	of	knowledge	in	order	to	give	way	to	informational	capitalism.	TRIPS	is	however	 part	 of	 a	 new	 wave	 where	 knowledge	 that	 was	 thought	 to	 be	 either	intellectual	 commons	 or	 uncommodifiable	 is	 covered	 now	 with	 new	 or	 newly	extended	 IPRs.	 Some	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 process	 of	 “appropriation	 of	 knowledge”	 a	process	 “analogous	 to	 the	 enclosure	 of	 common	 land	 in	 England	 in	 the	 Eighteen	Century”61or	the	Second	enclosure,	this	time	referred	and	focused	on	knowledge62.	In	particular,	TRIPS	has	enable	an	unprecedented	material	and	spatial	expansion	of	IPRs	imposing	 on	 many	 developing	 countries	 the	 obligation	 to	 protect	 and	 propertize	knowledge	 that	 in	 the	past	was	part	 of	 the	public	 domain,	 strengthening	 the	 scope	and	 term	 of	 proprietary	 rights	 on	 IPRs	 and	 providing	 for	 categories	 of	 knowledge	which	were	new	 to	most	 countries	 (both	developing	 and	developed	 countries)	 and	which	have	to	be	commodified	now	(material	enclosures).					Other	than	creating	IPRs	protection	in	countries	which	had	a	lax	or	non-existing	IPRs	regime	or	expand	 the	protection	of	 some	 traditional	 categories	of	 IPRs	–term	of	20	years	 for	 patents,	 new	definition	 of	working	 requirement	 and	procedural	means	 to	ensure	compliance-	TRIPS	provides	cover	on	a	global	basis	via	art.	27	(…patents	shall	
be	 available	 for	 any	 inventions,	 whether	 products	 or	 processes,	 in	 all	 fields	 of	
technology,	 provided	 that	 they	 are	 new,	 involve	 an	 inventive	 step	 and	 are	 capable	 of	
industrial	 application…)	 to	 the	 commodification	 and	 “propertization”	 of	 new	categories	of	knowledge.		
																																																								
61 For some interesting views in this matter Dardot, P., & Laval, C. (2015). Commun: essai sur la révolution au 
XXIe siècle. la Découverte, and Mattei, Ugo.(2011) Beni comuni-un manifesto. Editori Laterza or Peekhaus, 
Wilhelm. (2009). Primitive accumulation and re-appropriation of the information commons.  
62 Boyle, J. (2003). The second enclosure movement and the construction of the public domain. Law and 
contemporary problems, 66(1/2), 33-74. 
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Leaving	 aside	 the	 protection/commodification	 of	 new	 categories	 of	 knowledge	affecting	 copyright	 (Digital	 Millenium	 Copyright	 Act	 or	 the	 European	 Database	Protection	Directive)	 or	 trademarks	 (trademark	antidilution	 rulings),	 in	 the	 field	of	patents	there	has	been	a	substantial,	sometimes	controversial	expansion	of	IPRs	over	categories	 of	 knowledge	 which	 were	 previously	 uncommodifiable	 or	 part	 of	 the	intellectual	 commons	 such	 as	 business	 methods,	 some	 biotechnology	 “inventions”	and	plants.	In	this	sense,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	intellectual	commons	which	 are	 referred	 to	 categories	 of	 knowledge	 whose	 property	 is	 collective	 and	subject	 to	 their	 own	 norms	 of	 access	 and	 use	 and	 protected	 from	 private	appropriation	but	which	 could	 be	 eventually	 private	 from	 that	 knowledge	which	 is	
terra	nullius	(public	domain)	and	in	principle,	it	is	not	capable	of	appropriation	(these	two	 categories	 are	 however	 contingent	 and	 they	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 previously	mentioned	 interplay	 of	 ideational,	 material	 and	 institutional	 dimensions).	 In	 this	sense,	it	is	important	to	remark	that	the	concept	of	intellectual	commons	seems	to	be	a	reaction	against	the	overwhelming	expansion	of	IPRs	to	fields	of	knowledge	which	were	 previously	 considered	 to	 be	 uncommodifiable	 and	 part	 of	 the	 public	 domain.	The	reaction	against	the	privatization	of	certain	commodified	knowledge	has	been	in	many	 cases	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 intellectual	 commons	 which	 implies	 a	 collective	property	which	intends	to	safeguard	the	collectively	use-value	of	certain	knowledge	against	its	privatization.				Following	 professor	 Picciotto	 observations	 on	 the	 matter63,	 the	 main	 focuses	 of	expansion	of	patents	over	previously	uncommodifiable	knowledge	has	to	do	with	the	“isolation”	 principle	which	 enables	 to	 claim	 patent	 rights	 on	 grey	 areas	 between	 a	discovery	 (not	 patentable)	 and	 an	 invention.	 This	 has	 been	 an	 important	 turning-point	 for	 the	 life-sciences	 industries.	 Since	 the	 previously	 mentioned	 Diamond	 v.	
Charkabarty	 ruling	 the	 door	 was	 opened	 to	 speculate	 about	 commodification	 of	diverse	categories	of	knowledge	which	were	previously	conceived	as	discoveries	or	uncommodifiable.	 Some	 examples	 of	 the	 former	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 patent	applications	for	partially	gene	sequences,	known	as	expressed	sequence	tags	(ESTs)	resulting	from	the	Human	Genome	Project	publicly	funded;	patents	related	to	specific																																																									
63 Picciotto, Sol. Regulating global corporate capitalism. See Chapter 4 footnote 78. 
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genes	 responsible	 for	 the	 beneficial	 properties	 of	 plants	 or	 formulations	 of	 natural	elements	 –previously	 known	 to	 particular	 communities	 and	 groups-	 in	 a	 manner	which	 has	 been	 denominated	 “biopiracy”;	 	 	 patents	 on	 cell	 lines	 derived	 from	 the	spleen	 taken	 from	 a	 leukemia	 patient	 without	 consent,	 a	 practice	 and	 a	commodification	 endorsed	 by	 the	 California	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 the	 case	 Moore	 v.	
Regents	 of	University	 of	 California64	 or;	 the	protection	of	 plant	 varieties	 through	 sui	
generis	protection	and	plant	patents	whose	titleholder	under	some	legislations	retain	IPRs	 to	 propagation	 thus	 being	 able	 to	 create	 an	 unsurmountable	 dependency	 for	individual	farmers65.					Apart	from	the	contradiction	previously	mentioned	within	the	capitalism	logic	itself,	this	 expansion	 of	 the	 IPRs	 regime,	 namely	 the	 patent	 regime	 has	 generated	 some	important	social	controversies.	Biotechnology	patenting	became	highly	contested	on	technical	 and	 ethical	 grounds.	 From	 the	 ethical	 and	moral	 perspective	 as	 we	 have	examined	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 patenting	of	 living	organisms	was	 challenged	on	moral	grounds	in	Europe.	The	main	ethical	concern	has	to	do	with	what	is	seen	as	the	commodification	of	 life	 forms,	 and	 “appropriation	of	 life”66.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	IPRs	 titleholder	may	 be	 entitled	 to	 claim	 rights	 in	 the	 progeny	 of	 certain	 patented	animal	or	plants,	it	may	happen	that	a	genetically	modified	animal	or	plant	could	be	governed	 by	 a	 IPRs	 license	 instead	 of	 by	 an	 outright	 sale.	 Genetically	 Modified	Organisms	 (GMOs)	 is	 still	 also	 very	 controversial	 not	 just	 for	 ethical	 motives	 but	because	of	their	impact	on	health	and	the	environment.		Another	 highly	 controversy	 raised	 by	 the	 new	 enclosures	 is	 associated	 with	 the	capacity	 of	 pharmaceutical	 and	 agribusiness	 firms	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 traditional	knowledge	on	formulations	with	healing	effects	or	intended	for	other	collective	social	uses	 –often	 explained	 by	 the	 biodiversity-richness	 of	 those	 areas	 inhabited	 by	traditional	 communities-	and	extract	 from	 it	knowledge	over	which	 they	may	claim	private	property	rights	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	that	knowledge	was	perceived	as	being	part	of	the	public	domain.	The	process	of	 identification	of	bioactive	compounds	and																																																									
64 Moore v. Regents of University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990). 
65 This is somehow reflected in “Consumed. What are you eating” a film (2015) by Daryl Wein distributed by 
Netflix in 2016. 
66 Bowring, F. (2003). Science, seeds and cyborgs: Biotechnology and the appropriation of life. Verso. 
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commercialization	 of	 new	 products	 based	 on	 biological	 resources	 many	 of	 which	were	 intuitively	enjoyed	by	traditional	and	indigenous	communities	has	been	called	bioprospecting.	 As	 result	 of	 a	 number	 bioprospecting	 projects	 some	 helpful	compounds	and	extracts	have	been	screened	and	shaped	the	subject	matter	of	diverse	patent	applications.	Many	of	these	“appropriation”	practices	have	been	considered	as	activities	 of	 biopiracy	 by	 local	 communities67	 who	 paradoxically	 could	 be	 even	prevented	 from	 using	 formulations	 of	 plants	 -which	 have	 been	 used	 for	 a	 very	longtime-	on	the	grounds	that	they	infringe	new	patent	rights68.	This	situation	led	to	different	 social	 activists	 to	 denounce	 this	 abusive	 practice69.	 These	 controversies	around	the	new	enclosures	of	traditional	knowledge	have	been	sometimes	addressed	by	developing	countries	governments	and	some	scholars	through	the	lens	of	the	IPRs	perspective.	 In	 this	 sense,	 new	 IPRs	 formulations	 have	 been	 proposed	 such	 as	eventual	 community’s	 IPRs	 or	 “benefit-sharing”	 based	 models.	 Also,	 it	 has	 been	suggested	that	this	knowledge	could	be	used	as	a	strategic	tool	to	take	advantage	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement70.			Notwithstanding	 the	 above,	 it	 cannot	 go	 unnoticed	 that	 some	 of	 those	 solution	proposals	are	based	precisely	on	the	paradigm	(commodification	and	appropriation	of	 knowledge)	 from	 which	 this	 sort	 of	 controversies	 emerges	 and	 that	 traditional	communities	may	have	concerns	which	do	not	have	to	do	with	sharing	of	economic	benefits	but	with	other	considerations	related	to	their	beliefs,	values	or	even	religion.	This	also	has	motivated	the	creation	and	formulation	of	regimes	of	collective	property	or	intellectual	commons	such	as	the	open	source	software71	which	govern	the	access	and	 use	 of	 common	 or	 collective	 property	 eventually	 under	 the	 premises	 of																																																									
67 Mooney, P. (2000). Why we call it biopiracy. Bioprospecting, Oslo, 37. 
68 Svarstad, H., & Dhillion, S. S. (2000). Responding to bioprospecting. From biodiversity in the South to 
medicines in the North. Spartacus Forlag. 
69 One of the most illustrative fights against the enclosure of traditional knowledge is represented by the case 
of the neem tree. In the 90’s the US Department of Agriculture and WR Grace received several US and EPO 
patents on methods of controlling fungal infections in plants using a composition that included extracts from 
the neem tree (Azadirachta indica), which grows throughout India and Nepal and whose virtues had been 
known in India for some 2000 years. In 2000 the European patent was successfully opposed by several 
groups from EU and India including the EU Green Party, Vandana Shiva, and the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) on the basis that the fungicidal activity of neem extract had long 
been known in Indian traditional medicine. WR Grace appealed, and lost that appeal in 2005 after an 
important demonstration before the EPO office in Munich on the day of the hearing. For further information 
see Shiva, Vandana. (2016). Biopiracy: The plunder of nature and knowledge. North Atlantic Books. 
70 Dutfield, G. (2001). TRIPS-related aspects of traditional knowledge. Case W. Res. J. Int'l L., 33, 233. 
71 Hess, C., & Ostrom, E. (Eds.). (2007). Understanding knowledge as a commons: from theory to practice 
(pp. 41-81). Cambridge, MA: Mit Press. 
270		
maximizing	the	collective	social	interest.	In	this	sense,	we	could	say	that	the	creation	of	intellectual	commons	today	is	a	defensive	reaction	to	the	excessive	appropriation	and	privatization	of	 knowledge,	 some	of	which	 is	 fundamental	 –or	 in	 the	upstream	space-	to	advance	and	to	further	progress	and	downstream	research.						
TRIPS	or	the	expansion	of	capitalist	social	relations	of	production	on	a	global	scale:	A	
critical	eclecticism	approach.		With	this	context	in	mind,	it	is	hard	to	understand	how	most	WTO	members	in	their	condition	of	net	 importers	of	 technology	or	knowledge-based	products	and	services	could	agree	to	be	bound	on	TRIPS.	As	we	have	said,	TRIPS	 implies	the	expansion	of	IPRs	and	it	is	the	most	effective	instrument	for	the	creation	of	new	territorial	(global)	and	 material	 enclosures	 at	 a	 global	 scale.	 Commodification	 of	 certain	 knowledge	encompasses	 the	 unfolding	 of	 knowledge-based	 products	 in	 two	 commodities	 and	thus,	it	carries	two	commercial	transactions;	the	tangible	product	which	is	governed	by	 an	 outright	 simple	 sale	 and	 the	 intangible,	 the	 IPRs	 embodied	 in	 it,	 which	 are	transmitted	 under	 a	 license	 which	 controls	 and	 restricts	 the	 use	 of	 it	 (computer	program,	 a	 music	 CD,	 a	 pharmacy	 pill	 or	 even	 the	 progeny	 of	 a	 plant	 or	 animal).	Naturally,	this	unfolding	justifies	an	increase	in	price,	especially	due	to	the	exchange	value	of	the	intangible	part	of	the	purchase.			In	order	to	explore	the	last	causal	factors	explaining	the	emergence	of	TRIPS	and	to	explain	 the	 real	motives	why	 states	 joined	 the	TRIPS	Agreement	 and	 agreed	 to	 the	apparently	 onerous	 conditions	 represented	 by	 TRIPS,	 we	 will	 follow	 the	 “critical	eclecticism”	approach	exposed	by	professor	Donald	G.	Richards72where	he	analyzes	the	 issue	 from	different	 traditional	 critical	 perspectives,	 namely	 the	world	 systems	theory;	 Gramscian	 hegemony	 and	 internationalization	 of	 capital.	 All	 three	perspectives	are	complementary	in	explaining	the	dependency	type	relations	created	by	the	economic	bonds	created	under	the	new	global	legal	architecture,	in	particular,	TRIPS	Agreement;	the	economic	explanation	of	the	capital	accumulation	through	the	commodification	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 some	 capitalist	 practices	 in																																																									
72 Richards, Donald G. (2004). Intellectual property rights and global capitalism. See Chapter 4 footnote 67. 
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seeking	 technological	 rents;	 the	 description	 of	 the	 process	 of	 how	 a	 hegemonic	transnational	 capitalist	 class	 succeed	 in	 achieving	 its	 goals	 by	 instrumentally	 using	the	state	and	creating	and	unifying	ideology	which	is	presented	as	universal.									Contrary	 to	 the	 official	 narrative	 –hegemony	 ideology-	 according	 to	 which	 TRIPS	would	 permit	 that	 developing	 countries	 were	 beneficiaries	 of	 larger	 foreign	investments	 as	 long	 as	 technology	 transfer	 and,	 in	 short,	 their	 modernization	 and	technological	catchup	with	the	most	developed	countries,	the	truth	is	that	as	we	have	seen	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 there	 is	 not	 economic	 evidence	 of	 those	 announced	benefits.	As	we	have	mentioned	previously,	not	only	has	 the	new	IPRs	regime	been	irrelevant	 to	 explain	 the	 flows	 of	 foreign	 investment	 or	 the	 transfer	 of	 technology	North	 to	South,	but	domestic	 incentives	 to	 innovation	are	also	not	demonstrated	 in	developing	countries73.		We	 have	 examined	 in	 chapter	 4	 the	 numerous	 shadows	 casted	 on	 the	 negotiation	process	 leading	to	 the	 final	act	subscribing	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	the	more	that	dubious	 legitimacy	 of	 such	 so	 negotiated	 agreements.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 still	considered	 by	 many	 international	 commentators	 that	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 is	 a	concession	of	developing	countries	 to	developed	countries,	 a	 concession	which	was	made	under	 duress	 and	without	 adequate	 compensation	 beyond	 the	 opening	 up	 of	some	 markets	 to	 the	 goods	 of	 developing	 countries.	 Bearing	 this	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	important	to	identify	at	this	moment	the	real	forces,	logics	and	reasons	leading	to	the	adoption	of	TRIPS	and	the	global	IPRs	regime.					From	 the	 World	 Systems	 Theory’s	 approach,	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 international	agreements	as	a	field	of	battle	or	a	contest	between	nations	and	power	relationships	TRIPS	 would	 be	 an	 attempt	 by	 powerful	 countries,	 namely	 the	 US	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	extent	 by	 Europe	 and	 Japan	which	 acting	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 their	 own	 national	 self-																																																								
73 If we compare for example the number of patent applications of residents of different developing countries 
we can see that TRIPS has had a little impact or no impact at all. According to the Balance of Payments 
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, the number of patent applications of residents in Bangladesh in 
1990 was of 32 (44 in 2014), in Guatemala in 1990 27 (10 in 2014), in Honduras 6 in 1990 (6 in 2014), Zambia 
7 (14 in 2014) or Nigeria 12 in 1990 (50 in 2013). On the other hand the number of patent applications by 
residents in the US was of 90.643 in 1990 and it has been increased to 285.096 in 2014.  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=BX.GSR.ROYL.CD&country=. Visited on 
January 21, 2017.  
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interest,	try	to	perpetuate	its	dominance	over	economic	relations.	In	this	sense,	as	it	is	described	by	Professor	Drahos74,	the	strategy	to	push	a	global	IPRs	regime	by	the	US	was	 preceded	 by	 the	 widespread	 fears	 over	 the	 loss	 of	 US	 competitiveness	 and	certain	feeling	of	decadence	of	the	country	as	result	of	the	loss	of	the	war	in	Vietnam,	the	 emergence	 of	 new	 regional	 leaders	 such	 as	 India	 and	 Brazil	 and	 powerful	competitors	like	Japan	with	an	important	trade	surplus	in	its	trade	relationship	with	the	US	and	the	myth	that	this	story	of	success	was	constructed	on	the	presumed	theft	of	American	ideas	and	know	how.	All	this	led	to	the	conclusion	that	stronger	property	rights	were	needed	to	protect	America	industry	and	ideas.			In	this	sense,	TRIPS	would	be	part	of	a	strategy	to	maintain	the	world	hegemony	of	the	US	(and	Europe	and	Japan	as	necessary	accomplices	of	this	trip)	by	establishing	the	terms	of	trade	or	the	game	rules	customized	to	the	powerful	countries	interests	at	the	expense	of	the	weakest	countries.	Under	the	official	discourse	of	TRIPS	would	lay	an	agenda	of	underdevelopment	and	dependency	of	peripheral	developing	countries	towards	 the	 center	 constituted	 by	 developed	 countries.	 According	 to	 Professor	Correa75,	 TRIPS	 would	 respond	 to	 an	 American	 strategy	 of	 technological	protectionism	with	the	aim	of	consolidating	an	international	division	of	labor	where	northern	 countries	 generate	 innovation	 and	 knowledge	 based	 products	 whereas	southern	countries	would	be	providers	of	raw	material	and	the	market	for	northern	products.	In	similar	terms,	professor	Drahos	views	TRIPS	as	an	institutional	project	of	
information	 feudalism,	 that	 is	 the	 project	 of	 acquiring	 and	maintaining	 global	 power	
based	on	the	ownership	of	knowledge	assets.76		The	widening	gap	between	North	and	South	or	center	and	periphery	is	also	explained	by	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 knowledge	 based	 economy.	 As	 professor	 Jessop	 explains,	 if	knowledge	based	or	knowledge	intensive	companies	in	the	information	economy	are	to	maintain	 above	average-	profit	 rates	 (also	because	 the	unfolding	of	physical	 and	intangible	commodities),	less	technologically	sophisticated	companies	will	get	below-																																																								
74 Drahos, P. (1995). Global property rights in information: the story of TRIPS at the GATT. Prometheus, 
13(1), 6-19. 
75 Correa, Carlos M. (2000). Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS 
agreement and policy options. (see chapter 4, footnote 68). 
76 Drahos, P., & Braithwaite, J. (2003). Hegemony based on knowledge: The role of intellectual property. Law 
Context: A Socio-Legal J., 21, 204. 
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average	profits	offering	products	and	services	with	 less	exchange	value.	This	would	be	 another	 driving	 force	 behind	 globalization	 insofar	 as	 less	 profitable	 firms	 are	forced	to	relocate	or	outsource	to	lower	cost	production	sites	and	countries	and	being	able	 to	 compete	 in	 terms	 of	 lower	 price.	 This	 would	 strengthen	 the	 tendencies	towards	unequal	exchange	and	development	associated	with	globalization77		In	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 strengthening	 of	 IPRs	 and	harmonization	of	IPRs	standards	can	lead	to	raise	the	cost	of	technological	spillovers,	reduce	the	rate	of	spillovers,	and	reduce	the	assimilative	capacity	of	the	small	 firms	that	 tend	 to	 dominate	 the	 industries	 of	 the	 semiperipheral	 countries,	 and	 slow	 or	even	 prevent	 the	 development	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industries	 in	 these	 countries	which	 eventually	 and	 historically	 have	 been	 more	 sensitive	 and	 responsive	 to	 the	health	 need	 of	 their	 local	 communities	 who	 in	 contrast,	 cannot	 afford	 the	 center-based	 pharmaceuticals78.	 Also,	 as	 Professor	 Drahos	 notes,	 this	 may	 affect	 an	important	 factor	 in	 economic	 growth,	 human	 capital	 or	 “knowledge	 embodied	 in	
people”79which	 may	 be	 impaired	 by	 unfit	 IPRs	 law	 by	 restricting	 dissemination	 of	knowledge	through	the	pricing	mechanism.				Even	 if	 this	 analysis	 is	 certain	 in	 identifying	 the	 national	 self-interest	 of	 some	powerful	states,	namely	the	US	to	explain	the	adoption	of	TRIPS	and	the	strategy	to	succeed	 in	 carrying	 out	 their	 political	 agenda,	 maintaining	 their	 hegemony	 and	keeping	 international	 relations	based	on	dependency,	 it	 is	 somehow	superficial	and	oversimplifies	 the	 real	 and	 complex	 factors	 behind	 the	 adoption	 of	 this	 new	 IPRs	regime.	 In	 particular,	 it	 takes	 for	 granted	 that	 nations	 and	 univocal	 units	 without	fissures	 and	 with	 a	 perfectly	 determined	 and	 defined	 national	 interest.	 This	perspective	 ignores	 also	 the	 competing	 interests	 and	 conflicting	 classes	within	 the	same	state.	In	this	sense,	in	peripheral	states,	there	may	be	also	privileged	sectors	of	population	who	can	advance	their	careers	and	vital	projects	in	perfect	tune	with	the	hegemonic	forces	of	the	world	economy80.																																																											
77 See Bob Jessop supra note 54. 
78 See Richards G. Donalds supra note 69 
79 See Drahos, Peter, supra note 26. 
80 See Matthews, Duncan, supra note 50. 
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Furthermore,	the	interests	at	stake	in	TRIPS	and	the	contradiction	and	controversies	around	 this	 international	 agreement	 are	 better	 explained	 by	 the	 distinction	 that	separates	 competitive	 from	 monopoly	 capital	 or	 by	 the	 tension	 between	 those	positions	 promoting	 the	 privatization,	 commodification	 and	 appropriation	 of	knowledge	versus	those	supporting	public	domain,	 intellectual	commons	and	public	regarding	approach	to	IPRs.	Naturally,	different	states	are	situated	differently	in	this	regard,	southern	states	tend	to	defend	policies	favoring	a	public	regarding	approach	of	 knowledge	 and	 developed	 countries	 the	 proprietary	 understanding	 of	 the	 IPRs	regime	 but	 this	 is	 not	 always	 like	 that	 and	 political	 positions	 of	 the	 states	 are	 a	consequence	rather	than	the	cause	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	which	as	an	international	regulatory	 infrastructure	 of	 globalization,	 responds	 to	 a	 deeper	 process	 of	 capital	accumulation.											In	fact,	the	decision	of	implementing	developed	countries’	IPRs	standards	worldwide	rather	 than	 being	 designed	 in	 consideration	 of	 the	 general	 interest	 of	 a	 specific	nation,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 US,	 was	 the	 result	 of	 an	 important	 pressure	 of	transnational	 companies	 and	 business,	 transnational	 capital	 which	 make	 the	 US	government	represent	their	interests.	The	role	played	by	the	US	government	seeking	the	adoption	of	TRIPS	goes	beyond	state-centered	 theories	and	hegemonic	 stability	theories	 of	 international	 relations	 or	 maximizing	 the	 social	 welfare	 of	 its	 citizens;	being	 these	 considerations	 important,	 they	 were	 not	 decisive	 to	 implement	 the	strategy	deployed	by	the	US.	The	story	about	how	the	TRIPS	Agreement	was	forged	following	 the	 transnational	 business	 penetration	 in	 the	 core	 of	 political	 decision-making	 processes	 of	 the	 US	 Government	 via	 the	 Advisory	 Committee	 for	 Trade	Negotiations	(ACTN)	chaired	by	the	CEO	of	Pfizer81suggests	that	rather	than	by	public	interest	considerations,	the	position	and	standing	of	the	US	is	better	explained	by	its	condition	 as	 representative	 of	 a	 transnational	 capitalist	 class;	 an	 hegemonic	 one	which	involves	the	consent	of	the	controlled	classes	–via	the	coercive	capabilities	of	the	 state	 and	 the	 intellectual	 leadership	 of	 key	 elements	 of	 civil	 society-	 and	 the	
																																																								
81 For and interesting and exhaustive explanation on the precedents of the negotiation see Drahos, P. (1996). 
Global law reform and rent-seeking: the case of intellectual property. Journal of Political Economy, 988, 1002.  
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instrumental	 use	 of	 the	 state	 through	 the	 Gramscian	 termed	 mechanism	 of	 the	
extended	state82.			Therefore,	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 reasons	 explaining	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 IPRs	regime	on	a	global	scale	is	the	desire	of	a	hegemonic	transnational	capital	to	capture	and	maximize	 as	 fully	 as	 possible	 the	 rents	 associated	with	 their	 knowledge	 based	commodities	as	an	instrument	to	get	extraprofits	in	the	profit-driven	logic	of	capital	accumulation.	 IPRs	 would	 be	 the	 basis	 for	 those	 extraprofits	 (based	 on	 the	commodification	 of	 knowledge)	 and	 monopoly	 rents	 –IPRs	 permit	 them	 to	consolidate	 longer	 term	advantages	and	 technological	 rents	which	would	otherwise	go	away	as	a	consequence	of	free	riders	or	further	innovations-.	In	this	sense,	much	of	IPRs	 global	 regime	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 unproductive,	 rents-profit-seeking	activities.	 Once	 the	 IPRs	 have	 been	 secured,	 many	 IPRs	 titleholders	 may	 be	 more	interested	 in	 conducting	 rent-seeking	 activities	 rather	 than	 investing	 in	 further	innovation	and	this	produces	a	logic	distortion	in	the	pattern	of	economic	activity.	In	fact,	 the	 pathway	 observed	 by	 the	 global	 pharmaceutical	 business	 analyzed	 in	previous	chapters	 seems	 to	match	with	 this	described	behavior	pattern.	The	 Italian	case83where	pharmaceutical	companies	successfully	challenged	the	Italian	legislation	which	excluded	pharmaceutical	products	 from	patentability	has	showed	us	 that	 the	use	of	more	patents	or	exclusive	rights	does	not	imply	more	investments	in	R&D.				Hence,	 the	 desire	 of	 a	 hegemonic	 transnational	 business	 and	 class	 for	 profit,	 their	capacity	 to	 create	 a	 hegemonic	 ideology	 –presented	 as	 universal-	 based	 on	 their	particular	interests	and	the	instrumental	state	at	the	service	of	their	interests	–which	are	 sometimes	 wrongly	 perceived	 as	 the	 general	 interest-,	 all	 this	 creates	 the	propitious	historic	bloc,	 the	guiding	 threat	which	articulates	 (manipulates)	 forces	of	the	state	and	the	civil	society	and	that	provides	a	better	guide	to	their	behavior	than	
their	 imagined	nationalistic	allegiances84.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 theory	of	public	 choice85	
																																																								
82 Cox, R. W. (1993). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. Cambridge Studies 
in International Relations, 26, 49-49. 
83 Scherer, F. M., & Weisburst, S. (1995). Economic effects of strengthening pharmaceutical patent protection 
in Italy. IIC-INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 26(6), 1009-
1024. 
84 See Richards, Donald G see Chapter 4 footnote 67. 
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which	 “dispassionately”	 analyses	 the	 political	 decision-making	 process	 as	 a	transaction	business	where	public	good	or	the	preferences	of	the	general	public	are	subordinated	to	private	interests	of	interest	groups	and	rent-seekers	could	certainly	and	sadly	make	sense	in	this	case.			 	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
85 Farber, D. A., & Frickey, P. P. (1991). Law and public choice: a critical introduction. University of Chicago 
Press. 
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6.4.	 Philosophical	foundations	of	IPRs:	the	contradictions	of	an	interpretation	
of	 IPRs	 as	 absolute	 rights	 versus	 IPRs	 as	 a	 set	 of	 rights/privileges	with	
property	prerogatives.			
Why	resorting	to	the	philosophical	foundations	of	IPRs?		As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 1,	 IPRs,	 or	 better,	 the	 ideational,	technological	 and	 institutional	 dimensions	 behind	 the	 protection	 of	 knowledge	through	IPRs	are	the	result	of	a	political,	historical	and	contingent	process	which	has	been	 shifting	 along	 the	 (brief)	 history	 of	 IPRs.	 In	 section	 2	 we	 have	 examined	 the	unprecedented	expansion	of	IPRs	spatially	and	materially.	 In	effect,	 the	IPRs	regime	has	become	global	and	new	enclosures	have	been	created	over	knowledge	previously	considered	 to	 be	 part	 of	 public	 domain	 and/or	 over	 intellectual	 commons.	 The	material	 and	 spatial	 expansion	 of	 IPRs	 have	 converted	 these	 rights	 in	 absolute	property	rights,	in	a	legal	institution	which	operates	in	the	knowledge	based	economy	as	 a	mechanism	 for	 capital	 accumulation	on	a	 global	basis.	 Furthermore,	 the	global	IPRs	regime	does	not	take	into	due	account	the	instrumental	nature	of	IPRs,	the	aims	informing	 their	 inception	 and	 their	 social	 function	 for	 the	 common	 good.	 The	 new	institutional	approach	of	IPRs	has	implied	a	iuris	et	de	iure	application	of	IPRs	which	deeply	 contradicts	 their	 nature	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 procurement	 of	 superior	goods,	 it	 fails	 in	 the	achievement	of	 the	purported	aims	and	 it	does	not	accomplish	their	social	function.					Considering	 the	 above,	 in	 the	 next	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 we	 are	 analyzing	 the	instrumental	nature	of	Intellectual	Property	as	opposed	to	the	consideration	of	IPRs	as	 absolute	 rights.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Intellectual	 Property	 is	 a	 legal	 institution	 created	mainly	 for	 the	 procurement	 of	 certain	 social	 goods,	 in	 particular	 to	 operate	 as	 an	incentive	for	creativity	and	technical	and	scientific	progress	of	the	society	where	it	is	implemented	 (to	 promote	 the	 Progress	 of	 Science	 and	 useful	 Arts).	With	 the	 aim	 of	accomplishing	 this	 key	 role	 in	 society,	 the	 institution	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	contemplates	 the	 granting	 of	 a	 set	 of	 rights	 to	 the	 IPRs	 titleholder	 with	 some	property-right	 related	 features	 and	 prerogatives.	 However,	 as	 we	 will	 see	 in	 next	section	 about	 property,	 IPRs	 legal	 configuration	 and	 content	 differs	 substantially	
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from	“genuine”	property	rights	making	IPRs	a	category	of	sui	generis	property	rights	or	 rather,	 a	 legal	 institution,	 a	 set	 of	 rights	 temporally	 “vested	 with	 property	prerogatives”.			Therefore,	the	philosophical	foundations	of	IPRs	may	be	very	helpful	to	us	in	order	to	understand	the	grounds	 justifying	IPRs	and	their	 inherent	social	 functions	 in	such	a	manner	 as	 to	 claim	 a	 revised	 and	 more	 contextualized	 application	 and	implementation	of	IPRs	in	the	different	jurisdictions.	In	this	sense,	we	should	escape	from	 certain	 “institutional	 fetishism”	 i.e.	 the	 belief	 that	 abstract	 institutional	conceptions	such	as	intellectual	property,	free	trade	or	free	civil	society	have	a	single,	natural,	 necessary	 and	 inevitable	 institutional	 expression86	 and	 being	 open	 to	 a	different	interpretation	and	implementation	of	certain	legal	institutions	like	IPRs,	an	insight	of	IPRs	which	far	from	being	willful,	and	discretionally	creative,	become	more	coherent	with	their	nature	and	social	grounds	which	justified	their	creation	and	give	their	 current	 legitimation.	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 those	 philosophical	justifications	 that	 view	 IPRs	 as	 quasi	 absolute	 rights,	 IPRs	 are	 contextualized	 in	 a	social	 context	 where	 they	 play	 an	 instrumental	 role,	 comply	 with	 certain	 social	functions	and	contemplate	certain	social	duties.					
Theoretical	rationale	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights.			As	 we	 have	 previously	 seen,	 IPRs	 and	 in	 particular	 patent	 rights	 are	 based	 on	intangible	 non-rivalrous	 goods.	 Goods	 which	 are	 non-rival	 are	 goods	 that	 can	 be	enjoyed	 simultaneously	 by	 an	 unlimited	 number	 of	 consumers.	 IPRs	 create	 then	artificial	 scarcity	 of	 non-rivalrous	 goods	 where	 otherwise	 there	 would	 not	 be.	Through	the	IPRs	and	the	“propertization”	of	certain	knowledge	or	intangible	goods,	her	owners	are	granted	a	bunch	of	rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives,	among	which	the	most	prominent	is	the	legal	monopoly	which	enables	its	owners	to	exclude	others	 from	access	to	them	without	the	titleholder’s	consent.	 	The	authors	analyzed	hereunder	 are	 those	 philosophical	 authors	 and	 philosophical	 schools	 which	 are	generally	invoked	to	support	different	interpretations	of	IPRs.																																																										
86 Unger, R. M. (1996). What should legal analysis become?. Verso. 
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IPRs	 as	 natural	 rights	 based	 on	 a	 simplistic	 interpretation	 of	 Lockean	 theory	 of	
property.		Diverse	 arguments	 tend	 to	 justify	 the	 creation	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 or	 the	property-prerogatives	 based	 system	 or	 the	 “propertization”	 paradigm	 over	 some	intangible	 goods.	 A	 first	 set	 of	 arguments	 have	 to	 do	 with	 natural	 rights	considerations	inspired	in	Locke’s	writings	about	property.	Locke	deals	with	property	in	the	Chapter	V	of	his	Second	Treatise87.	In	the	context	of	the	commons,	Locke	states	the	following:	[…]	God,	who	has	given	the	world	to	men	in	common,	has	also	given	them	
reason	to	make	use	of	 it	 to	 the	best	advantage	of	 life	and	convenience.	The	earth	and	
everything	 in	 it	 is	given	 to	men	 for	 the	 support	and	comfort	of	 their	existence.	All	 the	
fruits	 it	naturally	produces	and	animals	 that	 it	 feeds,	as	produced	by	 the	spontaneous	
hand	of	nature,	belong	to	mankind	in	common	[…]		every	individual	man	has	a	property	
in	his	own	person	(owns	himself);	 this	 is	 something	 that	nobody	else	has	any	right	 to.	
The	labor	of	his	body	and	the	work	of	his	hands,	we	may	say,	are	strictly	his.	So	when	he	
takes	something	from	the	state	that	nature	has	provided	and	left	in,	he	mixes	his	labour	
with	 it,	 thus	 joining	 to	 it	 something	 that	 is	 his	 own;	 and	 in	 that	way	 he	makes	 it	 his	
property	[…].			Locke	 is	 frequently	 cited	 and	 invoked	 in	 the	 context	 of	 IPRs.	 As	 it	 is	 explained	 by	Drahos,	the	willful	construction	of	a	theory	of	IPRs	based	on	Locke	general	thinking	is	explained	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 find	 ideological	 legitimacy	 by	 those	 who	 defend	 a	configuration	of	 IPRs	 as	natural	 property	 rights,	 as	 quasi-absolute	 rights	which	 are	not	 subject	 to	 any	 other	 consideration	 or	 nuance88.	 The	 element	 of	 labor	 and	 the	mixing	metaphor	 in	 order	 to	 create	 private	 property	 -without	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	consent	of	the	other	commoners-	permit	the	advocates	of	an	absolute	view	of	IPRs	to	hold	that	private	property	rights	are	part	of	the	state	of	nature,	that	they	are	previous	to	the	state	and	that	 they	are	not	dependent	 for	their	existence	upon	convention	or	positive	law.																																																																
87 Locke, J. (2014). Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End 
of Civil Government. John Wiley & Sons. 
88 Drahos, P. (1996). A philosophy of intellectual property (Vol. 1). Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
280		
	In	this	sense,	IPRs	would	be	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	creator’s	moral	entitlement	to	hold	 as	 property	 the	 fruits	 of	 her	 labor	 (Labor	 theory).	 This	 would	 be	 a	 moral	justification	based	on	justice	considerations;	it	seems	to	be	fair	that	one	could	be	the	owner	 of	 what	 she	 creates.	 Furthermore,	 within	 these	 considerations	 there	 are	arguments	justifying	IPRs	holding	that	“but	for”	the	creator,	there	would	not	be	work	and	therefore,	granting	an	exclusive	right	to	the	creator	does	not	deprive	anybody	of	something	that	otherwise	would	not	exist.	Therefore,	the	author	of	the	creative	works	would	be	fully	entitled	to	the	property	of	her	work89.			Notwithstanding	this,	Lockean	theory	on	property	and	its	application	to	IPRs	are	not	as	unanimous	and	simple	or	absolute	as	one	could	think	and	it	has	been	the	subject	of	diverse	 –sometimes	 opposed-	 and	 lively	 interpretations	 which	 are	 beyond	 the	purpose	 of	 this	 dissertation.	 While	 for	 some	 commentators	 such	 as	 Tully,	 Locke’s	thinking	justifies	not	the	right	of	private	property	but	the	commons90,	for	others	like	Macpherson,	 Locke’s	 theories	 provide	 a	 moral	 foundation	 and	 legitimation	 for	capitalism,	 unlimited	 private	 accumulation,	 bourgeois	 legitimation	 and	 a	 political	theory	of	appropriation91.			Furthermore,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 remarks	which	 deserve	 specific	 attention	 and	which	question	the	somehow	simplistic	interpretation	of	Locke’s	work	as	supportive	of	 IPRs	 as	 natural	 rights.	 First,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Locke	 derives	 property	 rights	(IPRs)	 from	natural	 law,	private	 rights	would	not	be	absolute	but	 instrumental	and	subordinated	 to	 the	 prevalent	 rights	 to	 life	 and	 self-preservation92.	 Second,	 it	 is	important	to	frame	Locke’s	reflections	on	the	historic	period	when	they	were	made.	In	 effect,	 natural	 rights	 were	 called	 to	 play	 a	 revolutionary	 political	 role.	 In	 this	respect,	it	is	noteworthy	noting	that	Locke	deals	with	property	in	the	chapter	5	of	the																																																									
89 Sidgwick, H. (1901). The principles of political economy (Vol. 132). Kraus. 
90 Tully, J. (1982). A discourse on property: John Locke and his adversaries. Cambridge University Press. This 
author explains how wealthy landowners were attempting to enlarge their estates by enclosing the Commons 
without the consent of the commoners. Their justification was that they could make better use of the land than 
could the commoners. Three Bills to legalise enclosure without consent were introduced in the House of 
Commons, 1664, 1661 and 1681, but they were defeated. As he explains, Locke's theory serves explicitly to 
legitimate the rights of the commoners against the enclosing landlords.[…] 
91 Macpherson, Crawford Brough. (1964). The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
92 Drury, S. B. (1982). Locke and Nozick on Property. Political Studies, 30(1), 28-41. 
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Second	 Treatise	 of	 Government,	 a	 work	 where	 Locke	 develops	 his	 theory	 about	Government	and	which	is	considered	an	open	challenge	to	the	absolutist	monarchical	government.	Contrary	to	the	idea	that	the	kings	were	Adam’s	heirs	and	consequently	they	held	the	legitimacy	to	rule	the	world,	he	is	also	opposed	to	the	Adamite	theory	of	property	by	which	property	has	come	under	the	dominion	of	the	aristocracy	as	heirs	of	 the	 original	 owners	 of	 the	 land.	 In	 introducing	 the	 labor	 element,	 Locke	undermines	the	aristocratic	origin	of	property.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 and	 following	 Locke’s	 logic,	 IPRs	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 fair	reward	to	their	creators	and	inventors,	i.e.,	it	is	a	question	of	justice	that	an	inventor	or	an	author	receives	a	reward	and	that	she	can	make	a	 living	out	of	 it	–individuals	had	 to	 exist	 by	 their	 labor-.	 However,	 from	 the	moment	 that	 their	 work	 and	 their	capacity	are	 commodified	and	 that	 their	 intellectual	work	and	 implied	 IPRs	are	 the	property	 of	 the	 company	 or	 firm	 which	 hires	 them	 (owner	 of	 the	 means	 of	production),	the	argument	which	links	IPRs	with	the	“just	reward”	is	certainly	diluted	since	the	reward	received	by	the	original	creator	or	inventor	may	be	far	from	being	just	 or	 proportional	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 capital	 for	 the	 firm	 where	 the	 original	individual	inventor	came	up	with	the	innovative	work.			Also,	it	is	not	clear	which	is	the	specific	object	of	the	property	right	affected	by	labor,	its	precise	demarcation.	In	this	sense,	it	is	remarkable	Nozick’s	teasing	example	when	he	 is	wondering	whether	 he	may	 claim	 property	 rights	 in	 the	 ocean	 by	mixing	 his	tomato	 juice	 with	 the	 ocean93.	 Furthermore,	 in	 today’s	 complex	 processes	 of	production	where	 a	 bunch	 of	 actors,	 legal	 entities	 and	 elements	 are	 implied	 in	 the	innovation	 of	 products	 and	 services,	 where	 the	 romantic	 image	 of	 the	 individual	inventor	 represents	 a	 a	rara	avis	among	 the	patent	owners,	especially	 as	 far	 as	 the	development	of	patentable	knowledge	is	regarded	–where	innovation	is	the	result	of	more	 and	more	 sophisticated	 and	 industrial	 processes-,	 demarcation	 and	 extent	 of	the	object	of	the	property	right	following	this	labor	perspective	has	become	a	difficult	-when	not	discretionary-	task.																																																																						
93 Drahos, see supra note 85. 
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Finally,	in	order	to	comprehend	the	general	picture	of	Lockean	approach	to	property,	it	 is	 important	 to	 refer	Lockean	provisos94;	 the	 acquisition	of	private	property	 from	the	 commons	 would	 be	 limited	 by	 certain	 so-called	 provisos:	 property	 would	 be	conditional	upon	a	person	leaving	in	the	commons	enough	and	as	good	for	the	other	commoners	(sufficiency	proviso)	and	a	person	cannot	take	more	out	of	the	commons	than	they	can	use	to	advantage	(spoliation	proviso).	It	is	also	said	that	the	reading	of	Lockean	writings	and	its	application	to	IPRS	cannot	be	limited	to	just	one	or	at	most	two	 (typically,	 spoliation	 and	 sufficiency)	 provisions	 but	 also	 to	 the	 third	 proviso	(charity	proviso	in	Locke’s	First	Treatise)	saying	that	an	individual	has	a	right	to	the	surplus	of	others	when	that	individual	is	starving	or	lacking	any	necessity	of	life,	this	giving	us	a	new	more	balanced	and	complete	Lockean	liberal	theory	of	property95	and	IPRs.			Therefore,	from	a	Lockean	perspective,	IPRs	would	be	far	from	being	absolute.	Apart	from	the	historical	and	circumstantial	context	of	Locke’s	thinking	which	requires	an	updated	reading	of	his	–then	“revolutionary”-	work	–some	commentators	have	even	considered	that	property	arrangements	after	the	introduction	of	money	are	justified	primarily	 by	 utility	 rather	 than	 natural	 right96-,	 the	 so-called	 by	 Nozick97	 Lockean	provisos,	establish	important	limitations	for	the	acquisition	of	private	property	from	the	 commons,	 limitations	which	 take	 into	 due	 account	 the	 social	 impact	 of	 private	property	and	the	necessary	common	good	which	has	to	be	safeguarded.					
Personality	based	justification	for	IPRs;	Hegel	and	Kant.		A	second	set	of	approaches	–especially	developed	 in	 the	continental	European	 legal	tradition-	 would	 be	 based	 on	 personality-based	 considerations,	 saying	 that	 some	creations	are	intimately	associated	with	her	creator’s	personality	and	unique	spirit;	a	certain	 relationship	 of	 property	 to	 individual	 will,	 individual	 choice,	 individual	freedom	 and	 personal	 autonomy.	 This	 approach	 is	 partly	 inspired	 on	 Hegel	 and																																																									
94 Widerquist, K. (2010). Lockean theories of property: Justifications for unilateral appropriation. Public 
Reason, 2(1). 
95 Merges, R. P. (2011).  Justifying intellectual property. Harvard University Press. 
96 See Drury, supra note 89. 
97 Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia (Vol. 5038). Basic books. 
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Kantian	theorization	of	property,	a	“personality	theory”	that	describes	property	as	an	expression	of	the	self.	These	theories	also	conceive	private	property	rights	as	crucial	instruments	to	the	satisfaction	of	some	fundamental	human	needs.			For	 Hegel,	 property	 plays	 a	 dual	 role.	 First	 and	 most	 importantly,	 property	 is	 the	embodiment	of	personality,98	in	particular,	the	first	embodiment	of	personality	in	the	process	to	achieve	absolute	freedom;	freedom	not	to	be	understood	as	an	absence	of	restraint	 for	 the	 individual	but	rather	as	a	 “realization	of	necessity”99	 (the	ability	of	the	individual	to	understand	what	they	rationally	must	do),	a	state	of	being	which	is	to	 be	 situated	 in	 a	 given	 historical	 context.	 Property	 in	 this	 sense	 will	 help	 the	individual	 to	make	 a	 transition	 from	 a	 subjective	world	 (self-consciousness)	 to	 the	objective	reality	(a	manifestation	of	one’s	personality	in	a	particularistic,	determined	manner).	According	to	Hegel,	 individual’s	goes	through	a	process	where	property	 is	framed	in	the	first	stage	of	an	evolutionary	process	(personality	to	morality,	morality	to	 ethical	 life,	 family	 to	 civil	 society,	 civil	 society	 to	 state),	 thus	 property	 is	 not	 an	absolute	 reality	 but	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 be	 an	 instrument,	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	development	of	personality.	Secondly,	less	importantly	n	Hegel’s	work	and	related	to	the	 development	 of	 the	 personality,	 property	 helps	 the	 individual	 to	 satisfy	 her	biological	necessities.			Hegel	entrusts	to	the	state	the	task	of	protecting	the	property	of	its	citizens;	property	is	not	viewed	as	an	end	in	itself	but	it	plays	an	instrumental	role	within	the	tense	and	delicate	balance	of	three	subsystems	of	the	state:	the	political,	the	civil	and	the	ethical	dimensions,	 three	 of	 which	 constitute	 the	 state.	 Civil	 society	 represents	 the	 self-interested	 individualism,	 the	 subjective	 impulse	 where	 institutions	 protecting	property	are	framed,	civil	society	may	pose	a	danger	to	the	ethical	life	of	the	state	and	thus	 it	 has	 to	 be	 tempered	 by	 the	 ethical	 dimension	 (the	 set	 of	 shared	 values,	attitudes	and	approaches	to	life	of	a	given	community)	for	only	the	ethical	life	of	the	state	 makes	 it	 a	 community.	 Hence,	 even	 if	 Hegel	 talks	 of	 an	 “absolute	 right”	 of	appropriation,	it	is	necessary	to	put	in	context	his	views	on	property	as	an	instrument	to	 externalize	 and	 recognize	 individual’s	will	 -	 externally	 and	before	others-,	 in	 the																																																									
98 Hegel, G. W. F. (2015). The philosophy of right. Hackett Publishing. 
99 Ryan, A. (1984). Property and political theory (p. 118ff). Oxford: Blackwell. 
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first	 stage	 of	 an	 evolutionary	 process	 (an	 instrument	 at	 the	 service	 of	 the	development	of	personality).	Furthermore,	Hegel	–who	at	the	end	holds	a	bourgeois	model	of	 society-	 is	 aware	of	 the	extremely	needy	 individuals	and	 the	duties	of	 the	state	and	the	civil	society	in	order	to	offset	the	consequences	of	a	system	creating	a	legion	of	 impoverished	class100.	For	Hegel,	the	state	cannot	be	merely	the	compliant	arm	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 of	 individual’s	 subjectivism	 and	 their	 property	 claims,	 this	sort	 of	 ascendency	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 its	 subjective	 individualistic	 interests	 could	provoke	 the	 imbalance	 of	 the	 mentioned	 balance	 of	 the	 three	 dimension	 and	 be	ruinous	for	the	state.	If	the	state	became	a	mere	servant	of	the	proprietarian	elements	of	civil	society,	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	protect	the	ethical	life	of	the	state	would	be	certainly	 impaired	 for	 individual	 participation	 in	 the	 larger	 ethical	 life	 of	 the	community	is	the	final	stage	of	the	individual’s	journey	to	freedom101.					Referring	to	intangible	realities	or	knowledge	which	could	be	subject	to	property	(to	Intellectual	Property),	Hegel	distinguishes	between	physical	property	and	intellectual	property	as	the	latter	may	affect	differently	to	personality	and	the	individual’s	will.	In	this	 sense,	Hegel	 expresses	 his	 hesitations	 in	 calling	 such	 gifts,	 knowledges,	 powers,	
mere	things,	because	although	the	may	be	bargained	for	as	a	thing,	they	have	an	inner	
spiritual	side102.	This	understanding	of	 intangibles	may	support	our	consideration	of	IPRs	as	sui	generis	property	or	as	rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives.	Thus,	Hegel	acknowledges	 the	possibility	 that	 a	mental	product	 can	be	externalized	and	directly	
converted	into	an	object,	which	it	is	possible	to	others	to	reproduce.	In	this	respect,	as	to	the	 reproduction	 capacity,	 Hegel	 distinguishes	 between	 those	 hand-made	reproductions	of	an	original	artistic	work	 in	respect	 to	which	Hegel	considers	 to	be	
essentially	a	product	of	 the	copyist’s	own	mental	and	 technical	ability	–not	 infringing	the	 original	 artist’s	 rights-	 and	 those	more	 automatic	 reproductions	 such	 as	 those	literary	facsimiles	in	which	case	the	reproduction	right	belong	to	its	original	author.	In	this	respect	it	is	noteworthy	that	Hegel	resorts	to	a	labor	based	argument	to	justify	the	consideration	as	a	servile	copy	–	the	way	to	reproduce	such	things,	as	mere	things,	
is	a	matter	of	ordinary	skilled	labor-	or	one	deserving	certain	acknowledgement	-	.																																																										
100 Waldron, Jeremy. (1990). The right to private property. 
101 See Drahos, supra note 85. 
102 See Hegel, supra note 95. 
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	However,	Hegel	does	not	 seem	 to	hold	an	absolute	view	of	 the	 right	of	 the	original	author	or	 inventor	over	 their	 right	 to	 consent	 the	 reproduction.	He	 explicitly	notes	that	 the	 justification	 of	 the	 right	 of	 the	 author	 or	 inventor	 cannot	 be	 sought	 in	 his	
arbitrarily	 making	 it	 a	 condition	 […]	 and	 seems	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 importance	 of	common	 knowledge	 in	 the	 process	 of	 learning	 and	 the	 difficulties	 to	 draw	 the	 line	between	 original	 work	 deserving	 “property	 rights”	 and	 that	 knowledge	 which	becomes	a	necessary	element	in	the	process	of	learning.	In	Hegel’s	own	words	it	is	not	
possible	 to	 state	accurately,	and	establish	explicitly	by	 law	and	right,	 just	how	 far	 the	
new	 form,	which	accrues	 through	repeated	expression,	 should	 transmute	 the	 scientific	
treasure	 or	 the	 thoughts	 of	 others,	who	 are	 still	 in	 external	 possession,	 into	 a	 special	
mental	 possession	 of	 the	 person	 who	 re-constructs	 them;	 how	 far,	 in	 other	 words,	 a	
repetition	of	an	author’s	work	should	be	called	a	plagiarism.	Hence	plagiarism	must	be	
a	question	of	honor,	and	should	be	refrained	from	on	that	score.										Following	 a	 “personality	 type”	 approach	 to	 property,	 Kant	 explains	 property	 as	 an	instrument	 for	 the	 individual	 to	expand	her	range	of	 freedom.	 In	 this	sense,	 certain	vital	 projects	 of	 human	 beings	 require	 control	 over	 external	 objects	 and	 property	would	 ensure	 that	 control.	 Furthermore,	 in	 Kant’s	 view,	 the	 author’s	 work	 is	 an	expression	and	a	manifestation	of	her	ideas	and	an	expression	of	her	personality	and	thus,	 it	 deserves	 a	 moral	 respect.	 Kant’s	 view	 on	 property	 is	 said	 to	 inspire	 most	authors’	 rights	 jurisprudence	 and	 legislative	 European	 civil	 systems	 protecting	authors’	moral	rights.	Recognition	of	moral	authors’	rights	would	be	so	based	on	the	understanding	of	dignity	advanced	by	Kant.	In	this	sense,	author’s	creation	would	be	also	a	means	of	exchanging	thoughts	and	it	is	related	to	the	personal	and	inalienable	right	of	every	man	to	express	and	communicate	her	ideas.	This	approach	contributed	to	create	the	theoretical	basis	for	the	modern	doctrine	of	moral	rights103.		On	the	other	hand,	IPRs	would	also	be	justified	on	the	ground	that	they	create	social	and	economic	conditions	conducive	 to	creative	 intellectual	activity,	which	 in	 turn	 is	important	 to	 human	 flourishing.	 Kantian	 approach	 to	 property	 is	 far	 from	 being																																																									
103 Suhl, N. C. (2001). Moral rights protection in the United States under the Berne Convention: A fictional 
work. Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ, 12, 1203. 
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absolute,	or	categorical.	In	this	sense,	as	it	happens	with	the	Lockean	charity	proviso,	Kant’s	 Universal	 Principle	 of	 Justice	 –individual	 freedom	 has	 to	 coexist	 with	 the	fundamental	 freedom	 of	 any	 other	 person-	 encompasses	 obvious	 constrains	 on	private	property	 rights	which	 are	 limited	by	 the	 freedom	of	 others.	 In	 this	 respect,	Kant	argues	that	one’s	property	claims	are	only	valid	insofar	as	they	take	into	account	the	freedom	of	all	others	as	well.	As	a	result	of	these	premises,	Kant’s	theory	is	said	to	hold	 two	 nuclear	 values;	 the	 dignity	 and	 worth	 of	 every	 individual	 and	 the	importance	of	the	community	of	human	kind104.				Critics	 of	 the	 personality-based	 arguments	 are	 focused	 on	 the	 important	shortcomings	 of	 this	 approach	 in	 today’s	world	 and	 the	 circumstances	 surrounding	nowadays	production	and	creation	of	intangibles.	On	the	one	hand,	personality-based	theory	would	 not	 justify	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 IPRs	 regime	 on	 intangible	 goods	 since	there	would	be	other	 instruments	and	means	which	could	also	satisfy	the	ethical	or	moral	rights	of	creative	or	inventive	individuals.	Furthermore,	this	personality	based	argumentation	posed	reasonable	doubts	on	whether	or	not	personality	is	present	in	every	case	and	every	intangible	covered	by	IPRs.	Intuitively,	artistic	or	literary	works	may	embody	better	her	author’s	personality	 than	a	pharmaceutical	 compound;	 it	 is	held	that	while	some	copyrightable	works	such	as	poems,	songs,	paintings	or	movies	are	 receptacles	 for	personality,	 the	 justification	does	not	 seem	to	 fit	well	 into	other	categories	 of	 words	 covered	 by	 IPRs	 such	 as	 computer	 software,	 pharmaceutical	patents	 or	 microchips	 which	 normally	 embody	 utilitarian	 solutions	 to	 specific	needs105.	Also,	 some	 innovative	processes	 imply	a	collective	effort	of	 large	 teams	of	people	contributing	to	a	part	of	creations	and	works	owned	by	corporate	entities,	a	creative	 process	where	 the	 “romantique”	 figure	 of	 the	 single	 inventor	 in	 her	 lab	 is	more	 and	 more	 diluted.	 In	 effect,	 the	 corporatization	 of	 the	 production	 of	 most	intangibles	covered	by	IPRs,	today’s	real	world	conditions	in	the	industries	producing	IPRs	invalidate	the	idealized	myth	of	the	lone	creator	while	corporations	use	the	IPRs	system	to	advance	their	own	self-interests106.																																																													
104 See Merges supra note 95. 
105 Hughes, J. (1988). The philosophy of intellectual property. Geo. LJ, 77, 287. 
106 See Merges, supra note 95. 
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The	Utilitarians.	Maximizing	pleasure	for	all.		Utilitarians	 seek	 to	maximize	 total	 utility.	 The	 father	 of	 Utilitarism	 Jeremy	 Betham	describes	utility	in	terms	of	the	sum	of	all	pleasure	resulting	from	an	action	minus	the	suffering	of	anyone	involved	in	the	action	following	the	principle	according	to	which	
it	 is	 the	 greatest	 happiness	 of	 the	 greatest	 number	 that	 is	 the	 measure	 of	 right	 and	
wrong.107Utility	maximization	 is	 considered	 to	be	a	guiding	behavioral	 rationale	 for	economic	actors	with	 the	aim	of	 allocating	 the	 resources	of	 the	market	 in	 the	most	efficient	 manner.	 Utilitarians	 provide	 important	 support	 to	 property	 rights	 and	 its	role	 in	 the	 economic	 system.	 Bentham	 whose	 thinking	 was	 premised	 on	 the	 then	nascent	capitalism,	defended	that	happiness	consisted	in	four	subordinate	ends	of	the	legislative	 process;	 subsistence,	 abundance,	 equality	 and	 security.	 Security	was	 the	prevalent	 end	 of	 the	 law	 and	 in	 case	 of	 conflict	 between	 equality	 and	 security,	preeminence	 was	 to	 be	 given	 to	 security	 (security	 as	 to	 the	 certainty	 about	 one’s	property	rights	and	that	one	will	enjoy	the	fruits	of	her	labor)108.				Logically	 enough,	 utilitarian	 arguments	 are	 the	 most	 influential	 justifications	 of	modern	 IPRs	 regime.	 Goals	 such	 as	 incentives	 to	 innovation,	 dissemination	 of	knowledge	 or	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 progress	 of	 science	 and	 useful	 arts	 (US	Constitution)	 are	 constantly	 cited	 and	 mentioned	 in	 defense	 of	 IPRs	 and	 as	explanatory	memorandums	of	many	IPRs	norms	and	laws.	The	traditional	utilitarian	justification	 for	 IPRs	 is	 well	 known;	 as	 ideas	 require	 time	 and	 investment	 to	 be	created	and	produced	and	may	be	copied	freely	without	depriving	others	of	their	use	coping	with	important	free	riding	problems,	it	becomes	necessary	to	give	creators	an	exclusive	right	in	order	that	they	could	recoup	the	investment	made	and	IPRs	would	contribute	to	that	end	as	an	incentive	for	new	knowledge	which	is	ultimately	good	for	society.	In	this	sense,	 it	 is	considered	that	absent	the	protection	of	IPRs	most	would																																																									
107 Bentham, J. (1996). The collected works of Jeremy Bentham: An introduction to the principles of morals 
and legislation. Clarendon Press. 
108 Bentham, Jeremy, and R. Hildreth. (1864). Principles of the civil code. 
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prefer	to	copy	ideas	rather	than	investing	time	and	resources	to	create	new	ideas	and	knowledge.			Apart	 from	 the	 legitimate	 doubts	 as	 to	whether	 the	 creators	 or	 inventors	 are	most	strongly	motivated	by	 the	prospect	of	having	a	monopoly	and	substantial	economic	profit	 and	 surplus	 (disregarding	 noneconomic	motives	 to	 create),	 and	whether	 the	maximum	 utility	 is	 effectively	 achieved	 by	 restricting	 knowledge	 and	 information	flow	instead	of	permitting	 its	 free	dissemination,	 IPRs	may	be	counterproductive	as	IPRs	 may	 discourage	 innovation	 by	 reducing	 and	 impairing	 follow-on	 innovations	based	on	improvement	of	IPR	protected	knowledge109.	However,	it	is	noteworthy	that	rather	 than	 challenging	 the	 utilitarian	 rationale	 as	 a	 valid	 approach	 to	 justify	 IPRs	regime,	 and	 the	 instrumental	 nature	 of	 IPRs,	 critics	 and	 debates	 are	 focused	 on	casting	doubts	about	the	real	gains	and	announced	virtues	of	the	IPRs	system.	In	fact,	as	we	have	previously	seen	in	the	analysis	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	and	its	announced	benefits,	many	of	the	arguments	invoked	to	justify	its	adoption	and	its	necessity	are	predicated	on	unproven	or	even	disproven	empirical	claims.			
Other	philosophical	justifications.		There	are	also	other	theoretical	justifications	some	of	which	may	be	slight	variants	of	the	 traditional	 sets	 of	 philosophical	 theories	 analyzed	 above.	 Some	 of	 those	 are	rooted	in	the	proposition	that	IPRs	should	contribute	to	the	achievement	of	a	just	and	attractive	 culture.	This	 theoretical	 construction	 derives	 from	 different	 schools	 of	thought	such	as	the	Legal	Realists,	and	the	various	proponents	(ancient	and	modern)	of	classical	republicanism110.		On	the	other	hand,	professor	Lemley	distinguishes	between	standard	justifications	for	IPRs	 which	 would	 be	 ex	 ante	 justifications	 i.e.	 the	 goal	 of	 IPRs	 is	 to	 influence	 the	behavior	 that	 occurs	 before	 the	 right	 comes	 into	 force	 and	 the	 new	 justifications	
																																																								
109 Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. S. (1998). Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical 
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identified	by	the	professor	in	the	practice	of	US	law,	justifications	which	are	not	based	on	 the	 incentive	 to	 create	 new	 ideas	 but	 centered	 on	 the	 evolutive	 process	 and	management	 of	 those	 ideas	 that	 IPRs	 permit	 afterwards	 (ex	 post	 justifications).	 In	particular,	 they	 consider	 IPRs	 as	 an	 important	 incentive	 for	 IPRs	 titleholders	 to	 do	follow-on	 innovation	 and	 improvement	 of	 existing	 innovations	 and	 how	 IPRs	 are	necessary	 to	 control	overuse	of	 information	 (tragedy	of	 the	 information	commons).	Both	 justifications	 are	 strongly	 challenged	by	Lemley	 as	 theories	without	 empirical	support	 and	 tending	 to	 hold	 strong,	 and	 quasi	 perpetual	 IPRs	 which	 question	 the	market	capacity	to	produce	efficient	outcomes111.							
Some	final	remarks	on	philosophical	foundations	of	IPRs.		In	spite	of	the	fact	that	the	legal	configuration	of	IPRs	are	partly	rooted	in	many	of	the	above	 moral	 considerations,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 say	 that	 the	 most	 extended	 and	accepted	justification	for	the	existence	of	IPRs	nowadays	is	of	an	utilitarian	nature;	it	is	based	on	economic	rationale	utilitarian	arguments,	i.e.	IPRs	are	perceived	as	a	way	to	get	maximization	of	net	social	welfare.	IPRs	are	in	this	sense,	believed	to	constitute	the	necessary	incentive	for	inventors	to	engage	in	creative	and	innovative	endeavors.	Unlike	 tangible	 assets,	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 -the	 idea	 that	 property	 held	 in	common	may	be	harmed	by	overuse-	does	not	take	place.	The	problem	for	intangible	assets	is	just	the	opposite;	the	risk	is	rather	one	of	underproduction.	It	is	argued	that	inventors	might	fail	to	invent	or	create	for	fear	of	free	riding	by	others	–new	entrants	without	 those	 sunk	 costs-	 losing	 all	 competitive	 advantage	 as	 original	inventors/creators.	 As	 some	 inventions	 are	 costly	 to	 create	 and	 the	 costs	 of	 it	 are	front-end,	fixed	costs,	IPRs	will	enable	the	inventor	to	recoup	those	fixed	costs.			Also,	 from	this	utilitarian	rationale,	 IPRs	are	held	 to	 fulfill	one	 important	goal	other	than	being	an	incentive	for	innovation;	IPRs	system	permits	a	complete	and	sufficient	disclosure	of	 the	 invention	 to	 the	public	 that	will	enable	other	skilled	people	 in	 the	pertinent	field	to	research	and	use	the	invention;	being	this	spread	of	new	inventions	beneficial	to	the	transfer	of	technology	and	in	general,	to	society.	In	this	sense,	IPRs																																																									
111 Lemley, M. A. (2004). Ex ante versus ex post justifications for intellectual property. The University of 
Chicago law review, 129-149. 
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would	constitute	a	social	contract	between	society	and	creators/inventors	by	which	a	monopoly	 is	 granted	 to	 the	 IPRs	 owner	 in	 order	 to	 recoup	 her	 efforts	 and	 being	encouraged	to	keep	on	innovating	in	return	of	disclosing	the	relevant	information	on	the	 protected	 invention.	 We	 have	 previously	 seen	 how	 different	 national	governments	 have	 used	 IPRs	 system	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	different	strategic	purposes	of	the	national	economy.		The	important	point	of	revising	philosophical	justifications	of	IPRs	is	not	to	explore	a	rhetoric	metaphysical	analysis	of	the	legal	institution	made	of	IPRs.	For	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation	this	analysis	and	the	importance	of	utilitarian	arguments	to	justify	the	 economic	 prerogatives	 inherent	 to	 IPRs	monopolies	 serves	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	IPRs	 are	 not	 absolute	 quasi-natural	 rights	 but	 contingent	 historical	 and	 political	creatures	of	 law.	Those	who	 invoke	Locke	or	Kantian	 and	Hegelian	 justifications	of	IPRs	implicitly	tend	to	suggest	that	IPRs,	and	in	general	property	rights	are	previous	to	 law	 and	 previous	 to	 the	 state.	 This	 doctrinal	 approach	 to	 IPRs	 is	 not	 trivial;	 the	configuration	 of	 IPRs	 as	 quasi	 natural	 absolute	 rights	 enables	 their	 titleholders	 to	claim	 an	 application	 of	 IPRs	 decontextualized	 and	 without	 regard	 to	 the	socioeconomic	 context	 or	 socioeconomic	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 in	 the	 spatial	 and	 time	dimensions	where	 IPRs	are	applied.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 instrumental	nature	 implied	 in	the	 utilitarian	 approach	 to	 IPRs	 confers	 the	 states	 to	monitor	whether	 these	 rights	fulfill	 the	 social	 goals	 they	 are	 called	 to	 advance.	 Ironically,	 those	 who	 support	 a	“natural	rights-based	absolute	propietarianism”	of	IPRs	are	the	least	fitted	candidates	to	be	the	holders	of	a	natural	rights	version	of	IPRs	since	Lockean	or	Hegelian	views	on	property	and	subsequent	 interpretations	of	 IPRs	are	mostly	 inspired	on	creative	or	inventive	individuals	who	present	very	few	similarities	with	today’s	corporations	devoted	to	intensive	production	of	commodified	intangibles.								
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CHAPTER	7.	 THE	SOCIAL	FUNCTION	OF	INTELLECTUAL	
PROPERTY	FOLLOWING	PARAMETERS	OF	
DELIBERATIVE	DEMOCRACY.					
Introductory	notes.		In	previous	chapters	we	have	observed	that	the	expansion	of	IPRs	regime	towards	a	conception	of	absolute	quasi	natural	rights	-that	emphasizes	the	private	proprietary	aspects	over	other	dimensions	of	 this	 social	 legal	 institution-	disregards	 the	nature	and	 legal	 grounds	 which	 justify	 and	 explains	 its	 existence	 and	 enforceability	 as	 a	social,	 contingent,	 historic	 and	 political	 institution	 at	 the	 service	 of	 specific	 social	functions.			The	 mentioned	 evolution	 of	 IPRs,	 its	 strengthening	 and	 its	 spatial	 and	 material	expansion	 to	 new	 categories	 of	 knowledge	 and	 intangibles	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 any	empiric	research	which	supports	this	approach	in	view	of	the	outcomes	provided	by	in	 the	sense	of	better	contributing	 to	achieve	 the	social	goals	attributed	to	 IPRs.	On	the	 contrary,	 it	 has	 been	 revealed	 that	 this	 new	 configuration	 of	 IPRs	 creates	important	 global	 dysfunctions	 and	 that,	 far	 from	 encouraging	 innovation	 and	 the	progress	 of	 all	 societies,	 the	 current	 patent	 regime	 as	 a	 system	 of	 incentives	 may	block	 follow-on	 innovation	 or	 slow	 it.	 Also,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 regarding	 the	pharmaceutical	 field,	 the	 patent	 system	may	 foster	 rent-seeking	 or	 anticompetitive	conducts	rather	than	investments	in	real	innovations	or	novel	products	with	effective	new	therapeutic	effects.	Furthermore,	the	implementation	of	a	global	IPRs	regime	as	it	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 or	 TRIPS-Plus	 agreements	 may	 impair	 the	development	 of	 some	developing	 countries	 –with	different	 degrees	 of	 development	and	 different	 social	 and	 economic	 needs-	 and	 the	 access	 to	 certain	 knowledge	 or	goods	 which	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 population.	 In	 particular,	pharmaceutical	patents	may	conflict	with	the	desirable	access	to	medicines	by	large	number	 of	 people	 who	 cannot	 afford	 them	 because	 patents	 raise	 the	 price	 to	insurmountable	thresholds.			
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In	fact,	the	expansion	of	IPRs	rather	responds	to	the	characteristics	of	a	new	phase	of	capitalism	which	requires	 the	commodification	of	knowledge	and	 information	 in	 its	constant	 process	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 over	 new	 realities	 and	 goods.	 The	globalization	of	 IPRs	also	contributes	 to	keep	 the	hegemony	of	developed	countries	and	especially,	of	global	capital	that	now	operates	at	global	scale	overcoming	national	borders,	 national	 limitations	 and	 expensive	 and	 time	 consuming	 bureaucracies,	procedures	and	different	regulations.			The	new	paradigm	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	focused	exclusively	in	securing	IPRs	as	absolute	quasi-natural	rights	has	thus	forced	a	denaturalization	of	IPRs	which	entails	undesirable	consequences	and	carries	a	negative	impact	in	socioeconomic	terms.	The	attempts	of	resorting	to	other	legal	bodies	of	international	law	-such	as	human	rights	law-	in	a	scenario	of	legal	pluralism	or	other	political	collective	actions	of	governance	-like	 global	 public	 goods-	 have	 showed	 important	 shortcomings	 in	 their	 role	 as	measures	to	counterbalance	IPRs	regime	negative	impact.	Therefore,	this	dissertation	holds	the	thesis	that	the	excesses	and	negative	consequences	of	a	iuris	et	de	iure	and	decontextualized	application	of	IPRs	could	be	remedied	by	recovering	the	real	nature	and	scope	of	IPRs.	In	this	sense,	IPRs	would	be	a	social	institution	integrated	by	rights	vested	 temporarily	 with	 property	 prerogatives.	 In	 the	 core	 of	 their	 definition	 and	scope,	 IPRs	would	 be	 a	 legal	 instrument	 called	 to	 fulfil	 certain	 social	 functions	 and	pursue	the	general	interest	following	deliberative	democratic	parameters	in	order	to	properly	 identify	 and	weigh	 all	 the	 interests	 as	well	 as	hegemonic	mainstream	and	counterhegemonic	voices	in	a	global	public	sphere.				In	this	sense,	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	 in	the	recent	debates	of	the	TRIPS	Council,	some	countries	have	highlighted	the	importance	of	evaluating	TRIPS	provisions	in	the	light	of	principles	other	than	the	mere	and	strict	protection	of	private	property	–enforcing	the	 principles	 contemplated	 in	 article	 7	 and	 8	 of	 TRIPS-.	 Some	 commentators	 hold	that	 the	development	of	such	global	welfare	standards,	and	the	evaluation	of	TRIPS	provisions	in	light	of	them,	requires	wide-ranging	public	discussions.	We	are	still	only	
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in	 at	 the	 initial	 stages	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 the	 framing	 of	 an	 international	 IPR	 regime	
that	can	adequately	reflect	global	welfare	standards1.			Likewise,	 the	 final	 report	 of	 the	 U.K.	 Commission	 on	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	states	 that	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 should	be	 regarded	 “as	 instruments	 of	 public	
policy	 which	 confer	 economic	 privileges	 on	 individuals	 or	 institutions	 solely	 for	 the	
purposes	of	contributing	to	 the	greater	public	good”	and	that	 the	conferred	privileges	
should	 be	 “a	means	 to	 an	 end,	 not	 an	 end	 in	 itself”’.	 Such	 an	 emphasis	 is	 important,	because	interest	groups,	the	Commission	held,	often	lose	sight	of	the	basic	mission	of	
the	WTO	which,	as	stated	in	the	preamble	of	the	WTO	Agreement,	 is	to	promote	trade	
and	 economic	 development,	 not	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 particular	 private	 IPR-
holding	 interest	 groups.2Therefore,	 a	 new	 conceptual	 framework	 of	 the	 IPRs	 more	coherent	 with	 the	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	 these	 sui	 generis	 property	 rights	 and	 the	identification	 of	 a	 global	 public	 sphere	 where	 public	 interest	 and	 deliberative	democracy	could	be	advanced	become	necessary	 to	overcome	 the	dysfunctions	and	failures	of	the	current	regime,	to	compensate	or	minimize	the	negative	socioeconomic	impact	and	to	provide	it	with	greater	institutional	legitimacy.					 	
																																																								
1  Picciotto, S. (2002). Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and the WTO. See chapter 2 footnote 107. 
2 Barton, J. H. (2002). Integrating intellectual property rights and development policy: Report of the 
commission on intellectual property rights. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. 
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7.1.	 Putting	 IPRs	 in	 context;	 a	 comparative	 review	 of	 the	 social	 function	 of	
property	and	IPRs.			IPRs	 system	 are	 today	 widely	 and	mainly	 based	 and	 justified	 on	 social	 utility	 and	instrumental	 considerations.	 In	 this	 sense,	 propertization	 of	 intangible	 assets	 or	conferring	property	prerogatives	over	 intangibles	 are	 said	 to	promote	 innovation	–which	eventually	will	not	be	undertaken	if	not	properly	rewarded	and	protected	from	free	riding	problems-	and	facilitate	dissemination	of	relevant	information,	all	of	which	contributes	 to	 the	 development	 of	 science	 and	 industry	 and	 it	 is	 beneficial	 to	 the	society	where	this	exclusive	rights	system	is	implemented.			As	we	have	seen	in	the	previous	sections,	IPRs	are	the	result	of	a	contingent,	political	and	historic	process	which	are	therefore,	subject	to	changes	and	transformation.	As	it	happened	with	other	legal	institutions	like	the	history	of	corporations	and	the	history	of	property	itself,	IPRs	have	transited	different	phases;	from	being	a	privilege	granted	by	the	state,	eventually	became	a	right	and	then	finally	property	itself	to	be	protected	by	the	state3.	As	it	often	happens,	the	origins	of	IPRs	as	a	creation	of	the	state	and	the	social	 function	 entrusted	 to	 them	 are	 gradually	 and	 purposely	 forgotten.	 Hence,	 it	becomes	necessary	to	rectify	certain	absolutist	and	expanding	interpretation	of	IPRs	as	 quasi	 natural	 rights	 and	 emphasize	 the	 social	 function	 which	 justifies	 IPRs	existence	and	implementation.		It	will	be	next	briefly	reviewed	the	foundations	and	function	of	traditional	property	as	a	helpful	and	healthy	exercise	to	remark	the	prevalent	social	 function	of	 IPRs	as	sui	
generis	rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives.	In	this	sense,	we	will	see	that	even	if	there	are	some	 justice-regarding	motives	 to	 justify	 the	 reward	granted	by	 IPRs,	 the	social	 function	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	 instrumental	 nature	 of	 these	 particular	 rights	outweigh	 any	 other	 consideration	 and	 they	 are	 significantly	 more	 pronounced	regarding	 IPRs	 than	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	 conventional	 property.	 This	 will	 allow	 us	 to	claim	 an	 interpretation	which	must	 be	 coherent	with	 IPRs	 inherent	 social	 function																																																									
3 Marshall, Alex. The Surprising Design of Market Economies... (see chapter 6, footnote 19). 
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and	nature	and	whose	application	cannot	be	based	on	a	iuris	et	de	iure	premise	but	on	a	 iuris	 tantum	presumption	which	 logically	 enough	may	be	 rebuttable	on	 a	 case	by	case	basis.			The	purpose	of	 this	section	 is	 to	highlight	 that	 it	 is	not	necessary	 to	resort	 to	other	bodies	 of	 law	 or	 legal	 institutions	 or	 international	 instruments	 in	 an	 eventual	scenario	of	legal	pluralism	where	different	self-contained	regimes	overlap	or	compete	with	each	other	in	addressing	and	regulating	the	same	reality	and	where	some	legal	values	 or	 institutions	 emerge	 as	 a	 counterbalance	 to	 offset	 the	 most	 negative	 and	unwanted	 legal	 institution	 of	 IPRs	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 previous	 chapters.	 On	 the	contrary,	 IPRs	 themselves	 are	 conceived	 to	 fulfill	 certain	 social	 functions.	Only	 this	social	 function	 justifies	 IPR’s	 very	 existence	 and	 therefore,	 they	 have	 to	 be	implemented	and	interpreted	accordingly.	In	this	sense,	it	is	important	to	unmask	the	fake	 debate	 and	 dialectic	 tension	 between	what	 it	 would	 be	 economically	 rational,	desirable	and	efficient	-which	is	associated	with	strong	quasi	natural-absolute	IPRs-	and	those	approaches	tending	to	take	into	account	the	socioeconomic	impact	of	IPRs	and	the	necessity	of	finding	a	balance	between	all	the	interests	at	stake	and	which	are	conceived	and	presented	by	the	hegemonic	neoliberal	ideology	as	naively	pertaining	to	the	wishful	thinking	and	to	the	realm	of	impracticable	ingenuity	from	a	presumed	“objective	and	real”	economic	rationale.												
Property	and	its	social	function.		At	the	center	of	most	debates	of	political	economy	and	other	social	and	philosophical	disciplines	has	been	the	issue	of	property.	The	thoroughly	review	of	this	institution	is	beyond	the	purposes	and	extent	of	this	dissertation.	However,	in	order	to	adequately	address	the	nature	and	scope	of	IPRs,	it	is	important	to	note	which	conceptual	frame	of	 property	we	 assume	 as	 the	 basis	 to	 consider	 the	 social	 function	 of	 IPRs.	 In	 this	sense,	we	can	say	in	advance	that	we	are	not	challenging	the	existence	of	property.	In	our	 cultural	 context	 and	 the	 development	 of	 our	 civilization,	 property	 has	 been	legitimized	by	 society	 as	 an	 instrument	necessary	 to	develop	one’s	 personality	 and	autonomy.	Historically	and	during	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	century,	property	rights	of	 individuals	and	the	possibility	 that	everybody	could	be	owner	were	 in	 fact	
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associated	with	the	process	of	empowerment	and	emancipation	of	individuals	against	absolute	monarchs	 and	 absolute	 regimes	 (Locke’s	 time),	many	members	 of	 society	pertaining	to	the	third	estate	became	citizens,	equal	citizens	before	the	law	who	were	entitled	 to	 hold	 property	 rights4.	 As	 Professor	 Drahos	 explains,	 it	 seems	unconceivable	 that	 the	 development	 of	 human	 personality	 and	 the	 protection	 of	individual	interests	can	take	place	in	the	absence	of	property	rules	that	guarantee	the	individual	possession5.			However,	 it	 is	noteworthy	 that	property	 is	 considered	 for	our	purposes,	 as	 a	 social	legal	institution	which	makes	sense	within	the	existence	of	the	state	and	that	it	is	also	the	 product	 of	 a	 contingent,	 political	 and	 historical	 process	 and	 thus	 subject	 to	changes.	 In	 effect,	 the	 emancipatory	 role	 played	 historically	 by	 individual	 rights	 of	property	 -which	 were	 linked	 to	 the	 ideals	 of	 freedom	 and	 equality	 of	 all	 human	beings-	 does	 not	mean	 that	 property	 rights	 are	 neither	 natural	 rights	 nor	 absolute	rights.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 property	 rights	 are	 instrumental	 rights	 intended	 to	 fulfil	certain	 social	 functions	 and	be	 calibrated	according	 to	 the	 social	 context	 and	 social	need.	 In	 particular,	 we	 will	 emphasize	 those	 legal	 conceptualizations	 which	 view	property	 as	 a	 social	 institution	 that	 encompasses	 both	 a	 set	 of	 rights	 and	 a	 set	 of	duties,	 property	 as	 a	 set	 of	 socially	 accepted	 rules	 of	 conduct,	 a	 set	 of	 rules	which	govern	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 owner	 and	 the	 other	 members	 of	 society	 rather	than	between	the	owner	and	the	things6.		Following	the	above	mentioned	approach	of	property,	property	rights	fulfill	different	social	functions.	One	of	these	functions	consists	of	promoting	efficiency	in	the	market,	in	particular	to	respond	to	the	need	for	signaling	in	market	relations.	As	resources	are	scarce,	the	risk	of	conflicts	as	to	who	may	possess	and	benefit	of	them	may	multiply	exponentially	to	infinity;	neither	community	norms	of	trust	nor	protection	by	force	-which	is	impracticable	due	to	its	transaction	cost	and	the	number	of	transactions	to	be	 enforced	 at	 any	 one	 time-	 are	 enough	 to	 maintain	 a	 modern	 market	 where																																																									
4 Skinner, Q. (1978). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 2, The Age of Reformation (Vol. 
2).Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
5 Drahos, Peter. (1999). The universality of intellectual property rights… (see chapter 6, footnote 26). 
6 May, C. (2013). The global political economy of intellectual property rights: The new enclosures? (Vol. 3). 
Routledge. 
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anonymous	 actors	 and	 transaction	 agents	 operate	 on	 recognizable	 universally	accepted	parameters.	Therefore,	property	regime	would	permit	to	give	certainty	and	predictability	 in	economic	activities	and	exchange	and	thus,	 it	 is	said	to	constitute	a	necessary	instrument	for	the	efficient	allocation	of	scarce	economic	resources.	In	this	sense,	 the	state	plays	a	 fundamental	role	 in	recognizing	and	 legitimizing	possession	by	creating	property	rights	beyond	the	mere	possession	by	those	with	the	capacity	of	protecting	themselves	from	dispossession	in	a	scenario	without	law.			Notwithstanding	 this,	 efficiency	has	 neither	 one	meaning	nor	 does	 it	 constitute	 the	whole	 picture	 of	 property.	 In	 effect,	 efficiency	 has	 different	 versions	 depending	 on	which	 “efficiency”	 is	 prioritized	 by	 hegemonic	 forces;	 efficiency	 favoring	 society	 or	collectivity	versus	efficiency	 favoring	 individual	 interests.	Also,	being	scarce	as	 they	are,	 allocation	 of	 resources	 by	 conferring	 property	 rights	 over	 them	has	 important	distributive	effects,	and	therefore	the	manner	how	this	allocation	is	made	becomes	a	central	 issue	 of	 the	 state’s	 economic	 policy7.	 In	 this	 respect,	 as	 the	 professor	 of	political	 economy,	 Richard	 Ely	 interestingly	 stated;	 property	 must	 serve	 social	
interests	and	that	welfare	of	society	must	come	first.	In	his	definition	of	police	power,	this	professor	held	that	it	is	for	the	judge	to	declare	what	private	property	carries	with	
it	 and	 what	 it	 does	 not	 carry	 with	 it	 and	 that	 the	 state	 has	 the	 power	 to	 interpret	
property	 and	 especially	 private	 property	 and	 to	 give	 the	 concept	 a	 content	 at	 each	
particular	period8.			A	second	often	mentioned	function	of	property,	 in	particular	of	private	property	–in	the	seventeenth	century	was	a	move	to	conceive	of	property	as	something	that	could	only	 be	 owned	 privately-	 has	 to	 do	with	 being	 an	 incentive	 for	work	 and	 efficient	production.	 According	 to	 Bentham9,	 property	 provides	 individuals	 with	 reasons	 to	labor;	property	 rights	 are	needed	 to	 vanquish	natural	 aversion	 to	 labor	and	be	 and	incentive	 to	 labor	and	 industry.	Also	Adam	Smith	seems	 to	consider	property	as	an	incentive	 for	workers	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 their	 property;	 this	 incentive	 –property-																																																									
7 Alexander, G. S. (2008). Commodity & Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought, 
1776-1970. University of Chicago Press. 
8 Ely, R. T., Orth, S. P., & King, W. I. (1914). Property and Contract in their Relations to the Distribution of 
Wealth (Vol. 1). Macmillan. 
9 Bentham, Jeremy. (1887). Theory of legislation. Trübner & Company. 
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may	 make	 things	 better	 in	 a	 more	 suitable	 manner	 than	 government	 intervention	could	implement10.	The	school	of	economic	analysis	of	law	tends	to	justify	property	as	the	 instrument	 to	 create	 incentives	 to	 use	 resources	 efficiently11.	 In	 connection	with	this,	Garret	Hardin	 introduced	 the	metaphor	of	 the	 tragedy	of	 the	commons12	which	justified	 private	 property	 rights	 based	 on	 the	 potential	 of	 overuse	 of	 common	property.	Inspired	on	the	enclosure	movement	in	England	during	mainly	the	eighteen	century13and	 the	 economic	 outcomes	 of	 this	 process	 which	 apparently	 led	 to	 an	unparalleled	productive	increase14,	many	have	seen	private	property	as	an	important	incentive	 to	manage	 resources	 efficiently	 and	 large-scale	 investments	 addressed	 to	improve	 property	 and	 avoid	 the	 tragedies	 of	 overuse	 and	 underinvestment15.	Ironically,	as	it	has	been	noted	by	Picciotto16,	Hardin’s	famous	article	and	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	metaphor	was	intended	to	call	 for	stronger	public	regulation	in	the	realm	of	 property	 and	private	 freedoms	 rather	 than	 for	 justifying	 stronger	private-property	rights17.				Finally	 and	most	 important	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 social	 function	 of	property.	 While	 it	 is	 uncontroversial	 that	 private	 property	 has	 limits,	 it	 is	 less	accepted	or	rather	ignored	–especially	nowadays-	that	property	has	a	social	function	and	 that	 owners	 may	 have	 obligations.	 However,	 as	 some	 commentators	 argue,	 a	mere	 rights-based	 theory	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	 fullness	 of	 the	 private	 property	institution	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 its	 instrumental	 nature,	 property	 also	encompasses	 specific	 and	 general	 duties	which	 cannot	 be	 adequately	 articulated	 in	terms	of	correlative	rights	and	duties	between	and	among	individuals.	 In	 fact,	other																																																									
10 West, E. G. (2003). Property rights in the history of economic thought. Property rights: Cooperation, conflict, 
and law, 20. 
11 Posner, Richard A. (1973). Economic analysis of law. 
12 Hardin, G. (2009). The Tragedy of the Commons∗. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 1(3), 
243-253. 
13 By the enclosure movement is meant the process –mostly through Parliamentary acts (inclosure acts)- by 
which the passed from being farmed following the ancient system of open field and common land to being 
privately owned. Once enclosed the use of land became restricted to the owner and it ceased to be commun 
land for communal uses. See for an interesting analysis and debate: Neeson, J. M. (1996). Commoners: 
common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-1820. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
14 Ernle, R. E. P. B. (1917). English Farming Past & Present. Longmans. 
15 James Boyle explains that in the previous common land situation, the feudal lord would not invest in 
drainage systems, sheep purchases, or crop rotation that might increase yields from the common since he 
knew all too well that the fruits of his labor could be appropriated by others. See Boyle supra note 59. 
16 See Picciotto supra note 60. 
17 However, new concepts of public property and commons –also intelectual commons- have started to 
emerge suggesting that it is possible to govern the commons without tragedy. Between others see Ostrom, 
Elinor. (2015). Governing the commons. Cambridge university press. 
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than	the	most	explicit	and	immediate	individual	rights-based	approach	to	property,	it	becomes	necessary	to	consider	other	dimensions,	other	non-rights	based	arguments	in	order	to	apprehend	the	whole	picture	of	all	 the	contours	of	 this	social	 institution	with	a	deep	 impact	 in	 its	 allocative	and	social	 consequences.	 In	 this	 sense,	 theories	exclusively	 based	 on	 property	 as	 individual	 rights	 ignore	 important	 aspects	 of	 this	social	institution	as	the	societal	values	and	goals	which	is	served	to	advance	and	the	duty-based	 dimension	 of	 property,	 whether	 these	 duties	 are	 conceived	 as	 being	intended	 to	 serve	 values	 in	 society	 or	 whether	 they	 are	 grounded	 in	 more	individualized	 theories	 or	 ethical	 categories	 of	 right	 action	 (in	 terms	 of	 good	 or	moral)18.			Unlike	the	traditional	liberal	view	of	property	which	defines	property	rights	in	terms	of	negative	duties	on	both	 the	state	and	other	 individuals	of	society	–both	of	which	are	refrained	from	interfere	into	individual	rights	to	property-	the	social	function	of	property	implies	that	other	than	external	limits,	property	has	internal	limits	in	order	that	 property	 has	 to	 fulfill	 the	 social	 role	which	 is	 called	 to	 play.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	owner	 could	 not	 do	 whatever	 she	 wants	 with	 her	 property	 and	 should	 put	 her	property	in	line	with	the	interest	of	society.	Property	rights	owe	their	existence	to	the	act	 of	 recognition	 made	 by	 the	 state	 and	 the	 law	 to	 certain	 possessory	 situations	which	 furthermore	 are	normally	understood	 to	be	 legitimate	under	 social	 accepted	parameters.	 Consequently,	 the	 state	 and	 the	means	 of	 the	 state	 devoted	 to	 protect	property	rights	will	be	only	deployed	when	the	property	rights	in	question	fulfill	their	social	 function.	 When	 the	 owner	 is	 not	 acting	 in	 a	 manner	 consistent	 with	 her	property-duties,	the	state	is	entitled	to	intervene	to	punish,	reorient	or	to	encourage	due	performance	of	rights19.							The	French	professor	León	Duguit	is	credited	as	one	of	the	intellectual	fathers	of	the	so-called	 social	 function	 of	 property	 views	 in	 modern	 property	 law.	 As	 early	 as	 in	1912,	Duguit	 attempted	 to	overcome	 the	 limits	posed	by	 the	positivist	 approach	 to	law	as	it	was	deemed	rigid	and	unreal.	Duguit	rejects	the	classical	liberal	approach	of	individual	 rights	 of	 property	 for	 being	 excessively	metaphysical	 and	 unreal.	 In	 this																																																									
18 Hudson, A. (2003). New Perspectives on Property Law: Obligations and Restitution. Cavendish Publishing. 
19 Foster, S., & Bonilla, D. (2011). The social function of property: a comparative law perspective. 
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sense,	he	challenges	the	premises	under	which	liberal	conception	is	grounded;	first	he	challenges	 the	 isolated	 individual	 supposed	by	 liberalism	 and	 emphasizes	 the	 deep	interconnections	 between	 members	 of	 society	 to	 meet	 their	 physical	 and	 spiritual	needs	and;	secondly,	he	remarks	the	connections	between	the	social	economic	needs	of	the	community	and	the	allocation	of	resources	which	is	legitimized	and	protected	by	 the	 state	 through	 the	 social	 institution	 of	 property.	 In	 his	 opinion,	 liberal	conception	 of	 property	 based	 on	 individual	 rights	 ignores	 the	 social	 reality	 whose	central	 element	 is	 the	 interdependence	 between	 people.	 Hence,	 solidarity	 (derived	from	interdependence	between	people)	would	be	a	social	fact	rather	than	a	political	objective20.		The	 social	 function	 of	 property	 is	 not	 just	 a	 rhetoric	 and	 academic	 issue	 but	 it	 has	crossed	 the	 doorstep	 of	 the	 libraries	 and	 universities	 and	 it	 populates	 important	positive	norms	and	regulations,	namely	 in	Europe	and	Latin	America.	Article	153	of	the	Weimar	Constitution,	article	42	of	the	Italian	Constitution	of	1947	or	article	33	of	the	Spanish	Constitution	of	1978	for	instance	include	explicitly	the	idea	of	the	social	function	of	property.	In	particular,	art.	33	of	the	Spanish	Constitution21	acknowledges	the	 right	 to	 private	 property	 and	 inheritance	 and	 it	 expressly	 states	 that	 social	
function	 of	 property	 shall	 define	 the	 contours	 of	 the	 right	 to	 property	 in	 accordance	
with	laws.					Spanish	Constitutional	Court	has	developed	a	rich	jurisprudence	around	the	concept	of	the	social	function	of	property.	According	to	the	highest	interpreter	of	the	Spanish	Constitution,	 property	 encompasses	 a	 bunch	 of	 rights,	 a	 set	 of	 negative	 limitations	and	 also	 duties	 which	 may	 imply	 positive	 obligations	 which	 –the	 Court	 says-	 are	within	 the	 legal	 definition	of	 property	 rights.	 These	 set	 of	 duties	 for	 the	owner	 are	
																																																								
20 Duguit, L. (1920). Les transformations générales du droit privé depuis le Code Napoléon. In his conferences 
in Buenos Aires Argentina, Duguit argues that legal institutions are constantly adjusting to practical needs of 
society. [...] les lois positives, les codes peuvent subsister intactes dans leurs textes rigides: par la force des 
choses, sous la pression des faits, des besoins pratiques se forment constantement des institutions juridiques. 
21 Article 33 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that: 1. Se reconoce el derecho a la propiedad privada y a 
la herencia. 2. La función social de estos derechos delimitará su contenido, de acuerdo con las leyes. 
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established	following	the	values	or	interests	of	the	community,	i.e.,	the	purpose	or	social	
utility	that	each	category	of	goods	subject	to	property	is	called	to	fulfill”22					There	have	been	even	some	statements	of	the	Constitutional	Court	which	declare	that	the	social	function	of	property	is	part	of	its	essential	content	or	“core”	of	the	property	right23.	 As	 examples	 of	 the	 social	 function	 of	 property,	 law	 courts	 mention	 for	instance	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	 owners	 of	 buildings	 or	 real	 state	 integrating	 the	Spanish	Historical	Heritage	to	be	responsible	for	the	good	maintenance,	preservation	and	 safeguard	 of	 them.	 Also,	 the	 social	 function	 of	 property	 has	 been	 alleged	 to	determine	 the	manner	 in	which	 agricultural	 exploitation	 has	 to	 be	made	 in	 certain	types	of	farms	or	the	transfer	of	land	to	be	implemented	by	the	owner	of	urban	estate	in	favor	of	the	state.24In	some	Latin	American	jurisdictions	also	the	social	function	of	property	has	emerged	as	an	important	element	of	the	contents	and	definition	of	the	right	of	property25.		In	 the	 US	 no	 legal	 norm	 includes	 explicitly	 the	 expression	 of	 “social	 function	 of	property”	and	this	particular	concept	of	 “social	 function	of	property”	seems	to	have	had	 a	 limited	 influence	 in	 the	 US	 legal	 system	 and	 practice.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	there	are	scholars	who	consider	that	social	obligations	and	social	responsibilities	or	duties	are	attached	to	the	social	institution	of	property	in	US	law	as	this	is	manifested	in	the	development	of	certain	jurisprudence26.	Maybe	the	most	prominent	American	author	 analyzing	 what	 he	 calls	 collectively	 “social	 obligation”	 theories,27is	 the	professor	 Gregory	 S.	 Alexander.	 In	 his	work	 the	 social-obligation	 norm	 in	 American																																																									
22 SSTC 37/1987, 26 March or SSTC 89/994, 7 April. In this cases the Constitutional Court states that La 
Constitución reconoce un derecho a la propiedad privada que se configura y protege, ciertamente, como un 
haz de facultades individuales sobre las cosas, pero también y al mismo tiempo, como un conjunto de 
deberes y obligaciones establecidos, de acuerdo con las leyes, en atención a valores o intereses de la 
comunidad, es decir, a la finalidad o utilidad social que cada categoría de bienes objeto de dominio esté 
llamada a cumplir. 
23 Some Spanish commentators consider this type of declarations as being rhetorically exaggerated and not 
consistent with the real meaning of this legal institution. See in this respect de Santiago, J. M. R. (2008). Las 
garantías constitucionales de la propiedad y de la expropiación forzosa a los treinta años de la Constitución 
española. Revista de administración pública, (177), 157-194. 
24 SSTC 6/1997, 20 march. 
25 For a more extensive review see Mirow, Matthew C. (2011). Origins of the Social Function of Property in 
Chile. Ankersen, Tom, and Thomas Ruppert. (2006). Tierra y Libertad: the social function doctrine and land 
reform in Latin America. dos Santos Cunha, A. (2011). The social function of property in Brazilian law. 
Fordham L. Rev., 80, 1171. 
26 See Foster, Sheila supra note 125. 
27 Alexander, G. S. (2011). Pluralism and Property. Fordham L. Rev., 80, 1017. 
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property	 law28,	 the	 author	 challenges	 the	 classical	 liberal	 rights-based	 view	 of	property	 and	 defends	 that	 the	 social-obligation	 norm	 is	 implicit	 in	 different	 legal	doctrines	of	American	property	 law	such	as	the	eminent	domain,	cases	adjudicating	remedies	 for	 nuisance,	 historic	 preservation	 laws,	 environmental	 regulations,	 or	beach	access	rights	among	others.			In	similar	terms	as	Duguit’s	idea	of	social	function	of	property,	Alexander	presents	the	human	being	as	a	 social	 and	political	 animal	 (human	beings	are	not	alone	and	self-sufficient	 beings)	 who	 needs	 other	 members	 of	 the	 community	 to	 promote	 the	capabilities	that	are	essential	to	human	flourishing	(conditions	enabling	human	beings	
to	 live	 lives	 worthy	 of	 human	 dignity).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 individuals	 have	 an	obligation	 to	 others	 in	 their	 respective	 communities	 to	 promote	 human	 flourishing	and	 property	 owners	 shall	 be	 obliged	 to	 use	 property	 accordingly.	 The	 social-obligation	norm	implicit	 in	property	 law	implies	the	obligation	to	share	property	at	
least	 in	 surplus	 resources.	Using	an	argumentation	which	reminds	us	of	 the	Lockean	proviso,	the	author	holds	that	the	state	may	compel	the	wealthy	to	share	their	surplus	so	that	the	needed	could	develop	her	capabilities.	The	state’s	role	though	is	limited	by	the	 same	 principles	 of	 human	 flourishing,	 i.e.,	 freedom,	 practical	 rationality	 and	sociality	(solidarity	in	Duguit’s	“European”	words).	These	social	obligations	inherent	in	property	are	justified	as	necessary	to	cultivate	the	conditions	for	human	beings	to	live	 worthy	 lives	 and	 promote	 just	 community	 relations	 where	 justice	 means	
something	 more	 than	 simply	 aggregate	 wealth-maximization29and	 to	 promote	 just	social	relations.	In	Alexander’s	view,	American	academia	and	law	courts	have	failed	to	explicitly	 identify	 the	social	obligation	norm	implicit	 in	property	 law	because	of	 the	hegemony	of	the	school	of	law	and	economics,	an	approach	which	is	considered	to	be	morally	anemic	to	do	justice	to	the	values	inhere	in	those	obligations	(social-obligations	of	property).				 	
																																																								
28 Alexander, G. S. (2008). The social-obligation norm in American property law. Cornell L. Rev., 94, 745. 
29 Id.  
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7.2.	 IPRs	grounded	in	their	social	function.			
Propertization	of	intangibles	and	denaturalization	of	IPRs.		Hence,	as	a	summary	of	the	above,	we	can	say	that	property	is	a	political,	contingent,	historic	 and	 social	 institution	 that	 consequently	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 changes	 in	response	 to	 social	 and	 political	 needs	 of	 each	 time	 and	 place.	 It	 is	 a	 conventional	institution	 constructed	 by	 the	 state	 and	 the	 law	 which	 legitimizes	 it.	 It	 is	 not	something	 previously	 existing	 but	 it	 rather	 protects	 certain	 possessory	 interests	giving	 them	 a	 status	 of	 “property”.	 Thus,	 property	 rights	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	support	of	the	state	which	enforces	law	within	socially	legitimated	parameters.									Therefore,	property	emerges	as	an	 institution	that	 is	 justified	on	the	grounds	of	 the	functions	 it	 is	 called	 to	 fulfil.	 In	 this	 sense,	 justifications	 of	 property	 have	 been	founded	 on	 the	 role	 of	 property	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	 efficient	 operation	 of	markets	 and	 efficient	 allocation	 of	 scarce	 economic	 resources;	 secondly,	 as	 an	incentive	for	the	efficient	use	and	productivity	of	property	and	to	avoid	an	scenario	of	a	 “tragedy	of	 the	commons”;	 last,	 as	a	 legal	 institution	which	must	contribute	 to	 the	common	good	or	flourishing	of	society	(social	function	of	property).		Regarding	 IPRs,	 the	 reality	 which	 IPRs	 are	 called	 to	 regulate	 (knowledge	 or	intangibles)	differs	substantially	from	the	tangible	and	scarce	resources	which	are	the	subject	 matter	 of	 conventional,	 “genuine”	 property.	 This	 diversity	 affects	consequently	 the	 foundations	 and	 justifications	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 legal	 institution	 in	 the	sense	of	emphasizing	on	a	more	remarkably	manner	than	conventional	property	the	instrumentality	and	the	social	function	of	IPRs.	However,	the	trend	of	IPRs	regime	has	been	recently	quite	the	opposite;	the	IPRs	regime	has	evolved	towards	the	expansion	of	IPRs	and	its	conceptualization	as	absolute	rights	which	appeals	to	its	consideration	as	 quasi-natural	 rights	 that	 disregard	 the	 real	 nature,	 function	 and	 justification	 of	these	sui	generis	 IPRs.	In	fact,	as	we	will	see,	rather	than	property,	the	institution	of	IPRs	would	be	better	defined	as	being	an	institution	integrated	by	rights	temporarily	vested	with	property	prerogatives	called	to	fulfill	certain	social	functions.	
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Unlike	genuine	property,	the	non-rivalrous	and	non-excludable	nature	of	knowledge,	inventions,	 intangibles,	expressions	or	ideas	and	the	fact	that	these	can	be	used	and	reproduced	endlessly	and	simultaneously	by	an	indefinite	number	of	people	without	their	consumption	be	depleted	implies	that	the	function	of	property	as	an	instrument	to	permit	the	efficiency	of	the	market	and	the	efficient	allocation	of	limited	resources	(avoiding	never	ending	bilateral	conflicts)	does	not	make	sense	in	the	context	of	the	subject	matter	of	IPRs.	Also,	the	support	needed	by	the	state	to	protect,	legitimate	and	enforce	 this	 type	 of	 property	 is	 significantly	 more	 intense	 and	 it	 requires	 more	resources	 since	 first,	 IPRs	 imply	 the	 artificial	 construction	of	 scarcity	of	 intangibles	through	 legal	 instruments	 and	 second,	 as	 intangible	 resources	 are	 not	 naturally	limited	 (as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 tangible	 goods),	 the	 state	 has	 to	 be	constantly	vigilant	 to	ensure	 that	 the	use	of	 information	or	knowledge	 is	 limited	 to	those	that	are	authorized	to	use	it	by	IPRs	titleholders.			Furthermore,	IPRs	cannot	either	be	justified	as	an	incentive	to	the	efficient	use	of	an	existing	good.	In	fact,	the	construction	of	scarcity	and	the	creation	of	exclusive	rights	on	information	and	knowledge	could	actually	be	detrimental	to	the	potential	use	and	social	 utility	 of	 naturally	 unlimited	 intangible	 resources.	 In	 the	 same	 token,	 the	tragedy	of	the	commons	announced	by	Hardin	is	not	either	applicable	when	it	comes	to	 the	 non-rivalrous,	 non-excludable	 and	 unlimited	 information	 goods.	 Quite	 the	opposite,	 some	 commentators	 note	 that	 IPRs	 and	 the	 artificial	 scarcity	 created	 by	them	may	provoke	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 anti-commons30in	 the	 sense	 that	 patents	 can	deter	 and	 block	 further	 innovation.	 In	 particular,	 and	 regarding	 patents,	 some	commentators	hold	that	in	those	cases	where	innovation	in	an	industry	is	sequential	and	cumulative,	IPRs,	and	particularly,	patents	may	block	subsequent	innovations	as	it	 happens	 in	 the	 software	 industry	 and	 as	 it	 may	 be	 the	 case	 in	 the	 biotech	 and	pharmaceutical	industry.	As	we	have	previously	seen	for	pharmaceutical	patents,	the	monopoly	 granted	 by	 IPRs	 on	 certain	 intangible	 assets	 is	 sometimes	 –when	 it	 is	interpreted	in	a	restrictive	and	narrow	interpretation	of	Pharmaceutical	IPRs-	used	to	create	unjustified	bottlenecks	against	competition	and	prevent	follow-on	innovation	blocking	 new	 inventions	 based	 on	 past	 discoveries	 and/or	 knowledge.	 Also,	 it	 is																																																									
30 Heller, Michael A., and Rebecca S. Eisenberg. (1998). Can patents deter innovation? … (see chapter 6 
footnote 109). 
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noted	that	this	system	may	make	the	Research	and	Development	(R&D)	be	inefficient	as	 this	 can	duplicate	 each	other’s	 efforts	 (secretive	R&D	processes	 and	works)	 and	waste	 resources.	 The	 existing	 empirical	 studies	 in	 this	 respect	 are	 far	 from	 being	conclusive31.		Account	taken	of	 the	above,	 it	becomes	clear	that	 the	social	 function	of	 IPRs	and	 its	instrumental	 character	 constitute	 the	 main	 justification	 of	 this	 institution	 and	 the	elements	 that	 defines	 the	 core	 of	 these	 rights.	 Also,	 that	 IPRs	 are	 not	 genuine	property	 rights	but	 they	 are	 rather	 rights	 vested	with	property	prerogatives	which	are	 granted	 as	 long	 as	 IPRs	 fulfil	 their	 social	 function.	 In	 particular,	 IPRs	 and	 the	patent	 system	 are	 intended	 to	 be	 an	 incentive	 for	 scientific	 progress	 and	dissemination	 of	 valuable	 information	 to	 the	 public.	 As	 an	 incentive	 to	 avoid	eventually	 a	 scenario	 of	 underproduction	 of	 knowledge,	 IPRs	 attempt	 to	 overcome	the	eventual	undersupply	of	ideas	and	intangibles	due	to	the	risk	that	the	incapacity	to	exclude	competitors	and	nonpaying	consumers	(free	riders)	may	deter	the	efforts	and	 the	 investments	 necessary	 to	 develop	 new	 ideas	 and	 improvements	 of	 the	current	state	of	the	art.	In	the	absence	of	some	legal	solution	it	is	said	that	there	could	be	a	significant	underinvestment	in	some	technical	fields	such	as	the	pharmaceutical	industry	because	of	the	practical	impossibility	of	keeping	secret	the	formulae	and	the	threat	 that	 competitors	would	 easily	 reproduce	 and	 copy	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 the	invention	without	 having	 incurred	 in	 any	 expense	 so	 having	 an	 unfair	 competitive	advantage.					
Alternatives	to	IPRs	regime?		The	premise	that	 the	system	of	 IPRs	or	state-enforced	monopolies	which	artificially	create	scarcity	as	being	the	best	or	the	only	solution	to	incentivize	innovation	is	more	than	questionable32.	It	is	not	unusual	to	find	from	time	to	time	scholar	views	standing																																																									
31 Hahn, R. W., & Hahn, R. W. (Eds.). (2005). Intellectual property rights in frontier industries: software and 
biotechnology. AEI Press. 
32 Bettcher, D. W., Yach, D., & Guindon, G. E. (2000). Global trade and health: key linkages and future 
challenges. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 78(4), 521-534. They argue that the premises of patent 
protection, (to stimulate innovation and generate money for research and development), fail to recognize that 
considerable research and development is conducted using government monies, that patents and intellectual 
property rights are relatively recent phenomena, that innovation and research and development has occurred 
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for	alternative	systems	to	IPRs,	in	particular,	publicly	funded	reward	systems33.	Once	the	award	is	granted	to	the	creator,	the	innovation	falls	into	the	public	domain	and	is	available	 to	 everyone	 who	 is	 willing	 to	 produce/market	 it.	 As	 to	 the	 value	 of	 this	economic	 reward,	 some	 commentators	 consider	 that	 it	 should	 be	 based	 on	 the	volume	of	use	of	the	 information	–such	as	the	sales	volume	of	a	book-	and	on	some	measure	of	its	utility.	Use	and	utility	may	be	accounted	for	in	this	sort	of	alternative	reward	system	and	both	factors	are	said	to	reflect	socially	optimal	valuations	rather	than	merely	those	of	the	individuals	able	to	afford	the	monopoly	price34.				As	 it	 was	 pointed	 out	 by	 Nobel	 Prize	 Joseph	 Stiglitz	 at	 the	 Hearing	 before	 the	Subcommittee	on	Primary	Health	and	Aging	of	the	Committee	on	Health,	Education,	Labor,	 and	 Pensions	 of	 the	 US	 Senate	 in	 2012,	 The	 patent	 system	 may	 even	 have	
adverse	 effects	 on	 innovation,	 because	 the	most	 important	 input	 into	 any	 research	 is	
prior	ideas;	and	the	patent	system	encourages	secrecy,	just	the	opposite	of	the	openness	
that	is	the	hallmark	of	successful	universities	and	academia	more	generally.		Recently,	it	has	been	discussed	the	“Prize	Fund”	Bill	project	as	a	partial	alternative	to	the	 current	 IPRs	 system.	 The	 Medical	 Innovation	 Prize	 Fund	 (S.	 1137,	 112th	Congress)	is	a	proposal	to	change	the	system	of	rewards	to	foster	R&D	investments	in	certain	 areas.	 This	 project	 is	 interestingly	 based	 on	 the	 separation	 between	 the	markets	 for	 products	 from	 the	 markets	 for	 innovation.	 The	 proposed	 legislation	discussed	by	the	American	 legislature	would	eliminate	patent	and	other	 intellectual	property	 barriers	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 generic	 medicines.	 Instead	 of	 product	monopolies,	 it	 would	 be	 implemented	 a	 new	 Medical	 Innovation	 Prize	 Fund	 as	 a	reward,	 that	 would	 provide	 more	 than	 $80	 billion	 in	 annual	 rewards	 for	 useful																																																																																																																																																																																			
in the absence of patent protection, and that intellectual property rights are afforded only when a country has 
achieved a certain level of economic development. Also see Shavell, S., & Van Ypersele, T. (2001). Rewards 
versus intellectual property rights. The Journal of Law and Economics, 44(2), 525-547 where the authors 
conclude that IPRs do not possess a fundamental social advantage over  reward  systems paid by the 
government and  that an  optional reward system—under which innovators choose between rewards and 
intellectual property rights—is superior to IPRs. 
33 Kapczynski, A., & Syed, T. (2013). The continuum of excludability and the limits of patents. 
34 Calandrillo, S. P. (1998). An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications and 
Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run 
Reward System. Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ, 9, 301. 
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investments	 in	R&D	 for	new	medicines	 and	vaccines.	Research	placed	 in	 the	public	domain	would	also	be	eligible	to	receive	rewards	from	the	Prize	Fund.	In	distributing	the	 rewards,	 they	 would	 be	 valued	 those	 innovations	 which	 constitute	 a	 real	improvement	 to	 health	 benchmarked	 against	 existing	 pharmaceuticals,	 de-incentivizing	 “me-too”	 or	 copycat	 pharmaceuticals.	 This	 Fund	 also	 encompasses	rewards	to	those	persons	or	communities	that	as	an	open	source	contribution	openly	shared	 knowledge,	 data,	 materials,	 and	 technology	 on	 a	 royalty-free	 and	nondiscriminatory	basis.		This	provision	 in	 favor	of	open	 source	providers	 embraces	 the	 contributions	of	 the	discussion	on	the	applicability	of	Open	Source	models	in	non-software	contexts	such	as	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector.	 This	 applicability	 has	 been	 profusely	 discussed	 in	academic	literature.	Despite	some	important	reticence	to	extend	open	source	models	beyond	software	contexts,	there	is	a	growing	interest	 in	applying	them	in	fields	 like	biology	 and	 biotechnology,	 especially	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 success	 of	 non-proprietary	initiatives	 (SNP	 Consortium	 and	 the	 HapMap	 project).	 Regulation	 on	 Open	 Source	models	recognizes	that	there	is	an	alternative,	more	open	and	collaborative	approach	to	 innovation	 that	 has	 proven	 itself	 successful	 in	 a	 number	 of	 areas	 of	 research.	According	 to	Stiglitz	 the	prizes	 "would	 create	a	powerful	 economic	 incentive	 to	open	
source	 knowledge,	 data,	 materials	 and	 technology,	 which	 should	 directly	 benefit	
product	developers."		The	 “open	 source”	 model	 has	 showed	 an	 important	 success	 in	 the	 industry	 of	software	 development.	 This	 model	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	 norm-based	 Mertonian	framework	 for	 conducting	 scientific	 research	 where	 the	 scientists	 (software	developers)	 work	 openly,	 without	 secrecy	 and	 without	 exclusionary	 proprietary	rights.	In	this	model,	an	intangible	is	made	freely	available	to	anyone	who	can	modify	or	 build	 on	 it	 or	 improved	 upon	 the	 condition	 that	 his	 own	 work	 would	 be	reciprocally	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 condition.	 There	 is	 an	 important	 literature	
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speculating	about	 the	applicability	of	 the	open	source	model	of	 innovation	 to	other	areas	such	as	biomedical	or	pharmaceutical	industry35.			In	 the	 face	 of	 the	 current	 proprietary	 and	 secretive	 routine	 of	 biomedical	 and	pharmaceutical	 research,	 it	 is	 raised	 the	 possibility	 of	 implementing	 an	 open	 and	collaborative	 science	 for	 certain	 innovations	 in	 the	 biomedical	 and	 pharmaceutical	fields.	 Given	 the	 cumulative	 nature	 of	 research	 in	 these	 areas,	 this	 open	 and	collaborative	 model	 would	 in	 theory	 make	 R&D	 more	 efficient,	 would	 reduce	 the	transactions	 costs	 resulting	 from	 complex	 licenses	 (between	 parties	 with	 different	bargaining	 power)	 and	 it	 would	 eliminate	 the	 secrecy	 based	 and	 exclusionary-proprietary	 problems	 which	 at	 certain	 point,	 may	 impede	 or	 erode	 the	 follow-on	innovation	and	research	as	long	as	provoking	a	reallocation	of	effort	away	from	less	commercially	 valuable	 projects.	 In	 short,	 it	 explores	 the	 possibility	 of	 creating	 a	commons	 out	 of	 pharmaceutical/biotechnological/biomedical	 knowledge.	 Also,	 this	type	 of	 models	 have	 been	 thought	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 a	 somehow	 exhausted	pharmaceutical	 industry	 who	 seems	 to	 be	 less	 and	 less	 able	 to	 develop	pharmaceutical	 blockbusters	 and	 new	 compounds	 despite,	 as	 we	 will	 see,	 the	important	increase	in	pharmaceutical	R&D	in	recent	years.			There	is	today	an	Indian	consortium	inspired	on	this	model	under	the	name	of	Open	Source	Drug	Discovery	(OSDD)	which	is	aimed	at	providing	a	global	platform	where	anyone	 can	 collaborate	 and	 collectively	 endeavour	 to	 solve	 the	 complex	 problems	
associated	 with	 discovering	 novel	 therapies	 for	 neglected	 tropical	 diseases	 like	
Tuberculosis,	 Malaria,	 Leishmaniasis	 […]	 OSDD	 envisions	 making	 drugs	 available	 at	
affordable	prices	that	afflict	the	developing	world	by	expanding	resources	for	research	
through	open	collaboration	and	sharing36.	The	drugs	developed	by	OSDD	will	be	made	available	 like	 a	 generic	 drug,	without	 any	 IPRs	 encumbrance.	 Currently,	more	 than	1500	 registered	 participants	 from	 31	 countries	 are	 working	 on	 more	 than	 100	projects	 posted	 online.	 Also,	 this	 Consortium	 has	 entered	 international	 bilateral	agreements	with	other	institutes	as	the	Systems	Biology	Institute	of	Japan.																																																										
35 Srinivas, K. R. (2010). Open Source Drug Discovery A Revolutionary Paradigm orA Utopian Model?’. 
Incentives for Global Health Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines, Pogge, T., Rimmer, M., 
Rubenstein, K., Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge  University Press, 263-283. 
36 www.osdd.net 
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	In	 this	 sense,	 Open	 Science,	 with	 its	 curiosity-driven,	 investigator-initiated	 agenda	and	priority	and	publication-based	incentives,	is	a	distinctive	and	vital	component	of	the	 biomedical	 innovation	 system.	 Over	 the	 long	 run,	 biopharmaceutical	 research	productivity	 depends	 critically	 on	 the	 contributions	 of	 open	 science.	 Some	 of	 these	contributions	are	easy	to	see,	such	as	the	generation	of	new	knowledge,	new	models,	new	 data,	 and	 trained	 personnel	 that	 are	 available	 to	 industry.	 Others	 are	 more	subtle.	 For	 example,	 some	 of	 the	 unique	 institutions	 of	 Open	 Science	 such	 as	 peer	review,	 publication,	 and	 replication	 of	 experiments	 provide	 important	 "managerial	infrastructure"	 to	 commercial	 science,	 where	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 use	 their	employees'	 participation	 in	 the	wider	 scientific	 community	 to	monitor	 and	 reward	research	activity.	Open	Science	also	plays	an	important	role	as	a	public	"truth-telling	mechanism"	 on	 complex	 and	 difficult	 questions	 relating	 to	 safety,	 efficacy,	 and	utilization	of	drugs.37		Therefore,	 the	possibility	 of	 implementing	 this	 alternative	 innovation-system	based	on	 an	 open	 and	 collaborative	 model	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 reality	 which	 may	 emerge	 as	 a	workable	 model	 in	 the	 long	 run	 at	 least	 for	 the	 discovery	 of	 pharmaceuticals	 for	neglected	 diseases.	 Also,	 it	 is	 noted	 that	 this	 collaborative	 and	 open	 research	 can	work	in	the	case	of	upstream	knowledge	projects/compounds	that	as	in	the	software	industry,	 can	 be	 used	 for	 the	 development	 of	 privative	 downstream	 applications38.	Notwithstanding	this,	it	is	noted	that	it	is	necessary	to	be	cautious	with	the	extension	of	 this	 collaborative	 and	 open	model	 to	 every	 field	 of	 science,	 in	 particular	 to	 the	pharmaceutical	 sector.	 In	 this	 sense,	 some	 empirical	 studies	 note	 that	 patents	 on	pharmaceuticals	are	crucial	to	recoup	the	large	costs	associated	with	preclinical	and	clinical	R&D	in	this	field39.	Before	taking	a	categorical	position	on	this	matter	is	then	important	to	know	that	the	new	paradigm	could	be	complementary	to	the	traditional	IPRs	 based	 R&D	 and	 that	 it	 is	 indispensable	 to	 asses	 which	 kind	 of	 industry	 is	addressed,	 which	 capital	 investment	 is	 necessary	 to	 innovate	 beyond	 the	 existing																																																									
37 Cockburn, I. M. Is the pharmaceutical industry in a productivity crisis?. (see chapter 3, footnote 69). 
38 Rai, A. K. (2004). Open and collaborative research: A new model for biomedicine. Hahn, R. W., & Hahn, R. 
W. (Eds.). (2005). Intellectual property rights in frontier industries: software and biotechnology. AEI Press. 
39 Cohen, W. M. (2005). Does open source have legs. Intellectual property rights in frontier industries: 
Software and biotechnology, 159-75. 
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state	 of	 the	 art,	 which	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 is	 attempted	 to	 develop	(upstream/downstream),	as	well	as	its	social	interest	or	the	beneficiaries	of	it.						
IPRs	as	a	legal	institution	temporally	vested	with	property	prerogatives.		Despite	the	above,	we	share	Machlup’s	views	previously	cited	that	since	we	have	had	a	patent	system	for	a	long	time,	it	would	be	irresponsible,	on	the	basis	of	our	present	knowledge,	to	recommend	abolishing	it.	In	effect,	it	does	not	seem	reasonable	nor	is	it	viable	 in	 the	medium	 term	 to	 substitute	 the	patent	 system	 for	 other	 type	 of	 public	incentive	 of	 innovation.	 Notwithstanding	 this,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 the	instrumentality	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	 patent	 system	 and	 the	 necessity	 to	 adjust	 this	incentive-reward	system	on	a	case	by	case	basis	instead	of	carrying	out	an	automatic,	absolute,	iuris	et	de	iure	application	of	IPRs	in	order	to	make	IPRs	perform	correctly	and	coherently;	IPRs	would	be	valid	rights	as	long	as	they	are	suitable	instruments	to	achieve	 the	 social	 goals	 entrusted	 to	 them.	 	 In	 particular,	 patent	 rights	 are	instrumental	 rights	 intended	 to	 serve	 societal	 needs	 and	 interests	 –ideally	democratically	identified	by	society-	that	justify	their	protection	and	enforceability.	In	this	 regard,	 the	 evidence	 shows	 that	 the	 patent	 system	 -as	 a	 policy	 and	 social	instrument	to	encourage	inventions	and	technical	progress-	has	been	more	effective	in	certain	industries	like	pharmaceuticals	or	chemicals,	and	less	so	in	electronics,	and	even	that	it	has	little	direct	effect	in	other	industries,	especially	in	services40so	even	a	different	 treatment	 of	 IPRs	depending	on	 the	 field	 could	be	 considered	 to	 optimize	the	use	of	this	legal	“instrument”.			The	social	instrumentality	of	IPRs	is	actually	implicit	in	the	regulation	of	this	special	institution	 -remarkably	 in	 the	 field	 of	 patents-	which	 differs	 from	 the	 regulation	 of	“genuine”	 property;	 In	 our	 view,	 IPRs	 are	 not	 genuine	 property	 but	 an	 institution	temporally	vested	with	property	prerogatives	conferred	to	 IPRs	titleholder	 in	order	to	advance	certain	social	functions.	In	this	respect,	there	are	different	aspects	of	IPRs	law	 that	 permit	 us	 to	 reach	 and	 uphold	 this	 consideration;	 in	 this	 sense,	 property	rights	are	not	granted	to	no	matter	which	knowledge,	information	or	expression	but																																																									
40 Guellec, D., & de La Potterie, B. V. P. (2007). The economics of the European patent system: IP policy for 
innovation and competition. Oxford University Press on Demand. 
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only	 to	 those	 intangibles	 that	 the	 law	considers	 to	contribute	 to	 the	progress	of	 the	state	 of	 the	 art.	 Because	 of	 this,	 the	 inventor	 that	 by	 her	 owns	means	 develops	 an	invention	 is	 not	 entitled	 to	 any	 right	 on	 it	 (apart	 from	 its	 free	 use	 for	 her	 own	purposes)	 if	 she	 had	 the	 misfortune	 of	 being	 preempted	 by	 other	 inventor	 who	applied	patent	protection	 for	 the	 same	 subject	matter	before	 in	 time.	 Furthermore,	patent	rights	are	come	into	existence	upon	public	registration	instead	of	by	its	mere	creation	 (as	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	 copyright).	 This	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 state’s	acknowledgement	that	the	invention	in	question	deserves	monopoly	rights.	Also,	this	different	 treatment	 given	 to	 copyright-protected	 assets	 and	 patent	 subject	 matter	reveals	 that	 the	utilitarian	dimension	 is	more	remarkable	when	 it	 comes	 to	patents	than	it	is	in	the	case	of	copyright	where	the	personality-based	justifications	may	have	a	more	pronounced	sense	and	reflection.					On	the	other	hand,	it	is	noteworthy	that	unlike	“genuine”	property	whose	vocation	is	permanence	 and	perpetuity	 over	 time	 –derived	 from	 conceptualizing	property	 as	 a	bunch	of	rights	which	are	attached	to	things	instead	of	rights	in	the	context	of	social	relations-,	 patent	 rights	 are	 temporary	 rights	 and	 they	 expire	 upon	 a	 period	 of	 20	years	 after	 the	 filing	 date	 –art.	 33	 TRIPS-	 and	 the	 existence	 and	 enforceability	 of	rights	are	subject	to	the	payment	of	annual	fees	without	which	payment	patent	rights	expire	(art.	116	Spanish	Patent	Law).			Finally,	 other	 difference	 between	 IPRs	 and	 “genuine	 property”	 and	 which	 is	 very	illustrative	of	 the	social	 function	of	 IPRs	and	in	particular	of	patents,	consists	of	 the	fact	 that	many	national	 laws	 contemplate	 the	obligation	 that	patent	 rights	 expire	 if	the	subject	matter	of	the	patent	is	not	used	in	a	period	of	time.	In	this	sense,	no	use	of	the	patent	makes	it	becomes	part	of	the	public	domain–art.	83	of	the	Spanish	Patent	Law-.	The	implicit	social	function	of	IPRs	and	in	particular	of	patents,	derive	also	from	the	regime	of	compulsory	licenses	and	free	use	of	patents.	Those	uses	escape	from	the	consent	 of	 the	 patent	 titleholder	 and	 are	 closely	 related	 with	 especially	 sensitive	public	 regarding	 cases	 as	 long	 as	 with	 collective	 and	 community	 interests.	 In	 this	respect,	 compulsory	 licenses	 are	 foreseen	 for	 instance,	 for	 cases	 associated	 with	improvements	 of	 patents	 developed	 by	 an	 inventor	 other	 than	 the	 inventor	 of	 the	preexisting	 patent	 owner	 (in	 which	 case	 a	 cross-license	 regime	 is	 implemented	
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between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 inventor)	 or	 compulsory	 licenses	 grounded	on	public	interest	 and	 social	 utility	 –art.	 86	 of	 the	 Spanish	 Patent	 Act-.	 Regarding	 uses	exempted	 from	 the	 patent	 owner’s	 authorization,	 in	most	 national	 legislations	 it	 is	permitted	 the	 experimental	 use	 of	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 patent,	 the	 non-commercial	 use	 of	 it,	 and	 the	 use	 of	 the	 invention	 within	 the	 private	 sphere	 for	private	 purposes	 or	 the	 preparation	 of	master	 formulas	 of	 pharmaceuticals	 by	 the	pharmacy	or	drugstore41.								All	these	legal	traits	of	the	IPRs	regulation	and	in	particular	of	patents,	clearly	suggest	the	prevalent	functionalist	and	utilitarian	nature	of	the	IPRs	institution	-in	particular	of	patents-	and	its	condition	as	an	instrument	of	the	state	at	the	service	of	its	strategy	and	purposes.	This	is	also	coherent	with	the	fact	that	both	private	international	and	public	 international	 law	recognize	the	right	of	sovereign	states	 to	regulate	property	rights,	 to	 adjust	 them	 to	 economic	 and	 social	 circumstances	 (during	 the	drafting	of	article	17	of	the	Universal	Declaration	it	was	agreed	that	ownership	of	property	was	subject	to	national	laws,	but	that	there	was	no	need	to	state	this	in	the	Declaration)42.			The	 social	 dimension	of	 IPRs	 is	 even	more	 remarkable	 if	we	 take	 into	 account	 that	knowledge	and	new	ideas	are	the	result	of	social	rather	than	individual	creation;	i.e.,	it	is	also	due	to	earlier	inventors	and	scientists	who	have	provided	the	foundation	for	the	new	contribution	as	 long	as	 to	society	as	a	whole;	 this	also	 includes	professors,	family,	universities	and	society	which	have	created	the	necessary	conditions	 for	 the	inventor	 or	 creator	 to	 come	 up	 with	 the	 new	 invention.	 It	 is	 therefore,	 the	consequence	 of	 a	 social	 process	 rather	 than	 a	 process	 exclusively	 developed	 in	 an	individual	 sphere	 and	 therefore,	 a	 social	 product	 rather	 than	 an	 individual	 one.	 In	particular,	most	patents	are	largely	the	result	of	costly	processes	of	research	where	a	multiplicity	of	actors	takes	part	and	that	it	is	mostly	funded	by	public	institutions.	In	this	 respect,	 a	 study	 carried	 out	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 90’s	 revealed	 that	 seventy-three	
																																																								
41 The experimental use exception is being questioned and restricted in the US jurisdiction. See in this 
respect,;  Cai, M. (2004). Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities' Experimental Use 
Defense. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 175-192. 
42 Drahos, Peter. (1999). The universality of intellectual property rights…(see chapter 6, footnote 26). 
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percent	 of	 the	 patents	 cited	 by	 US	 industry	 patents	 are	 public	 science43.	 Hence,	today’s	 tendency	 towards	 the	 expansion	 and	 security	 of	 IPRs	 and	 its	conceptualization	as	absolute,	quasi	natural	proprietarian	private	rights	and	its	iuris	
et	 de	 iure	 treatment	 overtly	 contradicts	 IPRs	 nature	 and	 foundation	 as	 legal	institution	consisting	of	rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives	addressed	 to	 fulfil	particular	social	functions.	As	a	result,	it	seems	urgent	to	reconfigure	and	reshape	the	current	 IPRs	 regime	 to	 its	 founding	 and	 justificatory	 nature	 and	 economic	 role	following	democratic	parameters.		
Saddlebags	for	the	return	journey	of	IPRs	to	their	nature.			Therefore,	 there	 is	 an	obvious	 tension	between	 the	 interests	of	 the	 IPRs	 titleholder	and	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 having	 full	 and	 free	 access	 to	 knowledge	 and	 its	dissemination	to	the	benefit	of	society	 	Law	and	legal	practitioners	should	reconcile	correctly	 all	 the	 interests	 at	 stake	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 purposes,	 rationale	 and	social	function	implied	in	the	regulation	of	IPRs.	In	this	sense,	rather	than	resorting	to	other	 institutions	 or	 external	 bodies	 of	 law	 to	 compensate	 or	 counterbalance	 IPRs	application	and	impact,	it	becomes	necessary	to	apply	and	interpret	IPRs	themselves	correctly,	 i.e.,	 following	 the	 principles	 inspiring	 and	 justifying	 its	 existence	 and	 its	enforceability.	In	this	sense,	IPRs	application	has	to	succeed	in	handling	the	delicate	balance	between	all	the	interests	at	stake	in	a	manner	that	ensures	the	social	function	and	public	interest	embedded	in	the	core	of	this	legal	institution.			In	this	sense,	the	proportionality	principle	claimed	by	Professor	Merges	in	relation	to	IPRs	shows	the	necessity	of	pursuing	that	balance	along	IPRs	life	in	order	to	achieve	IPRs	entrusted	social	goals.	Hence,	the	“societal”	interest	of	IPRs	should	be	reviewed	first	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 right	 from	 the	 moment	 it	 is	 granted	 (time	 limits,	exceptions	to	patentability,	claims	covered	by	the	patent),	secondly,	law	courts	should	make	sure	that	IPRs	do	not	coalesce	with	social	interest	and	the	rationale	of	IPRs,	and	thus	they	have	to	prevent	conferring	disproportionate	leverage	on	a	titleholder	and;	third,	the	rewards	and	benefits	obtained	from	a	creative	work	have	to	be	just	without																																																									
43 Narin, F., Hamilton, K. S., & Olivastro, D. (1997). The increasing linkage between US technology and public 
science. Research policy, 26(3), 317-330. 
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ignoring	 the	 social	 interest	 in	 each	 innovative	work;	 i.e.,	 the	 just	 reward	 has	 to	 be	substantial	 as	 to	 constitute	 an	 effective	 incentive	 for	 innovation	 but	 the	 system	cannot	provide	cover	for	interpretations	and	implementations	of	IPRs	where	IPRs	are	decontextualized	 of	 the	 social	 context	 in	 which	 they	 are	 applied;	 where	 private	interest	of	the	titleholder	prevails	over	the	prevalent	social	function	implied	in	IPRs	as	an	 instrument	 for	 the	advance	of	 the	public	 interest;	where	practices	of	abuse	of	rights	distort	the	core	and	purpose	of	IPRs.							Therefore,	 either	 when	 considering	 IPRs	 first	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	maximize	 social	welfare	(incentive	to	 innovation	and	dissemination	of	 information)	and	secondly,	as	an	ethically	accepted	reward	to	her	creator,	the	idea	of	proportionality	–the	balance	of	 all	 the	 interests-	 should	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 IPRs	 regime.	 IPRs,	 the	 reward	those	IPRs	imply,	should	be	proportioned	to	effort,	 the	value	and	the	significance	of	the	work	 covered	 by	 the	 right.	 Proportionality	 principle	 should	 play	 a	 central	 role	both	 into	 the	 inception	of	 IPRs	and	 into	 their	 implementation,	when	 they	are	used,	when	they	are	infringed	and	when	their	scope	is	determined.	Under	this	principle,	it	should	be	checked	on	a	case	by	case	basis	when	legal	entitlements	based	on	IPRs	give	someone	 a	 disproportionate	 reward	 and	 power	 –over	 knowledge-	 beyond	 what	makes	 sense	 and	 beyond	 the	 purposes	 and	 the	 social	 function	 of	 IPRs,	 given	 the	circumstances.		In	 this	 sense,	 and	 despite	 the	 today	 mostly	 accepted	 instrumental	 nature	 of	 IPRs	system	as	a	tool	to	achieve	some	legitimate	social	ends	and	benefits,	 it	 is	surprising	the	 lack	 of	 economic	 analysis	 of	 questions	 regarding	 the	 cost-benefits	 of	 the	 IPRs	system	and	its	optimum	implementation	and	use.	In	fact,	the	discussions	carried	out	in	the	last	century	and	the	concerns	around	the	economic	rationale	and	impact	of	the	IPRs	seem	to	have	been	completely	sidelined.	Even	if	we	accept	that	IPRs	system	may	have	 been	 working	 in	 certain	 sectors	 where	 it	 is	 necessary	 a	 legal	 instrument	 to	recoup	 investments	 (pharmaceutical	 sector),	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	 a	 one-size-fits-all	approach	 to	 cover	 all	 the	 intangible	 realities	 does	 not	make	 sense.	 In	 this	 respect,	what	 is	missing	 today	 is	a	continuous	analysis	of	 the	 impact	of	 IPRs	and	a	dynamic	and	permanent	adjustment	of	IPRs	to	the	socioeconomic	circumstances	at	any	given	time.		
315		
Also,	 the	 use,	 application	 and	 interpretation	 of	 these	 rights	 vested	 with	 property	prerogatives	have	been	automatic,	iuris	et	de	iure;	a	dogmatic	application	which	does	not	 encompass	 any	 questioning	 or	 objection	 as	 to	 whether	 those	 IPRs	 are	accomplishing	 the	goals	which	 justify	 their	existence	and	 implementation	or	not.	 In	effect,	 a	pharmaceutical	 patent	owner	 can	 exclude	others	 from	using	 the	 intangible	goods	covered	under	her	title	regardless	the	effective	impact	of	her	exclusive	right	in	the	market	and	into	the	society	where	that	patent	is	being	implemented.	Despite	the	fact	 that	 the	raison	d’être	of	 IPRs	has	 to	do	with	 their	 instrumental	nature,	 -i.e.	as	a	tool	to	foster	innovation,	technology	transfer	and	dissemination	of	information-,	and	therefore	 its	 social	 function	 is	 far	 more	 noticeable	 than	 property	 rights	 related	 to	tangible	goods,	there	is	not	any	serious	approach	which	reviews	the	fulfillment	of	the	goals	for	which	they	have	been	conceived,	whether	the	benefits	for	society	outweighs	the	 private	 benefits	 for	 the	 IPRs’	 owner	 and	 if	 the	 investments	 made	 to	 develop	certain	intangible	goods	have	been	fairly	recouped.			This	question	remains	unresolved	today.	There	is	a	number	of	unresolved	questions	as	 to	 the	 optimal	 balance	 between	 the	 propertization	 of	 some	 intangibles,	 the	suitability,	 scope	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 incentives	 so	 generated	 and	 the	 negative	impact	 of	 restricting	 access	 to	 a	 naturally	 unlimited	 good.	 The	 proportionality	principle	 suggests	 us	 that	 IPRs	 could	 constitute	 an	 economic	 return	 which	substantially	 exceeds	 the	 deserved	 reward	 for	 the	 investments	 made	 for	 the	contribution	to	social	welfare	and	for	the	risk	of	failure,	this	restricting	access	to	the	covered	 intangible	 unnecessarily	 and	 in	 an	 inappropriate	 manner.	 Also,	 the	protection	term	which	is	generally	identical	to	all	intangible	goods	covered	by	patents	might	 be	 considered	 as	 arbitrary	 and	 far	 from	 being	 optimal	 into	 the	 necessary	tradeoff	between	the	private	benefits	and	fair	reward	for	the	 innovation	on	the	one	part	and	the	interests	of	society	on	the	other	hand.			Furthermore,	TRIPS	has	contributed	to	break	the	balance	between	the	reward	given	to	the	innovator	and	the	social	benefit	provided	by	that	innovation;	the	now	potential	extension	 of	 IPRs	worldwide	 affects	 substantially	 the	 proportionality	 principle,	 the	reward	granted	by	IPRs	and	IPRs	instrumental	nature.	As	we	have	said	IPRs	regime	is	mainly	premised	under	 the	belief	 that	 creating	an	artificial	monopoly	on	 intangible	
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new	 and	 innovative	 intangibles	 constitute	 an	 incentive	 for	 innovation;	 i.e.,	 the	purpose	of	artificially	creating	scarcity	of	an	unlimited	good	such	as	knowledge	is	to	incentivize	 innovation	 –and	 investment	 on	 innovation-	 and	 disseminate	 valuable	information	among	population	and	society.	Thus,	being	this	the	rationale	behind	the	creation	of	IPRs,	the	application	of	the	IPRs	cannot	be	iuris	et	de	iure	but	it	should	be	subject	 to	 an	 analysis	 about	 the	 conveniences/benefits	 of	 it	 versus	 the	disadvantages/inconveniences	 produced	 by	 this	 instrumental	 legal	 institution.	 If	granting	of	 IPRs	has	 a	 social	 function,	what	 about	 if	 this	 system	 is	not	 fulfilling	 the	aims	and	the	ends	for	which	it	has	been	created?	What	about	if	the	reward	granted	by	IPRs	 substantially	 overwhelms	 the	 social	 function	 to	 be	 accomplished	 by	 its	institution?		On	the	other	hand,	TRIPS	Agreement	is	the	reflection	of	the	extreme	denaturalization	of	IPRs;	If	a	patent	owner	was	supposed	to	be	sufficiently	rewarded	by	an	exclusive	right	covering	all	the	territory	of	a	certain	nation	state,	what	does	it	happen	when	this	monopoly	 on	 the	 same	 innovation	 is	 rewarded	with	 a	 temporary	monopoly	 that	 is	likely	 to	 be	 extended	 at	 a	 global	 scale?	What	 about	 if	 this	 exclusive	 right	 does	 not	constitute	 any	 incentive	 for	 innovation	 in	 a	 country	missing	 the	basic	 technological	infrastructures	to	even	absorb	the	know-how	implied	in	that	patent?	In	this	sense,	it	is	noteworthy	 that	TRIPS	has	 created	a	 further	asymmetry	between	 the	announced	social	benefits	of	the	IPRs	regime	and	the	private	interests	of	their	titleholders;	while	TRIPS	Agreement	has	increased	substantially	the	reward	given	to	the	IPRs	titleholder	who	has	now	the	potential	 to	enjoy	a	worldwide	legal	monopoly,	 the	social	benefits	and	 the	 social	 function	 of	 IPRs	 have	 not	 been	 grown	 accordingly	 and	 it	 is	 not	automatically	 extended	 to	 all	 the	 jurisdictions	where	 a	 given	 patent	 is	 applied	 and	enforceable.			
Striking	the	balance	by	challenging	some	of	the	presumptions	implied	in	IPRs.		Needless	 to	 say	 that	 it	 does	 seem	 neither	 rational	 nor	 fair	 to	 claim	 that	 all	 the	countries	have	to	contribute	to	pay	the	bill	resulting	of	 the	reward	of	 the	 innovator	without	 simultaneously	 enjoying	 any	 of	 the	 eventual	 benefits	 associated	 with	 an	artificially	created	legal	monopoly	which	is	intended	to	fulfil	certain	social	functions.	
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Otherwise,	 there	 would	 be	 a	 manifest	 disconnection	 between	 the	 reward-based	incentive,	private	gains	and	the	prevalent	public	and	social	rewarding	dimensions	of	IPRs;	 a	 decoupling	 which	 should	 be	 fixed	 in	 order	 to	 reinstate	 the	 balance	 of	 the	tradeoff	involved	in	IPRs	on	proportional	and	rational	terms.			Therefore,	 the	 next	 step	 is	 wondering	 how	 this	 “reinstatement	 of	 the	 balance”	between	all	the	interests	at	stake	has	to	be	effected	when	it	comes	to	the	regulation	of	IPRs.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 is	 iuris	 tantum	 presumption	 that	 IPRs	 fulfill	 their	 social	functions	and	it	 is	required	to	analyze	whether	this	presumption	is	actually	effected	in	 a	 given	 context.	 In	 this	 respect,	 we	 believe	 that	 the	 spatial	 framework	 of	 the	analysis	has	to	be	the	sphere	integrated	by	national	jurisdictions.	On	the	other	hand,	the	moment	when	this	evaluation	has	to	be	made	corresponds	to	the	second	phase	of	IPRs	life	i.e.,	when	law	courts	or	other	interpreters	of	the	law	and	adjudicators	have	to	consider	 the	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 or	 have	 to	 settle	 a	 given	 dispute	 or	 conflict	 associated	with	the	enforceability	of	IPRs.			In	effect,	 taking	 into	account	 that	even	 if	 standardized,	 IPRs	are	national	 rights,	 the	spatial	framework	to	consider	the	socioeconomic	impact	and	performance	of	IPRs	has	to	 be	 the	 national	 jurisdiction	 where	 IPRs	 are	 applied	 –regardless	 of	 whether	 the	evaluator	 could	 be	 a	 national	 or	 an	 international	 adjudicator-.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 national	context	where	 the	 evaluation	 as	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	maintenance	 of	 the	balance	 of	 the	 constellation	 of	 interests	 has	 to	 be	 done	 since	 the	 performance	 and	impact	 of	 IPRs	 vary	 substantially	 between	 countries	 in	 different	 stages	 of	development	 and	with	 different	 needs	 and	 cultural	 patterns	while	 there	 is	 no	 such	thing	 as	 global	 government	 or	 global	 collective	 action	 which	 takes	 care	 of	 the	consequences	of	IPRs	and	the	welfare	of	humanity	as	a	whole.			In	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 the	pharmaceutical	 sector	 for	 instance,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	socioeconomic	 impact	 of	 enforcing	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 has	 to	 be	 effected	 in	national	terms.	As	we	have	mentioned	previously,	it	would	not	be	logical	–nor	would	it	 be	 fair-	 to	 claim	 that	 for	 this	 analysis	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 innovation	 have	 to	 be	evaluated	 in	 global	 terms,	 i.e.,	 that	 all	 the	 countries	 have	 to	 pay	 the	 bill	 of	 a	 legal	monopoly	because	innovation	benefits	everybody	while	the	impact	and	the	negative	
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consequences	of	 commodifying	knowledge	and	having	monopoly	prices	 in	 terms	of	access	to	medicines	have	to	be	faced	exclusively	by	national	means	since	there	are	not	so	 far	 global	 instruments	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 shortcomings	 and	 the	 failures	 of	 the	system.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 we	 disregard	 international	 solutions	 or	 global	responses	to	the	failures	of	the	system	and	of	the	IPRs	global	regime.	On	the	contrary,	it	 is	 necessary	 to	 develop	 global	 standards	 to	 take	 into	 due	 account	 national	 or	regional	 realities	 and	 be	 able	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 necessary	 flexibility	 in	 the	application	of	an	instrumental	institution	such	as	IPRs,	moving	away	from	one	size	fits	
all	 formulae	which	usually	 tend	 to	decontextualize	and	denaturalize	 the	nature	and	
rationale	 of	 IPRs	 and	 which	 are	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 absolute	 quasi-natural	 rights	application	 of	 IPRs	 versus	 the	 more	 convenient	 consideration	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 set	 of	privileges	vested	with	the	prerogatives	of	property.							Unlike	the	other	patent	requirements	(novelty,	 inventive	and	 industrial	application)	which	 have	 to	 be	 met	 at	 the	 time	 of	 applying	 the	 patent,	 the	 evaluation	 as	 to	 the	impact	and	use	of	the	exclusive	rights	has	to	be	necessarily	effected	when	IPRs	have	been	 implemented	and	enforced	 in	a	given	national	society.	Although	 it	 is	 logical	 to	think	that	this	evaluation	is	going	to	be	made	in	a	dispute	resolution	process,	there	is	nothing	 in	 TRIPS	 to	 preclude	 national	 legislators	 -by	 legislating	 property-	 from	including	a	judicial	declarative	process	where	law	courts	could	declare	that	the	use	of	property	 or	 the	 use	 of	 a	 given	 pharmaceutical	 patent	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 prevalent	public	interest	and	social	function	that	the	use	of	the	patent	must	observe	since	it	is	for	 national	 legislators	 to	define	 the	 specific	 contours	 of	 property	 and	 the	 inherent	social	function	within	it.			In	this	sense,	IPRs	laws	are	premised	upon	previously	defined	legal	concepts	such	as	property	 which	 have	 to	 be	 duly	 assessed	 and	 considered	 in	 national	 terms	 and	 in	accordance	with	national	interests	and	needs	especially	when	IPRs	do	not	pertain	to	the	 realm	 of	 genuine	 property	 but	 they	 are	 rather	 a	 legal	 institution	 vested	 with	property	 prerogatives.	 Hence,	 the	 process	 of	 defining	 property	 and	 considering	whether	property	or	IPRs	as	sui	generis	property	as	a	 legal	 institution	integrated	by	rights	 or	 privileges	 vested	 with	 property	 prerogatives	 is	 a	 prius	 or	 a	 preliminary	question	 that	 precedes	 the	 application	of	 specific	 IPRs	 laws	or	 in	particular,	 patent	
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laws.	Therefore,	articles	30	and	31	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	-regulating	exceptions	to	the	enforceability	of	the	owner’s	IPRs-	cannot	limit	or	condition	the	previous	national	definition	 of	 the	 contours	 of	 property	 and	 the	 evaluation	 as	 to	 the	 specific	performance	of	property	or	IPRs	in	relation	to	its	inherent	social	function.	In	fact,	the	application	of	articles	30	and	31	–and	those	of	the	specific	patent	 law-	should	come	next,	as	one	of	the	specificities	of	those	particular	rights,	once	the	use	of	the	patent	–the	 rights	 vested	 with	 property	 prerogatives-	 is	 presumed	 to	 be	 valid	 and	 it	 is	enforceable	since	its	use	is	in	accordance	with	the	parameters	of	its	social	function.																On	the	other	hand,	and	in	the	context	of	a	dispute	or	a	litigation	process	for	IPRs	or	patent	 infringement,	 the	 eventual	 infringer	 of	 the	 exclusive	 rights	 conferred	 by	 for	instance	a	pharmaceutical	patent	could	challenge	plaintiff’s	claim	on	the	grounds	that	the	 specific	 patent	 does	 not	 fulfill	 the	 social	 function	 entrusted	 to	 it	 –and	 which	justifies	 the	 conferring	 of	 property	 prerogatives-.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 validity	 of	 IPRs	and	in	particular,	of	pharmaceutical	patents	at	a	given	moment	must	be	iuris	tantum	in	order	to	be	fully	enforceable;	i.e.,	the	presumption	that	these	exclusive	rights	fulfill	their	inherent	social	functions	–and	that	they	are	consequently	vested	with	property	prerogatives-	 may	 be	 rebuttable	 if	 it	 is	 proved	 that	 the	 patent	 is	 being	 used	 in	 a	manner	contrary	to	the	social	functions	entrusted	to	property	in	general	and	to	IPRs	in	particular.			Other	 than	 the	 general	 functions	 of	 IPRs	 mentioned	 before	 (as	 an	 incentive	 to	innovation	and	dissemination	of	information),	what	is	social	function	will	depend	on	the	 national	 definition	 given	 to	 property	 and	 to	 IPRs	 in	 particular	 following	democratic	deliberative	democratic	parameters	in	view	of	the	socioeconomic	national	context	 where	 IPRs	 are	 called	 to	 be	 applied.	 In	 defining	 these	 parameters,	 the	categories	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 public	 interest	 take	 on	 their	 full	 significance	 as	 an	integral	part	of	the	social	function	to	be	fulfilled	by	property	and	IPRs;	i.e.,	instead	of	confronting	property	and	IPRs	versus	Human	Rights	or	public	interest	as	if	they	were	conflicting	bodies	of	 law,	both	elements	(RRHH	and	public	interest)	are	internalized	in	the	legal	institution	of	property	as	they	come	to	integrate	part	of	the	sense	and	the	scope	of	its	social	function.	In	this	sense,	some	authors	claim	for	an	integrated	vision	
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of	International	Law	where	IPRs	should	be	interpreted	in	accordance	with	principles	of	human	dignity44			Furthermore,	in	evaluating	enforceability	of	IPRs	and	fulfillment	of	its	social	function,	it	would	be	necessary	to	review	the	reward	granted	to	the	IPRs	titleholder,	the	impact	of	 IPRs	 in	 the	society	where	they	are	 implemented	and	the	benefits	 they	provide	 in	terms	 of	 flourishment	 of	 that	 society.	 For	 instance,	 when	 considering	 a	pharmaceutical	patent	in	a	developing	country,	the	analysis	as	to	the	social	function	of	property	should	entail	the	assessment	about	the	reward	given	to	the	titleholder	–since	this	could	be	considered	excessive	in	view	of	the	necessary	balance45-,	the	price	of	the	medicine	in	relation	to	the	average	salary	of	the	population	of	the	country,	the	investment	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 company	 in	 researching	 neglected	 diseases	affecting	the	country,	or	the	technological	transfer	effected	to	the	country	in	terms	of	ensuring	dissemination	of	knowledge	and	providing	the	country	with	the	capacity	to	absorb	 the	 new	 knowledge	 and	 even	 to	 innovate.	 Therefore,	 from	 democratic	deliberative	parameters,	 international	and	national	 interpreters	and	adjudicators	of	law	 shall	 apply	 and	 enforce	 IPRs	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 these	instrumental	 rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives	 fulfil	with	 the	social	 function	and	the	prevalent	public	interest	of	the	particular	society	where	those	IPRs	are	called	to	be	implemented.		Finally,	it	is	noteworthy	that	this	instrumental	approach	to	IPRs	is	perfectly	coherent	with	the	principles	and	objectives	announced	in	article	7	and	8	of	TRIPS.	In	effect,	by	saying	that	the	protection	and	enforcement	of	IPRs	should	contribute	to	the	promotion	
of	technological	innovation	and	to	the	transfer	and	dissemination	of	technology,	to	the																																																									
44 Hernández, X. S. (2010). La protección de la salud ante la regulación internacional de los productos 
farmacéuticos. Marcial Pons. 
45 Interestingly, in the case AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömű Kft v. The Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award of September 23, 2010. The Arbitral Tribunal –under the 
International Center for settlement of Investment Disputes) held between others the following: […] Having 
concluded that Hungary was principally motivated by the politics surrounding so-called luxury profits, the 
Tribunal nevertheless is of the view that it is a perfectly valid and rational policy objective for a government to 
address luxury profits. And while such price regimes may not be seen as desirable in certain quarters, this 
does not mean that such a policy is irrational. One need only recall recent wide-spread concerns about the 
profitability level of banks to understand that so-called excessive profits may well give rise to legitimate 
reasons for governments to regulate or re-regulate. (p. 10.3.34) Therefore, under some parameters of 
international economic law, excessive profits (or luxury profits) would justify regulation or re-regulation by 
national governments.   
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mutual	advantage	of	producers	and	users	of	technological	knowledge	and	in	a	manner	
conducive	 to	 social	and	economic	welfare,	 and	 to	a	balance	of	 rights	and	obligations,	article	7	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	recognizes	both	the	instrumental	nature	of	IPRS	and	its	 implicit	 social	 function	 since	 it	 states	 certain	 objectives	 to	 be	 achieved		(technological	 innovation,	 transfer	 and	 dissemination	 of	 technology,	 social	 and	economic	 welfare)	 and	 it	 also	 speaks	 of	 obligations	 adhered	 to	 IPRs.	 On	 its	 part,	article	 8	 establishes	 as	 principles	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 that	 members	 may,	 in	
formulating	 or	 amending	 their	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 adopt	 measures	 necessary	 to	
protect	public	health	and	nutrition,	and	to	promote	the	public	interest	in	sectors	of	vital	
importance	 to	 their	 socio-economic	and	 technological	 development,	 provide	 that	 such	
measures	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 this	 Agreement.	 Both	 principles	 and	objectives	expressed	explicitly	in	the	TRIPS	Agreement	provide	room	for	alternative	interpretations	and	applications	of	today’s	global	IPRs	regime.		 	
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7.3.	 Transforming	the	regime	from	premises	of	deliberative	democracy.		The	 trend	 towards	 the	 expansion	 of	 IPRs	 and	 particular,	 of	 patents	 towards	 new	material	 and	 spatial	 enclosures	 of	 knowledge	 coupled	 with	 a	 strict,	 absolute	definition	 of	 property	 rights	 and	 an	 overprotection	 of	 the	 private	 proprietary	interests	 of	 the	 titleholders	 of	 IPRs	 -who	 have	 seen	 how	 their	 rights	 have	 become	global	without	 any	 further	 contribution	 to	 the	 innovation	 and	 progress	 of	 society-,	has	 ignored	 the	 nature	 of	 IPRs	 as	 historical,	 contingent	 and	 political	 rights	 vested	with	 property	 prerogatives	 which	 have	 been	 designed	 to	 fulfill	 certain	 social	functions	and	serve	the	prevalent	public	interest	implied	in	these	sui	generis	property	rights.	One	 factor	explaining	this	“evolution”	or	rather,	denaturalization	of	 this	 legal	institution	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 development	 and	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	 have	 been	dominated	 by	 a	 neoliberal	 hegemonic	 epistemic	 community	 who	 favors	 private	interests	 of	 proprietors,	 has	 narrow	 and	 biased	 values	 and	 facilitates	 processes	 of	unrestricted	 capital	 accumulation.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 inoculate	counterhegemonic	voices	and	reasons,	interests	and	needs	that	currently	IPRs	do	not	reflect,	including	the	prism	of	human	rights	discourse	and	the	public	interest	insight	in	such	a	manner	as	to	foster	that	IPRs	interpretation	and	implementation	will	fulfill	their	social	functions.				The	 emergence	of	well	 defined,	 secure	property	 rights	 at	 a	 global	 scale	 is	 part	 of	 a	much	 broader	 historical	 process	 that	 we	 are	 living	 today	 and	 which,	 as	 we	 have	suggested	 along	 this	 dissertation,	 goes	 beyond	 the	 particular	 “evolution”	 of	 IPRs,	patents	or	pharmaceutical	patens.	Notwithstanding	this,	the	political	process	leading	to	a	global	IPRs	regime	and	in	particular,	pharmaceutical	patents	have	displayed	the	inacceptable	failures	and	shortcomings	of	the	current	system	and	it	could	have	served	to	 initiate	 an	 alternative	process	which	questions	 the	premises	under	which	 the	 so	called	“globalization”	is	being	constructed	and	the	legitimacy	of	the	decision	making	processes	 and	 methods.	 As	 some	 political	 theorists	 hold,	 by	 introducing	 and	providing	 room	 for	 counterhegemonic	 voices	 and	 opinions,	 it	would	 be	 possible	 to	recover	 legitimacy	 and	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 to	 reconstruct	 democracy	 based	 on	political	 principles,	 institutions	 and	 practices	 adapted	 to	 the	 new	 forms	 of	 public	sphere	deliberation	and	post-industrial	capitalism	characterized	by	global	production	
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and	marketing	 networks	 beyond	 the	 national	 state	 framework.	 Habermas	 suggests	that	 democratic	 deliberative	 processes	may	 be	 adapted	 to	 a	 global	 and	 decentered	society.	 This	 approach	 to	 democratic	 decision	 making	 processes	 would	 no	 longer	need	to	operate	within	the	notion	of	society	exclusively	centered	in	a	given	national	state	and	it	could	solve	problems	in	ways	unavailable	to	representative	systems.				In	this	sense,	and	following	professor	Piccioto,	decision-making	should	be	the	result	of	 active	 democratic	 participation	 based	 on	 discursive	 reasoning	 i.e.,	 instead	 of	 the	pursuit	of	individual	interests	the	aim	is	to	reason	as	to	which	one	is	the	best	solution.	While	accepting	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	an	absolute	and	objective	standard	of	truth	 since	 perspectives	 are	 subjective,	 truth	 can	 be	 the	 result	 of	 the	 deliberative	
interaction	between	perspectives	 i.e.,	 the	objective	truth	can	be	obtained	through	the	process	 of	 subjective	 interactions,	 this	 being	 the	 most	 basic	 justification	 for	
democracy.	 In	 this	 interaction,	 the	 communicative	 interaction	 -the	manner	how	 the	process	 of	 public	 reasoning	 is	 carried	 out-	 becomes	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	 identify	inequalities	of	power	and	imbalances	in	capacities	to	participate	in	public	reasoning	and	 to	 ensure	 conditions	 to	 foster	 informed	 participation	 in	 deliberative	 decision-making	rather	than	expert	or	elite	deliberation46.						
Public	Health,	the	opening	door	to	counterhegemonic	voices.		As	we	have	seen,	TRIPS	is	part	of	a	hegemonic	strategy	towards	a	new	international	regime	 which	 favors	 the	 international	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	global	welfare.	This	strategy	has	been	conducted	by	transnational	actors	which	have	been	able	to	articulate	a	hegemonic	discourse	adopted	by	hegemonic	countries.	The	instrumental	 use	 of	 IPRs	 has	 distorted	 the	 nature	 of	 IPRs	 emphasizing	 and	strengthening	 their	 property	 dimension	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 owners	 over	 any	other	social	considerations.	However,	TRIPS	has	not	been	successful	in	implementing	peacefully	and	without	controversy	the	new	global	regime	of	IPRs.	In	particular,	the	field	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 and	due	 to	 their	 important	 impact	 on	public	 health																																																									
46 Picciotto, Sol. (2000). Democratizing the new global public sphere. Working paper, Lancaster 
University. Retrieved at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/staff/lwasp/demglobpub.pdf. 
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and	 to	 the	 human	 right	 to	 health	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 case	 where	 TRIPS	 hegemonic	ideology	has	suffered	a	setback	and	the	counterhegemonic	movement	has	opened	a	door,	a	path	to	rewrite	and	reinterpret	TRIPS.			In	 spite	of	 its	 limited	effects	and	 impact,	 the	Doha	Declaration	marked	a	 significant	momentum	in	the	counterhegemonic	struggle	over	IPRs.	This	incomplete	victory	has	served	to	show	that	 the	 ideological	debate	 is	not	closed	and	that	the	door	has	been	opened	for	counterhegemonic	reflections	and	considerations.	In	effect,	TRIPS	and	the	regime	of	IPRs	have	been	called	into	question	as	they	have	entered	and	affected	basic	human	needs	and	values	such	as	health.	The	different	crisis	generated	by	TRIPS	and	some	partial	 retreats	 of	 the	hegemonic	 interests	 boosting	TRIPS,	 have	 revealed	 the	important	conflict	of	interests	between	different	actors	and	the	unbalance	balance	in	IPRs	between	public	and	private	reward,	a	crisis,	also	a	legitimacy	crisis	which	cannot	be	 longer	 silenced	 and	must	 be	 handled	 from	 a	 new	 and	 probably	more	 generous	approach.						Apart	 from	 the	 use	 that	 the	 proponents	 of	 counterhegemonic	 views	 of	 TRIPS	 can	make	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 own	 channels,	 i.e.,	 TRIPS	 Council	 –empowered	 to	 oversee	 and	monitor	the	implementation	of	TRIPS-,	the	DSU	and	the	continuing	negotiations	over	the	multilateral	trading	regime,	and	which	will	be	explored	in	further	chapter,	TRIPS	has	placed	 interestingly	 IPRs	 issues	 in	 the	top	of	 the	agenda	of	diverse	 fora	such	as	the	 UN	 or	 the	 WHO.	 In	 these	 fora	 the	 activity	 and	 discussions	 encompass	 the	negotiation	 of	 new	 treaties,	 reinterpretation	 of	 existing	 treaties	 or	 the	 approval	 of	declarations,	guidelines,	recommendations,	resolutions,	reports	and	other	“norms”	of	soft	law	which	undoubtedly	influence	and	interfere	in	the	TRIPS	regime.	According	to	some,	 this	renewed	interest	 for	 IPRs	has	to	do	with	a	strategy	of	regime	shifting	by	developing	 countries,	 NGOs	 and	 other	 counterhegemonic	 entities	 which	 are	dissatisfied	 with	 TRIPS	 and	 are	 seeking	 new	 ways	 and	 paths	 to	 compensate,	recalibrate,	or	reinterpret	it.47In	this	sense,	these	counterhegemonic	entities	would	be	seeking	 different	 international	 regimes	 whose	 institutions,	 purposes,	 actors	 and	mandates	are	more	favorable	and	are	more	aligned	to	their	own	interests.	From	these																																																									
47 Helfer, L. R. (2004). Regime shifting: the TRIPs agreement and new dynamics of international intellectual 
property lawmaking. Yale J. Int'l L., 29, 1. 
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fora,	counterhegemonic	forces	are	challenging	settled	principles	and	legal	practice	in	the	 field	 of	 IPRS	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 reshape	 the	 international	 regime	 towards	 a	 legal	landscape	more	convenient	to	their	interests	from	deliberative	democratic	processes.			In	this	context	there	are	more	and	more	explicit	positions	and	reflections	pointing	to	TRIPS	as	a	hurdle	to	access	to	affordable	medicines.	The	Global	Commission	on	HIV	and	 the	 Law	 (convened	 by	 UNDP)	 for	 example	 issued	 a	 publication48	 where	 it	explicitly	 claims	 that	 strong	 patent	 law	 applied	 to	 pharmaceuticals	 in	 developing	
countries	undermines	access	to	medicines	and	compromises	the	human	right	to	health	and	 that	 there	 is	 little	 reason	 to	 expect	 that	 stronger	 patent	 rights	 in	 developing	
countries	 will	 lead	 to	 any	 substantial	 offsetting	 gains	 in	 innovation	 for	 the	 affected	
countries	and	it	concludes	that	from	both	economic	and	human	rights	perspectives,	the	
optimal	 patent	 policy	 in	 developing	 countries	 would	 likely	 be	 to	 exclude	 patents	 on	
medical	products	altogether,	as	many	once	did.			Maybe	the	most	recent	and	important	initiative	of	this	approach	is	represented	by	the	UN	 Secretary	 General’s	 High-level	 panel	 on	 access	 to	 medicines	 launched	 in	November	201549.	The	scope	of	 this	 initiative	 is	 “to	review	and	assess	proposals	and	
recommend	 solutions	 for	 remedying	 the	 policy	 incoherence	 between	 the	 justifiable	
rights	of	inventors,	international	human	rights	law,	trade	rules	and	public	health	in	the	
context	 of	 health	 technologies.”	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 the	 contributions	 and	 reflections	provided	are	very	diverse	as	long	as	qualified	so	it	is	expected	that	it	will	generate	a	deep	 and	 interesting	 debate.	 In	 fact,	 the	 industry	 has	 rushed	 to	 present	 a	 counter-report	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	 Hudson	 Institute	 –declared	 to	 be	 a	 research	organization	 promoting	 American	 leadership	 and	 global	 engagement	 for	 a	 secure,	free,	and	prosperous	future-	which	under	the	name	“The	Patent	Truth	About	Health,	
Innovation	and	Access”	 criticizes	 the	bias	 of	 the	UN	 initiative	 and	mention	different	factors	 other	 than	 patents	 as	 the	 real	 reasons	 to	 explain	 the	 lack	 of	 access	 to	affordable	medicines50.																																																										
48 El Said, Mohammed, and A. Kapczynski. Access to medicines: The role of intellectual property law and 
policy… (see chapter 2, footnote 130). 
49 http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/#homepage-1 
50 http://www.hudson.org/research/12622-the-patent-truth-about-health-innovation-and-access. Among other 
factors, they include the lack of good governance, poor physical infrastructure and distribution systems, a 
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Transforming	the	regime	from	deliberative	democracy	basis		The	 crisis	 and	 the	 growing	 contestation	 of	 TRIPS,	 especially	 as	 pharmaceutical	patents	are	concerned,	are	narrowly	linked	to	the	lack	of	legitimacy	and	legitimating	procedures	of	this	regime	and	the	perceived	democratic	deficit	of	it	as	we	have	seen	previously	in	Chapter	4.	Consequences	of	this	 lack	of	 legitimacy	have	to	do	with	the	coercion	exercised	for	the	adherence	of	developing	countries	to	TRIPS	and	the	unjust	and	 poor	 –even	 detrimental-	 outcomes	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 global	 extension	 of	western	 type	 IPRs	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Regardless	 the	 specific	 arguments	 and	substantive	 propositions	 to	 improve/transform	 the	 current	 regime	 which	 will	 be	addressed	further	in	this	chapter,	and	absent	a	global	demos	or	a	global	government	with	the	capacity	to	create	political	order	-making	and	enforcing	the	law	through	the	monopoly	over	the	use	of	force-,	the	manner	and	proceedings	suggested	to	overcome	the	democratic	and	legitimacy	deficit	and	crisis	of	this	regime	should	be	grounded	on	the	idea	of	deliberative	democracy	following	Jürgen	Habermas’	work51.			This	 methodological	 approach	 not	 only	 permits	 us	 to	 explore	 the	 eventual	overcoming	of	today’s	WTO	crisis	and	deadlock	through	inclusive	and	argumentative	bases	 but	 also,	 it	 is	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 reveal	 and	 show	 the	 real	 interests	 behind	 the	current	 architecture	 and	 functioning	 of	 TRIPS	 beyond	 the	 global	 and	 presumably	universal	 interests	 as	 they	 are	 presented	 today	by	 the	hegemonic	 ideology,	 i.e.,	 the	manner	in	which	international	regimes	operate	mainly	by	the	conventions	of	power	politics	 delivering	 coercion	 based	 decisions,	 fake	 consensus	 and	 unjust	 and	inequitable	outcomes.				As	we	 have	mentioned,	 theories	 of	 deliberative	 democracy52	 emphasize	 procedural	issues	of	decision-making.	In	this	sense,	equality	between	participants	is	a	must	in	a																																																																																																																																																																																			
shortage of healthcare facilities and providers, insufficient public health spending, corruption, taxes and tariffs 
on medicines, and the lack of policies that promote economic growth and incentives for individuals and 
businesses to develop new technologies so their countries can grow and prosper 
51 Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms, trans. William Rehg, London: Polity Press, 274-328. 
52 Bohman, J. (1997). Deliberative democracy: Essays on reason and politics. Boston: MIT press. 
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deliberative	democracy	 scenario,	 i.e.,	 the	 reciprocal	 and	mutual	 recognition	 of	 each	other	 as	 equal	 political	 agents	 in	 discourse	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 fair	 procedures53.	Also,	 it	 is	 important	 the	 quality	 and	 transparency	 of	 knowledge	 and	 relevant	information	 in	 order	 to	 maximize	 that	 the	 best	 arguments	 see	 the	 light	 and	 be	properly	adjudicated.	However,	procedural	fairness	is	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	condition	to	guarantee	outcome	fairness.	Just	and	democratic	outcomes	or	decisions	can	be	achieved	only	by	rational	discourse.	For	Habermas	rational	deliberation	is	not	about	 an	 autonomous	 reason	 that	 calculates	 independent	 of	 society	 but	 a	
'communicative	rationality'	that	acts	in	concert	with	others.	Deliberative	democracy	is	about	 a	 socially	 generated	 dialogue	 of	 reason,	 the	 “to	 and	 from”	 of	 argument	 and	counter-argument.		In	 this	sense,	 collective	decisions	should	be	 founded	not	 in	 the	mere	aggregation	of	interests	of	its	members	but	on	arguments	in	a	process	of	mutual	learning	and	honest	reasoning	to	achieve	a	mutual	and	genuine	consensus.	Arguing	implies	that	actors	try	to	seek	a	communicative	consensus	about	their	understanding	of	a	situation	as	well	as	 justifications	 for	 the	 principles	 and	 norms	 guiding	 their	 action.	 Argumentative	rationality	also	means	that	the	actors	in	a	discourse	are	open	to	be	persuaded	by	the	better	 argument	 of	 others	 ignoring	 relationships	 of	 power	 and	 social	 hierarchies.	Argumentative	 and	 deliberative	 action	 attempts	 not	 to	 attain	 one's	 interest,	 but	 to	seek	 a	 reasoned	 and	 genuine	 consensus.	 Actors'	 interests	 and	 preferences	 are	therefore	subject	to	discursive	challenges	and	are	prepared	to	change	their	views	and	opinions	 or	 even	 their	 interests	 in	 light	 of	 the	 better	 argument.	 Also,	 unlike	“bargaining”	the	mere	aggregation	of	interests	where	only	mutual	assessment	counts	in	a	dyadic	logic	–mutual	trading	of	costs	and	benefits-,	arguing	follows	a	triadic	logic,	references	 to	 a	 mutually	 acknowledged	 external	 authority	 to	 validate	 empirical	 or	normative	assertions54.			
																																																								
53 In this sense, WTO has an important potential to implement deliberative practices. Despite the fact that 
WTO operates through a de facto system based on the economic power and the size of a country’s market, 
decision-making processes theoretically have in their favor that they are consensus based with a juridical 
notion of member equality (one-member-one-vote).  
54 Risse, Thomas. (2004). Global governance and communicative action. Government and opposition 39.2: 
288-313. 
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The	 goal	 of	 this	 rational	 argumentative	 activity	 is	 to	 achieve	 a	 genuine	 consensus.	Consensus	 would	 be	 reached	 only	 through	 the	 force	 of	 the	 better	 argument.	 A	consensus	 produced	 through	 argumentation	 not	 power	 politics.	 This	 consensus	implies	 that	 all	 affected	 by	 agreed	 decisions	 or	 rules	 –also	 the	 foreseeable	consequences	 and	 side	 effects	 of	 their	 general	 observance-	would	 consent	 to	 them	and	 would	 jointly	 accept	 them	 without	 coercion;	 this	 consensus	 giving	 force	 and	legitimacy	 to	 just	 decisions	 as	 the	 affected	 would	 become	 convinced	 by	 the	moral	validity	of	the	rule	in	question.		As	Habermas	remarks,	deliberative	action	contributes	to	reach	substantially	just	outcomes	since	at	the	very	least	decisions	taken	by	genuine	consensus	‘enhance	the	perception	of	the	outcome	being	fair	and	balanced’	and	also	to	get	the	common	good,	being	a	positive	perception	a	vital	ingredient	in	any	process	of	institutional	legitimation.		Furthermore,	these	models	of	deliberative	democracy	can	take	place	as	long	as	there	is	a	public	sphere.	Public	sphere	–whose	definition	has	an	evolving	interpretation	and	conceptualization-,	 is	 a	 social	 site	 where	 equal	 citizens	 deliberate	 dialogically	 and	arguments	 are	 publicly	 exchanged	 on	 State	 issues	 and	 other	 matters	 of	 common	interest	 under	 suitable	 conditions	 to	 conduct	 a	 deliberative	 and	 argumentative	activity.	This	locus	of	debate	is	distinct	from	the	state	and	the	economy	–governed	by	power	 and	 money-	 and	 it	 is	 the	 place	 where	 collective	 and	 democratic	 will	 is	processed	 and	 political	 decisions	 justified55.	 In	 the	 last	 conceptualization	 of	 public	sphere,	Habermas	acknowledges	the	plurality	of	publics,	i.e.,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	“the	 public”	 but	 the	 existence	 of	 diverse	 publics	 and	 deliberations	 and	 forms	 of	communication	circulating	through	different	forums56.		
																																																								
55 Habermas describes the political public sphere as a sounding board for problems that must be processed 
by the political system because they cannot be solved elsewhere. To this extent, the public sphere is a 
warning system with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society. From the 
perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, 
not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with 
possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary 
complexes. Besides the "signal" function, there must be an effective problematization. The capacity of the 
public sphere to solve problems on its own is limited. But this capacity must be utilized to oversee the further 
treatment of problems that takes place inside the political system. I can provide only a broad estimate of the 
extent to which this is possible.[…] In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary 
structure between the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of the lifeworld and functional 
systems, on the other. It represents a highly complex network that branches out into a multitude of overlapping 
international, national, regional, local, and subcultural arenas. (Between facts and norms) 
56 Maia, R. (2007). Deliberative democracy and public sphere typology. Estudos em Comunicação, 1(2007), 
69-102. 
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	In	 the	 context	 of	 international	 legitimacy	 and	 multilateral/multilevel	 political	authority	-such	as	it	is	represented	by	WTO	and	the	international	IPRs	regime-	and	in	the	 absence	 of	 global	 democratic	 representation	 and/or	 voting	 by	 a	 global	 demos,	many	 International	 Relations	 scholars	 have	 seen	 this	 model	 of	 deliberative	democracy	as	an	adequate	way	and	methodology	in	order	to	increase	the	democratic	legitimacy	of	governance	mechanisms57.	The	virtues	of	this	approach	is	among	other	that	 it	permits	 to	 involve	all	 the	affected	–also	 the	counterhegemonic	contributions,	reasons	and	concerns-,	and	it	ensures	the	accountability	and	traceability	of	decisions	in	the	sense	that	they	should	be	confronted	to	review	in	terms	of	their	validity	from	rational	 argumentation	 standards.	 Also,	 genuine	 and	 reasoned	 consensus	 from	rational	 deliberation	 would	 greatly	 enhance	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 rule	 and	 would	increase	the	degree	of	voluntary	compliance	of	the	rule.		However,	 the	 procedural	 conditions	 to	 conduct	 a	 real	 and	 genuine	 deliberative	process	 –equality	 between	 participants,	 transparency	 and	 access	 to	 relevant	information,	 equal	 consideration	 of	 all	 viewpoints	 and	 no	 time-constrains	 among	others-	 are	 part	 of	 an	 “ideal	 discourse	 situation”	 whose	 conditions	 are	 hardly	replicable	 in	 real	 life.	 As	we	 have	 seen	 for	 example	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	WTO,	 the	participants,	 i.e.,	 the	 Member	 States	 hold	 unequal	 status,	 they	 do	 not	 attempt	 to	pursue	a	common	good	neither	do	they	reflect	upon	collective	interest	issues	and	are	unwilling	to	listen	to	others	carefully	and	show	reluctance	to	change	their	agenda	or	their	 viewpoints.	 Instead	 of	 reaching	 genuine	 consensus	 based	 on	 rationale	argumentation	many	 decisions	 and	 public	 consensus	 are	 the	 result	 of	 domination,	coercion	 and	 political	 power.	 Current	 WTO	 functioning	 and	 decision	 making	 is	characterized	by	the	poor	quality	of	deliberations	and	decisions	which	are	based	on	political	calculations	and	bargaining	of	compromises	and	trade-offs58.			Even	 from	 a	 logistic	 point	 of	 view,	 many	 developing	 countries	 do	 not	 have	 the	resources,	 capacity	 and	 expertise	 for	 effective	 deliberation	 and	 unlike	 other																																																									
57 Nanz, Patrizia. Democratic legitimacy and constitutionalisation of transnational trade governance… (see 
chapter 4 footnote 4). 
58 Kapoor, I. (2004). Deliberative Democracy and the WTO. Review of International Political Economy, 11(3), 
522-541. 
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organizations	 WTO	 does	 not	 provide	 its	 members	 with	 substantial	 technical	assistance.	Also,	the	epistemic	power	to	define	global	economic	governance	is	rooted	in	 the	 hegemonic	 neoliberal	 ideology	which	 permeates	WTO	 culture	 and	nourishes	the	liberal	trade	theory	discourse.	Critical	voices	are	weak	and	developing	countries	encounter	difficulties	to	bring	about	new	voices	and	new	ideas.	Following	Higgott	and	Erman,	the	dual	ability	and	opportunity	to	both	formulate	policy	and	advance	policy	–	is	
constrained	not	only	by	capacity	and	cost,	but	also	by	the	residual	strength	of	existing	
liberal,	 rationalist	 norms	 within	 the	 core	 epistemic	 and	 political	 groupings	 at	 the	
WTO.59		In	this	respect,	political	public	sphere	and	civil	society	would	play	a	key	role	in	order	to	cope	with	the	above	mentioned	distortions	and	problems	of	today’s	 international	trade	 system	and	of	 the	TRIPS	 regime.	A	public	 sphere	–based	on	an	 informed	and	critical	 civil	 society	 encompassing	 all	 voices-	 which	 could	 enhance	 the	 equality,	accountability,	 liberty	 and	 justice	 of	 the	 political	 process	 through	 deliberative	 and	argumentative	action.	Unlike	formal	deliberative	decision	in	the	political	arena,	in	the	public	 sphere	 there	 would	 be	 deliberative	 practices	 through	 informal	 processes	 of	opinion-formation	 and	 will-formation	 which	 could	 identify	 social	 problems	 and	counterhegemonic	perspectives	outside	the	agenda	of	formal	politics	and	bring	them	into	 formal	 negotiations	 of	 political	 decision-making.	 Also,	 it	 would	 be	 able	 to	critically	scrutinize	political	decisions	and	require	accountability	(in	terms	of	rational	justifiability	of	decisions).	Even	if	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	the	way	in	which	the	public	sphere	 can	 operate	 in	 a	 contemporary	 large-scale,	 global	 and	 pluralist	 society,	 it	 is	important	to	open	the	process	of	political	deliberation	to	public	scrutiny	in	order	to	conform	 transnational	 public	 spheres	 (World	 Social	 Forum,	 government	 officials,	social	activists,	scientific	experts,	NGOs,	associations,	representatives	of	minorities,	or	advocacy	 groups	 of	 a	 multitude	 international,	 national,	 regional,	 local	 and/or	subcultural	arenas	all	affected	by	multilateral	decisions).					Therefore	 and	 in	 spite	 of	 today’s	 shortcomings	 in	 WTO	 functioning,	 deliberative	democracy	views	are	an	important	instrument	that	could	improve	both	the	legitimacy																																																									
59 Higgott, Richard, and Eva Erman. (2010). Deliberative global governance and the question of legitimacy: 
what can we learn from the WTO?. Review of International Studies 36.02: 449-470. 
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problems	 of	 WTO	 by	 providing	 voice	 opportunities	 to	 various	 currently	 ignored	stake-holders	 and	 the	 problem-solving	 capacity	 of	 international	 organizations	through	deliberation.	Also,	models	based	on	deliberative	democracy	may	inform	the	necessary	reforms	of	WTO	and	the	global	regime	of	IPRs	and	mark	the	path	of	what	it	should	 look	 like;	 a	 forum	 which	 must	 be	 inclusive	 -	 no	 one	 is	 excluded	 from	articulating	 topics	 considered	 to	 be	 relevant	 to	 her	 interests	 and	 no	 relevant	information	is	left	out-,	coercion	free,	open,	transparent	and	symmetrical.	In	the	last	chapter	we	will	analyze	various	proposals	to	tackle	these	problems	and	to	enable	that	arguing	 and	 deliberative	 process	 be	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	 negotiation	 system	 and	decision	 making	 processes.	 Beyond	 the	 WTO	 bodies	 and	 organs,	 deliberative	democracy	 premises	 constitute	 also	 a	 valid	 methodologic	 approach	 to	 assess	 the	functioning	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 both	 domestic	 and	 international	 venues	 with	lawmaking	 and/or	 implementation	 authority	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	which	become	crucial	for	the	regime	change.		In	this	sense,	today,	most	states	find	themselves	in	the	positions	of	being	law	takers	rather	 than	 law	makers;	 i.e.,	 national	 legislators	 have	 to	 implement	 and	 administer	regulatory	standards	which	have	been	determined	somewhere	outside	their	national	borders.	 Also,	 supranational	 regulatory	 order	 becomes	 the	 target	 and	 the	 realm	 of	interest	 group	 activity	 and	 influence	 which	 seek	 rents	 to	 a	 powerful	 transnational	capital	 rather	 than	 the	 common	good	or	 the	general	welfare.	All	 this	 implies	a	new	form	 of	 domination,	 a	 domination	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law60.	 By	 implementing	democratic	 deliberative	 spaces	 and	 forums,	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 emancipate	 national	decision	making	processes	in	such	a	manner	as	to	permit	national	interpretations	of	IPRs	 which,	 far	 from	 being	 discretional	 or	 arbitrary,	 respond	 to	 foreseeable	 and	certain	democratic	deliberative	parameters	agreed	globally	 in	view	of	 the	 interests,	values	 and	 needs	 of	 the	 national	 or	 regional	 society	where	 IPRs	 are	 to	 be	 applied.	Furthermore,	 at	 a	 global	 scape	 democratic	 deliberative	 processes	 are	 proposed	 to	overcome	 the	 lack	of	 legitimacy	of	 international	 regulatory	activity	and	adoption	of	global	standards	by	emancipating	of	undue	and	biased	 influence	and	making	all	 the	
																																																								
60 Drahos, Peter. (1996). Global law reform and rent-seeking… (see chapter 6, footnote 81)  
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process	more	democratic,	 transparent,	 participatory	and	 inclusive	of	diverse	voices	and	counterhegemonic	views.			In	this	respect,	the	previously	mentioned	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary-General’s	High-Level	 Panel	 on	 Access	 to	 Medicines	 released	 in	 September,	 201661	 has	 been	elaborated	 following	 a	 debate	 and	 discussion	 which	 could	 be	 close	 to	 be	 a	deliberative	 forum.	 The	 Report	 is	 divided	 into	 four	 chapters;	 Health	 Technology	Innovation	and	Access;	 IP	Laws	and	Access	 to	Health	Technologies,	New	 Incentives	for	 R&D	 of	Health	 Technologies	 and	Governance,	 Accountability	 and	 Transparency.	Other	 than	dealing	with	many	of	 the	 issues	addressed	 in	 this	dissertation	and	after	reaching	 similar	 conclusions62,	 the	 Report	 makes	 important	 remarks	 about	governance,	accountability	and	transparency.			Besides	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 report	 itself	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 diverse	groups	 of	 individuals	 from	 various	 backgrounds,	 experiences	 and	 continents-including	 a	public	 call	 for	 contributions	 around	 the	world-	 and	 that	 according	with	the	document	the	discussions	took	place	in	an	atmosphere	of	mutual	respect	and	that	despite	 different	 views	 of	 participants	 they	 reached	 broad	 consensus	 on	 many	aspects,	i.e.,	that	something	similar	to	a	global	public	sphere	was	created	to	discuss	a	global	 issue,	 the	 Final	 Report	 in	 its	 chapter	 4	 tackle	 the	 issues	 of	 governance,	accountability	 and	 transparency	 and	 it	 puts	 forward	 a	 set	 of	 considerations	 for	promoting	 transparency,	 governance	 and	 accountability	 which	 could	 contribute	 to	create	 an	 interesting	 forum	 and	 space	 for	 deliberative	 processes	 of	 debate	 and	decision	and	that	will	be	mentioned	and	discussed	in	the	next	section.	 	
																																																								
61 Final Report of the UN Secretary-General’s high level panel on access to medicines September 2016, 
available at: http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ 
62 The Report reveals among others that investment in R&D of health technologies does not adequately 
address a number of important needs and that the imperative to respect patents on health technologies could 
create obstacles to the public health objectives of WTO members (p. 7); that sometimes patent laws do not 
encourage genuine innovation (versus evergreening of medicines) and that do not contemplate flexibilities 
because of capacity constraints and undue political and economic pressure; that market-driven R&D has 
permitted the development of many improved health outcomes but has also gaps and shadows in health 
technology innovation and access (p.8); that public-private partnerships tend to be fragmented, disparate and 
insufficient to deal with priority health needs on a sustainable and long term basis. Importantly the Report 
recommends that public funders of research must require that knowledge generated from public funded 
research be made freely and widely available through publication in peer-reviewed literature and seek broad, 
online public access to such research. (p.9)    
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7.4.	 Embracing	 a	 global	 public	 sphere	 to	 deliberate	 and	 define	 democratic	
parameters	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	 and	 implementation	 of	
pharmaceutical	patents.		In	the	previous	section	and	in	previous	chapters	we	have	reviewed	the	shortcomings	of	 today’s	 global	 approach	 and	 global	 regulation	 in	 terms	 of	 both	 intertwined	concepts	of	legitimacy	and	democratic	nature.	In	this	context,	we	have	also	seen	that	global	IPRs	regime	is	other	reflect	of	this	new	global	architecture	whose	driving	force	is	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 new	 version	 of	 capitalism	(supercapitalism	or	global	capitalism).	Therefore,	and	with	the	purpose	of	suggesting	an	 alternative	 process	 of	 globalization	 and	 especially	 an	 alternative	 reading	 and	interpretation	of	IPRs,	in	this	section	we	will	explore	first	whether	there	is	margin	to	think	 of	 public	 deliberative	 sphere	 as	 a	 space	 or	 forum	enabling	 the	 conditions	 for	making	the	regime	more	democratic	and	more	legitimate	in	the	sense	of	being	more	inclusive	 and	 participative	 of	 all	 the	 affected	 actors.	 Secondly,	 and	 regarding	 the	subject	matter	of	 this	 thesis,	 the	global	public	 sphere	should	entail	 transparent	and	traceable	 modes	 of	 public	 reasoning	 about	 how	 to	 better	 incentivize	 genuine	innovation	 for	 all	 (neglected	 diseases	 too)	 while	 ensuring	 affordable	 access	 for	everybody.	 This	 could	 permit	 to	 adequately	 define	 and	 adopt	 the	 democratic	parameters	under	which	IPRs	have	to	be	 implemented	in	order	that	they	fulfil	 their	social	 functions	and	that	the	public	 interest	prevails	and	human	rights	respected.	In	this	manner,	these	rights/privileges	vested	with	property	prerogatives	should	serve	the	interests	and	needs	of	society	and	its	citizens.			In	 this	 global	 public	 sphere	 there	 would	 be	 at	 least	 four	 key	 dimensions	 or	conglomerates	 of	 interests	 and	 concerns	 which	 contribute	 to	 the	 configuration	 of	power;	 state	 based	 national	 and	 international	 institutional	 framework	 (also	 the	judicial	 and	 law	 adjudicator),	 global	 operation	 of	 pharmaceutical	 business,	 global	media	 and	 global	 civil	 society.	 The	 public	 sphere	 composed	 of	 at	 least	 these	 four	elements	 should	 be	 oriented	 to	 discuss	 and	 reason	 how	 to	 bring	 about	 the	aforementioned	 aim	 (how	 to	 incentivize	 genuine	 innovation	 and	 ensure	 affordable	access	 to	 medicines).	 Today,	 there	 is	 an	 obvious	 imbalance	 among	 these	 four	dimensions,	 being	 the	 interests	 and	 views	 of	 the	 global	 pharmaceutical	 business	
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which	 prevail	 over	 the	 rest	 of	 actors	 and	 what	 has	 been	 impregnating	 the	 other	dimensions.	In	particular,	we	have	seen	that	the	imperative	to	respect	pharmaceutical	patents	 from	 an	 absolute	 quasi	 natural	 rights	 approach,	 constrain	 national	governments	 to	 achieve	 their	 own	 public	 health	 objectives	 as	 long	 as	 their	development	needs	and	innovation	public	policies	and	puts	the	international	law	and	the	state	at	the	service	of	the	lucrative	interest	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry	instead	of	 permitting	 affordable	 access	 to	medicines.	 In	 this	 sense,	 national	 legislators	 and	officers	 administer	 standards	which	 have	 been	 adopted	 outside	 of	 a	 given	 state,	 in	many	occasions	 as	we	have	 seen	 regarding	WTO	after	 opaque	processes	which	 are	not	the	subject	of	any	“democratic	check”.			The	necessity	 for	 reform	 in	 global	 health	 is	 not	unique	 to	 the	 field	of	 health	or	 the	pharmaceutical	 business.	 In	 fact,	 global	 reform	 is	 nowadays	 a	 hot	 issue	 with	 no	solution	in	sight.	Following	Professor	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos63,	we	can	say	that	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	globalization	and	governance	has	excluded	many	people	from	participation	in	social	issues,	relations	of	power	and	allocation	of	resources.	The	state’s	 previous	 role	 as	 the	 instrument	 to	 ensure	distributive	policies	 and	 establish	the	 political	 social	 contract	 -for	 among	 other	 things,	 agreeing	 upon	 allocation	 of	resources-	has	been	replaced	for	the	market	rule,	considered	as	being	more	efficient	under	 the	 mantra	 of	 privatization,	 marketization	 and	 liberalization	 worldwide.	Although	 the	 new	 paradigm	 of	 governance	 or	 the	 proposals	 on	 global	 pubic	 goods	have	been	presented	as	political	pathways	to	overcome	the	more	and	more	obvious	market	 failures,	 growing	 inequality	 and	 unjust	 outcomes,	 today	we	 are	 aware	 that	this	is	part	of	the	strategy	of	consolidating	the	hegemonic	neoliberalism;	in	particular,	by	presenting	it	as	a	politically	guided	creation,	governance	attempted	to	give	certain	legitimacy	 to	 the	 new	 established	 regime	 based	 on	 market	 rules	 and	 capital	accumulation.			The	conclusion	that	governance	and	neoliberal	governance	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin	 is	 derived	 rather	 than	 from	 the	 values	 and	 concepts	 usually	 encompassed	 by																																																									
63 de Sousa Santos, B. Beyond neoliberal governance: The World Social Forum as subaltern cosmopolitan 
politics and legality. Law and globalization from below: Towards a cosmopolitan legality, (see Introduction 
footnote 2). 
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governance	 -which	 in	 fact	 echoes	 some	 of	 the	 aspirational	 features	 of	 deep	democracy-,	 from	 the	 silences	 it	 keeps	 on	 concepts	 such	 as	 popular	 participation,	social	 conflicts,	 social	 justice	 or	 redistributive	 justice.	 Furthermore,	 governance	attempts	to	depoliticize	 important	social	 issues	as	being	questions	pertaining	to	the	technical	 realm	 without	 saying	 that	 the	 process	 of	 depolitization	 itself	 is	 a	 highly	political	 option	 and	 entrust	 the	 state	 the	 task	 of	 creating	 the	 space	 for	 non-state	regulators	once	it	has	withdrawn	from	being	the	social	regulator.	Therefore,	instead	of	 being	 at	 the	 service	 of	 a	 project	 of	 social	 inclusion	 and	 social	 redistribution,	 the	concepts	 and	 formulae	 usually	 associated	 to	 governance	 such	 as	 problem	 solving,	self-regulation,	partnership	and	coordination	and	so	on,	seem	to	be	at	the	service	of	exclusion	and	economic	polarization.			The	important	part	here	is	that	the	paradigm	of	governance	and	the	decision	making-process	 at	 global	 scale	 exclude	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 world	 population	 from	participation	 by	 keeping	 them	 in	 “non-existing”	 status	 and	 denying	 the	 inherent	conflicts	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources.	 Even	 if	 some	 of	 the	 new	 formulae	 of	governance	can	bring	some	benefits	-as	it	is	the	case	of	the	Public	Private	Partnership	in	 the	 field	 of	 health-they	 do	 not	 implement	 the	 conditions	 to	 enable	 popular	participation	or	social	redistribution	as	a	matter	of	right;	i.e.,	it	is	not	emancipatory64.					Account	 taken	 of	 the	 global	 scale	 of	 the	 new	 strategy	 and	 of	 the	 process	 of	accumulation	of	capital	 that	has	been	released	from	the	constrains	created	by	some	welfare	 states	 and	 their	 redistributive	 policies,	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 global	 public	 sphere	where	 global	 decisions	 have	 to	 be	 discussed,	 confronted	 and	 adopted	 under	democratic	 deliberative	 parameters	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 necessary	 counterpoint	 to	 the	expansive	and	rapacious	nature	of	today’s	global	capitalism.	It	also	has	to	give	room	to	 the	 excluded	by	 the	 current	 neoliberal	 globalization	 and	being	 able	 to	 introduce	counterhegemonic	 voices	 who	 challenge	 the	 conceptions	 of	 world	 development	under	the	hegemonic	discourse	of	globalization	and	governance	at	the	service	of	the	endless	 process	 of	 accumulation	 of	 capital.	 Once	 national	 governments	 have	 been	displaced	 from	 their	 role	 as	 social	 regulators	 and	 spaces	 to	 manage	 and	 handle																																																									
64 Ibidem. 
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conflicting	 interests	 and	 absent	 a	 world	 government	 where	 to	 convey	 the	 social	conflicts	 and	 to	 agree	 the	 social	 contract,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 create	 forums	 that	 while	ensuring	 democratic	 popular	 participation	 and	 being	 inclusive	 of	 all	 the	 voices,	aspirations	and	sensitivities,	contribute	to	fight	against	social	exclusion	and	promote	social	 emancipation	 by	 fostering	 social	 redistribution	 as	 long	 as	 recognition	 of	difference.		
Some	precisions	about	global	public	sphere.		By	global	public	 sphere	we	want	 to	 invoke	 forums	where	decisions	 come	 from	and	after	democratic	 inclusive	deliberative	processes.	 In	this	sense,	 it	 is	 important	to	be	aware	 that	 the	 somehow	bucolic	Habermas’	 public	 sphere	 composed	 of	 individuals	speaking	face	to	face	in	a	rather	small	space	of	a	cafeteria	does	not	longer	exist	–if	it	ever	 did-	 and	 that	 we	 live	 in	 the	 age	 of	mass	media	 and	 internet	 social	 networks.	While	 Habermas	 is	 aware	 of	 the	 decay	 of	 the	 bourgeois	 public	 sphere	 due	 to	 the	emergence	 of	 today’s	 mass-media	 which	 paved	 the	 way	 from	 a	 press	 that	 took	
ideological	sides	to	one	that	was	primarily	a	business	and	that	the	public	sphere	became	
a	 field	 for	 business	 advertising65,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 our	 purposes	 to	 reconstruct	 a	conceptualization	of	the	public	sphere	as	an	analytic	tool,	getting	rid	of	the	historical	circumstances	implied	by	Habermas’	analysis.	In	fact,	the	concept	of	public	sphere	is	highly	helpful	 and	must	have	evocative	power	 to	monitor	and	 scrutinize	whether	a	given	 decision-making	 process	 or	 forum	 enables	 the	 implementation	 of	 inclusive	democratic	 deliberative	 process	 where	 decisions	 are	 taken	 by	 rational	 collective	consensus	 ensuring	 equality	 between	 participants,	 transparency	 and	 access	 to	relevant	information.	Also,	an	instrument	to	evaluate	whether	decisions	are	justified																																																									
65Habermas, Jürgen. (1991). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of 
bourgeois society. MIT press. Habermass holds that mass media have become complexes of societal power 
which threaten the critical functions of publicists’ institutions since the new business approach to the mass 
media view this as an exchange commodity valued in terms of its effectiveness to attract publicity and 
advertising and it makes mass media more accessible to the pressure of certain private interests. Very 
precisely and interestingly Habermas says that whereas the press was able to limit itself to the transmission 
and amplification of the rational-critical debate of private people assembled into a public, now conversely this 
debate gets shaped by the mass media to begin with. In the course of the shift from a journalism of private 
men of letters to the public services of the mass media, the sphere of the public was altered by the influx of 
private interests that received privileged exposure. The separation of public and private spheres implied that 
the competition between private interests was in principle left to the market as a regulating force and was kept 
outside the conflict of pinions.    
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and	traceable	thus	permitting	accountability.	Even	if	 these	conditions	are	part	of	an	ideal	 discourse	 situation,	 they	 serve	 us	 to	 value	 the	 (democratic)	 quality	 and	legitimacy	of	a	given	decision.		By	using	the	term	global	(public	sphere),	we	do	not	mean	that	the	dynamic	and	the	proposed	democratic	deliberative	process	have	to	be	delinked	from	specific	national	realities.	On	the	contrary,	we	have	said	before	that	the	social	function	of	IPRs	has	to	be	reviewed	at	the	national	level,	pursuant	to	national	needs,	socioeconomic	realities	and	 strategies.	 Notwithstanding	 that,	 in	 many	 occasions	 the	 state	 is	 no	 longer	 the	center	of	political	decisions	or	 is	not	 the	only	 center	of	decisions	but	decisions	and	debates	that	affect	the	national	space	have	been	“transnationalized”.	The	transfer	of	“political”	 power	 outside	 the	 national	 borders	 has	 not	 brought	 about	 a	 parallel	transfer	of	 the	 formal	 instruments	of	 representative	democracy	which	 take	place	 in	national	 states.	 Furthermore,	 other	 than	 global/transnational	 actions	 or	 decisions	with	national	consequences,	there	are	national	or	local	actions	or	decisions	that	may	have	 even	unintentionally	 a	 global	 impact	 contributing	 to	 its	 reproduction	 in	 other	local	spaces.			The	 case	 of	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	 strong	 popular	mobilization	 against	 the	 prices	 of	AIDS	 and	 antiretroviral	 medicines	 pressing	 the	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 to	withdraw	their	 legal	claims	against	compulsory	licensing	is	very	illustrative	of	what	we	have	said.	First,	the	popular	pressure	was	addressed	to	support	the	decision	of	the	national	 state	 of	 South	 Africa	 about	 expropriating	 the	 HIV/AIDS	 pharmaceutical	patents	to	enable	an	affordable	access	to	those	medicines	i.e.,	the	government	and	the	national	 population	 joined	 together	 against	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 and	 their	TRIPS	fostered	IPRs	since	the	state	is	no	longer	the	privileged	center	of	decisions	in	this	 regard.	 Second,	 the	 success	 of	 this	 joint	 struggle	 had	 an	 impact	 beyond	 South	African	 borders	 and	 it	 shook	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 as	 well	 as	inspired	 similar	 reactions	 in	 other	 locations.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 cases	 of	 Thailand,	Kenya	 or	 Guatemala	 constitute	 examples	 of	 how	 some	 developing	 countries	 have	struggled	to	implement	the	TRIPS	Agreement	in	a	manner	that	protects	public	health	with	 the	 complicity	 (and	 the	 pressure)	 of	 civil	 society	 in	 fighting	 for	 the	 right	 to	
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access	 affordable	medicines66.	 Hence,	 national	 and	 global	 dimensions	 are	 narrowly	intertwined	and	interrelated	in	today’s	world.			As	we	have	said	before	the	global	public	sphere	of	health	would	be	anchored	between	at	 least	 four	 dimensions	 which	 shape	 the	 configuration	 of	 power	 in	 this	 field	 of	pharmaceuticals	and	access	to	medicines.	First,	the	institutional	framework,	it	 is	the	dimension	 where	 formal	 decisions	 are	 made	 and	 where	 the	 game	 rules	 are	established.	It	is	composed	of	both	national	states	including	law	adjudicators	(mainly	law	courts	at	national	scale)	and	international	institutions	which	have	a	direct	impact	(WTO	 and	 WHO)	 or	 less	 direct	 one	 (WIPO,	 UN,	 World	 Bank	 or	 IMF);	 second	 the	operation	 of	 the	 pharmaceutical	 business	 as	 subjects	 which	 provide	 most	 of	 the	health	 related	 goods	 and	 services	which	 are	 the	 object	 of	 regulation.	 They	 have	 to	adjust	 their	 conduct	 within	 the	 possibilities	 given	 by	 the	 market	 –including	 the	concerns	and	interests	of	consumers-,	the	game	rules	established	by	institutions	and	the	limits	established	by	social	pressure.	It	is	also	noteworthy	the	tendency	of	making	corporations	 more	 and	 more	 accountable	 through	 soft	 law	 mechanisms	 such	 as	corporate	 responsibility	 or	 “compliance”67and	 criminal	 liability	 of	 companies.	 The	operation	 of	 the	 business	 is	 also	 an	 indispensable	 channel	 of	 information	 since	markets	 and	 their	 failures	provide	us	 information	as	 to	what	 is	profitable	 and	how	operators	are	incentivized	and	to	do	what.	These	are	key	points	in	order	to	evaluate	the	functioning	of	the	industry	and	the	reality	and	effectiveness	of	the	proposals	for	their	 improvement;	 third,	 the	dimension	of	mass	media	 is	 also	 a	public	 sphere	 and	contributes	 to	 regulate	 other	 public	 spheres	 by	 providing	 participants	 with	information	 or	 just	 the	 opposite,	 creating	 misinformation.	 It	 can	 therefore	 play	 a	crucial	 role	 in	 enabling	 contestation	 and	 critical	 perspective	 and	 echoing	counterhegemonic	 voices.	 Finally,	 civil	 society	 would	 consider	 the	 non-state	organizations	identified	as	belonging	to	civil	society68.	While	the	first	two	dimensions	(institutions	 and	 industry)	 are	 the	 places	where	 relevant	 and	 formal	 decisions	 are	made,	 the	 two	 last	 (media	 and	 civil	 society)	 are	 the	dimensions	which	may	 control																																																									
66 Ford, N. (2004). Patents, access to medicines and the role of non-governmental organizations. Journal of 
Generic medicines, 1(2), 137-145. 
67 Compliance is a legal service addressed to provide the companies with tools and instruments of due 
diligence and self-control in order to prevent them from incurring any liability (mainly criminal). 
68 Germain, R., & Kenny, M. (Eds.). (2004). The Idea of Global Civil Society: Ethics and Politics in a 
Globalizing Era. Routledge. 
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and	 monitor	 the	 two	 other	 and	 thus	 adjust	 their	 operation	 to	 acceptable	 and	democratic	 standards.	 Except	 for	 the	 dimension	 regarding	 the	 operation	 of	 the	business	which	has	been	previously	reviewed	 in	chapter	2,	we	are	going	 to	analyze	next	the	three	other	dimensions.																				
Global	civil	society.	Does	it	really	exist?		We	 do	 know	 that	 capitalism	 and	 transnational	 companies	 and	 some	 international	institutions	 enabling	 the	 neoliberal	 type	 globalization	 are	 global;	 however	 the	existence	of	a	real	and	active	global	civil	society	may	give	rise	to	serious	doubts	about	its	reality.	It	is	obvious	that	it	does	exists	a	worldwide	population	who	is	the	target	of	transnational	 political	 decisions	 –in	 broad	 sense	 and	 including	 business	 global	strategies-	and	who	goes	through	multiple	cultural,	economic	and	social	transnational	processes.	What	we	want	to	review	here	is	whether	there	exists	an	articulated	global	social	 society	 which	 could	 play	 the	 indispensable	 role	 of	 representing	 the	 popular	participation	at	the	global	public	sphere,	this	including	the	counterhegemonic	voices.			The	 relative	 attractiveness	 of	 this	 concept-idea	 can	 also	 be	 a	 double-edged	 sword	which	may	 conceal	 certain	 attempts	 to	 reshape	 the	 global	 political	 order	 after	 the	breakdown	 of	 the	 cold	 war	 –and	 the	 release	 of	 all	 the	 potential	 capitalism	 from	welfare	state’s	constraints	and	concessions-	and	which	see	global	civil	society	as	an	interesting	conceptual	instrument	to	explore,	as	well	as	an	apparently	benign	value	to	promote	with	the	intent	of	legitimizing	the	neoliberal	political	order	at	global	scale.	In	this	 sense,	 the	 idea	of	 global	 civil	 society	 could	 represent	 a	powerful	 instrument	 to	exclude,	delegitimize	or	silence	groups	or	practices	considered	to	be	“uncivil”	69	and	so	consolidating	the	dominant	hegemonic	neoliberal	agenda	by	not	even	recognizing	the	existence	of	counterhegemonic	voices	(“sociology	of	absences”	in	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos’	words).	Also,	global	civil	society	can	be	employed	as	a	type	of	catchall	term	comprising	CSOs	and	social	movements	of	all	shapes	and	colors	operating	in	the	international	 scenario	 losing	 sight	 of	 their	 transformative	 and	 emancipatory	potential.	Furthermore,	there	are	some	commentators	who	challenge	the	very	notion																																																									
69 Kaldor, M. (2003). The idea of global civil society. (See chapter 4 footnote 3). 
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of	global	civil	society;	they	hold	that	in	the	absence	of	a	global	state	there	are	serious	collective	action	problems	for	global	mobilization	and	identity	formation.	The	dictates	of	 nation-state	 premises	 –national,	 linguistic	 and	 cultural	 differences	 framework-	would	frustrate	any	form	of	global	society	and	power70.			Being	that	true	and	being	aware	of	the	shortcomings	of	the	role	of	a	real	and	active	global	 civil	 society,	 we	 consider	 that	 there	 is	 space	 to	 conform	 and	 share	 a	 joint	perspective	 of	 global	 issues	 from	diverse	 national	 and	motivational	 and	 ideological	origins	 and	 concerns.	 Again,	 the	 aspirational	 existence	 of	 a	 global	 civil	 society	may	become	 an	 important	 analytical	 instrument	 to	 evaluate	 and	 transform	 the	 current	system	towards	democratic	parameters.	In	this	sense,	by	civil	society	we	do	not	mean	the	civil	society	understood	by	liberal	political	theory	i.e.,	 the	idea	of	civil	society	as	opposed	 to	 the	 state	 (which	 inherently	 would	 oppress	 and	 limits	 it)71but	 a	 civil	society	representing	the	democratic	interest	of	people	and	citizens.	More	precisely,	it	becomes	crucial	 to	see	 the	manner	how	a	global	civil	 society	or	 the	 idea	of	a	global	civil	 society	 could	 review,	monitor	 and	 counterbalance	 the	 neoliberal	 globalization	i.e.,	 certain	 expansion	 of	 capitalism	which	 does	 not	 know	 restrictions/limits	 at	 the	global	 scale	 and	 that	 does	 not	 take	 into	 due	 account	 the	 interests	 and	 needs	 of	population,	 in	particular	of	 the	excluded.	 In	this	sense,	we	have	to	 focus	on	genuine	civil	society	organizations	(CSO)	which	are	non-state	and	non-commercial	and	ignore	those	 “civil	 society”	 manifestations	 which	 are	 rather	 dominated	 by	 business	organizations	or	imbued	with	business	strategies.								The	 idea	 of	 a	 global	 civil	 society	 responds	 then	 to	 the	 necessity	 of	 overcoming	 the	absence	 of	 citizens’	 common	 good	 in	 the	 current	 construction	 of	 the	 international	architecture.	Hence,	if	many	relevant	and	key	decisions	are	taken	at	the	global	level,	there	have	to	be	mechanisms	for	increasing	the	responsiveness	of	global	institutions	to	the	demands	of	individual	citizens.	Procedural	democracy	of	national	states	at	the	global	 level	 could	not	 achieve	 at	 this	moment	 or	 in	 a	 reasonable	half	 term	a	world																																																									
70 T Tarrow, S. (2001). Transnational politics: contention and institutions in international politics. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 4(1), 1-20. 
 
71 Santos, B. D. S. (2002). The processes of globalization. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais and Eurozine, 
1-48. 
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citizenry	 represented	by	 a	world	parliament.	Once	we	have	 assumed	 than	dialogue	and	democratic	inclusive	deliberation	open	to	all	civil	society	groups	and	which	take	place	at	many	 levels,	are	 the	next	best	option	 it	 is	 important	 to	 identify	an	active,	a	real	 global	 civil	 society	 and	 CSOs	 which	 really	 represent	 individual	 citizens	 and	common	 good	 as	 a	 “functional	 equivalent”	 or	 an	 “alternative	 mechanism”	 for	democratizing	global	governance.72		Furthermore,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 the	 different	 global	 civil	 society	organizations.	Other	than	the	multiplicity	of	motives	which	are	at	the	origin	of	CSOs,	the	relevant	distinguishing	element	for	our	purposes	among	associations	is	whether	they	question	or	not	the	current	regime.	In	fact,	there	are	CSO	which	do	not	question	the	 current	 regime	 and	 the	 causes	 behind	 it;	 they	 are	 rather	 focused	 on	 the	consequences	of	its	malfunctioning	without	holding	any	critical	discourse.	Their	focus	is	on	the	private	rather	than	on	the	public,	on	the	social	rather	than	on	the	political,	on	the	micro	rather	than	on	the	macro73.	On	the	contrary,	there	are	CSOs	which	frame	their	actions	in	a	broader	concept	of	political	activism	and	which	question	the	current	hegemonic	 regime	 giving	 voice	 to	 counterhegemonic	 voices	 against	 neoliberal	globalization	 and	 governance.	 Those	 CSOs	 are	 genuine	 agents	 of	 citizens’	 interests	and	the	channels	for	inclusive	popular	participation	being	the	necessary	catalyst	for	regime	 transformation	 toward	 a	 more	 democratic	 system	 by	 actualizing	 a	 global	public	sphere.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 certain	 dilemmas	 have	 emerged	 as	 to	 whether	 deliberation,	debates	 and	 “struggles”	 between	 conflicting	 interests	 have	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 at	 a	national	 or	 a	 global	 level.	This	dilemma	cannot	be	 resolved	 in	 terms	of	 a	 excluding	dichotomy.	As	we	have	mentioned	regarding	WTO	protests	in	Seattle,	a	multiplicity	of	actors	 with	 different	 motives,	 concerns,	 origins	 and	 territorial	 scope	 were	 joined	together	 against	 something	 that	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 global	 agenda	 affecting	 all	 of	them.	Seattle	initiated	the	path	showing	that	cooperation	was	possible	among	diverse	
																																																								
72  Kaldor, M., Anheier, H., & Glasius, M. (2003). Global civil society. Cambridge: Polity. 
73 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, vid supra at 61. 
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local	activist	communities	supported	by	global	groups	that	provided	the	resources	for	mass	mobilization	around	global	justice	issues74.	Likewise,	and	assuming	that	democratic	emancipation	is	grounded	on	the	principle	of	equality	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 respect	 for	 difference,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 tendency	 that	some	CSOs	are	totally	inclined	to	stand	for	just	a	segmented	concern	(feminists,	LGTB,	indigenous	or	black	or	animal	rights	supporter	movements)	ignoring	the	general	view	of	 the	 broader	 political	 context	 where	 they	 are	 inserted.	 This	 tendency	 may	 be	dangerous	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 emancipatory	 value	 of	 some	 movements	 may	 be	gobbled	 up	 and	 jeopardized	 by	 partial	 concessions	 of	 the	 regime	 at	 the	 expense	 of	providing	 the	 system	 with	 seeming	 legitimacy	 while	 maintaining	 the	 structural	causes	of	exclusion	and	injustice.				However,	the	above	is	not	always	the	rule.	In	this	respect,	it	is	remarkable	and	fairly	encouraging	the	recent	role	played	by	the	feminist	movement.	On	last	January	21	and	one	day	 just	after	the	presidential	oath	of	Trump,	over	5	million	women	worldwide	came	 to	 march	 to	 vindicate	 their	 rights	 but	 also	 to	 invoke	 a	 fairer	 world.	 This	spontaneous	 demonstration	 and	 protest	 of	 women	 extended	 globally	 and	 went	beyond	the	specific	vindication	of	the	status	of	women.	Especially	illustrative	of	this,	it	is	the	speech	addressed	by	the	black	activist	Angela	Davis	during	that	march	when	she	 explicitly	 said	 that	 the	 march	 was	 the	 ground	 zero	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	 social	
justice75.			Regarding	health,	the	above	mentioned	perspective	of	global	civil	society	in	terms	of	contestation	and	critical	approach	to	the	hegemonic	configuration	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	as	 the	manner	 to	actualize	a	global	public	 sphere	 in	 this	 field	has	 somehow	taken	 place	 following	 the	 HIV/AID	 crisis	 that	 as	we	 have	 said,	 opened	 the	 door	 to																																																									
74 Murphy, G., & Pfaff, S.  Thinking locally, acting globally? … (See Chapter 4 footnote 4). 
75  It is noteworthy to reproduce here some of the words pronounced by the important black activist: […]"The 
struggle to save the planet, to stop climate change, to guarantee the accessibility of water from the lands of 
the Standing Rock Sioux, to Flint, Michigan, to the West Bank and Gaza. The struggle to save our flora and 
fauna, to save the air—this is ground zero of the struggle for social justice. “This is a women's march and this 
women's march represents the promise of feminism as against the pernicious powers of state violence. And 
inclusive and intersectional feminism that calls upon all of us to join the resistance to racism, to Islamophobia, 
to anti-Semitism, to misogyny, to capitalist exploitation. “Yes, we salute the fight for 15. We dedicate ourselves 
to collective resistance. Resistance to the billionaire mortgage profiteers and gentrifiers. Resistance to the 
health care privateers. Resistance to the attacks on Muslims and on immigrants. Resistance to attacks on 
disabled people. Resistance to state violence perpetrated by the police and through the prison industrial 
complex. Resistance to institutional and intimate gender violence, especially against trans women of color […]. 
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certain	 counterhegemonic	 voices	 which	 explicitly	 questioned	 the	 regime	 and	confronted	 it	 with	 other	 powerful	 and	 legitimate	 social	 interests	 such	 as	 public	health.	As	we	have	previously	mentioned,	the	Access	to	medicines	campaign	initiated	a	counterhegemonic	 struggle	 which	 explains	 among	 others	 the	 posterior	 Doha	Declaration	 on	TRIPS	 (probably	 the	main	 victory	NGOs	have	 achieved	 so	 far	 in	 the	access	 to	medicines).	 In	 fact	 some	 commentators	 situate	 the	 first	 coalition	 of	 CSOs	against	the	IPRs	global	regime	as	early	as	1996	with	occasion	of	an	event	organized	by	Health	Action	International	(HAI)	in	Bielefeld	(Germany);	Important	CSOs	such	as	HAI,	Act	Up,	Health	GAP,	Third	World	Network,	CPTech,	Quakers	UN	office	in	Geneva,	or	 the	more	 renowned	Medicines	 Sans	 Frontiers	 and	 OXFAM	 (and	 its	 Cut	 the	 cost	campaign)	adhered	to	the	movement.			A	 crucial	 factor	 to	 explain	 the	 success	 of	 the	 global	 coalition	was	 the	manner	 they	functioned.	 They	 coordinated	 concerted	 action	 among	 North	 and	 South	 CSOs	 with	national	and	international	scope	and	social	movements	either	at	the	grass-roots	level	or	 focusing	on	 international	processes.	While	national	CSOs	 in	developing	countries	put	pressure	on	their	governments	(Brazil	or	South	Africa)	to	safeguard	public	health	and	 promote	 access	 to	 medicines,	 global	 CSOs	 helped	 ease	 the	 pressure	 from	developed	countries	and	pharmaceutical	transnationals	on	developing	country	trade	negotiators	 and	 socialized	 the	 conflict	 to	 the	 public	 opinion.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	performance	 of	 this	 coalition	 of	 CSOs,	 IPRs	 are	 now	 seen	 as	 remarkable	 political	issues	rather	than	as	purely	technical	matters	thus	entering	the	global	public	sphere.	In	 this	 regard,	 the	CSOs’	network	gained	ground	 in	 the	Access	Campaign	because	 it	successfully	 highlighted	 how	 stringent	 patent	 laws	 can	 imperil	 public	 health	 in	 the	context	of	the	HIV/AIDS	crisis.76		Most	of	the	CSOs	which	were	active	in	the	Access	to	Medicines	still	remain	active	in	the	 field	 and	 they	 provide	 effective	 advocacy	 and	 campaigning,	 including	 use	 of	media,	 development	 of	 campaign	 slogans	 and	 presenting	 the	 issues	 in	 pedagogical	manner	to	the	general	public.	CSOs	perform	important	tasks	 for	the	actualization	of	the	global	public	sphere	such	as	research,	strategy	development,	 legal	and	technical																																																									
76 Sell, S. K., & Prakash, A. (2004). Using ideas strategically: The contest between business and NGO 
networks in intellectual property rights. International Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 143-175. 
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expertise,	 institutional	 presence,	 monitoring	 of	 international	 institutions,	 national	governments	 and	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 and	 dissemination	 of	 relevant	information	to	the	public.			
Conventional	Mass	media.			The	evolution	of	 the	mass	media,	 internet	 and	 social	networks	and	 their	 impact	on	society	 and	 democracy	 are	 interesting	 and	 challenging	 matters	 in	 contemporary	discussions	which	would	deserve	a	specific	dissertation.	In	this	section	we	would	like	to	remark	the	importance	of	this	dimension	in	creating	the	conditions	to	achieve	an	effective	public	sphere	where	implementing	deliberative	and	democratic	processes	of	discussion	on	public	issues.					In	 this	 sense	and	as	we	have	previously	mentioned,	 far	 from	 the	editorialist	nature	and	small	format	which	could	represent	the	media	of	the	eighteen	century	–closer	to	the	 idea	 of	 the	 public	 sphere-,	 mass	 media	 has	 gone	 through	 a	 process	 of	commodification.	This	process	has	also	entailed	the	privatization	of	some	previously	publicly	funded	media,	the	creation	of	big	media	conglomerates77,	their	political	use	and	their	global	character.	For	many	commentators	this	has	raised	important	issues	of	 conflicts	 of	 interests	 which	 deeply	 impair	 participatory	 democracy	 and	 the	independence	and	critical	role	of	mass	media78.			In	 this	 sense,	 media	 has	 entered	 the	 mercantile	 logic	 under	 which	 commercial	imperatives	 and	 audience-attracting	 activities	 prevail	 over	 any	 other	 consideration	and	 over	 the	 necessity	 that	mass	media	 could	 inform	 the	members	 of	 a	 society	 in	order	that	they	are	able	to	participate	-as	 informed	members-	 in	a	public	sphere.	 In	the	end,	market	forces	coupled	with	public	policy	have	tended	to	opt	for	private	gains	
over	 the	public	 interest79.	The	precariousness	on	which	 the	media	business	 is	based	
																																																								
77 Bagdikian, B. H. (2014). The new media monopoly: A completely revised and updated edition with seven 
new chapters. Beacon Press. 
78 McChesney, R. W. (2015). Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in dubious times. New 
Press, The. 
79 Curran, James. (1991). Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere. Communication and Citizenship: 
journalism and the Public Sphere, edited by Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. Routledge.  
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today	 with	 professionals	 and	 journalists	 badly	 remunerated	 an	 its	 economic	 and	structural	 interaction	 with	 globalizing	 capitalism	 and	 consumer	 culture	 impair	 the	critical	potential	of	mass	media	and	 its	engagement	with	democratic	values	beyond	those	formal	democratic	standards.				From	 the	 standpoint	 of	 creating	 a	 real	 public	 sphere,	 the	 commodifying	 and	mercantile	logic	of	mass	media	impairs	the	access	to	relevant	information,	increasing	differentials	 in	 access,	 bringing	about	 asymmetries	 and	 further	 eroding	 the	 ideal	 of	universal	 citizenship.	 As	 liberal	 tradition	 approach	 justifies	 that	 media	 should	 be	based	on	the	free	market	to	guarantee	media’s	independence	from	the	state,	a	more	progressive	approach	notes	that	free	market	can	never	be	a	totally	adequate	basis	for	organizing	 the	 media	 since	 it	 results	 in	 a	 system	 biased	 in	 favor	 of	 hegemonic,	dominant	 class	 interests80which	 does	 not	 represent	 many	 subordinated	 sectors	 of	society.					Furthermore,	 commercial	 rationality	 of	 mass	 media	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	segmentation	 of	 audiences	 depending	 on	 socioeconomic	 and	 educational	characteristics	 of	 people,	 purchase	 power	 and	 consumption	 habits	 of	 “consumers”.	Fragmentation	has	eroded	the	former	role	played	by	national	“serious”	public	media	–mainly	in	Europe-	as	a	public	space	for	national	discussion	i.e.,	the	decline	of	certain	public	sphere	for	national	politics.	These	different	audiences	often	respond	to	social	movements	 that	 link	 experiences	of	 everyday	 life	 (from	sport	disciplines	 to	dietary	habits	 or	 fashion	 tendencies	 or	 even	 Game	 of	 thrones	 followers).	 This	 social	phenomenon	is	facilitated	by	the	customization	and	flexibility	permitted	by	the	new	technologies	 and	 internet.	 These	 new	 segmented	 media	 markets	 generate	international	 “communities”	 beyond	 national	 boundaries.	 However,	 as	 it	 mostly	happens	 in	 social	 networks,	 these	 “communities”	 rarely	 encompass	 a	 normative	vision	which	may	be	 eventually	 translated	 into	political	 or	 collective	 action.	On	 the	contrary,	and	inspired	on	Byunng-Chul	Han’s	vision	of	our	contemporary	societies81	they	rather	contribute	to	the	reaffirmation	of	multiple	self	or	multiple	“narcissuses”	who	are	not	able	to	joint	together	and	create	a	collectivity	which	transcend	them.																																																										
80 Id. 
81 CHUL HAN, B. (2014). La agonía del Eros. Herder. Barcelona (España). 
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		Notwithstanding	this,	institutions	–in	a	broad	sense-,	the	processes	of	“globalization”	and	the	social	order	are	anything	but	stagnant	and	therefore	are	subject	 to	changes	and	transformations.	Truthful	and	exhaustive	information	is	a	must	to	create	a	public	sphere	where	governments,	private	sector	and	other	actors	are	held	accountable	for	the	 impact	 of	 their	 actions.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 main	 challenge	 today	 is	 to	 establish	information	 mechanisms	 and	 structures	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 which	 shall	 include	different	 viewpoints,	 forms	 of	 expression	 and	 which	 encourages	 full	 and	 active	participation	and	somehow	citizenship.			In	this	respect,	it	is	noteworthy	that	mass	media	are	key	instruments	with	a	view	to	promote	 communication	 and	 exchange	 within	 the	 public	 sphere.	 Specially,	 media	contributes	to	inform	and	educate	the	members	of	a	society	in	the	sense	of	promoting	a	public	reasoning	which	should	encompass	questioning	of	established	or	hegemonic	perspectives	 from	 a	 critical	 engagement82	 i.e,	 if	 a	 public	 sphere	 emerges	 from	discursive	 interaction	of	 citizens,	 audiences	 (the	 condition	 that	all	 citizens	 could	be	members	of	that	audience)	are	a	previous	step	and	a	precondition	of	the	creation	of	a	public	sphere	integrated	by	citizens	as	members	of	that	audience.	According	to	some	commentators,	 media	 should	 play	 a	 role	 of	 vigilant	 against	 injustices	 and	wrongdoings,	thus	becoming	an	agent	who	scrutinizes	critically	the	exercise	of	power	(the	power	exercised	either	by	the	state	or	by	corporations	or	other	actors)83.									
The	emergence	of	internet	and	social	networks.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 emergence	 of	 internet	 has	 motivated	 important	transformations	 in	 mass	 media	 and	 it	 is	 somehow	 behind	 the	 crisis	 of	 traditional	mass	media.	 Internet	 and	 the	multiplicity	 of	 sources	of	 information	 it	 encompasses	has	eroded	the	traditional	 journalistic	control	over	the	information	market.	Internet	promotes	 informational	 self-determination	 of	 the	 audience	 and	 makes	 them	 more	independent	 from	 traditional	 mass	 media.	 This	 alters	 the	 role	 of	 journalism	 and																																																									
82 Germain, R. (2010). Global politics and financial governance. Palgrave Macmillan. 
83 Carroll, W. K., & Hackett, R. A. (2006). Democratic media activism through the lens of social movement 
theory. Media, culture & society, 28(1), 83-104. 
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journalism	 professionals	 and	 undermines	 the	 power	 of	 official	 sources.	 Even	 if	internet	 raises	 certainly	 some	 doubts	 as	 to	 its	 limited	 access	 to	 certain	 kinds	 of	information,	 a	 tendency	 to	 increase	 rumors	 and	hoaxes,	 false	 information	 and	bias,	Internet	has	also	become	a	watch	dog	and	an	effective	instrument	to	monitor	official	mass	media84.			Furthermore,	some	social	networks	like	Twitter	have	become	themselves	a	source	of	information,	 somehow	 competing	with	 traditional	media	 (both	 physical	 and	 online	versions	 of	 traditional	 media).	 In	 fact,	 some	 empirical	 studies	 reveal	 that	 social	networks,	 in	particular	 twitter,	gives	coverage	to	certain	 issues	which	were	 ignored	by	 traditional	 channels85.	 Furthermore,	 internet	 and	 social	 networks	 contribute	 to	create	global	virtual	 communities	modelled	around	different	 themes	and	categories	than	 traditional	 media,	 national	 boundaries	 and	 political	 interests.	 Hence,	 Internet	and	 social	media	provides	us	with	 an	 effective	 instrument	 to	 create	 a	 global	 public	sphere	 by	 permitting	 inclusive	 participation,	 greater	 access	 to	 information,	 and	opportunities	 to	 engage	 in	public	 speech.	Also,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 the	 links	 and	connections	between	traditional	media	and	social	networks.	On	the	one	hand,	many	journalists	are	embedded	in	social	networks	where	they	obtained	information	since	Twitter	for	instance	has	become	a	leading	source	of	breaking	news86	and	sometimes	they	are	also	influencers	of	the	virtual	world.				However,	it	is	questionable	whether	social	networks	and	internet	actually	encourage	undertaking	 collective	 action	 in	 order	 to	 provoke	 transformations	 of	 the	 system	or	are	 just	 forums	 of	 at	 best	 individual	 self-realization,	 showcasing	 of	 individuality	 or	self-reflection	when	no	stark	narcissism.	Some	commentators	note	that	expectations	generated	by	internet	some	years	ago	have	not	been	met.	In	this	sense,	it	is	said	that	internet	 reflect	 the	 same	 inequalities,	 linguistic	 division,	 and	 the	 conflicting	 values	and	 interests	of	 the	real	world;	 that	 internet	did	not	 refresh	democracy	neither	did																																																									
84 Bucher, Hans-Juergen. (2002). Crisis communication and the Internet: Risk and trust in a global media. First 
Monday, 7(4). 
85 Zhao, W. X., Jiang, J., Weng, J., He, J., Lim, E. P., Yan, H., & Li, X. (2011, April). Comparing twitter and 
traditional media using topic models. In European Conference on Information Retrieval (pp. 338-349). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
86 Kwak, H., Lee, C., Park, H., & Moon, S. (2010, April). What is Twitter, a social network or a news media?. In 
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on World Wide Web (pp. 591-600). ACM. 
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transform	the	economy	and	that	internet	did	not	result	in	a	renaissance	of	journalism	as	it	was	previously	thought87.			In	our	view	this	analysis	is	important	since	it	makes	us	depart	from	certain	ingenuity	when	 considering	 the	 “magic	 virtues”	 of	 internet	 –which	 is	 a	 mere	 instrument	reflecting	 the	 reality	 of	 our	 society-.	 However,	we	 think	 that	 these	 conclusions	 are	premature	and	too	pessimistic	as	to	the	potential	role	played	by	the	internet	and	the	social	networks	in	the	configuration	of	global	society.	In	particular,	it	seems	to	be	too	soon	to	value	the	real	 impact	of	 internet	on	next	generations’	 lives	and	interactions.	For	 our	 purposes	 it	 is	 important	 to	 highlight	 first	 the	 emancipatory	 potential	 of	internet	and	social	networks	 to	promote	a	 real	global	public	 sphere	which	 includes	counterhegemonic	 voices	 and	 counterbalances	 hegemonic	 power	 and	 official	mainstream.	 We	 consider	 that	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 it	 has	 not	 played	 all	 the	emancipatory	potential	 that	 it	was	once	 announced	 is	due	 to	 the	 slower	process	of	creating	 global	 communities	 or	 rather	 the	 awareness	 about	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	community	itself	and	about	the	power	of	an	instrument	like	internet;	today	it	is	more	and	more	usual	to	see	how	decisions	made	at	a	local	scale	–in	local	communities-	may	be	 strongly	 contested	 from	 below	 through	 sometimes	 spontaneous	 other	 times	organized	 collective	 voices	 created	 in	 the	 context	 of	 social	 networks	which	 have	 a	direct	 impact	on	political	decision	making	processes.	 In	 this	 sense,	 collective	action	fostered	 by	 means	 of	 internet	 and	 social	 networks	 encompasses	 the	 previously	mentioned	continuous	dialogue	and	connection	between	the	local	and	the	global.			In	 this	 sense,	 from	 the	 Arab	 Spring	 to	 the	 "indignados"	 protests	 in	 Spain	 and	 the	Occupy	 movement	 or	 the	 recent	 women’s	 march,	 social	 networks	 represent	 new	forms	 of	 protest.	 Cyberspace	 is	 not	 however	 composed	 of	 an	 army	 of	 internet	addicted	peoples	detached	from	physical	reality.	On	the	contrary,	according	to	some	scholars,	the	use	of	social	networks	contributes	to	construct	emotional	bonds	which	permit	to	overcome	the	sense	of	isolation,	dispersion	and	passivity	showed	by	today’s	citizenry	 -fallen	 prey	 to	 neoliberalism’s	 attack	 on	 all	 forms	 of	 public	 space-	 in	 a	project	of	re-appropriation	of	public	space,	i.e.,	social	networks	function	like	channels																																																									
87 Curran, J., Fenton, N., & Freedman, D. (2016). Misunderstanding the internet. Routledge. 
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of	emotional	conduits	in	order	to	reconstruct	a	sense	of	togetherness	and	viability	of	collective	 actions	 among	 a	 spatially	 dispersed	 geography	 of	 individuals,	 so	 as	 to	facilitate	 its	 physical	 gathering	 in	 public	 spaces.	 Therefore,	 other	 than	 permitting	monitoring	and	traceability	of	decisions,	social	networks	are	means	and	instruments	to	 create	 emotional	 bonds	 and	 sense	 of	 community,	 propitiate	 physical	 gatherings	recovering	 physical	 public	 spaces	 and	 connecting	 local	 struggles	 with	 global	challenges.	 This	 could	 constitute	 the	 pillars	 of	 an	 effective	 and	 democratic	 global	public	 sphere	 which	 ensures	 inclusive	 and	 democratic	 participations	 and	 which	reflects	an	increasing	contemporary	feeling	of	individuals	who	stand	for	direct	action,	direct	 democracy	 and	 direct	 face	 to	 face	 contact	 and	 who	 reveal	 a	 deep	 distrust	regarding	 traditional	 representative	 systems	 which	 are	 perceived	 hierarchical,	opaque	and	elitists88.			In	this	regard,	it	is	noteworthy	that	in	a	recent	empiric	study	by	the	Berkman	Center	for	 Internet	 &	 Society	 at	 Harvard	 University	 about	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 networked	public	 sphere	 over	 proposed	 legislation	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 outcomes	 reveals	 that	 the	discussion	 process	 entails	 many	 voices	 and	 organizations	 most	 of	 which	 are	 not	traditional	sources	of	power	in	shaping	public	policy	in	the	US	thus	presenting	quite	an	optimistic	view	of	a	deliberative,	diverse	and	decentralized	public	sphere	that	–the	study	 says-	 exhibited	 broad	 participation,	 leveraged	 topical	 expertise,	 and	 focused	
public	sentiment	to	shape	national	public	policy89.		Furthermore,	 it	 is	 especially	 remarkable	 some	 global	 platforms	 like	 Change.org	 or	avaaz.org	whose	operation	fits	right	into	the	local-global	dialogue	based	parameters	previously	explained	in	the	sense	of	facilitating	a	global	cybernetic	platform	where	a	dispersed	 constituency	 achieves	 a	 feeling	 of	 togetherness	 around	 specific	 -mostly	local-	realities	and	from	where	it	is	promoted	local	collective	action90.	Avaaz.org	was																																																									
88 Swann, Thomas. (2012). Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism. Plutopress. 
89 Benkler, Y., Roberts, H., Faris, R., Solow-Niederman, A., & Etling, B. (2015). Social mobilization and the 
networked public sphere: Mapping the SOPA-PIPA debate. Political Communication, 32(4), 594-624. 
90 For instance, Avaaz webpage reports that when Monsanto started to build a mega genetically modified seed 
factory in Argentina, courageous local leaders physically blocked the construction. Then Avaazers stepped in 
to amplify their fight with a million voices worldwide. Together we went door-to-door, ran opinion polls showing 
massive local opposition, helped elect a city council opposed to the factory, and ran targeted campaigns to 
local and national politicians until Monsanto was forced to abandon the plant. 
https://avaaz.org/page/en/highlights/ 
350		
co-founded	 in	 2007	 -by	 Res	 Publica91,	 MoveOn.org	 -an	 American	 non-profit	progressive	 public	 policy	 advocacy	 group-	 and	 by	 Service	 Employees	 International	Union	 and	 it	 counts	 on	 more	 than	 44	 million	 of	 members	 along	 194	 countries	 -operating	under	 the	 claim	of	being	a	global	web	movement	 to	bring	people-powered	
politics	 to	 decision-making	 everywhere-.	 Avaaz	 is	 rather	 (but	 not	 only)	 focused	 on	global	issues	such	as	climate	change,	free	and	open	internet	for	all,	or	the	creation	of	bigger	 massive	 marine	 reserves	 and	 presented	 in	 a	 single	 format	 for	 different	languages	–with	some	slight	differences-	and	dealing	with	the	same	topics	 in	all	 the	versions.	Although	Avaaz	is	declared	not	to	support	any	specific	ideology,	the	truth	is	that	this	platform	often	supports	causes	considered	progressive92.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Change.org	 which	 operates	 under	 the	 claim	 empower	 people	
everywhere	 to	 create	 the	 change	 they	want	 to	 see,	was	 also	 founded	 in	 2007	 and	 it	claims	to	have		more	than	100	million	people	in	196	countries.	Change.org	seems	to	be	 addressed	 to	 deal	 with	 demands	 of	 local	 communities	 and	 it	 has	 differentiated	versions	of	demands	adjusted	to	the	different	national	communities.	There	has	been	debate	and	criticism	around	the	fact	 that	Change.org	 is	a	 for-profit	business	despite	using	the	.org	domain	suffix	rather	than	the	commercial	.com.	and	around	the	fact	that	petitions	 are	 rather	 focused	 on	 first	 world	 problems93.	 In	 any	 case,	 Change.org	reports	and	claims	as	 its	own	some	 important	 successes	and	victories	 in	 the	health	field94.	 With	 the	 described	 distinctive	 aspects	 of	 both	 platforms,	 both	 spaces	 are	definitely	 contributing	 to	 create	 a	 public	 sphere	 by	 echoing	 diverse	 voices	 and	 by	including	the	questioning	of	hegemonic	decision	making	processes.					
Institutional	dimension	and	democratic	deliberative	process.		Last	but	not	least,	it	is	important	to	analyze	the	performance	of	the	complex	national	and	international	 institutional	framework	in	favor	of	promoting	dialogue	and	public																																																									
91 Res publica is a community of public sector professionals dedicated to promoting good governance, civic 
virtue and deliberative democracy. 
92 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avaaz 
93 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Change.org#In_Spain 
94 such as the fact that the FDA has allowed Tekmira Pharmaceuticals to use its drug TKM-Ebola in infected 
patients under its policy of “compassionate use.” -with this expanded access, Tekmira is able to provide TKM-
Ebola for treatment to people with confirmed or suspected Ebola virus infections-.  
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reasoning	i.e.,	democratic	deliberative	processes.	In	this	regard,	it	becomes	necessary	to	 identify	 the	 dual	 role	 of	 the	 institutions	 as	 facilitating	 agents	 for	 deliberative	processes	and	as	forums	where	democratic	deliberative	processes	may	take	place.	In	this	 analysis,	 special	 attention	 will	 be	 addressed	 to	 international	 institutions	 with	impact	 in	 the	 realm	of	health	and	 to	national	and	 international	 judicial	and	dispute	settlement	processes	as	legal	adjudicators	and	last	interpreters	of	law.			The	 above	 mentioned	 Report	 of	 the	 UN	 Secretary-General’s	 High-level	 Panel	 on	Access	to	Medicines	offers	a	helpful	diagnosis	and	guidance	as	to	how	implement	at	global	 scale	 certain	 conditions	 to	 improve	 governance,	 accountability	 and	transparency.	In	reality	those	conditions	are	the	premises	enabling	the	creation	of	a	public	 sphere	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 democratic	 deliberative	 processes.	 In	particular,	 the	 adoption	 of	 some	 of	 the	 recommendations	 suggested	 by	 the	 Report	would	 enable	 internationally	 agreed	 and	 shared	 premises	 for	 the	 definition	 of	 the	social	function	of	IPRs	and	pharmaceutical	patents	following	democratic	deliberative	parameters.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 this	 definition	 (social	 function	 of	 IPRs)	 would	 be	referred	to	the	national	framework	and	depend	on	the	specific	socioeconomic	context	where	those	pharmaceutical	patents	are	called	to	be	applied	by	national	adjudicators.	The	 distinctive	 issue	 here	 is	 that	 public	 reasoning	 carried	 out	 by	 national	 law	adjudicators	at	the	time	of	enforcing	IPRs	would	be	based	on	premises	and	data	and	methodology	 agreed	 at	 a	 global	 scale	 and	 thus,	 it	 would	 depart	 from	 eventual	arbitrary,	capricious	interpretations	of	law	avoiding	critics	about	its	impartiality	and	giving	certainty	to	private	agents	by	establishing	a	model	based	on	–alternative-	rule	of	law.											Therefore,	 as	 enabling	 agents	 to	 permit	 public	 spheres	 with	 informed	 members,	institutions	have	the	power	to	put	 in	place	mechanisms	to	provide	law	adjudicators	with	 reliable	 data	 and	 relevant	 information	 to	 make	 adequate	 judgements	 and	considerations	other	than	strengthening	transparency.			In	this	sense,	WTO	shall	be	bound	to	certain	figures	and	assessments	made	by	WHO	or	 other	 international	 institutions	 focused	 on	 global	 health	 or	 development.	 In	 this	sense,	WHO	could	be	perfectly	 in	 charge	of	 among	others;	 establishing	a	 list	of	 low	
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and	middle	income	countries	where	the	implementation	of	IPRs	can	be	challenged	in	view	 of	 their	 difficulties	 to	 fulfill	 with	 universal	 access	 to	 medicines;	 validating	national	 lists	 of	 essential	 medicines	 depending	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 each	country95;	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 Global	 Price	 Reporting	 Mechanism	 and	 in	 a	 context	where	 international	exhaustion	of	 IPRs	 is	not	contemplated,	establishing	thresholds	above	which	it	is	considered	that	prices	impair	access	to	medicines	(for	instance	GDP	per	capita	or	purchase	power);	establishing	degrees	of	therapeutic	innovation	of	new	medicines	as	some	public	health	systems	have	started	 to	do;	managing	reliable	and	updated	information	as	to	R&D	costs	to	bring	about	an	innovative	pharmaceutical	–to	be	able	to	value	the	fairness	of	the	reward	given	by	IPRs-	and	profits	gained	by	each	product	and	any	public	funding	received	in	the	development	of	the	health	technology,	including	tax	credits,	subsidies	and	public	grants;	together	with	WIPO	and	WTO,	WHO	could	 also	 establish	 standards	 as	 to	what	 implies	 transfer	 of	 technology	 and	which	guarantees	are	necessary	to	ensure	a	real	and	effective	transfer	of	technology;	WHO	should	 be	 notified	 by	 pharmaceutical	 companies	 about	 actions	 taken	 to	 promote	access	 to	 health	 technologies	 and	 the	 efforts	 and	 investments	 made	 to	 procure	innovation	regarding	neglected	diseases;	WHO	could	also	elaborate	templates	(maybe	following	 the	 so-called	 Ruggie	 Principles)	 with	 the	 factors	 and	 the	 methodology	necessary	 to	 previously	 prepare	 assessments	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 granting	pharmaceutical	patents	in	a	given	national	market	and	implement	a	system	to	record	all	 the	 transactions	 of	 transfer	 of	 technology	 to	 developing	 countries.	 This	assessments	 as	 to	 the	 impact	 should	 be	 submitted	 together	 with	 the	 patent	application	or	extension	before	the	corresponding	national	or	regional	patent	offices.	In	this	respect,	national	governments	need	to	implement	an	integrated,	systemic	and	holistic	 approach	 to	 these	 issues	 and	 assess	 the	 impact	 of	 healthcare-sensitive	provisions	 within	 the	 patent	 system	 instead	 of	 dealing	 with	 them	 in	 a	 sectorial,	dispersed	manner	among	the	different	departments	and	policies96.																																																											
95 Regarding the confusion between national essential medicines and the international essential medicines list 
developed by WHO, Dr. Hogerzeil stated that any national list was more important, as it referred to the specific 
needs of the country; he also cautioned, however, that, in circumstances where a large country with many 
health problems had only some 30 essential medicines on its list, this was clearly not enough and, in such 
cases, the WHO list should perhaps be taken as a reference (special Rapporteur. 16 March 2011). That is 
why, list of essential medicines has to be national in scope but internationally validated. 
96 Mercurio, B., & Kim, D. (Eds.). (2017). Contemporary Issues in Pharmaceutical Patent Law: Setting the 
Framework and Exploring Policy Options. Abingdon: Routledge. 
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All	this	information	could	contribute	to	higher	degrees	of	transparency	of	the	system	and	 help	 law	 adjudicators	 (especially	 national	 judges)	 to	 assess	 whether	 IPRs	 and	pharmaceutical	 patents	 are	 fulfilling	 the	 social	 functions	 they	 are	 called	 to	 achieve	and	whether	and	to	which	extent	they	deserve	legal	protection	and	enforcement	in	a	given	 national	 market.	 Also,	 these	 data	 are	 the	 basis	 for	 that	 civil	 society	 could	elaborate	 the	so-called	 “shadow	reports”	 to	scrutinize	governments	and	companies’	performance	 and	 make	 them	 accountable	 as	 long	 as	 to	 remark	 misinformation,	failures	and	unaddressed	issues.											Also,	at	the	national	level,	it	is	possible	to	develop	alternative	regulatory	strategies	to	address	 correctly	 the	 mandatory	 implementation	 of	 a	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 and	 the	development	 of	 a	 global	 system	 of	 patent	 office	 administration	 –which	 enables	 a	cheaper	 and	 quicker	 patent	 application	 worldwide-	 with	 other	 interests	 such	 as	access	 rights.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 some	 aspects	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 patent	model	such	as	the	necessary	consent	of	the	National	Sanitary	Surveillance	Agency	for	the	granting	of	pharmaceutical	patents.	Article	229-C	of	 law	0.96/200	provides	that	
the	 allowance	 of	 patents	 to	 pharmaceutical	 products	 and	processes	will	 depend	upon	
the	 previous	 consent	 of	 the	 National	 Sanitary	 Surveillance	 Agency	 (ANVISA).	 In	 this	manner,	 patent	 applications	 on	 pharmaceuticals	 go	 through	 the	 different	 phases	 of	the	Brazilian	Patent	Office	but	the	final	grant	depends	on	ANVISA’s	consent.	ANVISA	carries	out	a	substantive	analysis	of	 the	patent	application	to	determine	whether	 in	fact	 there	 really	 is	 an	 invention	 and	 that	 is	 novel	 thus	 improving	 the	 quality	 –and	ensuring	the	therapeutic	novelty-	of	patents	and	ensuring	that	patents	are	in	line	with	national	 interest	 in	 both	 IPRs	 and	 public	 health	 policies.	 The	 fact	 that	 ANVISA	 has	rejected	 patents	 approved	 by	 the	 Patent	 Office	 has	 raised	 a	 number	 of	 critics	 by	pharmaceutical	corporate	lawyers	who	criticize	that	an	independent	group	of	health	experts	 with	 patent	 training	 now	 have	 a	 veto	 role	 over	 pharmaceutical	 patent	examinations97.		On	 15	 April	 2013,	 it	 was	 announced	 a	 further	 change	 in	 the	 administrative	 rules	relating	 to	 prior	 consent	 procedure	 involving	 ANVISA.	 According	 to	 new	 rules,																																																									
97 Drahos, P. (2008). Regulating Patent Offices: Countering Pharmaceutical Hegemon. 
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ANVISA	will	only	examine	cases	where	 the	subject	matter	of	a	patent	application	 is	considered	 to	 be	 “contrary	 to	 public	 health”	 when	 the	 application	 relates	 to;	 	 a	pharmaceutical	product	or	process	which	poses	 a	health	 risk;	 a	product,	 the	use	of	which	 has	 been	 banned	 in	 Brazil,	 or	 a	 process	 producing	 such	 a	 product;	 or	 a	pharmaceutical	product	or	process	which	is	of	interest	to	the	policies	or	medicines	or	pharmaceutical	 assistance	 within	 the	 National	 Public	 Health	 System;	 and	 said	product/process	does	not	comply	with	the	requirements	of	Brazilian	IP	Law.			
WTO	reform	towards	a	decision	making	based	on	a	democratic	deliberative	model.		Much	has	been	written	on	this	issue98.	Also,	in	chapter	4	of	this	dissertation	we	have	analyzed	 the	 lack	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 WTO	 and	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	 regime	 enabled	 by	TRIPS.	In	this	context,	it	is	suggested	that	deliberative	democracy	offers	some	helpful	conceptual	 and	 methodological	 tools	 to	 address	 some	 of	 the	 poorly	 democratic	international	 decision-making	 in	 place.	 In	 this	 sense,	 without	wishing	 to	 engage	 in	repetition	 and	 assuming	 that	WTO	 has	 considerable	 deliberative	 potential,	 we	will	mention	below	a	number	of	proposals	discussed	so	far	to	improve	WTO	functioning	towards	a	democratic	deliberative	forum.	Other	than	the	decision	making	processes	by	formal	consensus	which	often	entail	unequal	negotiations	where	public	reasoning	is	replaced	by	relations	of	power,	it	is	noteworthy	the	following	considerations:										First,	taking	into	account	that	due	to	different	circumstances	governments	and	states	–especially	 developing	 countries-	 do	 not	 represent	 their	 population	needs	 and	 that	some	 transnational	 corporate	 agents	 lobby	 and	 have	 a	 great	 influence	 on	 these	international	 fora,	 some	 commentators	 suggest	 that	 WTO	 should	 implement	mechanisms	enabling	CSOs	to	participate	 in	 the	agenda	setting	process	of	 the	WTO.																																																									
98 For an in-depth reading see Picciotto, S. (2006). The WTO as a Node of Global Governance: Economic 
Regulation and Human Rights Discourses. Human Rights and Global Justice.; Coffey, P., Coffey, P., & Riley, 
R. J. (2006). Reform of the international institutions: the IMF, World Bank and the WTO. Edward Elgar 
Publishing; Gerhart, P. M. (2003). The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization. U. Pa. J. 
Int'l Econ. L., 24, 1; Guan, W. (2014). Consensus Yet Not Consented: A Critique of the WTO Decision-Making 
by Consensus. Journal of International Economic Law, jgu004; Hannah, E., Scott, J., & Wilkinson, R. (2017). 
Reforming WTO-civil society engagement. World Trade Review, 1-22; Higgott, R., & Erman, E. (2010). 
Deliberative global governance and the question of legitimacy: what can we learn from the WTO?. Review of 
International Studies, 36(02), 449-470. 
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Representatives	 of	 civil	 society	 maybe	 from	 the	World	 Social	 Forum	may	 propose	issues	 to	 be	 addressed	 by	 WTO	 members	 around	 not	 only	 trade-related	 subjects	currently	in	WTO	treaties	but	also	in	issues	such	as	labor	standards	(the	controversial	“social	clause”99),	poverty	alleviation,	debt	and	finance	or	sustainable	development100.	Also,	 further	 transparency	 of	 the	 decision	making	 processes	 are	 required	 to	 avoid	opaque,	 secretive	 spaces	 and	 enable	 CSOs	 to	 scrutinize	 the	 performance	 and	 the	positions	of	deciding	members	and	make	them	accountable.			Second,	 it	 is	missing	a	more	intense	cooperation	and	integration	of	WTO	with	other	international	organizations.	Linkages	of	WTO	with	WIPO	for	IPRs	or	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 (OHCHR)	 or	 United	 Nations	 Development	Programme	(UNDP),	and	especially	WHO	regarding	pharmaceutical	patents	are	more	than	evident.	Those	other	international	organizations	should	be	duly	represented	in	the	 decision	 making	 process	 of	 WTO	 at	 the	 time	 of	 presenting	 legal	 or	 executive	proposals	 affecting	 specific	 fields.	This	 representation	 could	be	at	 first	materialized	through	mandatory	previous	impact	assessment	reports	to	be	publicly	available.		Third,	 developing	 countries’	 participation	 should	 be	 ensured	 by	 providing	 WTO	secretariat	 with	 sufficient	 resources	 and	 staff	 to	 assist	 technically	 to	 developing	countries	 and	 their	 representatives.	 Furthermore,	 developing	 countries	 of	 different	geographic	 areas	 should	 be	 duly	 represented	 in	 Green	 Room	 and	 other	 informal	meetings.					
Dispute	 Settlement	 Understanding	 and	 the	 Appellate	 Body.	 The	 case	 for	 an	 ‘all	 the	
factors’	approach		Much	of	the	power	of	WTO	and	what	makes	WTO	unique	is	the	procedures	address	to	enforce	 its	 rules	 through	 adjudication	 of	 disputes	 between	member	 states	 and	 the	quasi-judicial	 nature	of	 its	Appellate	Body	 (AB).	 If	 a	member	 state	 considers	 that	 a	
																																																								
99 Chan, A. (2003). Racing to the bottom: international trade without a social clause. Third World Quarterly, 
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measure	adopted	by	another	member	state	has	deprived	it	of	a	benefit	accruing	to	it	under	one	of	the	covered	agreements	and	after	a	60	day	period	of	consultations,	the	complainant	 state	 may	 request	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 Panel	 composed	 of	 three	members	 appointed	 ad	 hoc	 by	 the	 Secretariat	 of	 the	WTO.	 Decisions	made	 by	 the	Panel	 can	 be	 appealed	 before	 the	 Appellate	 Body.	 Unlike	 the	 Panels,	 the	 Appellate	Body	 is	 a	permanent	 institution	 composed	of	 seven	members	 -three	of	whom	shall	serve	on	any	one	case	serving	in	rotation-	appointed	for	a	four-year	term,	renewable	once	 among	 persons	 recognized	 authority,	 with	 demonstrated	 expertise	 in	 law,	
international	 trade	 and	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 covered	 agreements	 generally	 and	
unaffiliated	 with	 any	 government	 (art.	 17	 of	 the	 Understanding	 on	 Rules	 and	Procedures	 Governing	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Disputes).	 The	 Appellate	 Body	 takes	decisions	in	the	form	of	reports	to	the	Dispute	Settlement	Body	(DSB).	These	reports	have	to	be	adopted	within	thirty	days.	States	are	required	to	implement	the	decisions	within	a	reasonable	period	by	bringing	their	domestic	regulations	into	line	with	the	report.			Due	to	the	unique	WTO	system	ensuring	the	enforceability	of	its	decisions	(reports),	the	 Appellate	 Body	 (AB)	 has	 become	 an	 international	 economic	 court	 in	 all	 but	name101which	 has	 the	 power	 to	 review	 the	 validity	 of	 regulations	 and	 even	 laws	enacted	by	legislatures.	The	approach	taken	by	AB	to	interpret	WTO	meta-regulation	rules	 (rules	 governing	 how	 states	 should	 regulate)102has	 been	 considered	 as	 being	too	 formalist	by	 stressing	a	 literal	 approach	 to	 interpretation	of	WTO	 law	as	 if	 this	was	 a	 self-contained,	 self-referential	 system	of	 rules	which	often	 conceals	 a	 chosen	policy	 outcome103.	 In	 this	 respect,	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 that	WTO	 rules	 have	 an	important	 impact	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 law	 –which	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	 effective	compliance	mechanisms-	 some	 commentators	 suggest	 that	WTO	obligations	 do	not	constitute	a	self-contained	regime	and	thus	it	should	be	interpreted	in	line	with	other	provisions	 of	 international	 law,	 including	 human	 rights104.	 Other	 commentators																																																									
101 Neuwahl, N. A. (2001). JHH Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA-Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade. European Foreign Affairs Review, 6(1), 144-145. 
102 Morgan, B. (2003). The economization of politics: Meta-regulation as a form of nonjudicial legality. Social & 
legal studies, 12(4), 489-523. 
103 Picciotto, S. (2005). The WTO's appellate body: Legal formalism as a legitimation of global governance. 
Governance, 18(3), 477-503. 
104 Pauwelyn, Joost. The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How far can we go? ... (See chapter 4 
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consider	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 construct	 a	 superior	 framework	 that	 elevates	 to	 a	primary	position	some	superior	public	goods	and	values	such	as	access	to	knowledge,	access	 to	 medicines,	 cultural	 diversity	 and	 biological	 diversity.	 In	 this	 sense,	interpretation	 of	 WTO	 rules	 would	 be	 subordinated	 to	 these	 principles,	 to	 be	supported	only	where	they	prove	to	be	consistent.105			Furthermore,	the	thesis	held	in	this	dissertation,	i.e.,	the	conceptualization	of	IPRs	as	a	 set	 of	 contingent,	 historical,	 political	 rights/privileges	 vested	 with	 property	prerogatives	as	long	as	they	fulfil	with	their	social	functions	in	relation	to	which	IPRs	are	instrumental,	does	not	even	need	to	resort	to	other	bodies	of	law	or	depart	from	the	 same	 IPRs	 legislation	 to	 qualify	 or	 temper	 the	 absolutist,	 iuris	 et	 de	 iure	application,	implementation	and	interpretation	of	IPRs.	A	plain,	literal	interpretation	of	 WTO	 rules,	 in	 particular	 of	 TRIPS	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 a	 pretext	 to	 promote	 an	interested,	partial	and	neoliberal	reading	of	IPRs	which	decontextualize	IPRs	from	the	socioeconomic	 and	 political	 context	where	 IPRs	 are	 implemented.	 On	 the	 contrary,	we	 have	 seen	 that	 a	 full	 of	 sense	 an	 optimal	 policy	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 IPRs	 regime	involves	more	than	conferring	a	set	of	proprietary	rights	 to	 their	 titleholders	and	 it	requires	the	monitoring	of	their	application	and	implementation	in	the	specific	social	and	economic	context	and	the	assessment	as	to	the	achievement	of	the	political	and	legal	 goals	 associated	 with	 their	 enforceability.	 In	 this	 sense,	 IPRs	 should	 be	presumed	 to	 fulfil	 the	 social	 functions	 that	 justify	 their	 enforceability	 but	 this	presumption	 may	 be	 open	 to	 be	 subject	 to	 rebuttal	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 what	 is	 really	happening	 with	 the	 application	 of	 the	 specific	 IPRs	 whose	 full	 enforceability	 is	claimed.										In	order	to	make	the	DSU	and	AB	process	conducive	and	prone	to	this	new	paradigm	related	to	the	 interpretation	of	 IPRs	 in	accordance	with	 its	real	nature,	AB	and	DSU	process	should	transit	towards	a	model	of	discussion	close	to	a	public	sphere	where	the	 debate	 of	 the	 conflicting	 issues	 and	 perspectives	 should	 follow	 democratic	deliberative	 parameters	 of	 public	 reasoning	 about	 the	 scope	 of	 IPRs	 its	instrumentality	and	the	social	function	fulfilled	at	the	specific	socio	economic	context																																																									
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at	 issue.	 Without	 prejudice	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 international	 law	 and	 WTO	process106compared	 to	national	 law	and	national	 judicial	process	or	 just	because	of	this,	WTO	 dispute	 settlement	 and	 AB	 quasi-judicial	 process	 should	 entail	 different	aspects	enabling	the	system	to	be	closer	to	a	real	deliberative	public	sphere	and	gain	so	in	legitimacy.			In	this	sense,	different	proposals	have	been	suggested	regarding	transparency	and	a	greater	 involvement	 and	 participation	 of	 civil	 society	 through	 the	 mechanisms	 of	
amicus	 curiae	 briefs107;	 while	 under	 the	 rubric	 of	 transparency	 it	 is	 defended	 the	possibility	 of	 opening	 the	 panel	 and	 the	 appellate	 hearings	 to	 the	 public,	 amicus	
curiae	briefs	 –already	 contemplated	 in	 DSU	 rules	 if	 they	 are	 “pertinent	 and	 useful”	(EC-Sardines	(2002)-,	a	greater	involvement	of	civil	society	could	be	achieved	through	the	general	acceptance	of	submissions	by	CSOs	and	other	actors	an	representatives	of	the	civil	society	of	reports	as	amicus	curiae	reports	(Also	unsolicited	ones).	Also	and	in	order	to	strengthen	the	information	of	participating	members	and	civil	society,	in	cases	where	 pharmaceutical	 patents	may	 impair	 access	 to	medicines	 and	 rights	 to	health,	 submission	 by	 WHO	 of	 health	 impact	 assessment	 reports	 should	 be	established	as	mandatory	expert	reports	in	the	process.		
The	role	of	the	Judiciary:	a	safeguard	for	a	genuine	and	coherent	application	of	law?						The	role	of	the	judiciary	as	the	most	authoritative	law	adjudicator	and	interpreter	of	law	 becomes	 one	 of	 the	 cornerstone	 pieces	 for	 the	 materialization	 of	 an	interpretation	of	law	in	accordance	with	the	interpretative	approach	presented	in	this	dissertation.	 It	 is	 not	 that	 we	 consider	 judges	 or	 law	 courts	 as	 heroic	 agents	 (or	angels)	of	change	who	would	be	part	of	a	virtuous	species	of	human	beings	insulated																																																									
106 See Yerxa, Rufus, and Bruce Wilson, eds. (2005). Key issues in WTO dispute settlement: the first ten 
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still room for diplomatic flexibility.     
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from	the	sins	and	corruptions	from	the	rest	of	mortals	and	capable	of	bringing	about	spectacular	 social	 transformations.	 The	 relevance	 of	 judges	 and	 law	 courts	 for	 our	purposes	is	that	it	is	mostly	at	this	stage	(judicial)	when	it	should	be	implemented	a	coherent	 application	 and	 interpretation	 of	 the	 legal	 institution	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 set	 of	historically	contingent	and	political	rights	vested	with	property	prerogatives	for	the	fulfilment	 of	 their	 inherent	 social	 functions.	 In	 fact,	 the	 main	 problem	 and	dysfunctions	 observed	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 patent	 system	 have	 raised	 from	 a	formal,	absolutist	 interpretation	of	 IPRs,	as	quasi	natural	rights	which	has	distorted	the	 instrumentalist	 nature	 of	 IPRs,	 in	 particular	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 and	 has	decontextualized	the	nature	of	pharmaceutical	patents	as	legal	instruments	aimed	at	incentivizing	 genuine	 therapeutic	 innovation	 as	 long	 as	 coexisting	 with	 other	democratic	values,	goods	and	goals	such	as	public	health	and	access	to	medicines	on	a	fair,	balanced	and	rational	basis.	Rather	than	the	(also	important)	enactment	of	legal	amendments,	this	thesis	holds	and	claims	a	more	rational	and	coherent	application	of	IPRs	 by	 law	 adjudicators	 in	 view	 of	 the	 historic,	 legal	 and	 political	 foundations	 of	IPRs.			Hence,	 the	potential	 and	adequacy	of	 the	 judiciary	 to	put	 in	place	an	 interpretation	based	on	 the	 approach	held	 in	 this	dissertation	 follows	 three	 lines	of	motives;	 first	that	law	adjudicators	are	in	charge	of	scrutinize	and	monitor	IPRs	along	their	life	and	thus	they	can	analyze	the	impact	of	pharmaceutical	patents	on	a	case	by	case	basis	in	the	 specific	 socioeconomic	 context	 where	 IPRs	 are	 being	 applied;	 second,	 that	 the	presumed	independence	of	law	courts	and	judges	and	certain	institutional	structures	and	guarantees	may	contribute	 to	 shield	 their	decisions	 from	undesirable	 influence	and	capture	of	judicial	behavior	and	judicial	decision	making;	and	third,	the	potential	of	 the	 judicial	 system,	 especially	 constitutional	 courts	 as	 spaces	 for	 deliberative	democracy.	The	perspective	taken	here	about	the	role	of	the	judiciary	in	relation	with	IPRs	application	is	anchored	and	it	is	the	subject	of	more	intense	and	general	debates	about	 the	 role	of	 the	 judiciary	and	 the	 separation	of	powers	and	which	 range	 from	those	 visions	 conceiving	 the	 judiciary	 as	mere	 “law	 enforcers”	 (positivism)	 to	 those	theories	which	view	the	judiciary	as	active	agents	of	change	(judicial	activism)	and	all	the	intermediate	considerations	among	both	extremes.																		
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In	 particular,	 and	 beginning	 from	 the	 first	 set	 of	 motives;	 the	 social	 function	 of	property,	 namely,	 the	 social	 function	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 can	 be	 mostly	analyzed	and	scrutinized	once	the	right	at	issue	has	been	entered	the	legal	order	and	it	 is	 susceptible	 of	 being	 enforced	 i.e.,	 the	 grant	 of	 exclusive	 rights	 based	 on	 a	pharmaceutical	patent	law	which	is	protected	by	IPRs	law	of	a	given	country	does	not	imply	per	se	that	those	exclusive	rights	or	legal	monopoly	are	been	used	in	a	manner	contrary	 to	 the	 social	 functions	 that	 give	 IPRs	 -and	 the	 specific	 pharmaceutical	patent-	 meaning,	 value	 and	 ultimately,	 enforceability	 against	 infringers.	 On	 the	contrary,	IPRs	are	presumed	to	fulfil	their	inherent	social	functions.			However,	 logically	 enough,	 that	 presumption	 (being	 used	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	social	 functions)	 could	 be	 challenged	 by	 a	 third	 party	 –private	 citizens,	 or	 a	manufacturer	of	generics	or	the	state	itself-	other	than	the	titleholder	of	IPRs	mostly	in	the	context	of	a	legal	dispute	about	the	infringement	of	the	exclusive	rights	granted	by	pharmaceutical	patents,	or	a	declarative	process	about	the	no-infringing	nature	of	certain	uses	of	 the	patented	subject-matter	or	even	an	eventually	 instituted	process	address	 to	declare	 that	 a	pharmaceutical	 patent	 (or	 certain	 IPRs)	does	not	 fulfil	 its	inherent	social	 functions.	Therefore,	 the	analysis	as	to	the	adequate	use	of	IPRs	will	be	 mostly	 elucidated	 before	 the	 judiciary.	 The	 problem	 does	 not	 lie	 in	 the	 legal	wording	of	 the	 law	but	 in	 its	 interpretation.	 It	 seems	clear	 that	 the	very	same	 legal	wording	 may	 bring	 about	 substantially	 different	 outcomes	 depending	 on	 the	premises	under	which	law	is	interpreted	and	applied.			In	 line	with	what	has	been	said	by	prominent	 IP	scholars	such	as	Lessig,	Lemley	or	Merges,	IP	policy	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	provision	of	a	clear	set	of	property	rights	–and	then	getting	the	government	out	of	the	way-108,	but	it	is	necessary	to	keep	track	of	the	performance	of	those	rights	beyond	the	 initial	conditions	of	appropriation,	 to	monitor	their	socioeconomic	impact	and	the	conduct	deployed	by	their	titleholders	to	ensure	 that	 IPRs	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 are	 fulfilling	 their	 inherent	 social	functions.	In	this	sense	and,	apart	from	the	role	played	by	other	institutions	and	civil	society	 within	 a	 desirable	 public	 sphere	 –and	 with	 substantial	 and	 traceable																																																									
108 Merges, Robert P. Justifying intellectual property. (see chapter 6 footnote 95). 
361		
information-	in	monitoring	the	pharmaceutical	companies	conduct	in	a	given	country,	it	 will	 be	mostly	 for	 the	 judiciary	 to	 value	 and	 decide	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis	 the	adequacy	of	the	use	of	IPRs,	and	in	particular	of	pharmaceutical	patents.										Inspired	on	an	Aristotelian	perspective	of	the	judicial	 function,	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	the	 nature	 of	 practical	 reasoning	 and	 the	 evaluation	 of	 whether	 certain	pharmaceutical	 patent	 rights	 deserve	 to	 be	 adequately	 enforced	 goes	 beyond	 the	phase	of	law	enactment	and	it	is	elucidated	on	a	case	by	case	basis;	there	is	no	such	thing	as	universal	and	clear	rule	fitting	all	the	cases	we	are	discussing.	Decisions	on	this	 field	 will	 be	 intensely	 and	 inevitably	 fact	 dependent.	 As	 in	 the	 Aristotelian	metaphor109where	while	the	stone	is	what	really	matters,	the	contour	of	that	stone	is	not	always	clear,	and	reasonable	people	may	reasonable	discern	its	shape,	lawmakers	cannot	 anticipate	 all	 circumstances	 and	 it	 is	 for	 the	 judges	 to	 develop	 an	 objective	understanding	of	 the	 law	and	 justice	 adapted	 to	 the	 case	at	 issue,	 a	decision	which	will	 be	 the	 result	 of	 a	 reasoning	 process	 which	 is	 inevitably	 interpretative	 and	contestable.	In	this	sense,	we	are	not	thinking	here	of	a	judge	creating	new	law,	but	-paraphrasing	partly	Professor	Gregory	S.	Alexander110-,	we	mean	a	 lawful	 judge,	 the	
judge	 who	 realizes	 that	 legality	 means	 supporting	 the	 legal	 framework	 as	 a	 whole.	
Acting	equitably,	Aristotle	tells	us,	is	not	acting	outside	or	against	the	law.	Much	to	the	
contrary,	equity	actually	promotes	the	law	by	making	it	operate	better;	the	legal	system	
works	 best	 when	 legislators	 know	 that	 defects	 in	 their	 products	 will	 not	 necessarily	
result	 in	 injustice	 because,	 -we	 would	 add-	 law	 adjudicators	 will	 interpret	 the	 law	within	 the	 specific	 socioeconomic	 context	 where	 the	 law	 is	 applied	 and	 by	considering	the	legal	framework	as	a	whole.											Secondly,	 as	we	have	mentioned	 in	 this	 thesis,	neoliberal	 globalization	has	 reduced	governments’	maneuver	in	different	ways	in	order	to	eliminate	the	state	constraints	of	 a	 global	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 free	 from	 burdensome	 state	 regulation	 and	redistributive	 policies.	 As	we	 have	 seen,	 the	 adoption	 of	 TRIPS	 is	 anchored	 in	 this	neoliberal	logic	and	in	the	process	of	expansive	commodification	of	information	even	when	 this	 scenario	 and	 new	 international	 architecture	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 views																																																									
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expressed	by	many	developing	 countries	whose	 consent	 to	 the	 creation	of	 the	new	IPRs	regime	 is	questionable.	 Instead	of	pursuing	an	overall	welfare	 improvement	of	some	 kind	 which	 benefits	 society	 as	 a	 whole,	 some	 legal	 enactments	 and	 reforms	follow	other	less	reasonable	and	less	respectable	logic	which	has	been	even	elevated	to	the	category	of	academic	theory	by	some	neoliberal	economists	under	the	rubric	of	the	 previously	 mentioned	 Public	 Choice	 Theory111.	 As	 it	 is	 explained	 by	 this	theoretical	 approach,	 governments	 and	 international	 institutions	 have	 been	 often	captured	by	self-interested	groups	instead	of	being	concerned	on	the	achievement	of	the	common	good.	As	noted	by	Professor	Drahos,	not	all	legislation	can	be	explained	in	this	way	(as	being	the	result	of	undue	influence)	but	there	is	little	doubt	that	IPRs	regime	is	a	case	in	point.112							In	this	sense,	and	as	it	is	even	recognized	by	scholars	of	the	Public	Choice	Theory113	the	 judiciary	 seems	 to	 be	 better	 equipped	 to	 resist	 exogenous	 pressures	 and	 be	insulated	from	interests	alien	to	the	due	judicial	reasoning	process.	The	institutional	and	 social	 –the	 social	 perception	 and	 psychological	 self-perception	 of	 being	 the	agents	of	 justice-	constraints	seem	to	be	effective	to	promote	the	independence	and	autonomy	 of	 the	 judicial	 behavior	 and	 judicial	 decision	 making	 process	 and	 limit	forms	of	misbehavior	and	abuse.		Like	Caesar’s	wife,	judges	must	be	above	suspicion	and	 this	 higher	 standard	may	 insulate	 them	 in	 a	more	 effective	way	 from	 obvious	demands	 of	 lobbies	 and	 the	 political	 process	 where	 political	 actors	 have	 the	permanent	 risk	 of	 not	 being	 elected	 in	 the	 following	 election	 and	 are	 the	 target	 of	constant	pressure	from	constituents	and	special	 interest	groups.	On	the	contrary,	 in	the	realm	of	IPRs,	the	cases	that	mostly	provoked	pressures	on	judges	and	law	courts	have	 come	 from	 public	 opinion	 and	 public	media	where	 the	 controversies	 at	 issue	give	rise	to	democratic	vindications	that	claim	independence	of	the	judiciary	against	
																																																								
111 As Public choice theory can be a helpful instrument to explain how political decision-making follows the 
achievement of particular interests and it results in outcomes that conflict with the preferences of the general 
interest, our criticism comes from the fact that this approach is limited because it is based on the skeptical 
perception of individuals totally devoid of morals and it does not account for cases and individuals who act in 
accordance with ethical values other than self-interest. 
112 Drahos, Peter. (1996). Global law reform and rent-seeking… (see chapter 6, footnote 81). 
113 Epstein, Richard A. (1990). The independence of judges: The uses and limitations of public choice theory. 
BYU L. Rev.: 827. 
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undue	 influence	 of	 big	 corporations’	 pressures	 and	 interests114	 or	 from	 the	government’s	 intervention.	 In	 this	 regard,	 some	 commentators	 suggest	 that	 citizen	activists	and	CSOs	are	on	the	basis	of	constitutional	change	or	fundamental	laws.115							Furthermore,	 the	 jurisprudential	nature	of	 the	 judicial	organs	and	the	fact	 that	they	decide	on	a	case-by-case	basis	encapsulate	the	judiciary	from	WTO	meta-norms	and	its	 mechanism	 of	 dispute	 settlement.	 In	 effect,	 it	 would	 not	 be	 reasonable	 at	 this	moment	 that	 national	 judicial	 decisions	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 judicial	 review	 by	 an	international	panel	like	the	one	of	WTO.			Also,	 article	 3	 of	 the	 Rules	 and	 procedures	 governing	 the	 settlement	 of	 disputes	establishes	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 claim	 before	 the	 DSU	 the	 following:	 The	 prompt	
settlement	 of	 situations	 in	which	a	Member	 considers	 that	 any	benefits	 accruing	 to	 it	
directly	 or	 indirectly	 under	 the	 covered	agreements	 are	 being	 impaired	by	measures	
taken	by	another	Member	 is	 essential	 to	 the	effective	 functioning	of	 the	WTO	and	 the	
maintenance	of	a	proper	balance	between	the	rights	and	obligations	of	Members.	Even	if	 the	 term	measure	 has	 been	 interpreted	 broadly	 to	 encompass	 many	 actions	 of	states,	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 of	 measure	 does	 not	 contemplate	 judicial	 decisions	which	 are	 elucidated	 to	 a	 particular	 case	 and	 lacks	 the	 general	 character	 of	 the	actions	under	the	concept	of	measures	to	be	challenged.	The	term	measure	has	been	interpreted	within	the	ordinary	meaning	of	measure	as	it	is	used	in	article	XXIII	1b)	which	 contemplate	 a	 law	 or	 regulation	 enacted	 by	 government	 as	 long	 as	governmental	 actions	 and	other	 instruments	which	 are	 applicable	 generally	 and	 are	
similar	 in	 character	 to	 the	 instruments	 explicitly	 referred	 to.	 Because	 of	 its	particularity,	judicial	decisions	cannot	be	either	subject	to	WTO	monitoring116.								Finally,	 law	 courts,	 and	 specially,	 constitutional	 courts	 regarding	 legal	 systems	anchored	in	civil	law	tradition,	have	an	important	potential	to	facilitate	the	conditions																																																									
114 Protests against the pharmaceutical companies for having sued the South African Government reveals 
what we have said.  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/protest-in-britain-as-drug-companies-
sue-south-african-government-5366011.html  
115 Cole, David. (2016). Engines of Liberty: The Power of Citizen Activists to Make Constitutional Law. Basic 
Books. The author notes how CSOs are crucial to speak for, lead and enable the movements and have the 
capacity to press for change.  
116 Dispute DS76. Japan — Measures Affecting Agricultural Products. 
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of	a	public	sphere	where	deliberative	dialogue	and	public	reasoning	takes	place.	 	 In	effect,	as	it	happened	in	the	Greek	cities	where	the	public	sphere	was	also	constituted	in	discussion	(lexis),	which	could	also	assume	the	forms	of	consultation	and	of	sitting	in	
the	court	of	law117,	in	today’s	proceedings	carried	out	in	trial	in	a	courtroom,	parties	to	 the	 litigation	 have	 to	 persuade	 an	 audience	 (the	 judges	 and/or	 the	 jury)	 by	reference	 to	 generally	 acknowledged	 legal	 principles,	 norms	 and	 values.	 Thus,	 they	must	 resort	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 arguing	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 make	 their	 case.	 The	institutional	 context	 of	 a	 law	 court,	 thus,	 facilitates	 that	 deliberation	 and	argumentative	dialogue	could	ultimately	operate.	 In	 this	sense,	some	commentators	distinguish	between	the	informal	public	sphere	which	is	the	domain	where	ordinary	citizens	discuss	matters	of	public	concern,	and	the	political	public	sphere	which	is	the	domain	 where	 policy	 makers	 and	 other	 public	 official	 formulate	 and	 finalise	 laws	where	the	courts	of	law	would	be	together	with	parliament	a	good	example.		As	 it	 is	 noted	 by	 professor	 Mendes,	 a	 (constitutional)	 court	 might	 not	 care	 about	being	deliberative	since	there	is	not	any	historical	or	theoretical	motive	requiring	that	approach	 and	 that	 a	 non-deliberative	 court	 may	 still	 be	 functional	 and	 justifiable.	However,	courts	and	specially	courts	 that	make	an	effort	 to	be	deliberative	–from	a	necessary	 awareness	 of	 its	 limitations	 and	 complexity-	 and	 to	 go	 through	 public	deliberative	 reasoning	 to	 administer	 justice	 enjoys	 of	 a	 powerful	 legitimating	credential	and	makes	a	relevant	contribution	for	a	political	regime118.			The	 deliberative	 reasoning	 is	 specially	 emphasized	 at	 the	 level	 of	 constitutional	courts	 and	 judicial	 review	when	 important	public	 and	heavily	political	 debates	 and	constitutional	 disputes	 are	 the	 object	 of	 constitutional	 scrutiny.	 In	 these	 debates,	judges	are	expected	to	hear	and	take	into	account	diverse	voices	and	points	of	view	in	order	 to	 support	 and	 justify	 their	 decisions	 with	 good	 public	 reasons	 which	 are	expected	 to	 be	 embraced	 by	 society	 and	 keep	 the	 social	 order.	 The	 possibility	 that	constitutional	 courts	 may	 overturn	 democratically	 enacted	 laws,	 justifies	 that	 the	manner	 in	 which	 this	 decision	 making	 process	 is	 made	 gains	 importance.	 In	 this																																																									
117 Habermas, J. (1991). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of 
bourgeois society. MIT press 
118 Mendes, C. (2013). Constitutional courts and deliberative democracy. Oxford University Press. 
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sense,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 objections	 to	 judicial	 review	 is	 raised	 around	 whether	electorally	 unaccountable	 judges	 in	 a	 democracy	 should	 be	 able	 to	 declare	unconstitutional,	 and	 so	 overturn,	 the	 laws	 and	 decisions	 made	 through	 ordinary	democratic	 political	 processes119.	 In	 responding	 this	 question	 (the	 democratic	questioning	of	judicial	decisions)	and	other	than	the	argument	which	says	that	judges	or	constitutional	judges	ensure	compliance	of	enacted	legislation	with	the	“will	of	the	constitutional	 founders”,	 there	 is	 one	 more	 relevant	 reason	 in	 relation	 with	 the	concept	 of	 democracy;	 it	 is	 held	 that	 democracy	 cannot	 be	 equated	 with	 simple	majoritarianism	and	 thus,	 constitutional	democracy	prevail	 over	majoritarian	 rules.	This	 is	said	 to	better	guarantee	an	appropriate	and	necessary	system	of	checks	and	balances	 for	an	adequate	 functioning	of	 the	state.	 In	 this	sense,	 the	 judiciary	and	 in	particular	 the	 judicial	 review	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 stage	 in	 a	 long	 term	 conversation	 and	dialogue	 between	 the	 legislator	 (also	 international)	 and	 the	 broader	 public	 sphere;	the	court	would	play	a	“public	reasoner”	role	which	would	attempt	to	be	responsive	to	 arguments	 it	 hears	 and	 it	 would	 become	 a	 dialogical	 actor	 that	 questions	 and	challenges	legislature	and	executive120.				National	law	courts	and	especially	constitutional	courts	are	especially	fit	to	interpret	and	implement	the	monopoly	rights	associated	with	IPRs	and	pharmaceutical	patents	in	 accordance	with	 the	nature	of	 this	 legal	 institution	of	 IPRs	 as	 rights	 vested	with	prerogatives	 of	 property	 for	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 social	 functions,	 in	 particular,	 among	others	with	public	health	concerns121.	The	judiciary	is	embed	in	national	reality	and	society	and	it	is	apt	to	elaborate	precise	socioeconomic	impact	assessment	about	the	performance	of	IPRs	and	pharmaceutical	patents	as	long	as	the	conduct	observed	in	the	 IPRs	 titleholder	 regarding	 the	 promotion	 of	 I&D	 for	 neglected	 diseases,	 or	 the	transfer	of	technology	operated	and	other	factors	affecting	the	national	society	which	is	 the	spatial	context	where	IPRs	are	enforced	and	that	 is	 the	reference	 frame	to	be	adopted	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 and	 evaluate	 whether	 IPRs	 are	 fulfilling	 their	 social	functions.	Taking	into	account	the	nature	of	WTO	norms	as	meta-norms	and	in	order																																																									
119 Zurn, C. F. (2007). Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review. Cambridge University 
Press. 
120 Mendes, Conrado. Vid supra at 114. 
121 The previously mentioned indian case of Novartis Novartis AG v Union of India & Others Civil Appeals Nos 
2706-2716, 2728 and 2717-2727 of 2013 Supreme Court of India (1 April 2013) is a very good example of 
what we are saying. 
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that	 judicial	 decisions	 are	 duly	 integrated	 within	 the	 global	 legal	 order	 and	 to	promote	predictability	and	certainty	in	the	application	of	law	–mainly,	in	the	eyes	of	foreign	 investors-,	 national	 courts	 should	 mirror	 and	 implement	 standards	 and	thresholds	 set	 up	 by	 international	 institutions	 -as	 we	 have	 previously	 mentioned	regarding	the	eventual	functions	of	WHO-.			Also,	 in	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 national	 courts	 usually	 are	 vehicles	 through	 which	international	 law	 enters	 domestic	 legal	 systems122,	 national	 courts	 decisions	 and	especially	 constitutional	 courts	 may	 contribute	 to	 create	 a	 common	 global	understanding	 about	 IPRs	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 emphasizing	 their	instrumental	nature	and	defining	democratic	deliberative	parameters	 that	 IPRs	and	pharmaceutical	 patents	 have	 to	 observe	 in	 order	 to	 be	 qualified	 as	 to	 fulfil	 the	expected	social	 functions	which	 justify	 their	enforceability.	This	“informal”	common	global	 understanding	 of	 national	 courts,	 especially	 constitutional	 courts,	 can	 be	achieved	through	what	it	has	been	called	“constitutional	cross-fertilization”123	around	the	 interpretation	 and	 conceptualization	 of	 IPRs.	 Finally,	 the	 proportionality	analysis124	 could	 also	 be	 crucial	 to	 recover	 the	balance	between	 all	 the	 interests	 at	stake	when	it	comes	to	IPRs,	in	particular	to	pharmaceutical	patents.			 	
																																																								
122 Attanasio, John B. (1995). Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and 
Courts. NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 28: 1. 
123 Slaughter, Anne-Marie. (1999). Judicial globalization. Va. J. Int'l L. 40: 1103. While opinions rendered by 
the courts of other national legal systems are never formally binding, they have an increasing importance as 
authoritative arguments. In fact, there are more and more examples of national constitutional courts which turn 
to foreign decisions for different perspectives on similar issues. 
124 Proportionality analysis describes a particular legal technique of resolving conflicts between human or 
constitutional rights and public interests through a process of balancing. This technique of balancing, 
deliberating and analyzing from proportionality premises seems to be extremely appropriate and suitable for 
the evaluation of IPRs and in particular pharmaceutical patents, their private proprietary aspects and the other 
rights and societal interests at stake. For an analysis of proportionality analysis’ contribution to global 
understanding of judicial techniques and interpretation and implementation of law, see Sweet, A. S., & 
Mathews, J. (2008). Proportionality balancing and global constitutionalism. Colum. J. Transnat'l L., 47, 72. 
 
367		
CHAPTER	8.	 CONCLUSIONS.		My	 research	 on	 this	 project	 started	 in	 the	winter	 of	 2014.	 Since	 then,	many	 things	have	changed	especially	in	the	political	arena.	We	can	observe	the	emergence	of	new	and	unpredictable	political	movements	and	 forces	 reaching	 the	power	and	national	governments	which	have	quarantined	the	previous	global	architecture	and	which	in	some	cases	have	even	showed	their	intention	to	go	back	to	a	new	era	of	protectionism	and	 nationalism.	 Paradoxically,	 many	 of	 those	 who	 criticize	 the	 process	 of	globalization	 are	 however	 staunch	 advocates	 of	 liberalism	 and	 harsh	 capitalism.	 In	this	sense,	some	of	those	new	political	movements	qualified	as	populist	or	nationalist	are	not	against	globalization	because	of	the	inequality	generated	by	it	but	because	it	has	led	to	a	shift	of	benefits	from	some	capitalist	to	others	in	what	seems	to	be	a	fight	between	 capitalists	 rather	 than	 between	 capitalist	 advocates	 and	 social	 justice	defenders	(Trump	or	Le	Pen	are	good	examples	of	what	I	have	just	said).		For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	it	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	the	above	since	we	can	account	 that	 although	 there	 may	 be	 attempts	 to	 stop	 the	 current	 process	 of	globalization	 and	 to	 boycott	 today’s	 global	 architecture,	 there	 is	 not	 any	 serious	institutional	 or	 political	 questioning	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 regime	 in	 terms	 of	equality	and	social	injustice	that	the	system	provokes	but	at	best,	a	lamentation	about	who	are	the	new	wealthy	from	a	system,	an	unlimited	capitalism,	which	seems	to	be	structurally	 unjust.	 Therefore,	 the	 shadows	 on	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 global	 IPRs	regime	raised	by	this	dissertation	–mostly	regarding	patents-,	the	explained	motives	behind	 this	 state	 of	 affairs	 and	 the	 suggested	 interpretation	 and	 implementation	of	IPRs	-in	particular	pharmaceutical	patents-,	remain	rabidly	topical.				Although	 I	 started	 the	 research	 on	 this	 topic	 three	 years	 ago,	 the	 interest	 for	 how	TRIPS	Agreement	was	affecting	the	performance	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	the	 fate	 of	 the	 disinherited	 of	 this	 world	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 my	 professional	beginnings	 at	 the	 corporate	 law	 firm	 more	 than	 ten	 years	 ago.	 I	 studied	 IP	 law	attracted	by	the	idea	of	defending	creators	and	extravagant	inventors	whose	interests	and	deserved	reward	could	be	easily	diluted	into	the	“law	of	the	strongest”.	However,	
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I	 learned	quite	 soon	 that	my	approach	was	naïf	 and	 that	 intangibles	were	part	of	 a	very	 profitable	 business	 of	 commodities	 which	 under	 the	 logic	 of	 market	 had	 lost	their	soul	and	their	romantic	–to	my	eyes-	condition.	The	research	has	obliged	me	to	enter	other	political	 and	economic	domains	 and	other	 academic	disciplines	 such	as	political	science,	philosophy	or	international	relations.	The	different	analyses	adopted	by	all	those	perspectives	have	permitted	me	to	have	a	richer	and	more	integral	part	about	what	is	going	on	in	the	known	as	“process	of	globalization”	as	long	as	about	the	performance	of	the	pharmaceutical	industry.	Also,	this	multidisciplinary	process	has	given	me	a	deeper	knowledge	and	comprehension	of	the	nature	IPRs	and	of	patents	as	the	result	of	a	contingent	political,	historical	and	economic	process	which	is	thus	subject	to	change	and	transformation.			On	 the	 other	 hand,	 apart	 from	 presenting	 our	 considerations	 about	 the	 reasons	leading	 to	 the	 current	 situation	 and	 a	 review	 on	 the	 proposed	 measures	 to	compensate	 the	 failures	 of	 the	 system	 in	 ensuring	 access	 to	 medicines	 for	 all,	 the	thesis	 propose	 and	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs,	 in	 particular	 of	 patents.	Furthermore,	 the	 proposal	 formulated	 by	 this	 thesis	 responds	 better	 to	 the	philosophical	foundation	of	IPRs	and	to	their	genuine	nature	as	instruments	aimed	at	fulfilling	 certain	 social	 functions.	 Finally,	 the	 suggested	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	 is	followed	by	a	proposal	on	the	method	or	the	approach	which	would	be	convenient	to	implement	to	make	effective	the	necessary	adjustments	on	the	interpretation	of	IPRs.	In	this	respect,	the	thesis	upholds	deliberative	democracy	and	deliberative	reasoning	as	 an	 appropriate	 tool	 to	 cope	with	 the	 deficit	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 system	 and	 the	necessary	 definition	 of	 indeterminate	 concepts	 such	 as	 social	 function	 or	 public	interest.			The	research	presented	in	this	thesis	has	yielded	a	number	of	substantial	conclusions	which	I	would	attempt	to	summarize	in	a	clear	and	orderly	manner.	To	this	end,	I	will	follow	the	same	order	as	the	chapter	integrating	this	thesis.	In	the	first	place,	contrary	to	what	some	people	think,	the	process	of	rapid	changes	we	are	experiencing	nowadays	under	the	term	of	“globalization”	conceals	the	reality	of	a	new	 phase	 of	 capitalism	 development	which	 some	 commentators	 have	 baptized	 as	“supercapitalism”.	 Supercapitalism	 has	 implemented	 a	 number	 of	 policy	 changes	
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which	 are	 narrowly	 associated	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 agenda.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	neoliberal	agenda	has	succeeded	in	imposing	like	a	mantra	the	adoption	of	the	same	policies	 everywhere;	 deregulation,	 liberalization	 of	 markets	 of	 goods	 and	 services	(especially	 of	 financial	 markets),	 budget	 austerity,	 privatization	 and	 reduction	 of	public	 services	 (expansion	 of	 the	 commodification	 process	 of	 goods	 and	 services	previously	in	the	public	domain	or	accessible	to	all),	flexibility	and	precariousness	of	labor	 market	 and	 a	 strengthening	 of	 property	 rights.	 Values	 such	 as	 competition,	efficiency	and	effectiveness	are	sacralized	as	objective	and	scientific	standards	which	must	 be	 advanced	 by	 states	 and	 must	 prevail	 over	 other	 considerations	 such	 as	equality	 or	 social	 justice	which	 are	 seen	 as	 pertaining	 to	 the	 realm	of	wishful	 (and	naively	 political)	 thinking.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 term	 globalization	 is	 biased	 and	 it	advances	 a	 hegemonic	 vision	 of	 globalization	 by	 supporting	 the	 process	 of	accumulation	of	capital	and	expansion	of	market	and	commodification	worldwide.				The	strong	legitimation	of	markets	and	other	has	enabled	private	interests	to	handle	areas	which	were	previously	under	public	control	and	the	political	room	of	national	states	 has	 been	 drastically	 constrained	 and	 reduced.	 All	 this	 has	 provoked	 certain	emptying	 of	 the	 traditional	 democratic	 and	 political	 processes	 which	 are	 seen	sometimes	as	hostages	of	external	non	democratic	mandates	and	guidelines.	All	this	has	 had	 a	 clear	 reflect	 in	 the	 field	 of	 health.	 The	 market	 driven	 logic	 has	 also	impregnated	 the	 functioning	of	health	which	 is	 seen	as	other	market	 (another	one)	with	 promising	 opportunities	 of	 business.	 For	 instance,	 WTO	 an	 international	institution	focused	on	the	promotion	of	free	trade,	has	paradoxically	become	the	most	influential	institution	for	health	issues	thanks	to	its	system	of	dispute	resolution	and	its	 capacity	 to	 enforce	 its	 rules.	 Meanwhile,	 WHO	 languishes	 in	 its	 function	 as	 an	institution	focused	on	technical	issues	without	political	influence.			Another	feature	of	the	new	global	scenario	in	the	field	of	health	is	the	emergence	of	new	actors	with	an	important	impact	on	health	and	on	access	to	medicines.	According	to	 the	 new	 paradigm	 of	 governance,	 private	 actors	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 handling	 of	public	 issues	 which	 were	 previously	 a	 matter	 of	 public	 authorities.	 While	 global	governance	and	the	participation	of	private	profit	seeking	driven	actors	are	explained	in	 terms	of	 a	wishful	political	 cooperation	aimed	at	 resolving	 those	market	 failures	
370		
which	are	overwhelming	to	public	states,	the	reality	is	that	this	implication	has	given	rise	to	a	multiplicity	of	problems	when	it	comes	to	health.	In	this	respect,	the	Public	Private	 Partnership	 which	 are	 presented	 as	 a	 good	 manner	 of	 establishing	cooperative	 bonds	 between	 private	 and	 public	 logics,	 has	 showed	 important	 and	sometimes	unsurmountable	difficulties	which	challenge	and	question	its	suitability	to	cope	with	the	health	problem	in	the	developing	world	due	to	its	lack	of	transparency,	its	 western	 vision,	 its	 undue	 distortion	 of	 local	 public	 health	 systems	 and	 local	priorities	and	 its	 instability;	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	not	guaranteed	 that	PPPs	can	be	maintained	over	time	and	finally,	the	conflict	of	interests	implied	in	the	relationship	and	exchange	of	information	between	the	private	sector	and	public	authorities.		Furthermore,	although	 there	are	some	commentators	who	view	today’s	 fragmented	architecture	as	an	orderly	mess	where	there	is	a	logic	at	the	bottom	which	make	the	different	 actors	 be	 complementary	 and	 specialized	 in	 their	 own	 function	 (an	optimistic	 liberal	view	similar	 to	 the	 invisible	hand	of	 the	market),	 the	 truth	 is	 that	the	system	represents	an	example	of	anarchy	where	many	efforts	are	duplicated	and	dispersed,	an	anarchy	where	the	law	of	the	strongest	is	imposed	and	that	makes	the	market	logic	prevail	over	any	other	consideration	of	public	health	or	universal	access	to	health	services	such	as	the	access	to	medicines.	Also,	by	making	health	a	sectorial	field	 to	 be	 dealt	 with,	 the	 link	 equity-health	 is	 decoupled	 and	 health	 is	 mostly	perceived	as	a	necessary	element	or	ingredient	for	the	society	to	be	fully	productive.			Finally,	 the	 signature	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 constitutes	 one	 benchmark	 in	 the	development	of	capitalism,	in	particular,	by	linking	free	trade	and	all	its	international	machinery	 (particularly	 the	 binding	 nature	 of	 its	 dispute	 settlement	 system)	 with	IPRs,	 IPRs	 defenders	 have	 achieved	 that	 IPRs	 protection	 is	 provided	 worldwide	pursuant	 developed	 economies’	 standards.	 The	 explicit	 limitations	 and	 exceptions	provided	 by	 TRIPS	 are	 generally	 underused	 due	 to	 the	 implicit	 threat	 of	 western	countries	or	because	poor	capacity	of	developing	countries	 to	make	use	of	 them.	 In	any	case,	we	conclude	that	after	more	than	20	years	since	its	signature,	TRIPS	has	not	brought	 the	benefits	and	virtues	which	were	once	announced.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	does	not	 appear	 that	 TRIPS	 has	 contributed	 to	 bring	 about	 greater	 technology	 transfer,	
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innovative	 processes	 or	 foreign	 investments.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 may	 have	jeopardized	public	health	and	access	to	medicines.	Secondly,	one	of	the	main	actors	in	the	new	scenario	of	health	and	in	particular	in	the	access	to	medicines	and	pharmaceutical	patents	are	integrated	by	the	pharmaceutical	industry.	The	performance	of	the	pharmaceutical	business	has	evidenced	substantial	and	severe	shortcomings	 regarding	 the	conditions	 to	 facilitate	affordable	medicines	for	 all.	 Pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 composed	 of	 traditional	 companies	 which	 have	resisted	the	entrance	of	new	entrants	to	the	profitable	business.	It	is	also	controlled	by	 few	hands	which	 tend	 to	 get	 concentrated	 in	 fewer	hands	 through	mergers	 and	acquisitions.	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	medicines	are	sensitive	products	 tightly	 related	 to	human	 health	 and	 life,	 pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 highly	 regulated.	 However,	regulation	 does	 not	 guarantee	 the	 optimal	 functioning	 of	 the	 system	 and	pharmaceutical	 industry	 has	 important	 resources	 and	 it	 strongly	 lobbies	 and	 put	pressure	on	governments	and	public	agencies	in	order	to	get	an	acceptable	legal	and	normative	framework	fit	for	their	interests.		Notwithstanding	 this,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 concerns	 about	 the	 performance	 of	 the	pharmaceutical	 industry	 is	 its	 preponderant	 and	 excessive	 profit	 seeking	 of	 its	activity.	In	this	sense,	pharmaceutical	industry	claims	for	stronger	IPRs	to	recoup	the	vast	 amount	 of	 money	 addressed	 to	 develop	 new	 medicines	 are	 somehow	contradicted	by	the	fact	that	there	seems	to	be	a	tendency	to	have	a	poorer	result	in	terms	of	new	developed	compounds	and	by	the	 fact	 that	pharmaceutical	companies	spend	larger	amounts	of	money	on	marketing	and	advertising.	This	is	true	even	if	we	take	 into	 account	 that	 this	 is	 a	 regulated	 industry	 that	 except	 for	 USA	 and	 New	Zealand,	and	that	direct	to	consumers	publicity	and	advertisements	are	prohibited	or	strictly	monitored.	In	this	sense,	many	questions	arise	about	whether	there	is	not	so	much	scientific	 innovation	but	marketing	innovation.	Also,	there	are	me	too	(similar	versions	of	patented	medicines	with	slight	changes)	medicines	whose	development	is	cheaper	and	which	may	be	more	profitable	than	investing	in	a	totally	new	medicine.	These	 tactics	 may	 cause	 the	 evergreening	 of	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 beyond	 the	patent	term	and	it	constitutes	a	fraud,	a	corruption	of	the	system	and	an	undue	use	of	the	patent	regime	which	is	aimed	at	promoting	real	innovation	of	medicines	in	their	therapeutic	dimensions.	
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	Finally,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 second	part	 is	 concerned,	 there	are	numerous	ethical	 conflicts	which	arise	around	medicines	and	which	receive	media	resonance.	Among	those,	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	clinical	trials	with	humans	in	the	developing	world	and	the	conditions	under	which	those	trials	are	carried	out	which	sometimes	challenges	basic	principles	 of	 human	 dignity	 and	 human	 rights.	 Also,	 there	 are	 important	controversies	 related	 to	 the	 sometimes	 aggressive	 and	 misleading	 advertising	 and	marketing	techniques	of	the	pharmaceutical	companies.	In	particular	it	is	problematic	the	techniques	deployed	by	the	pharmaceutical	industry	to	unduly	influence	medical	professionals	 and	 prescribers	 of	medicines	 through	 an	 important	 variety	 of	 tactics	(this	 including	 paying	 generously	 the	 staying	 costs	 for	 the	 attendance	 to	 biased	sponsored	 congresses	 of	 pharmaceutical	 problems	 and	 remedies	 or	 publications	based	 on	partial	 research	 or	 partially	 disclosed	 outcomes).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	also	 observable	 a	 sometimes	 undue	 influence	 and	 pressure	 on	 regulators	 and	 the	political	 establishment	 for	 the	enactment	of	norms	 favorable	 to	 the	 interests	of	 the	pharmaceutical	industry.		Thirdly,	other	than	the	shortcomings	and	market	failures	observed	in	the	functioning	of	 the	 global	 regime	 and	 also	 because	 of	 that,	 international	 institutions	 are	 going	through	 a	 severe	 crisis	 of	 legitimacy.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 have	 been	 installed	 an	intense	 questioning	 and	 a	 deep	mistrust	 in	 today’s	 global	 economic	 governance.	 In	particular,	 WTO	 and	 also	 because	 of	 its	 important	 scope	 and	 influence	 has	 been	subject	 of	 criticism	 which	 is	 directly	 linked	 with	 its	 perceived	 lack	 of	 democratic	character	coupled	with	the	parallel	loss	of	the	power	of	states	and	the	erosion	of	its	sovereignty.	Thus,	as	those	perceived	“far”	institutions	adopt	political	decisions,	there	is	not	 in	place	 the	 traditional	process	of	decision	making	where	state	democracy	or	popular	participation	operated.			Definition	of	legitimacy	is	a	harsh	task	and	its	comprehension	is	not	easy.	Noticeably,	it	 is	 said	 that	 we	 can	 tell	 when	 a	 given	 system	 is	 not	 legitimate	 or	 does	 not	 have	legitimacy	 but	 it	 is	 harder	 to	 define	 the	 concept.	 Also,	 following	 traditional	categorizations,	it	can	be	said	that	domestic	legitimacy	is	different	from	international	legitimacy.	Despite	 these	difficulties,	we	 identify	 three	dimensions/faces/sources	of	
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legitimacy	 which	 should	 coexist	 altogether	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 a	 regime	 as	 being	legitimate;	the	functional	or	systemic	legitimacy,	the	legal	or	the	legitimacy	based	on	the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 the	 democratic	 sources	 of	 legitimacy.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 upheld	 that	legitimacy	 must	 be	 based	 on	 the	 three	 sources	 in	 a	 balanced	 manner.	 Under	 this	premise,	 we	 must	 conclude	 that	 WTO	 and	 in	 particular	 TRIPS	 have	 important	legitimacy	 issues.	 In	particular,	 from	the	functional	source	of	 legitimacy	we	see	that	TRIPS	Agreement	is	not	working	out	in	the	manner	it	was	expected	since	it	does	not	advance	 in	 the	 announced	 virtues	 and	 effects	 in	 terms	 of	 promoting	 foreign	investments,	transfer	of	technology	and	general	economic	development.	On	the	other	hand,	TRIPS	Agreement	does	not	seem	to	be	 freely	adopted	by	numerous	countries	which	were	forced	to	accept	and	sign	an	Agreement	which	was	perceived	as	contrary	to	 their	 interests.	This	vitiated	consent	would	 invalid	 the	adoption	of	an	agreement	which	 would	 be	 held	 contrary	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 to	 legal	 parameters	 of	international	 law.	 Finally,	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 the	meta-normative	 character	 of	WTO	and	TRIPS	rules	and	their	direct	impact	on	the	citizenry’s	life	and	conduct,	it	is	demanded	a	more	democratic	process	in	the	adoption	of	norms	and	making	decision	process.		The	 lack	 of	 legitimacy	 of	 WTO	 ant	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 has	 triggered	 a	 reaction	consisting	of	a	vigorous	contestation	of	the	regime	by	diverse	formal	and	forces	and	organizations.	 These	 protests	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 forcing	 the	 regime	 to	 bring	about	 proposals	 addressed	 to	 compensate	 or	 satisfy	 the	 main	 demands	 of	 those	against	 the	 regime	 reflected	 in	WTO	 functioning	 and	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement.	 In	 this	sense,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 “public	 health”	 has	 opened	 the	 door	 to	 counterhegemonic	voices	and	critics	to	the	neoliberal	agenda	governing	worldwide.	Resulting	from	that	opposition	Doha	Declaration	on	TRIPs	and	Public	Health	was	approved	within	WTO	system.	 Even	 if	 Doha	 implied	 an	 important	 victory	 and	 a	 step	 forward	 in	 the	acknowledgement	of	values	related	with	human	dignity	and	human	rights,	the	truth	is	that	the	real	impact	of	this	important	Declaration	is	rather	limited.			Finally,	 the	 analysis	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 IPRs	must	 be	 reviewed	 in	 the	 context	 of	legitimacy	since	 legitimacy	has	 to	do	with	a	system	informed	by	the	 logic	of	human	rights;	 two	 bodies	 of	 law	 which	 may	 be	 perceived	 sometimes	 as	 contradictory	 or	
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conflicting.	While	 human	 rights	 contemplate	 the	 human	 right	 to	 health	 and	 to	 the	access	 of	 affordable	medicines,	 the	 patent	 system	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents	may	jeopardize	this	access	by	making	drug	access	unaffordable.	 In	this	sense,	other	than	analyzing	 the	 operation	 of	 public	 international	 law	 and	 the	 eventual	 existence	 of	eventual	self-contained	regimes	for	the	case	of	TRIPS,	we	consider	that	both	bodies	of	law	should	be	interrelated	under	a	shared	coherence.	As	to	the	existence	of	a	conflict	between	 prescriptions	 of	 both	 bodies	 of	 law,	 we	 can	 observe	 that	 the	 predicated	hierarchy	of	most	basic	human	rights	under	 the	umbrella	of	 jus	 cogens	 has	not	had	reflect	 in	 practice.	 The	 controversies	 around	 which	 human	 rights	 pertain	 to	 the	category	of	jus	cogens	and	about	the	real	content	and	definition	of	them	have	placed	them	 in	 a	 difficult	 stand-by,	 in	 a	 discursive	 ethos	 without	 emancipatory	 potential.	Also,	the	detailed	provisions	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	versus	the	more	dispersed	and	vague	language	of	human	rights	suggests	that	the	confrontation	of	both	bodies	of	law	before	 a	 given	 normative	 conflict	will	 not	 be	 very	 helpful.	 Also,	 some	 creative	 and	inventive	 manifestations	 may	 be	 also	 subject	 to	 both	 IPRs	 and	 Human	 Rights	 so	hypothetically	it	could	happen	that	there	could	be	a	conflict	between	diverse	human	rights.	 Even	 if	 human	 rights’	 emancipatory	 force	 is	 weak,	 human	 rights	 play	 and	important	 role	 at	 the	 time	 of	 informing	 and	 impregnating	 the	 application	 of	 other	bodies	 of	 law.	 In	 this	 sense,	we	 believe	 that	 the	 application	 and	 implementation	 of	IPRs	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 the	 language	 and	 the	 approach	 conferred	 by	 human	rights	as	instruments	to	ensure	human	dignity.			Fourthly,	GPGs	 and	 global	 public	 interests	 have	been	 formulated	 and	mentioned	 as	legal	and	institutional	instruments	in	order	to	respond	to	the	market	failures	and	the	challenges	 of	 collective	 action	 oriented	 to	 address	 the	 globalization	 process	 under	political	 and	 more	 “human”	 processes.	 Borrowed	 from	 economics,	 GPGs	 theory	attempts	 to	 apply	 this	 figure	 to	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	 problems	 in	 the	 context	 of	globalization.	This	theory	has	been	the	result	of	the	UNPD	Program	at	the	beginning	of	this	century.	GPGs	approach	calls	for	collective	action	of	public	and	private	actors	to	provide	GHGs	whose	lack	of	provision	are	said	to	be	at	the	origin	of	the	observed	shortcomings.		
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In	spite	of	the	good	reception	that	GPGs	received	at	its	debut,	its	evocative	power	and	its	 practical	 utility	 was	 gradually	 diluting	 as	 the	 criticism	 revealed	 GPGs	shortcomings.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 health	 does	 not	 receive	 a	 specific	 treatment	 by	(UNPD)	 GPGs	 theory	 except	 for	 some	 excerpts	 which	 address	 health	 as	 an	instrumental	factor	in	favor	of	greater	productivity	and	free	markets	and	fluid	traffic	of	 trade.	Furthermore,	GPGs	 is	neither	clear	nor	concise.	Far	 from	being	a	scientific	and	 analytical	 tool,	 GPGs	 theory	 does	 not	 question	 any	 of	 the	 premises	 of	 today’s	global	 regime	which	GPGs	 theory	 takes	 for	 granted	 and	 assumes	 as	 irreversible.	 In	fact	the	authors	of	this	theory	have	published	three	books	in	an	attempt	to	achieve	a	theoretical	 consistence	 which	 does	 not	 mean	 to	 be	 successful	 in	 view	 of	 the	 poor	repercussion	of	this	theory	nowadays.	Also,	the	ambitious	pretentions	of	GPGs	do	not	have	a	consistent	translation	to	practice	and	reality	when	it	comes	to	details.	In	this	sense,	GPGs	approach	does	not	specify	which	measures	have	to	be	adopted	in	order	to	make	their	purposes	effective.	On	the	other	hand,	GPGs	theory	does	not	account	for	the	 distributive	 consequences	 that	 a	 given	 decision	may	 bring	 about.	 In	 this	 sense,	some	GPGs	may	be	 incompatible	 and	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 opt	 for	 one	or	 another,	 this	election	 having	 important	 distributive	 consequences	 which	 GPGs	 do	 not	 consider.	Because	of	all	this,	GPGs	should	be	rather	categorized	as	a	rhetoric	device	directed	to	justify	 the	 hegemonic	 discourse	 under	 which	 the	 global	 architecture	 has	 been	constructed.															The	concepts	of	public	interest,	public	policy	and	ordre	public	are	old	acquaintances	of	the	legal	tradition.	On	the	occasion	of	the	transition	from	apolitical	regime	based	on	the	sovereignty	of	the	states	to	the	multilateral	and	multilayered	global	architecture,	a	 renewed	 interest	 has	 emerged	 around	 these	 figures	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 articulate	conveniently	 the	 perceived	 melting	 between	 previously	 well	 separate	 public	 and	private	 spheres.	Apart	 from	 the	 formal	 legal	meanings	 in	 the	different	 jurisdictions	(more	state	centered	in	the	case	of	Roman	legal	traditions	and	not	necessarily	linked	with	 government	 but	 occasionally	 in	 response	 to	 government	 intervention	 in	Common	 Law	 jurisdictions)	 this	 indeterminate	 legal	 term	 has	 found	 room	 in	 the	TRIPS	Agreement,	in	particular	in	the	general	principles	embodied	in	art.	7	and	article	8.	 Also,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 patent	 law	 the	 ordre	 public	 exception	 to	 patentability	 is	 a	traditional	 legal	 figure	 with	 its	 own	 contours.	 In	 this	 manner,	 those	 inventions	
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contrary	to	fundamental	interests	or	morals	of	a	given	community	have	been	said	to	be	non-patentable.	However,	and	with	the	exception	of	some	very	interesting	Indian	case	law	where	it	was	upheld	that	unaffordable	medicines	could	be	contrary	to	public	order,	 i.e.,	 public	 order	 was	 defined	 in	 socio-economic	 terms,	 the	 use	 of	 public	interest	 or	 ordre	 public	 has	 had	 a	 limited	 potential	 in	 providing	 an	 alternative	interpretation	of	law,	and	in	particular,	of	IPRs	and	patents.			The	analysis	of	the	main	theoretical	approaches	which	have	dealt	with	the	notion	of	the	public	 interest	reveals	conflicting	positions	regarding	the	concept	and	 its	scope.	While	some	theories	questioned	even	the	existence	and	the	feasibility	of	this	notion	in	view	of	the	impossibility	of	consensus,	either	due	to	the	fragmented	dimensions	and	different	interests	of	individuals	(postmodernism)	or	because	the	division	of	society	into	antagonistic	classes	(Marxism),	the	theories	which	have	studied	this	figure	with	the	intent	of	giving	a	specific	meaning	with	defined	legal	effects	(mainly	the	utilitarian	and	 the	 contractarian	 approaches)	 have	 proved	 to	 be	 incomplete,	 ineffective	 and	unsuccessful	as	to	their	pretension	of	giving	it	legal	substantivity	and	autonomy	from	undue	 interferences	 of	 power	 and	 other	 non-public	 interests.	 Public	 interest	 and	global	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 context	 of	 IPRs	 regime	 engenders	 –as	 it	 could	 not	 be	otherwise-	similar	difficulties	than	public	interest	does	in	other	legal	fields.		From	a	historical-critical	approach	of	the	concept	of	public	interest,	we	can	conclude	that	the	different	historical	conceptualizations	of	the	public	 interest	have	attempted	to	achieve	the	significance	of	the	common	good	as	both	an	instrument	and	goal	of	the	political	 action.	 This	 notion	 has	 been	 contingent	 and	 shifting	 over	 time	 and	 it	 has	been	anchored	in	the	distinction	between	what	has	meant	the	public	and	the	private	realm	 devised	 at	 each	 historical	 period.	 However	 and	 following	 the	 Gramscian	approach	 to	 “common	 sense”,	we	 can	observe	how	historically	 the	notion	of	 public	interest	has	been	defined	or	customized	to	the	hegemonic	needs	and	to	the	dominant	ideology	at	any	 time.	 In	 this	sense,	 today’s	hegemonic	 ideology	 is	dominated	by	 the	neoliberal	 ideology	 which	 promotes	 new	 process	 of	 accumulation	 of	 capital	characterized	 by	 an	 unprecedented	 international	 mobility	 of	 capital	 and	 the	commodification	of	knowledge.	Hence,	the	notion	of	public	interest	and	global	public	interest	have	been	today	impregnated	by	the	hegemonic	discourse	which	stands	for	
377		
liberalization,	 deregulation,	 efficiency	 and	 unrestrained	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 by	reducing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 economy	 and	 getting	 rid	 of	 the	 restrains	previously	 represented	 by	 welfare	 state,	 distributive	 policies	 and	 public	 services	which	are	viewed	as	inefficient	and	burdensome	to	the	free	development	of	market.							It	 is	difficult	then	to	devise	the	notion	of	public	interest	as	an	instrument	capable	of	bringing	 about	 change	 and	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 law.	We	 can	 conclude	 then	that	neither	public	 interest	nor	global	public	 interest	has	emancipatory	power	as	 it	has	 never	 been	 decisive	 for	 any	 political	 or	 institutional	 transformation.	 On	 the	contrary,	it	has	showed	a	natural	tendency	to	endorse	the	hegemonic	ideology	at	any	time.	In	this	sense,	global	public	interest,	as	it	happens	with	GPGs,	plays	a	discursive	role	 directed	 to	 legitimize	 the	 established	 order,	 the	 status	 quo	 thanks	 to	 its	seemingly	objective	semblance.				It	is	at	this	point	that	it	could	be	noteworthy	to	question	whether	the	relevance	of	this	concept	 resides	 in	 how	 to	 elaborate	 that	 public	 interest	 rather	 than	 in	 its	 specific	meaning.	The	emphasis	should	be	therefore	on	the	manner	in	which	the	consensus	is	constructed.	Once	we	have	renounced	to	achieve	a	precise	significance	of	the	notion	of	public	interest	and	in	order	to	make	the	public	interest	be	an	operative	concept	to	monitor	 political	 decisions–i.e.	 to	 evaluate	 that	 the	 decisions	 have	 been	 adopted	 in	furtherance	of	that	public	interest-	the	public	interest	should	be	the	result	of	a	socio-political	debate	on	the	objectives	and	priorities	of	society,	a	shared	understanding	of	the	 common	good	based	on	a	model	 of	 deliberative	democracy	 and	 communicative	action.	In	this	sense,	the	identification	of	public	interest	should	be	based	on	a	case	by	case	evaluation	and	the	demonstration	that	the	action	in	question	reflects	the	public	interest.	 This	 democratic-process	 to	 define	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis	what	 the	public	interest	 is,	 and	 in	 particular,	 what	 the	 global	 public	 interest	 implies	 can	 only	 be	achieved	 at	 a	 global	 scale	 through	 communicative	 action.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	Washington	Declaration	on	Intellectual	Property	and	the	Public	Interest	or	the	recent	Report	of	the	UN	Secretary	General’s	High-level	Panel	on	access	to	medicines	which	has	been	the	result	of	an	important	participation	of	a	diversity	of	actors	and	agents,	could	be	a	good	starting	point	to	reshape	the	policies	on	IPRs	regime.		
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Fifthly,	 as	we	have	 said	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 thesis,	 application	 of	 law	has	 been	decontextualized	 from	 the	 socioeconomic	 reality	 law	 is	 called	 to	 regulate.	 This	disconnection	 of	 law	 from	 reality	 has	 motivated	 some	 severe	 dysfunctions	 by	undermining	the	substance,	nature,	scope	and	social	functions	of	legal	institutions.	In	fact,	 this	depolitization	of	 law	may	be	a	highly	political	option.	 In	 this	 sense,	 and	 in	order	 to	 propose	 a	 consistent	 alternative	 to	 the	 current	 interpretation	 of	 law	 and	IPRs,	 it	 is	a	must	 to	revise	 the	philosophical	 foundations	of	 this	 legal	 institution,	 its	historic	evolution	and	the	social	needs	IPRs	are	intended	to	respond.			In	 this	 sense,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 IPRs	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 contingent,	 shifting,	historical	and	political	process	subject	to	contestation	and	change.	In	this	sense,	the	history	of	 IPRs	has	 fluctuated	between	 settlement	 and	 contestation	 in	 a	permanent	process	that	has	vacillated	between	the	public	regarding	benefits	of	the	dissemination	of	 technical	 advances	 and	 the	 legitimate	 economic	 rewards	 in	 exchange	(dissemination	 and	 competition	 versus	 private	 appropriation,	 protection	 and	exclusion).	Settlements	or	balances	or	imbalances	at	a	certain	historical	moment	are	placed	somewhere	 in	between	 these	 two	extremes	of	 the	road	(sometimes	 favoring	exclusion	some	other	times	favoring	dissemination)	and	are	the	result	of	the	interplay	between	 contingent	 and	 political	 ideational,	 institutional	 and	 material	 forces	 over	time.	Today,	IPRs	regime	has	evolved	towards	a	conception	of	absolute	quasi	natural	rights	that	clearly	emphasizes	the	private	proprietary	aspects	over	other	dimensions	of	this	social	legal	institution.		Also,	we	have	observed	that	the	prevalent	philosophical	justification	for	IPRs	today	is	of	utilitarian	nature,	 especially	 as	 far	 as	patents	 are	 concerned	–where	 the	brilliant	inventor	 individual	 is	 an	 exception	 within	 modern	 and	 sophisticated	 innovative	processes	supported	by	impersonal	teams	and	controlled	by	corporations-.	 IPRs	are	perceived	as	a	way	to	get	maximization	of	net	social	welfare.	 IPRs	are	 in	this	sense,	believed	to	constitute	the	necessary	incentive	for	innovative	actors	or	pharmaceutical	companies	to	engage	in	creative	and	innovative	endeavors.	Unlike	tangible	assets,	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	-the	idea	that	property	held	in	common	may	be	harmed	by	overuse-	does	not	take	place.	The	problem	for	 intangible	assets	 is	 just	the	opposite;	the	 risk	 is	 rather	 one	 of	 underproduction.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 inventors	might	 fail	 to	
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invent	or	 create	 for	 fear	of	 free	 riding	by	others	–new	entrants	without	 those	 sunk	costs-	 losing	 all	 competitive	 advantage	 as	 original	 inventors/creators.	 As	 some	inventions	are	costly	to	create	and	the	costs	of	it	are	front-end,	fixed	costs,	IPRs	will	enable	 the	 inventor/pharmaceutical	 companies	 to	 recoup	 those	 fixed	 costs	 and	sometimes	(as	it	seems	to	be	the	case	for	pharmaceuticals)	huge	investments.																									The	important	point	of	revising	philosophical	justifications	of	IPRs	is	not	to	explore	a	rhetoric	metaphysical	analysis	of	the	legal	institution	made	of	IPRs.	For	the	purposes	of	this	dissertation	this	analysis	and	the	importance	of	utilitarian	arguments	to	justify	the	 economic	 prerogatives	 inherent	 to	 IPRs	monopolies	 serves	 us	 to	 conclude	 that	IPRs	 are	 not	 absolute	 quasi-natural	 rights	 but	 contingent	 historical	 and	 political	creatures	of	 law.	Those	who	 invoke	Locke	or	Kantian	 and	Hegelian	 justifications	of	IPRs	implicitly	tend	to	suggest	that	IPRs,	and	in	general	property	rights	are	previous	to	 law	 and	 previous	 to	 the	 state.	 This	 doctrinal	 approach	 to	 IPRs	 is	 not	 trivial;	 the	configuration	 of	 IPRs	 as	 quasi	 natural	 absolute	 rights	 enables	 their	 titleholders	 to	claim	 an	 application	 of	 IPRs	 decontextualized	 and	 without	 regard	 to	 the	socioeconomic	 context	 or	 socioeconomic	 impact	 of	 IPRs	 in	 the	 spatial	 and	 time	dimensions	where	 IPRs	are	applied.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 instrumental	nature	 implied	 in	the	 utilitarian	 approach	 to	 IPRs	 confers	 the	 states	 the	 obligation	 of	 monitoring	whether	these	rights	fulfill	the	social	goals	they	are	called	to	advance.			In	 this	 sense,	 today’s	 premises	 informing	 IPRs	 regime	 towards	 a	 conception	 of	absolute	rights	where	the	private	proprietary	aspects	prevail	over	other	dimensions	of	 this	 social	 legal	 institution	disregards	 the	nature	and	 legal	 grounds	which	 justify	and	 explains	 its	 existence	 and	 enforceability	 as	 a	 social,	 contingent,	 historic	 and	political	construction	at	the	service	of	specific	social	functions.			The	 mentioned	 evolution	 of	 IPRs,	 its	 strengthening	 and	 its	 spatial	 and	 material	expansion	 to	 new	 categories	 of	 knowledge	 and	 intangibles	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 any	empiric	research	which	supports	this	approach	in	view	of	the	outcomes	provided	by	it	or	because	it	better	contributes	to	achieve	the	social	goals	attributed	to	IPRs.	On	the	contrary,	 it	has	been	revealed	that	this	new	configuration	of	 IPRs	creates	 important	global	dysfunctions	and	that,	far	from	encouraging	innovation	and	the	progress	of	all	
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societies,	 the	 current	 patent	 regime	 as	 a	 system	 of	 incentives	may	 block	 follow-on	innovation	or	slow	it.	Also,	as	we	have	seen	-regarding	the	pharmaceutical	field-	the	patent	 system	 may	 foster	 rent-seeking	 or	 anticompetitive	 conducts	 rather	 than	investments	 in	 real	 innovations	 or	 novel	 products	 with	 effective	 new	 therapeutic	effects.	Furthermore,	 the	 implementation	of	a	global	 IPRs	regime	as	 it	 is	 the	case	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	or	TRIPS-Plus	agreements	may	impair	the	development	of	some	developing	countries	–with	different	degrees	of	development	and	different	social	and	economic	needs-	and	the	access	to	certain	knowledge	or	goods	which	are	crucial	for	the	welfare	of	the	population.	In	particular,	pharmaceutical	patents	may	conflict	with	the	desirable	access	to	medicines	by	large	number	of	people	who	cannot	afford	them	because	 patents	 raise	 the	 price	 to	 insurmountable	 thresholds.	Neither	 is	 evidenced	that	implementation	of	TRIPS	is	bringing	about	the	promised	technology	transfer	and	more	foreign	investments.		In	fact,	the	expansion	of	IPRs	rather	than	being	the	result	of	a	shared	understanding	about	the	virtues	of	IPRs	worldwide,	it	responds	to	the	imperatives	of	a	new	phase	of	capitalism	which	requires	 the	commodification	of	knowledge	and	 information	 in	 its	constant	 process	 of	 capital	 accumulation	 over	 new	 realities	 and	 goods.	 Because	 of	that	 this	material	 and	 spatial	 expansion	 of	 IPRs	 has	 been	 known	 accurately	 as	 the	second	enclosure.	The	globalization	of	IPRs	also	contributes	to	keep	the	hegemony	of	developed	countries	and	especially,	of	global	capital	that	now	operates	at	global	scale	overcoming	national	borders,	national	limitations	and	expensive	and	time	consuming	bureaucracies,	procedures	and	different	regulations.	In	this	sense,	TRIPS	Agreement	would	 advance	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 transnational	 capitalist	 class	 where	 profit	maximization	 and	 capital	 accumulation	 prevail	 over	 considerations	 of	 national	allegiance,	patriotism	or	 identity.	Hence,	TRIPS	Agreement	would	be	part	of	a	more	comprehensive	strategy	and	it	would	fulfill	an	important	function	in	this	new	phase	of	capitalism	 or	 globalization	 process,	 a	 new	 function	 addressed	 to	 facilitate	international	 accumulation	 of	 capital	 that	 of	 securing	 property,	 by	 defining	knowledge	 as	 property	 and	 making	 a	 commodity	 out	 of	 certain	 knowledge	 or	knowledge-based	production	which	were	previously	free	in	the	public	domain.		
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The	new	paradigm	of	the	global	IPRs	regime	focused	exclusively	in	securing	IPRs	as	absolute	quasi-natural	rights	has	thus	forced	a	denaturalization	of	IPRs	which	entails	undesirable	consequences	and	carries	a	negative	impact	in	socioeconomic	terms.	The	attempts	of	resorting	to	other	legal	bodies	of	international	law	-such	as	human	rights	law-	in	a	scenario	of	legal	pluralism	or	other	political	collective	actions	of	governance	-like	 global	 public	 goods-	 have	 showed	 important	 shortcomings	 in	 their	 role	 as	measures	to	counterbalance	IPRs	regime	negative	impact.	Therefore,	this	dissertation	holds	the	thesis	that	the	excesses	and	negative	consequences	of	a	iuris	et	de	iure	and	decontextualized	application	of	IPRs	could	be	remedied	by	recovering	the	real	nature	and	scope	of	IPRs.	In	this	sense,	IPRs	would	be	a	social	institution	integrated	by	rights	vested	 temporarily	 with	 property	 prerogatives.	 In	 the	 core	 of	 their	 definition	 and	scope,	 IPRs	would	 be	 a	 legal	 instrument	 called	 to	 fulfil	 certain	 social	 functions	 and	pursue	the	general	interest	following	deliberative	democratic	parameters	in	order	to	properly	 identify	 and	weigh	 all	 the	 interests	 as	well	 as	hegemonic	mainstream	and	counterhegemonic	voices	in	a	global	public	sphere.				Sixthly	 and	 finally,	 based	 on	 a	 conception	 of	 law	 which	 is	 not	 contrary	 to	 social	change	 and	 that	 it	 has	 not	 to	 be	 the	 exclusive	 vehicle	 of	 hegemonic	 interests	 and	visions	but	which	it	may	encompass	alternative	interpretations,	this	thesis	proposes	an	alternative	and	a	more	than	justified	new	reading	of	the	IPRs	regime.	Also,	and	in	order	 to	 avoid	 legal	 interpretations	 that	 take	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 forgotten	 in	comfortable	 public	 libraries’	 shelves,	 the	 thesis	 proposes	 the	 implementation	 of	specific	institutional	changes	inspired	on	models	of	deliberative	communication	and	deliberative	democracy.			In	this	sense,	this	thesis	emphasizes	the	basic	instrumental	character	of	IPRs	and	the	social	functions	that	IPRs	are	called	to	fulfil.	In	this	sense,	and	because	of	the	rational	substrate	which	justify	the	existence	itself	of	IPRs,	the	social	function	of	IPRs	and	its	instrumentality	 constitute	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 these	 special	 rights	 in	 a	 much	 more	pronounced	manner	 than	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	 traditional	 property	 over	 intangibles.	 In	fact,	 and	 based	 on	 the	 features	 of	 intangibles	 and	 knowledge	 and	 the	 social	 needs	behind	its	 formulation,	this	dissertation	upholds	that	IPRs	are	not	genuine	property	but	they	would	be	better	conceptualized	as	a	“legal	institution	vested	with	temporary	
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property	prerogatives”.	This	conceptualization	seems	to	be	more	adequate	than	being	catalogued	as	another	category	of	property	or	special	property.					Property	is	an	institution	which	attempts	to	resolve	the	scarcity	and	limited	nature	of	tangible	 goods.	 Property	 would	 promote	 efficiency	 in	 the	 market,	 in	 particular	 it	would	respond	to	the	need	of	signaling	in	market	relations.	As	resources	are	scarce,	the	 risk	 of	 conflicts	 as	 to	 who	 may	 possess	 and	 benefit	 of	 them	 may	 multiply	exponentially	 to	 infinity	 i.e.,	 it	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	 scarce	economic	resources.	A	second	function	of	property	has	to	do	with	the	consideration	that	 property	 is	 an	 incentive	 for	 work	 and	 efficient	 production.	 According	 to	Bentham,	 property	 would	 be	 needed	 to	 vanquish	 natural	 aversion	 to	 labor.	 In	connection	with	 this,	 Garret	 Hardin	 introduced	 the	metaphor	 of	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	
commons	which	 justifies	 the	 existence	 of	 property	 rights	 as	 a	measure	 against	 the	overuse	 of	 common	 property.	 Finally,	 property	 has	 a	 social	 function	 i.e.,	 property	rights	are	not	absolute	or	unlimited	but	they	have	to	put	in	line	with	the	interests	of	society.			However,	the	institution	of	Intellectual	property	is	not	originated	as	the	response	to	the	 scarcity	 of	 resources	 and	 the	 eventual	 chaos	 of	 conflicts	 fighting	 for	 the	 same	limited	goods.	Quite	the	opposite,	 IPRs	imply	the	creation	of	an	artificial	scarcity	by	law	 since	 the	 non-rivalrous	 and	 the	 non-excludability	 of	 knowledge	 make	 them	naturally	 accessible	 to	 everybody	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Furthermore,	 the	 creation	 of	scarcity	 by	 the	 state	 implies	 a	 special	 effort	 and	deployment	 of	 public	 resources	 to	make	that	scarcity	effective.	Neither	is	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	applicable	to	IPRs	since	 the	 problem	 of	 intangibles	 and	 knowledge	 is	 one	 of	 underproduction	 (it	 is	argued	 that	 there	 will	 not	 be	 creative	 or	 inventive	 processes	 without	 incentives).	Therefore,	the	main	justification	of	IPRs	is	an	instrumentalist	one;	being	incentives	to	promote	 creative	 and	 inventive	 activity,	 the	 technical	 progress	 and	 sharing	knowledge	to	the	whole	of	society.	Therefore,	IPRs	are	a	legal	institution	vested	with	temporal	 property	 prerogatives	 and	 its	 fate	 is	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 social	 functions.	Hence,	 account	 taken	 of	 the	 instrumentality	 of	 IPRs,	 it	 would	 not	 make	 sense	 to	enforce	and	implement	IPRs	when	they	do	not	fulfil	their	social	functions.	Even	if	we	accept	 that	 IPRs	 system	 may	 have	 been	 working	 in	 certain	 sectors	 where	 it	 is	
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necessary	a	legal	instrument	to	recoup	investments	(pharmaceutical	sector),	it	seems	clear	 that	 a	 one-size-fits-all	 approach	 to	 cover	 all	 the	 intangible	 realities	 does	 not	make	 sense.	 In	 this	 respect,	 what	 is	 missing	 today	 is	 a	 continuous	 analysis	 of	 the	impact	 of	 IPRs	 and	 a	 dynamic	 and	 permanent	 adjustment	 of	 IPRs	 to	 the	socioeconomic	circumstances	at	any	given	time.		Also,	 the	 use,	 application	 and	 interpretation	 of	 these	 rights	 vested	 with	 property	prerogatives	 have	 been	 automatic,	 and	 dogmatic	 application	 of	 law	 without	questioning	or	objection	as	to	whether	those	IPRs	are	accomplishing	the	goals	which	justify	 their	existence	and	 implementation	or	not.	 In	effect,	a	pharmaceutical	patent	owner	can	exclude	others	from	using	the	intangible	goods	covered	under	the	patent	regardless	 the	 effective	 impact	 of	 her	 exclusive	 right	 in	 the	 market	 and	 into	 the	society	where	that	patent	is	being	implemented.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	raison	d’être	of	 IPRs	has	 to	do	with	 their	 instrumental	nature,	 -i.e.	 as	a	 tool	 to	 foster	 innovation,	technology	 transfer	 and	 dissemination	 of	 information-,	 and	 therefore	 its	 social	function	 is	 far	more	 noticeable	 than	 property	 rights	 related	 to	 tangible	 goods,	 it	 is	surprising	that	there	is	not	any	serious	approach	which	reviews	the	fulfillment	of	the	goals	for	which	they	have	been	conceived,	whether	the	benefits	for	society	outweighs	the	 private	 benefits	 for	 the	 IPRs’	 owner	 and	 if	 the	 investments	 made	 to	 develop	certain	intangible	goods	have	been	fairly	recouped.		In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	 upheld	 that	 instead	 of	 interpreting	 IPRs	 in	 an	 absolute	 manner	without	 evaluating	 the	 cause-effect	 relationship	 (iuris	 et	 de	 iure),	 there	 should	be	 a	presumption	 that	 IPRs	 are	 valid	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 IPRs	 fulfill	 their	 social	 function.	However,	 that	 presumption	 should	 be	 rebuttable	 if	 it	 is	 proven	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	given	case	that	IPRs	are	not	fulfilling	their	social	function.	Social	function	of	IPRs	must	be	 predicated	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 nation	 where	 those	 IPRs	 are	 enforceable.	 Also,	 in	order	to	avoid	the	eventual	uncertainty	(it	is	said	that	foreign	investors	are	reluctant	to	 invest	 in	 countries	 without	 a	 foreseeable	 rule	 of	 law	 system)	 and	 perceived	discretion	 of	 national	 law	 and	 national	 authorities	 in	 determining	 what	 social	function	is,	may	be	overcome	by	an	appropriate	dialogue	between	the	global	and	the	national	spheres	 i.e,	 the	determination	about	whether	 IPRs	are	 fulfilling	 their	social	functions	has	to	be	the	result	of	the	analysis	as	to	the	social	impact	and	necessities	of	
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the	national	society	and	the	application	of	internationally	established	standards	as	to	what	is	for	instance,	technology	transfer,	affordability,	or	investments	on	I&D.			Furthermore,	this	thesis	upholds	the	possibility	of	using	law	(perceived	as	part	of	the	hegemonic	mainstream)	as	an	emancipatory	tool,	as	a	vehicle	able	to	encompass	non-hegemonic	voices	and	of	deploying	law	in	counter-hegemonic	debates	and	struggles	in	what	professor	De	Sousa	has	called	the	expansion	of	the	conception	of	the	politics	of	
legality.	With	a	view	to	make	this	effective,	incorporate	an	application	of	law,	and	in	particular	of	IPRs,	in	accordance	with	their	social	function,	decision	making	processes	at	national	and	global	scale	and	somehow	a	different	interpretation	of	law	should	be	anchored	 in	 active	 democratic	 participation	 based	 on	 deliberative	 and	 discursive	reasoning.	Absent	a	world	government	and	before	a	formal	interpretation	of	law	(at	the	 service	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 process	 of	 globalization),	 democratic	 deliberative	processes	 are	 suggested	 to	 be	 able	 to	 overcome	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 global	architecture	and	the	global	IPRs	regime	in	terms	of	greater	legitimacy	of	the	system,	and	a	shared	and	more	democratic	character	of	decisions.	While	accepting	that	there	is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 an	 absolute,	 incontrovertible	 and	 objective	 standard	 of	 single	truth,	shared	truth	can	be	the	result	of	the	deliberative	interaction	between	different	perspectives.	 Hence,	 the	 objective	 truth	 can	 be	 obtained	 through	 the	 process	 of	subjective	 interactions,	 this	 being	 the	 most	 basic	 justification	 for	 democracy	 (in	Piccioto’s	words).		The	 alternative	 interpretation	 of	 IPRs	 as	 a	 legal	 institution	 vested	with	 temporary	property	 prerogatives	 directed	 to	 fulfill	 their	 inherent	 social	 functions,	 may	 be	possible	implementing	democratic	deliberative	processes	and	a	public	sphere	where	it	would	possible	to	implement	transparent	and	traceable	modes	of	public	reasoning	about	 the	 challenges	 of	 IPRs;	 how	 to	 better	 incentivize	 genuine	 innovation	 for	 all	(also	neglected	diseases)	while	ensuring	affordable	access	for	everybody.	This	could	permit	to	adequately	define	and	adopt	the	democratic	parameters	under	which	IPRs	have	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	 order	 that	 they	 fulfil	 their	 social	 functions	 and	 that	 the	public	 interest	 prevails	 and	 human	 rights	 respected.	 In	 this	 manner,	 these	rights/privileges	 vested	with	 property	 prerogatives	 should	 serve	 the	 interests	 and	needs	 of	 society	 and	 its	 citizens.	 The	 review	 of	 the	 four	 dimensions	 affecting	 the	
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outcome	of	 the	 IPRs	 regime	 (institutional	 framework,	business	 environment,	 global	media	and	civil	society)	sheds	light	on	the	real	possibility	of	creating	a	public	sphere	where	deliberative	democracy	encompasses	counterhegemonic	voices	and	a	friendly	context	to	an	alternative	application	of	IPRs	law,	an	application	that	turns	to	be	more	coherent	with	the	genuine	significance	of	IPRs.												I	want	 this	 thesis	 provides	 a	modest	 but	 consistent	 contribution	 to	 encourage	 to	 a	change	of	paradigm	in	the	interpretation	and	understanding	of	the	institution	of	IPRs,	a	 new	 turn	 (another	 one)	 in	 the	 necessary	 balance	 between	 public	 and	 private	regarding	 interests	on	 the	ground	of	 IPRs	 to	correct	 today’s	 illogic	and	exacerbated	version	 of	 IPRs	 as	 absolute	 rights	 of	 property	 decontextualized	 of	 the	 social	environment	where	they	are	applied	and	devoid	of	their	legal	significance,	foundation	and	raison	d’etre.	In	this	attempt,	I	am	persuaded	that	deep	and	long	lasting	changes	derive	from	civilizational	and	cultural	change	and	societal	values	which	occur	over	a	long	period	of	 time.	Because	of	 that,	 the	changes	proposed	here	are	not	going	to	be	the	result	of	a	revolution	from	day	to	day	but	they	are	intended	to	impregnate	step	by	step	the	practice	of	a	fairer	and	more	human	law.									
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